Grezia: erabateko desastrea (eta 3)

Sarrera: irakur Grezia: erabateko desastrea (1)1 eta Grezia: erabateko desastrea (2)2

Segida:

(3) Varoufakis (the big bluff) tarte garrantzitsu baterako desastrearen kapitaina

Varoufakis oso aipatua eta estimatua omen bide da Euskal Herrian. Hartu hemeroteka: badirudi ekonomialariak, politikariak, kazetariak eta progre guztiak haren alde egon direla (oraindik ere ote daude?)

Blog honetan askotan salatu dugu ezjakin eta bluff hori.

Guk baino hobeto ezagutzen dutenak, Bill Mitchell-ek, kasu, hitz gogorrak izan ditu bluff-erako:

Varoufakis, ezaguna3: Lo que Yanis dice hoy puede ser muy distinto de lo que dijo ayer”.

Varoufakis dela eta:4La seva croada actual per una nova Europa democràtica no treu cap a res.

Ikus, besteak beste, eta azkenak soilik aipatzearren:

Bill Mitchell Finantza Ministro(a)z ari

Varoufakis’ pipe dream (ezinezko ametsa)

Gauza bertsua Warren Mosler-ek: ikus gehiegi ez aipatzearren, ondoko linkak:

Warren Mosler eta A Modest Response

Varoufakis-en azken (aurreko) xelebrekeria

W. Mosler eta Y. Varoufakis

Warren Mosler eta Yanis Varoufakis

Eta bankugintzaz ikasteko, Greziari dagokionez, ikus ondoko lan eder hau, hirutan banatua:

Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (1)

Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (2)

Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (eta 3)

Nahikoa eta sobera!

Artikulua: Why Varoufakis’ DiEM2025 is fighting the wrong fight5

Hona artikuluan azaltzen diren punturik nagusienak.

(i) Varoufakis dela eta:

(a) Zazpi hilabeteko bi frakzioen talka: Syriza-k boterea hartu zuenetik (2015eko ekainean) berorren kapitulaziora (zazpi hilabete beranduago)6

(b) Haren herrikideak eta lagunak, edo lagun ohiak dioena7

(c) Demokrazia Europan izenekoa, Varoufakis-en ospea eta 2015ean esandakoa errepikatzea8

(ii) Zer nolako erreformak?

(d) Europako parlamentua, alderdi politiko transnazionalak9

(e) Arazoak. Zergatik ez hasi maila nazionalean?10

(e) Estrategia berria: ebidentziarik gabekoa11

(f) Kontrakoa da egiazkoa12

(g) Neoliberalismoa nagusi13

(h) Gehi lege antisozialak, nonahi14

(iii) Ezkerraren TINA (There is no alternative)

(i) Nazio-estatuaren garrantzia15

Nation-states can pursue their own policies”

(j) Dani Rodrik eta Bill Mitchell: gogoratu Nazio-estatua ezina omen da16

(k) Is the nation state ‘finished’?17

(l) Bill Mitchel comes to the rescue18. Berriz, gogoratu Nazio-estatua ezina omen da

(m) Varoufakis eta sofismazko ideologia19

(n) Moneta jaulkitzaileko herrialdeak bere zeregina edukitzen segitzen du20

(iv) Zergatik ez eman lehentasuna maila nazionalari?

Internationalism never meant giving up on the national struggle. The contrary is true

(o) Borroka maila nazionalean21

(p) Varoufakis-ek ez du goian aipatutako guztia ikusten22

Aspaldian idatzi nuen moduan, greziarrek ez zuten merezi Varoufakis bezalako bluffa.

Zertan ari gara gu, EHkook?

Arren, aldatu dezagun errotik aldatu behar dena.

Utz dezagun betiko ideologia neoliberala (progreen eskutik hedatuz doana etengabe) edo/eta Varoufakis-en bezalako sofismak…

Defenda ditzagun nazio-estatuaren garrantzia eta moneta propioaren rola eta etorkizuna.

