Bill Mitchell: Eskozia, Islandia, Katalunia,… Euskal Herria

Eskozia

Bill Mitchell-ek Eskoziaz

(…)

Hona hemen Mitchell-ek dioena[1]:

Eskoziarrei 2014ko erreferendumean baiezko boto ematea gomendatuko nieke, baldin eta soilik baldin haiek beren moneta flotatzailea, ez-lotua martxan jarriko balute eta eurogunea sartzeko edozein ideia baztertuko balute[2].

Baiezko botoa baldintzatuko luke gobernuak enplegu osoko lortzeko konpromisoak, berriki sortuko duten monetaz baliatuz.

Libera britainiarra erabiltzen segituko badute, orduan ez da ezer irabaziko.

Eskoziak benetan independentea izan nahi badu, bere moneta izan beharko du.

EHn jende askok Eskoziarekiko daukan liluramendu itsuak ez ditu kontuan hartzen oinarrizko baldintza horiek.

Diodan berriz, badaezpada ere, ni neu ere liluratzen nauela Eskoziak maila politikoan independentea izateko daukan aukera hurbilak.

Baina, adi!, Eskoziako ekonomiaz, politika fiskalaz eta moneta politikaz oso ezkorra naiz.

(Ikasiko ote dugu inoiz?)

Oharrak:

[1]  Ikus http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=21102.

[2] Eurogunean sartzekotan, gogoratu Warren Mosler-en proposamen dotorea: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/05/21/warren-mosler-en-proposamenak/.

Bill Mitchell-ek Eskoziaz, berriz (1)

(…)

(iii) Txostena bera (The Growth Commission Report) [1]

(…)

The arguments that the Growth Commission use to justify the retention of the pound are flawed and deceptive.

Oharra:

[1] (…)

My position has not changed since I wrote those blog posts.

In 2014, at the time of the Referendum, I wrote that I favoured a Yes vote.

But that was conditional on the provisos that Scotland introducing their own unpegged, floating currency and avoiding any talk of joining the Eurozone.

I also indicated that any Yes vote should be conditional on the government committing itself to achieving full employment on the back of their newly created currency sovereignty.

Which meant that any pro-cyclical biased fiscal rules should be eschewed.

Under those conditions, I concluded that a Yes vote would improve economic welfare for the Scottish people.

And to underline that conclusion, I also noted that if Scotland continued to use the British pound – then nothing will be gained.

I also specifically noted that I was not qualified to speak of cultural aspects of any desire to become independent even though I have a fairly detailed understanding of Scottish history.

In that sense, one could still make a case for independence operating with a monetary system that was austerity-biased. But I doubt it.”

Bill Mitchell-ek Eskoziaz, berriz (2)

(…)

(vi) Nazio independente baten ezaugarriak[1]

(…)

(viii) Moneta berria baten sormena eta Growth Commission delakoa: politika monetarioa. politika fiskala eta prezio egonkortasuna[2]

(…)

Ondorioak

(…)

(7) Overall, an independent nation has to have its own currency and monetary policyOtherwise, the independence is a sham.

Oharrak:

[1] Ingelesez: “Consider these essential characteristics for a democratically independent nation:

1. In a[1] fiat monetary systemthe currency-issuer can purchase whatever is for sale in that currency including all idle labour.

2. Such a sovereign government is never revenue constrained because it is the monopoly issuer of the currency.

3. Such a government has no need to borrow from the non-government sector to cover spending beyond taxation revenue. A progressive government issuing its own fiat currency would of course not issue any debt to match its deficits.

4. If such a government voluntarily chooses to match its net deficit spending with debt-issuance it is always able to control the yields on that debt-issuance including being able to borrow at zero (and negative rates) if it so desires.

5. And, moreover, such a government would never need to borrow in a foreign currency.

A newly independent Scottish government would lack all of those capacities.

Its spending capacity and thus command over real resource would be limited by its taxation revenue and the forced debt-issuance in a foreign currency.

Its capacity to borrow would be determined by private bond markets and it would have to accept the yields demanded from those private markets.

It would never be able to guarantee payment on its liabilities because they would be denominated in a currency that it uses rather than issues.

It would never be able to guarantee stability in its banking system including protecting deposits.

The viability of non-government sector debt would be dependent on the capacity of the nation to generate exports and earn pounds.

Taken together it is difficult to argue that the newly independent government would be able to focus on its socio-economic-ecological objectives when its financial capacity to command the necessary resources lay in the hands of the non-government sector (especially private bond markets and banks), whose goals would not likely be aligned with the welfare of all Scottish people.

And it would have to accept interest rate structures that the Bank of England determined were suitable for the UK rather than specifically suited to Scotland.

This is the same problem that the Southern European states faced in the build-up to the GFC. They were forced as Member States of the Eurozone to accept ECB interest rates that were specifically tailored for Germany as it laboured in the early 2000s with recession and the impacts of absorbing East Germany.

[2] Ingelesez: “We know that introducing a new currency does not require the redenomination of existng financial assets or liabilities held by the non-government sector.

