Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (eta 4)

Sarrera: ikus Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (3)1

Islandiari dagokion lehen artikuluan Mitchell-ek DTM-ko zenbait ezaugarri sakon gogoratu digu, blog honetan behin eta berriz ikusi eta aipatu ditugunak.

Bigarren artikuluan, ikusi dugun moduan, islandiarrek bankugintzan izan dituzten hutsuneak eta erabaki okerrak oso nabarmenak izan dira.

Okerrenaz, alta, hirugarren artikuluan jabetu gara. DTM-koek oso argi eta garbi adierazten duten bezala, bankugintzan bi transakzio oso ezberdinak bereizi behar dira: bertikalak eta horizontalak. Eta horretan islandiarrek kale egin dute.

Ikusiko dugun laugarren eta azken parte honetan, Islandiari DTM-koen proposamen zehatz eta sakonak proposatzen ditu Mitchell-ek.

Segi dezagun aurrera…

Segida:

Funtsezko erreforma behar da:

(a) Erabat funtsezkoa2

(b) Ideia berriak banku zentralaz, altxor publikoaz, bankuek jarduten dituzten erak eta moduak aldatuz3

(c) Bankuak aspaldian aritzen ziren eran ari behar izaten dira4

(d) FIRE-ko eragiketak eta espekulazioak alboratu behar dira5

(FIRE dela eta, ikus Fire: sua ote?; Fire: sua ote? Inflazioa, langabezia eta FIRE delakoa; Sua: fire ote? Burbuila finantzarioak eta Dena FIRE da.)

(e) Mosler-ek ere antzeko proposamenak egin zituen 2010ean6

Ikus Warren Mosler-ek bankugintzaz

Mitchell-en hitzez, “Once these changes were made (among others), then much of the concerns about financial instability arising from the banking sector would disappear.

Ondorioak:

(i) Islandian martxan egon den DSP delakoa ez da inongo modelorik sistema finantzario hobe baterako7

(ii) Erreforma funtsezkoagoak behar dira

Harrigarria bada ere, Islandia (mon amour) izeneko blog sarreran ikusi dugun legez, “mirakuluen (sic)” bidez edo Islandiaren bilakaera, eurolandiatik at, eurotik kanpo, moneta propioa, krona erabiliz, honelakoa izan da: “… become one of Europe’s top performers in terms of growt.”

Zer lortuko zuketen islandiarrek baldin eta goian aipaturiko DTM-ko proposamenak praktikan jarri izan balituzte?

Islandia herrialda txikia da.

Baina moneta subiranokoa izatea ez dagokio herrialdearen tamainari, DTM-koek erakutsi diguten moduan: ikus Herrialdearen tamaina, politika fiskala eta bankugintza berria.

Hona hemen, Randall Wray-k herrialde tamainaz dioena: Ekonomia mistoa eta gobernuaren tamaina: etsenplu bat.


2 Ingelesez: “Fundamental reform is required

Drawing lessons from the Icelandic bank collapse and the GFC generally, tells me that more fundamental approaches to financial market reform are required and that the problem is not related to the credit-creation capacity of the banks.

In September 2009, I wrote this blog – Operational design arising from modern monetary theory – which provided some ideas on such reforms.

I followed it up in October 2009 with this blog – Asset bubbles and the conduct of banks.”

3 Ingelesez: “The ideas can be distilled down to:

1. Government treasury and central bank operations should be brought under the “one roof” and the sham of central bank independence abandoned. Please read my blog – The sham of central bank independence – for more discussion on this point.

This aligns the major arms of macroeconomic policy making with the democratic responsibility and accountability.

2. All voluntary constraints on net spending and the institutional machinery that has arisen to implement these constraints, which have lead to unsustainable outcomes with the costs of the dysfunction being borne mainly by the less advantaged groups in the society, should be abandoned.

That is, I would recognise the differences and advantages that a government in a fiat monetary system has over one operating in a convertible currency system (Gold Standard) and create behaviours and institutions that allowed the the government to exploit those advantages to advance public purpose and generate full employment and environmental sustainability.

Specifically, I would stop issuing Treasury debt instruments – that is, stop public borrowing.

Such borrowing is unnecessary to support the net spending (deficits) given that the national government is not revenue-constrained and does not advance public purpose.

This would mean that the net spending would manifest as cumulative excess reserve balances at the central bank.

I would maintain that excess liquidity in the system and keep short-term interest rates at zero or just about. All adjustments to aggregate demand are better made using fiscal policy.

I would abandon all tax incentives, which push speculative behaviour in property markets.

3. Central bank lending to its member banks (those who have reserve accounts with the central bank) should never be constrained and should be priced at whatever the current rate for lending to banks is. By rejecting the “money multiplier” view of the world, we learn that commercial bank lending is not reserve-constrained.

Please read my blog – Lending is capital- not reserve-constrained – for more discussion on this point.

Also please read the following blogs – Building bank reserves will not expand credit and Building bank reserves is not inflationary – for further discussion.

The trick is to change the way the banks operate not restrict their capacity to be banks.

4 Ingelesez:

4. The only useful thing a bank should do is to facilitate a payments system and provide loans to credit-worthy customers.

Attention should always be focused on what is a reasonable credit risk. Banks should only be permitted to lend directly to borrowers. All loans would have to be shown and kept on their balance sheets.

This would stop all third-party commission deals which might involve banks acting as ‘brokers’ and on-selling loans or other financial assets for profit.

It is in this area of banking that the current financial crisis has emerged and it is costly and difficult to regulate. Banks should go back to what they were.

5. Banks should not be allowed to accept any financial asset as collateral to support loans. The collateral should be the estimated value of the income stream on the asset for which the loan is being advanced. This will force banks to appraise the credit risk more fully.

5 Ingelesez:

6. Banks should be prevented from having “off-balance sheet” assets, such as finance company arms which can evade regulation.

7. Banks should never be allowed to trade in credit default insurance. This is related to whom should price risk.

8. Banks should be restricted to the facilitation of loans and not engage in any other commercial activity.

9. Eliminate the vast majority of speculative trading in financial products by declaring them illegal. Almost all (around 97 per cent) of speculative activity in financial markets does nothing to advance public well-being. Financial market regulation should always be motivated by allowing activities that improve our collective lives and scrapping the rest.

By eliminating much of what we now call the FIRE industry, the life of the banker becomes much simpler and safer.

10. Make banks public institutions and make their non-profit mission to unambiguously pursue public benefit.

6 Mitchell-ek dioenez, On March 23, 2010, Warren Mosler wrote a similar article on the topic of banking reform Proposals for the Banking System. It is worth reading.”

7 Ingelesez: “There are many other points that could be made but these suffice to show that the SMS is not a model for a better financial system.”

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