Bukatzeko, hona hemen sei (6) urrats garrantzitsu: Sei (6) urrats XXI mendean independentista izateko


6 Ingelesez: “This text deals with strategy, but strategy cannot be seen separate from people and their histories and actions. SYRIZA has always been an uneasy conglomerate of groups of many political persuasions, but ever since it came to power in January 2015, until its capitulation seven months later, two main fractions fought a fierce fight. On one side, there was the heterogeneous left, which wanted to make good on the electoral promise (the Thessaloniki program): there was going to be no austerity any longer, Greece would negotiate a debt write off and if the Troika pushed the country to the brink, the group advocated leaving the euro zone. The leadership, on the other side, also wanted to end austerity. But under no condition was it willing to exit the euro zone.”

7 Ingelesez: As Lapavitsas explains, the Syriza leadership convinced itself that if it rejected a new bailout, European lenders would buckle in the face of financial and political unrest. The mastermind of this strategy was Yanis Varoufakis. He negotiated with the lenders for more than six months. But Greece could not negotiate effectively without an alternative plan, including the possibility of exiting the euro zone. Creating its own liquidity was the only way to avoid the Troika’s headlock. That would be far from easy, of course, but at least it would have offered the option of standing up to the catastrophic bailout strategies. The Syriza leadership would have none of it.”

(See One year on, Syriza has sold its soul for power: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/25/one-year-on-syriza-radicalism-power-euro-alexis-tsipras)

“‘SYRIZA failed,’ writes Lapavitsas, ‘not because austerity is invincible, nor because radical change is impossible, but because, disastrously, it was unwilling and unprepared to put up a direct challenge to the euro. Radical change and the abandonment of austerity in Europe require direct confrontation with the monetary union itself. For smaller countries this means preparing to exit, for core countries it means accepting decisive changes to dysfunctional monetary arrangements. This is the task ahead for the European left and the only positive lesson from the Syriza debacle.”(Ikus aurreko One year on, … gehi Lapavitsas Calls for Exit as the Only Strategy for Greek People: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5gojqrjhQo).

8 Ingelesez: “Today Varoufakis is back as the initiator of DiEM2025 (Democracy in Europe). The former Greek minister of finance enjoys a lot of credibility with the European left. Much of this credibility is based on the urban myth that the SYRIZA government put up a heroic fight with the undemocratic powers in Europe that showed no economic insight, no consideration to the fate of the Greek people and blatant disrespect for democracy.

The same discourse now is being propagated again. In 2015, there was ultimately ‘no choice’ for the Greek government than to accept the Troika’s conditions. Today, DiEM2025 wants to reform the EU institutions. There is, again, ‘no choice. A fight at the national level is impossible, the left has to unite all over Europe and fight the EU institutions head on. DiEM2025’s aim is ‘to democratise the EU in the knowledge that it will otherwise disintegrate at a terrible cost to all’ (see DiEM25:https://diem25.org/) Only two other ‘dreadful options’ remain: a retreat into the assumed antiquated ‘cocoon of the nation-state’ or ‘surrender’ to the European oligarchy. DiEM2025’s goal is ‘to convene a constitutional assembly where Europeans will deliberate on how to bring forward, by 2025, a fully fledged European democracy, featuring a ‘sovereign parliament’ that ‘respects national self-determination and shares power with national parliaments, regional assemblies and municipal councils’ (see DiEM25:https://diem25.org/). This is, as Varoufakis admits in The Independent, indeed ‘utopian.’ But, he continues, it is ‘a lot more realistic than trying to maintain the system as it is’ or ‘trying to leave.’ Whether you’re Greek or British, ‘escape’ is impossible (see Yanis Varoufakis: Europe is sliding back into the 1930s and we need a new movement: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/yanis-varoufakis-europe-is-sliding-back-into-the-1930s-we-need-a-new-movement-a6863311.html and “The UK should Stay in the EU to Fight Tooth and Nail against the EU’s Anti-democratic Institutions”. Yanis Varoufakis: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-uk-should-stay-in-the-eu-to-fight-tooth-and-nail-against-the-eus-anti-democratic-institutions-yanis-varoufakis/5509652?platform=hootsuite) Does this ring a bell?

9 Ingelesez: “DiEM2025’s ‘supra-national democracy’ system should rest on ‘a significantly empowered European parliament, which should be the sole initiator of European legislation’, alongside ‘a completely reformed executive branch, including a directly elected European president.’ This system would guarantee that the Commission would implement policies that are based on the will of the people. Everything must rest on the electoral results of new and truly transnational European parties” (see A Critique of Yanis Varoufakis’ Democracy In Europe Movement (DiEM25): https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/02/a-critique-of-yanis-varoufakis-democracy-in-europe-movement-diem25/ and The DiEM25 manifesto: Democracy in Europe Movement 2025: https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/anthony-barnett/introduction-to-diem25-manifesto).