For the new currency to be effective, the only initial requirement is that the government legislated that the new currency must be used to extinguish any tax or other contractual obligations the non-government sector has to the state.

In my view, the state would be wise to provide incentives to private citizens to convert what would become their foreign currency holdings into the new currency. But it is not necessary nor an urgency.

The Growth Commission tries to claim that there would be recourse to the European law and IMF rules should “a future Scottish Government … [try] … to alter existing contracts”.

But what is undoubted – and I explain this at length in my 2015 book – Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale – is that international law recognises the principle of Lex Monetae or ‘The Law of the Money’ as a well-established legal principle, backed up by a swathe of case law across many jurisdictions.

This principle states broadly that the government of the day determines what the legal currency is for transactions and contractual obligations within its national borders.

Within a nation’s own legal system, under the principle of Lex Monetaea newly independent Scottish government could determine that all contractual liabilities currently specified in pounds or whatever would now be valued in the new currency.

I explained that in this blog post (which was part of the draft of that book) – Options for Europe – Part 79 (May 6, 2014).

So again, the Growth Commission is simply making assertions that are not necessarily consistent with international law.

The Growth Commission is obsessed with the primacy of monetary policy and considers the currency issue within that frame – so a separate currency is unnecessary as long as “the economic cycle in Scotland is … [well correlated with] … the rest of the UK.

This is consistent with the mainstream New Keynesian assertion that fiscal policy doesn’t matter in the long run and that monetary policy should focus on price stability (after which optimal growth rates will follow).

It is not an assertion that stands up to any evidential scrutiny.”

Bill Mitchell: Eskozia independente baterako zenbait gogoeta (1)

Bill Mitchell: Eskozia independente baterako zenbait gogoeta (2)

Eskozia, independentziarantz? (1)

Bill Mitchell Glasgow-n

MMT SCOTLAND Bill Mitchell1

Bideoa:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?reload=9&v=YZYEoF-w-iQ&feature=youtu.be

Eskozia, independentziarantz? (2)

Eskozia: On the way to nowhere

Ondorioak:

a) Bidea: to Nowhere! Abiadura oso bizian, gainera!

b) Erremedioa: Sei (6) urrats XXI mendean independentista izateko

Gehigarri oso garrantzitsuak:

Warren Mosler Glasgow-n

Bill Mitchell Glasgow-n

Islandia

Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (1)

Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (2)

Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (3)

Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (eta 4)

(…)

Islandiari dagokion lehen artikuluan Mitchell-ek DTM-ko zenbait ezaugarri sakon gogoratu digu, [UEU-ko blogean] behin eta berriz ikusi eta aipatu ditugunak.

Bigarren artikuluan, ikusi dugun moduan, islandiarrek bankugintzan izan dituzten hutsuneak eta erabaki okerrak oso nabarmenak izan dira.

Okerrenaz, alta, hirugarren artikuluan jabetu gara. DTM-koek oso argi eta garbi adierazten duten bezala, bankugintzan bi transakzio oso ezberdinak bereizi behar dira: bertikalak eta horizontalak. Eta horretan islandiarrek kale egin dute.

Ikusiko dugun laugarren eta azken parte honetan, Islandiari DTM-koen proposamen zehatz eta sakonak proposatzen ditu Mitchell-ek.

(…)

Funtsezko erreforma behar da:

(a) Erabat funtsezkoa[1]

(b) Ideia berriak banku zentralaz, altxor publikoaz, bankuek jarduten dituzten erak eta moduak aldatuz[2]

(c) Bankuak aspaldian aritzen ziren eran ari behar izaten dira[3]

(d) FIRE-ko eragiketak eta espekulazioak alboratu behar dira[4]

(FIRE dela eta, ikus Fire: sua ote?; Fire: sua ote? Inflazioa, langabezia eta FIRE delakoa; Sua: fire ote? Burbuila finantzarioak eta Dena FIRE da.)

(e) Mosler-ek ere antzeko proposamenak egin zituen 2010ean[5]

Ikus Warren Mosler-ek bankugintzaz

Mitchell-en hitzez, “Once these changes were made (among others), then much of the concerns about financial instability arising from the banking sector would disappear.

Ondorioak:

(i) Islandian martxan egon den DSP delakoa ez da inongo modelorik sistema finantzario hobe baterako

(ii) Erreforma funtsezkoagoak behar dira

Harrigarria bada ere, Islandia (mon amour) izeneko … sarreran ikusi dugun legez, “mirakuluen (sic)” bidez edo Islandiaren bilakaera, eurolandiatik at, eurotik kanpo, moneta propioa, krona erabiliz, honelakoa izan da: “… become one of Europe’s top performers in terms of growt.”

Zer lortuko zuketen islandiarrek baldin eta goian aipaturiko DTM-ko proposamenak praktikan jarri izan balituzte?

Islandia herrialde txikia da.

Baina moneta subiranokoa izatea ez dagokio herrialdearen tamainari, DTM-koek erakutsi diguten moduan: ikus Herrialdearen tamaina, politika fiskala eta bankugintza berria.

Hona hemen, Randall Wray-k herrialde tamainaz dioena: Ekonomia mistoa eta gobernuaren tamaina: etsenplu bat.

Oharrak:

[1] Ingelesez: “Fundamental reform is required

Drawing lessons from the Icelandic bank collapse and the GFC generally, tells me that more fundamental approaches to financial market reform are required and that the problem is not related to the credit-creation capacity of the banks.

In September 2009, I wrote this blog – Operational design arising from modern monetary theory – which provided some ideas on such reforms.

I followed it up in October 2009 with this blog – Asset bubbles and the conduct of banks.”

[2] Ingelesez: “The ideas can be distilled down to:

1. Government treasury and central bank operations should be brought under the “one roof” and the sham of central bank independence abandoned. Please read my blog – The sham of central bank independence – for more discussion on this point.

This aligns the major arms of macroeconomic policy making with the democratic responsibility and accountability.

2. All voluntary constraints on net spending and the institutional machinery that has arisen to implement these constraints, which have lead to unsustainable outcomes with the costs of the dysfunction being borne mainly by the less advantaged groups in the society, should be abandoned.

That is, I would recognise the differences and advantages that a government in a fiat monetary system has over one operating in a convertible currency system (Gold Standard) and create behaviours and institutions that allowed the the government to exploit those advantages to advance public purpose and generate full employment and environmental sustainability.

Specifically, I would stop issuing Treasury debt instruments – that is, stop public borrowing.

Such borrowing is unnecessary to support the net spending (deficits) given that the national government is not revenue-constrained and does not advance public purpose.

This would mean that the net spending would manifest as cumulative excess reserve balances at the central bank.

I would maintain that excess liquidity in the system and keep short-term interest rates at zero or just about. All adjustments to aggregate demand are better made using fiscal policy.

I would abandon all tax incentives, which push speculative behaviour in property markets.

3. Central bank lending to its member banks (those who have reserve accounts with the central bank) should never be constrained and should be priced at whatever the current rate for lending to banks is. By rejecting the “money multiplier” view of the world, we learn that commercial bank lending is not reserve-constrained.

Please read my blog – Lending is capital- not reserve-constrained – for more discussion on this point.

Also please read the following blogs – Building bank reserves will not expand credit and Building bank reserves is not inflationary – for further discussion.

The trick is to change the way the banks operate not restrict their capacity to be banks.

[3] Ingelesez:

4. The only useful thing a bank should do is to facilitate a payments system and provide loans to credit-worthy customers.

Attention should always be focused on what is a reasonable credit risk. Banks should only be permitted to lend directly to borrowers. All loans would have to be shown and kept on their balance sheets.

This would stop all third-party commission deals which might involve banks acting as ‘brokers’ and on-selling loans or other financial assets for profit.

It is in this area of banking that the current financial crisis has emerged and it is costly and difficult to regulate. Banks should go back to what they were.

5. Banks should not be allowed to accept any financial asset as collateral to support loans. The collateral should be the estimated value of the income stream on the asset for which the loan is being advanced. This will force banks to appraise the credit risk more fully.

[4] Ingelesez:

6. Banks should be prevented from havingoff-balance sheet” assets, such as finance company arms which can evade regulation.

7. Banks should never be allowed to trade in credit default insurance. This is related to whom should price risk.

8. Banks should be restricted to the facilitation of loans and not engage in any other commercial activity.

9. Eliminate the vast majority of speculative trading in financial products by declaring them illegal. Almost all (around 97 per cent) of speculative activity in financial markets does nothing to advance public well-being. Financial market regulation should always be motivated by allowing activities that improve our collective lives and scrapping the rest.

By eliminating much of what we now call the FIRE industry, the life of the banker becomes much simpler and safer.

10. Make banks public institutions and make their non-profit mission to unambiguously pursue public benefit.

[5] Mitchell-ek dioenez, “On March 23, 2010, Warren Mosler wrote a similar article on the topic of banking reformProposals for the Banking System. It is worth reading.”

Islandiak frogatzen du nazio-estatua bizirik eta ongi dagoela (1)

Islandiak frogatzen du nazio-estatua bizirik eta ongi dagoela (eta 2)

Nazio-estatu txikiez hitz bi

Ikus ondoko hau:

Islandiaz hitz batzuk

Bereziki ondoko hauek:

Islandia: eredurik ereduena

Islandia: eredurik ereduena (power point)

Argi dagoenez, nazio-estatua bizirik dago… Hona hemen zantzu batzuk:

Dirua eta boterea

EH-ren ekonomia irekia da eta, jakina denez, inportazioak oso beharrezkoak dira.

Ikus dezagun DTM-koek zer proposatzen duten honelako kasuetan.

Bill Mitchel daukagu lekuko, eta Timor aztertzeko kasua.

Hasierarako, ikus East Timor – Wikipedia

Segida gisa, ikus ondoko linkak:

(i) Timor (1)

(ii) Timor (2)

(iii) Timor (3)

Mitchell-ek dioenez, moneta propioko nazioetan,

But all open economies are susceptible to balance of payments fluctuationsThese fluctuations were terminal during the gold standard for external deficit countries because they meant the government had to permanently keep the domestic economy is a depressed state to keep the imports down.