10 Ingelesez: “Some problems have to be noted here. To start with, the proposal assumes, bizarrely, that there is a causal link between empowerment of the parliament and political and ideological change. But why would this be the case? Will Europeans elect a more left leaning parliament once the  powers of this institution increase? How will this empowerment of the EP come about? The EP cannot do it itself, so much more is needed. Why concentrate upon the EP to begin with? Such a change can only come about when the power relations within the Commission and the two Councils change. Indeed, what is needed is a near complete overhaul of the European political institutions in globo. And this can only happen as a result of changes at the national level. Why then concentrate upon the supra-national level to start with?

11 Ingelesez: “DiEM2025 has a strategy (if you like) to achieve political change. The new European supra-national democracy needs to go in hand with the creation of a ‘post-national or supranational electorate’. But how would this work? As Thomas Fazi rightly notes, it is evident that for the great majority of ordinary European citizens linguistic barriers and cultural differences impair the opportunity for political participation at a supranational level (see A Critique of Yanis….) This may be obvious, but it is a real concern. Why do we need such parties? What can they achieve that others cannot? There is no shred of evidence that this would advance matters.”

12 Ingelesez: “The contrary is true. Further integration, even if accompanied by a strengthening of the parliament, is not equivalent to more popular control. Varoufakis naively assumes that an enhanced version of the European parliament would suffice for proper democratic control over the Union’s decisions. As Fazi rightly argues, this completely ignores the question of oligarchic capture (see A Critique of Yanis…). Research consistently shows that problems relating to lobbying are exacerbated at the supranational level. Transfers of sovereignty to international loci contribute to the weakening of popular control. These loci are, in general, physically, culturally and linguistically more distant from the general public than nationals one. And this leads to more oligarchic capture (see A Ctitique of Yanis…).”

13 Ingelesez: “… Austerity and reforms are being debated in parliaments until the minority votes against it and the majority approves it, perhaps with a lonely defector here and there. No national government in Europe fell as a consequence of the introduction of austerity measures. This shows that the problem is not exclusively located at the European level. Indeed, without the macabre obsession for ordoliberalism, monetarism, competitiveness, mercantilism and ‘structural reforms’ at the national level, the EU would be powerless to push this agenda.”

14 Ingelesez: “At the same time, as Wolfgang Kowalsky writes, social policy ambitions have been substantially lowered towards ILO standards that are well below current European minimum standards (see Understanding The European Union’s Facade Democracy: https://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/04/understanding-the-european-unions-facade-democracy/). This is, again, very bad. But look at what is happening at the national level. It is not different from what happens in France, the UK or Belgium or many countries where conservative governments (of whatever stripe or colour) implement (or try to implement) a plethora of anti-social laws.

Instead of this ‘façadism,’ as Kowalsky calls it (organising a ‘year of the EU citizen,’ etc.), there are a lot of initiatives that the EU could promote if it would be interested in democracy. It could, for example, make EU democracy real at the workplace and work towards industrial democracy – terms which are never to be found in any European policy document (the EP included). Instead, the institutions (the EP included) are now trying to intrude into national collective bargaining territory by setting limits on wage evolution – a clear strategy to destroy the autonomy of social partners (see Undertanding…). But this, again, is also taking place, in some form or another, in most European countries and so, again, this is a fight that has to be fought at the national level, not by transnational parties, but by social-democratic and democratic leftist parties.

15 Ingelesez: “DiEM’s TINA is much worse than its fallacious analysis of European institutions and their neglect of national power relations. There is nothing accidental about it. It is the logical result of their underlying diagnosis of what is wrong with the world: if nations have become powerless in the face of globalization, then it is indeed nonsensical to initiate a political fight at the level of the nation state. That is DiEM’s thesis. But the nation state has not become powerless in the face of globalization.