For a flexible exchange rate economy, the exchange rate does the adjustment. There is no clear relationship in the research literature to show that fiscal deficits create catastrophic exchange rate depreciation in flexible exchange rate countries.”

Hortaz, Timor bezalako nazio-txiki horietan guztietan, Euskal Herrian kasu, defizit fiskalak erabili ahal dira, beste edozein tamainatako nazioen kasuetan erabiltzen diren moduan.

Gainera, Euskal Herri independenteak behar izango dituen inportazioak gauzatu ahalko dira. Gogoratu inportazioak onuragarriak direla, eta esportazioak kostuak: S. Kelton, B. Mitchell, N. Wilson eta W. Mosler-ek esportazioaz.

Defizit publiko horrekin, Euskal Herrian eta nonahi ere, langabeziaren auka, job guarantee, hots, lan bermeko programa duin bat martxan jar daiteke, hau da langabezian dagoen eta lan egin nahi duen edozeinentzat lan postuak sortzeko programa.

Katalunia

Katalunia eta DTM

(vi) Moneta propioa

Moneta propiorik gabe Katalunia bono merkatuen biktima bilakatuko da, jaitsiera ekonomikoetan. Erosten egongo da Egonkortasun eta Hazkunde Akordioaren barruan (Stability and Growth Pact), zeinak EBko estatu kideei birtualki ezinezko egiten baitie oparotasun sostengatua lortzea.

Italian orain dela gutxi gertatu den moduan[23], Kataluniak amore emango du Bruselak austeritatea eskatuko dioenean.

Ondorioa

Bill Mitchell-ek dioen moduan,

Catalonia should develop its own independent nation and use its own currency to build on its prosperity. It certainly has the economic structure in which to prosper materially.

Oharra:

[23] Ikus http://moslereconomics.com/2014/10/29/italy-surrenders/.

Eskozia eta Katalunia: DTMkoen abisua

Historia ekonomikoa ikasi beharko dugu, batez ere, egindako akatsak eta bultzaturiko politika ekonomiko desegokiak berriz martxan ez jartzeko.

(…)

Katalunia eta Euskal Herria (nola ez!) aztergai izan dugu, baita izango ere.

Sinetsi ala ez, jakin ala ez, une honetan Europan euroaz, moneta propioaz, austeritateaz, defizit publikoaz, lan bermeaz, eta abar luzetxoaz eztabaidatzen deneko leku bakarra Italia da.

Solo in Italia esiste oggi un movimento che si oppone al totalitarismo che sta trascinando l’Europa, e forse il mondo, verso la catastrofe”[1]

Europa, oro har, hilda dago maila intelektualean.

Italian joan den urtean ReteMMT-koek lantxo hau plazaratu zuten:

a) Ingelezez: Scotland and Catalunya. The history will repeat itself?[2]

(Will Scotland and Catalunya become independent in 2014?

And will they consider the issues and related to their new monetary system? A MMT alert, based on sad Eurozone’s experience.)

b) Italieraz: Scozia e Catalogna. La storia ripeterà se stessa?[3]

Goiz ala berandu horra hor Katalunian ukitu behar duten gaia, … ukitu, analizatu eta gai horretaz erabaki, noski.

Gainera orain Greziaren (eta Syriza!) etsenplua dugu begien aurrean: alegia, kapitulazioa ala Grexit.

Zer erabakiko da Katalunian arlo ekonomiko eta monetarioan? Ardura daukate enpleguaz eta austeritateaz? Ala kezka bakarra independentzia ‘politiko hutsa’ da?

Mundu birtual batean bizi ote dira katalanak, zenbait euskaldun bezala, non ‘politikak’ ez daukan zer ikusirik ekonomiarekin, monetarekin, langabeziarekin, austeritatearekin, defizitarekin eta abar luzearekin…?

Hola izango balitz eta afera ekonomiko-monetarioa analizatuko ez balute eta litezkeen irtenbideak argi eta garbi plazaratuko ez balituzte, porrota izango lukete ondorio gisa, dudarik gabe.

Espero dezagun katalanak argiak eta azkarrak izatea, ‘politika’ mailan erakutsi duten bezala, eta benetako afera ekonomiko eta monetarioei aurre egin diezaieten.

Oharrak:

[1] Ikus http://www.retemmt.it/videomessaggio-del-prof-alain-parguez-agli-attivisti-mmt-italiani/. Halaber, ikus bideoa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-TKtNUojb5M.

Scozia e Catalogna, la storia si ripete?

Scozia e Catalogna, la storia si ripete?

Scotland and Catalunya, the history will repeat itself?

http://www.retemmt.it/scozia-e-catalogna-la-storia-si-ripete/

Katalunia eta DTM: nazio arazoa tartean

DTM edozein gobernuk erabil dezake, txikia zein handia izanik, liberala zein aurrerakoia. Ekonomiak nola funtzionatzen duen erakusten digu DTMk, baina ez du ezer esaten ideologiaz zein naziotasunaz.

Espainiarekiko jendearekin izandako esperientzia benetan txarra izan dut: Diru Teoria Modernoa (DTM) eta Red MMT España

Ez, denok ez gara lagunak.

Segida adierazgarria:

(i) Espainiar baten jarrera sinplista:

In Bill Mitchell: Brexit?

Hona Bill Mitchell-ek zioena, 2016an:

In May, I will be doing a two week lecture tour of Spain promoting the soon-to-be-released Spanish translation of my book – Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale. Full details will be forthcoming soon, if you are interested.

I’ll spend some time in Barcelona and will meet with some of the protagonists pushing for independence of Catalonia.

My position on that issue hasn’t changed in recent years and I fully support their desire to break away from Spain. However, as I outlined in this blog – Catalonia’s vote largely misses the point – it can only achieve true sovereignty if it abandons the euro and all the destructive restrictions and rules that go with being a Member State of that dysfunctional monetary system.

My evaluation of the Catalonian position is that it should develop its own independent nation and

use its own currency to build on its prosperity. It certainly has the economic structure in which to

prosper materially.

Eta hemen S. M. espainiarrak aipatzen zuena:

(Iruzkinetan)

S. M. says:

Thursday, February 25, 2016

Bill: although I favor a referendum on the issue of Catalan independence (something that PSOE, PP & Ciudadanos oppose, which is a mistake because it fails to deliver a solution) I have never been sympathetic to nationalist movements. They are conservative and elitist. An example: the most common surnames in Catalonia do not coincide with the rarer ones sported by the members of the Catalan Parliament. The electoral system is rigged in favor of more conservative rural regions to the detriment of the working class districts. There has been a surge in nationalist sentiment due to the PP’s manoeuvres against their new statute and the economic crisis has been conveniently blamed on Spain. However, the Catalan conservative elite is as corrupt and pro Euro as the Spanish one. Only the CUP have been consistent about getting out of Spain and the Euro altogether. But they are a small party. Since my brother lives in Barcelona and I have good friends who live there I am not particularly keen on seeing our union break. I’d much rather get all of Spain of the Euro.”

oooooo

Horrela nioen nik denbora hartan: Espainiar hori Espainiaren alde dagoen moduan ni neu Kataluniaren moneta propioaren alde nago Katalunia independente batean eta euskoaren alde Euskal Herri independentean.

Baina espainiarrak bere burua gainditu du, espainiar totala, osoa bilakatuz:

(ii) #referendumcatalan: l’opinione di S. M. (Red MMT España)

Abbiamo chiesto a S. M. di Red MMT España di commentare la situazione in corso in Catalogna.

(la Redazione)

(http://www.retemmt.it/referendumcatalan-lopinione-stuart-medina-miltimore-red-mmt-espana/)

Il referendum è stato illegale e una farsa totale priva di garanzie, passato attraverso un Parlamento privo del potere di indire un referendum del genere e senza tenere in alcuna considerazione le dovute procedure o i diritti dei gruppi minoritari.

I nazionalisti rappresentano il 48% del voto, ma a causa dell’elevata presenza nel Parlamento catalano hanno la maggioranza. Non ci sono scuse per la coalizione in carica del Governo catalano. Sono determinati a dichiarare l’indipendenza e stanno cercando un confronto con lo Stato nella maniera più antidemocratica.

Detto questo, l’atteggiamento di Rajoy rivela una stupidità da non crederci. Non ha fatto nulla per convincere i catalani né ha fatto una sola proposta per trovare una soluzione a un conflitto che si trascina da oltre cinque anni.

Un conflitto che lui e il suo partito hanno provocato organizzando un boicottaggio dei prodotti catalani e opponendosi a uno statuto per l’autonomia approvato con un referendum e da entrambi i Parlamenti, quello spagnolo e quello catalano.

Infine, alcuni articoli dello statuto sono stati bocciati dalla Corte Costituzionale, che avrebbe dovuto essere più cauta. Ma il danno è stato fatto e la decisione della Corte Costituzionale ha creato un conflitto che avrebbe dovuto essere affrontato anni fa.

Un leader avrebbe trovato un compromesso. Rajoy, da vigliacco, lascia che il tempo rovini le cose senza mai offrire una soluzione. Aggiungete a questo il fatto che i politici spagnoli hanno rinunciato scioccamente alla nostra sovranità monetaria e il risultato è stata una crisi economica e sociale enorme, che dura da 37 quadrimestri e che ha lasciato un buon 30% della popolazione disoccupata, sottooccupata o impoverita.

È stato facile, per i nazionalisti catalani, identificare il governo di Madrid come un opportuno capro espiatorio. Il Governo di Rajoy ha applicato le crudeli politiche di austerità imposte da Bruxelles e da Francoforte. Queste politiche hanno spinto la Spagna in una seconda recessione e distrutto la coesione sociale della Nazione e del sistema politico.