The thinking that DiEM2025 and many others promote is that the model of politics based on the nation state is ‘finished’ (Varoufakis). In Europe, nation-states gained ‘responsibility without power,’ while the supra-national level gained ‘power without responsibility.’ The sovereignty of national parliaments has been dissolved. Today, national electoral mandates are by design impossible to fullfil. Hence, reform of the European institutions (or more precisely, the EP), is the only remaining option. Varoufakis is far from the only one who sees it like this. According to Slavo Zizek, the lesson that the left has to learn from the ‘Syriza episode’ is that it is impossible to fight global capitalism in one country. According to Zizek, the ‘new Neo-Keynesian social democratic temptation’ that is momentarily in vogue in some quarters and that aims at putting up a fight at the level of the nation-state is but a smoke screen of the confused pseudo-left falling for nationalism and populism, entertaining the population with the illusion that they can make a difference (see At the same time, as Wolfgang Kowalsky writes, social policy ambitions have been substantially lowered towards ILO standards that are well below current European minimum standards (see Slavoj Žižek on DiEM25: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fFNJYpwv39s&ebc=ANyPxKqRbyyT93b3zEQUbZEqpRrJKQsiWNLRU58_C443ELrcu3NyhlnO0N7Kt145BVhgd2BkbZUBa7b7I_I2OgF94PoX2hx5HA). That is well put, but it is not true.”

16 Ingelesez: “How do they know this and why are they so sure? A couple of years ago, Dani Rodrik introduced what he calls ‘the political trilemma of the world economy’(…)

As Bill Mitchell rightly writes, it has been skillfully sold by all political forces everywhere. (…)

The truth is that we do not live in a completely globalised world, far from it. Ergo, nation-states can pursue their own policies. This conclusion is reached by all those who look into it (see The scope for progressive tax reform in the OECD countries: A macroeconomic perspective with a case study for Germany: http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_imk_wp_150_2015.pdf, for a study of Godar, Paetz and Truger on the scope for redistribution and growth policies at national level in the EU and Is Global Capitalism Eroding the State? for a literature overview)”

17 Ingelesez: “There is no evidence for DiEM’s TINA. Their thesis that capital became completely supra-national and that ‘we,’ in order to fight it and stand a chance, need to follow and bring the fight to the same supra-national level is incorrect. The ‘footloose’ character of capital will be fought at the national level which will in turn lead to international cooperation or it will not be fought. If capital did become completely footloose and the nation-state is ‘finished,’ why does Goldman-Sachs and others pay Hillary Clinton millions of dollars for speeches that have to remain secret? Why does the corporate lobby pumps billions into the regulatory institutions of countries, why are think thanks and marketing agencies that have no other goal than to skew the opinion of voters blossoming everywhere, why is the corporate sector so eager to buy up the media so that its ideological boundaries can be closely safeguarded? Is that because the nation state is ‘finished’?

18 Ingelesez: “As Bill Mitchell wrote on his blog…, ‘(t)he actual reality (is) that politicians still have legislative capacity to restrict economic activity across borders (…)

(see The impossibility theorem that beguiles the Left: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=32961)

And why is this not happening? One can accuse the right of many things, but not that they are right wing. They are what they are. But the same is not true for the left. As Bill Mitchell writes:

The problem is that the stupidity of the Left politicians has bought the myth that international economic integration is so advanced and inevitable …”

19 Ingelesez: “This, in a nutshell, is what happened during the last thirty or so years. It is not financialisation that broke social democracy’s back (as Varoufakis recently declared on Dutch television (see here)), but the fallacious ideology that nothing much can be done at all, that structural change is impossible, that the political struggle on the level of the nation state is over and that the only thing left to do is to manage the state in neoliberal vein, with some ‘social corrections’ here and there, corrections that prove completely insufficient, that is, at least, in so far that social democracy, as New Labour in the UK did under Blair, did not completely accept the neoliberal ideology about welfare scroungers etc. and made everything even worse for the unemployed and the poor than it already was.