Merkel, Sarkozy, Trichet e Barroso sono un altro gruppo di banditi che hanno fatto molto per annientare la capacità dello Stato spagnolo di offrire qualcosa alla propria gente. Perché una volta che hai rinunciato alla tua sovranità monetaria sei una colonia distrutta, ma la stampa idiota, le élite e gli intellettuali di questo Paese non lo capiscono. Cosa puoi offrire alla tua gente quando governi una colonia? C’è qualcuno che vuole vivere in uno Stato che è una colonia distrutta?

Non che i nazionalisti catalani da questo punto di vista brillino: vogliono lasciare la Spagna ma rimanere nell’Eurozona!

Il referendum è stato dichiarato illegale ma, ricorrendo a una strategia di repressione brutale per fermare l’apertura dei seggi elettorali, Rajoy ha dato ai nazionalisti una gran quantità di immagini che raffigurano la brutalità della polizia. Puigdemont ha ottenuto ciò che voleva.

Il suo referendum non è valido, ma lui ora ha guadagnato migliaia di dollari in più per la sua causa e l’attenzione della stampa straniera. Niente di buono può mai venire dal coinvolgimento straniero negli affari interni di un altro Paese.

Per amore di Dio: arrestare Puigdemont e intervenire sul Governo catalano applicando l’articolo 155 (sic) della Costituzione, ma mai usare la polizia contro i civili disarmati che chiedono il diritto di voto. Rajoy è uno stupido.

Il Governo avrebbe dovuto trovare un modo per indire un referendum legale con tutte le garanzie richieste in una democrazia normale. La questione dell’indipendenza sarebbe stata risolta una volta per tutte, perché solo una minoranza inferiore al 20% l’avrebbe sostenuta. Rajoy è riuscito a trasformare quasi il 45% dei Catalani in sostenitori dell’indipendentismo. Scommetto che oggi ha convertito qualche altro migliaio di Catalani a favore dell’indipendentismo.

Stupidità da non credere. Non solo è corrotto e incompetente, ma ha dimostrato di essere un reazionario criminale e idiota.

Una totale sciagura.”

oooooo

DTMkoek argi daukate afera:

(iii) Mitchell-ek oso argi dauka monetaren aferaKatalunia eta DTM

(iv) Baita Warren Mosler-ek ere: Katalunia eta Warren Mosler

Gehigarriak:

Eskozia eta Katalunia: DTMkoen abisua

Eskozia eta Katalunia /edo/ Katalunia eta Eskozia

Eta espainiar ‘ezkertiar’ horrek ulertzen ez duen autodeterminazio-eskubidea erabiliz, hona hemen Mosler-en azken proposamenak:

ICEC-Euskal Herria eta Warren Mosler

ICEC-Euskal Herria eta Warren Mosler (segida)

Warren Mosler eta ICEC-Euskal Herria

Vocale Europe delakotik ICEC-Euskal Herria delakora

Eskoziaz, Kataluniaz eta Euskal Herriaz (gehigarriak)

Bill Mitchell-i egindako elkarrizketa, Bartzelonan  

(…)

Visiteu Catalunya per primera vegada? Us ha sorprès res durant l’estada?
No és la primera vegada. Hi he estat unes quantes vegades. Sorpreses? Em pensava que el moviment independentista era una cosa de classe alta. Un moviment nacionalista i elitista. Em pensava que històricament això anava així, que la majoria de la classe treballadora, la gent que cobra els sous més baixos, era d’unes altres parts d’Espanya. I crec que encara és cert. Però ara he après, especialment aquesta vegada, que el sentiment independentista és generalitzatMolts dels pensadors d’esquerres a Espanya, els de fora de Catalunya, s’oposen a la independència perquè encara creuen que és un moviment nacionalista elitista i xenòfob. Per mi ha estat realment il·luminador de veure que l’independentisme català és un moviment molt més de base, i no d’elits. I fins i tot gent que potser no té grans arrels a Catalunya també volen la independència. Això dóna força al cas català. Ara, he llegit documents de grups independentistes que volen mantenir-se dins l’euro. I això és una bogeria. I autodestructiu.

Mitchell-ek Espainiako ‘ezkerrari’ egindako kritika  

Euskal Herria

Ekonomiaz jakin nahi zenuen eta galdetzeko ausartu ez zinen ia guztia (eguneraketa)

Oharra:

Koronabirusa dela eta, ikus Koronabirus krisiaren aurrean, Eurogunerako proposamen bat

Gehigarria

Sei (6) urrats XXI mendean independentista izateko

Gehigarri berezia

Gehigarri berezi gisa, ikus Barne inperialismoaz hitz bi

Bai, argi dago, oso argi, independentista honek, separatista honek (Frantziatik eta Espainiatik, noski!), ezin dela ados egon, inondik inora, Manifesto for Sovereignty, Democracy and Self-Determination delakoarekin. Manifestu horrek barne inperialismoa islatzen du!

Gure bidea, DTM erabiliz (bereziki W. Mosler, B. Mitchell eta R. Wray-ren bidetik), oso bestelakoa da.

Izan ere, Victor Hugo-k esan zuen moduan: “Un Basque n’est ni Français, ni Espagnol; il est basque et c’est tout2.”


Iruzkinak (1)

  • joseba

    The ‘disciplining role of markets’ should be replaced by the disciplining role of democracy

    http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=46942

    When we elect governments we should expect that they will do what they promised and represent our best interests. We don’t expect them to represent a small, privileged sector of the economy at the expense of the rest of it. The problem is that we overlay these aspirations onto an economic ownership system which has a different logic to our understanding of the operations of a democratic state. And mainstream economics gives reverence and priority to the logic of capitalism rather than ensuring that the quality of democracy is maintained. Which reflects its origins – as an apologist for the unequal ownership of the material means of production and the consequences that arise from that inequality. We keep seeing a restatement of that priority from prominent policy makers and while that generation is in charge it will be hard to really shift the paradigm.

    Late last year (November 5, 2020), the head of the Bundesbank, Jens Weidmann gave a speech in London to the Official Monetary and Financial Institutions Forum (OMFIF) – Too close for comfort? The relationship between monetary and fiscal policy – which exemplifies the sort of ideological resistance that is going on among mainstream policy makers to the more pragmatic choices being made by governments facing catastrophic consequences arising from the pandemic.

    It highlights the contradictions of our lives.

    On the one hand, is global capital, which reflects the inequality in property ownership that defines capitalism.

    Its strategic plan is to harness the capacity of the state, to reconfigure it, to ensure that the policy space provides the least resistance to its ambitions to maximise profit.

    Only the smallest proportion of its operations relate to anything that advances well-being of the people in general.

    The wealth shuffling creates massive wealth for a tiny few in relative terms.

    It will engage in widespread fraud, lie, bully and more to achieve its objectives.

    We could eliminate the vast majority of the financial sector and most of us would be better off.

    When capitalist hegemony was dominated by industrial capital – the robber barons – it was easier to control the capitalist lust because the surplus value production required reaching agreements with industrial labour.

    And through our governments, we could strive for social democratic goals using interventionist fiscal policy, because capital required production of things for it to prosper.

    That is not to say that the state didn’t provide substantial support for the surplus generating machine.

    Of course it did. It developed mass education and training systems, public health, public transport, public infrastructure and all sorts of advantages that capital could leverage off at no expense.

    State procurement contracts were essential and we developed an understanding of the military-industrial complex which grew out of the benefits derived from fiscal policies that ensured full employment and strong growth.

    There was always a conflictual distributional struggle – bosses wanting more and paying less, workers want higher pay for less work – but, mostly, this was mediated by the role of the state.

    But neoliberalism changed all that.

    The state abandoned its role as a mediator of the conflictual goals of labour and capital, and, instead, began to operate as an agent for capital.

    In that role, the state started to use its legislative and regulative power to reduce the capacity of trade unions to achieve wage gains, to protect workers, to even represent workers as the concept of ‘independent contractors’ emerged to avoid statutory minimum labour conditions and more.

    The state privatised public entities, putting more wealth into the speculative domain, which meant, for example, that essential public goods (telecommunications, energy, water and more) became objects of financial speculation, which distorted and, as we have seen, compromised their original purpose.

    Think Texas at the moment.

    The state also embraced the emerging Monetarist doctrines which also resulted in reduced employment growth and elevated levels of unemployment and reinforced the attacks that were made in the industrial relations domain that reduced wages growth and redistributed national income towards profits.

    This was going on at the same time as global supply chains were widening and the narrative in the 1970s conflated the opening up of trade and supply across borders with the emerging Monetarism and its microeconomic expression in the form of deregulation, privatisation etc.

    That conflation, promoted by the pro-capital interests on the Right, completely fooled the progressive forces of the Left, and social democratic political forces were coopted into becoming part of their own destruction.

    Thinks British Labour mid-1970s, French socialists 1980s, Australian Labor Party 1980s and beyond, New Zealand Labour Party 1980s – and a whole raft of progressive parties all around the world.

    They were compromised and became neoliberal machines because they failed to differentiate between the rise (and advantages) of global supply chains and the shift in ideology towards neoliberalism.

    We can have the former without the latter.

    But the conflation gave global financial capital the freedom to proliferate and that made the link between profit and production less obvious.

    And capital through its lobbying power has also meant that there is now democratic deficits rising all around the world. So, we don’t even get to express our political choices on an even playing field.

    But the incompatible logic between democracy and capitalism and the compromise of the former by the latter has brought the world to its knees.

    Why? Because capitalism has always required the state to attenuate its tendency to crisis.

    Crisis creates social havoc and that, in turn, makes the voice of the people stronger – such that governments cannot blithely ignore us.

    And the pandemic has meant the capitalism is now on state provided life support. Without the state support, substantial proportions of capitalist enterprise would fail now and that has meant that the pro-capital apologism of mainstream economics is being (termporarily) ignored in favour of fiscal dominance and the use of monetary policy to support that dominance.

    This is a major shift away from the claims that monetary policy has to be independent of the political aspirations of the nation – that is, the democratic expression – which for several decades has been the way neoliberal ‘depoliticisation’ has operated to allow elected politicians to use fiscal policy in an irresponsible way (austerity bias), but, at the same time, shift the responsibility for that destructive conduct to external bodies like the IMF and so-called ‘independent’ central bank boards.