20 Ingelesez: “The fact remains that it is possible for currency-issuing countries to follow their own economic policies – policies that have, among others, full employment as a goal. This is the real issue. It is not about the democratisation of institutions. It is not about the need for transnational European politics. It is not about anything that floats in the air, such a societal model which, as Varoufakis explains, is ‘at the same time libertarian, Marxist and Keynesian’ (see Yanis Varoufakis: Europe is sliding back into the 1930s and we need a new movement: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/yanis-varoufakis-europe-is-sliding-back-into-the-1930s-we-need-a-new-movement-a6863311.html and “The UK should Stay in the EU to Fight Tooth and Nail against the EU’s Anti-democratic Institutions”. Yanis Varoufakis: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-uk-should-stay-in-the-eu-to-fight-tooth-and-nail-against-the-eus-anti-democratic-institutions-yanis-varoufakis/5509652?platform=hootsuite). What we need are leftist parties that are capable of winning national elections.”

21 Ingelesez: “If DiEM2025 wants to fight for ‘more democratic EU institutions,’ let them. But the more important fight will take place at the national level. Nothing can harm the European oligarchy more than countries dropping out of the EMU (or threaten to do so), re-adjusting, returning to growth and doing better than the dysfunctional, ultra-neoliberal euro zone. Everywhere in Europe, capital is setting up divides among fictitious ethnic and cultural fault lines to pursue a divide and conquer strategy vis-à-vis labour. The left has to fight this struggle on every possible scale. Internationalism never meant giving up on the national struggle. The contrary is true. This has absolutely nothing to do with nationalism. (…) This does not exclude international solidarity. On the contrary, it is a condition for such solidarity to exist. We need authentic social democratic parties that win elections nationally, send left-wing representatives to the European parliament, left-wing representatives to the Council and the Commission and Keynesians to the ECB. The fight for investment, recovery and against austerity and corporate lobbying has be to taken to the inside of these institutions. How will transnational political parties achieve this? It is on the national (and local) level that people relate to politics. It is there that the major strengths lie.”

22 Ingelesez: This is, of course, not how Varoufakis sees it. As he explained in the Independent, almost eight years after the outbreak of the financial crisis, unemployment in the EU is still at crisis levels, it is twice as high as in the US and the UK – ‘which are now reaching what economists consider ‘full employment.’’ To begin with, no one believes these statistics. There are millions of unemployed people in these countries. ‘If unemployment was still 10-11% in the UK or the US, the administration would have collapsed,’ Varoufakis tells the Independent (see Yanis Varoufakis: Europe is sliding back into the 1930s… see also Left Manifestos for Europe: Diem25 – Democracy in Europe Movement 2025, Yanis Varoufakis and Transforming the EU: https://tendancecoatesy.wordpress.com/2016/01/26/left-manifestos-for-europe-diem25-democracy-in-europe-movement-2025-and-transforming-the-eu/ and A New Manifesto For Europe!: http://klauskastner.blogspot.com.es/2016/01/a-new-manifesto-for-europe_19.html for critique). How does he know? Did Spain’s government, where unemployment is still over 20%, collapse? Did the Irish government collapse? Ireland’s main’s austerity party got re-elected and the old prime minister is back in power. No transnational party will change this. But decent, authentic and principled social democratic parties can, if they stand up.”

Iruzkinak (4)

  • joseba

    Are okerragora!

    Costas Lapavitsas, A deal that takes Greece further down the path of foll:

    http://linkis.com/com/KXUCs

    “The tragedy is that the Greek political system has proven utterly incapable of taking the country down the path of reason. SYRIZA growled like a lion in opposition but squealed like a mouse in government. There has not been worse political chicanery in European politics in decades. The country desperately needs a democratic upheaval, a shock from below, if it is to avoid historical decline.”

  • joseba

    If you think it’s bleak for Greece now, wait until tomorrow

    http://www.macropolis.gr/?i=portal.en.the-agora.4069

    “… the IMF seems deeply pessimistic about what awaits Greece.

    (…)

    After years of recession (of which the IMF cannot simply wash its hands), the structural unemployment rate is 20 percent. In 2022, the Fund sees Greek unemployment at 18 percent and it anticipates that it will take another 24 years, until 2040, before it drops to 12 percent, which is around half where it stands at the moment. Unemployment is not seen nearing its pre-crisis levels of around 6 percent for another 44 years, or until 2060.

    In other words, one of the key players in shaping policy in Greece recently foresees that it will take more than four decades to repair the damage done in just over four years. It can only be seen as an utterly disheartening admission.

    (…)

    It is a depressing outlook for an economy that has suffered so much in recent years. A very slow and painful recovery will erode the prospects of thousands of Greeks, spreading over generations to come…”

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