    The mainstream macroeconomists claimed that we should ‘assign’ the macro policy instruments towards monetary policy and away from fiscal policy – which is just fancy terminology to say that fiscal policy would no longer target full employment and ensure that non-government spending gaps were more or less continually closed and that central banks would use unemployment as a policy tool rather than a policy target.

    They asserted that this policy regime would make us all be better off.

    That hasn’t happened. We are, in general, worse off, while a small proportion of people have gorged themselves on massive wealth creation at the expense of the rest of us.

    More people are starting to realise that.

    But the mainstream won’t give up to easily.

    Jens Weidmann’s speech exemplifies that resistance – he was particularly focused on “the problem of fiscal dominance”.

    He admits that during the pandemic that:

    … fiscal policy has taken the lead. And quite rightly so. It has both the democratic legitimacy for heavy interventions and the custom-fit instruments.

    So acknowledging two important factors:

    1. Fiscal policy is a flexible instrument which can be targetted spatially and demographically and impacts directly on the spending and income stream, whereas standard monetary policy (interest rate adjustments) is a blunt (indirect) instrument with ambiguous effects.

    2. Fiscal policy discretion is directly tied to our notion of democratic participation and responsibility, while monetary policy is the domain of unelected, and, largely unaccountable board members.

    So by supporting a regime that prioritises monetary policy over fiscal policy, one is using an inferior macroeconomic policy tool which expands the democratic deficit.

    Weidmann then moved on to discuss the “risk of fiscal dominance”.

    He said:

    1. “government bond purchases … [by central banks] … risk blurring the line between fiscal and monetary policy” – this is the usual claim that the two arms of policy should be independent of each other except that fiscal policy should be subjugated to monetary policy under this New Keynesian mainstream consensus.

    The fact is that the two arms of policy can never be independent. Fiscal policy directly impacts on bank reserves, which require monetary policy liquidity management operations to take into account or lose control over interest rates.

    The two arms have to work in a coordinated fashion – on a daily basis.

    2. “The problems are particularly pronounced in a monetary union with fiscally autonomous member states. Here, such purchases involve the fundamental risk of mutualising sovereign liability risks through the central banks’ balance sheets” – so a commentary on the Eurozone.

    The reality is that the ECB is funding fiscal deficits across the 19 Member States despite all the denial about that.

    If the ECB didn’t, then the common currency system would have collapsed in 2010 with the insolvency of several nations, given they surrendered their currency-issuing capacity.

    Such behaviour is thus endemic or intrinsic to the maintenance of the currency because the founders’ design was deeply flawed and unsustainable.

    It doesn’t mean that misery has been the norm. But in an existential sense, if the ECB does “mutualise sovereign liablitity risks” the system collapses.

    3. “Decisions on the redistribution of liability risks should be taken – if at all – by parliaments and governments, not by central banks” – again about the Eurozone.

    This statement is true but the reality that it is the ECB that is sustaining the system is just a statement of the reality that the fiscal autonomy of the 19 Member States is so compromised by the fiscal rules that they are unable to defend their own economic and financial systems.

    That is where the democratic deficit arises in Europe. It is by design. The states will never be able to redistribute liability risks effectively because they cannot.

    4. “the Eurosystem central banks have become the Member States’ biggest creditors – and that was the case even before the current crisis” – which is just a restatement of my point under (2 above).

    The central banks are the biggest creditors of the Member States because otherwise many of these states would have gone broke during the GFC because bond markets would have refused to fund them on viable terms given the expanding credit risk.

    All the result of a dysfunctional monetary architecture.

    5. Then he makes the fundamental point:

    For the part of sovereign debt that is on our books, funding costs are decoupled from the capital market. The interest on those bonds flows to central banks, which distribute them back to their treasuries as part of their profit. That weakens the disciplining role of markets. Thus, the incentives for sound budgeting diminish, especially as the EU’s fiscal rules are weak.

    This is the mainstream position.

    It is taught to university students all around the world as if it is truth. It appears in textbooks (not mine). It is pushed in the financial media.

    It is a basic denial of democracy and reveals clearly the role the economic profession plays in supporting that denial.

    Why should the ‘capital markets’ have some priority over making judgements over government policy?

    The answer economists will give is because they fund the government spending over tax revenue.

    Of course, once you blow the cover on that lie – that bond investors are funding the government deficits – then the question I posed starts to bite.

    Why indeed?

    There is no reason for maintaining a system where bond investors have the discretion to express their own ideological preferences by punishing governments that deviate from those preferences.

    That is a neoliberal contrivance to compromise democracies and tilt the capacity of government to benefit the top-end-of-town.
    Conclusion

    The “disciplining role of markets” should be replaced by the disciplining role of democracy.

    We vote.

    If we don’t like what government is doing with its fiscal policy interventions then we vote them out in favour of an alternative.

    A government cannot do that much damage in one electoral cycle.

    We will not break out of this destructive neoliberal era until we abandon the idea that the ‘capital markets’ should in some way be the arbiters of responsible policy settings.

    The ‘markets’ are always self interested.

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