Krisia: nahita induzitua

(a) Albistea: Striking Admission By Former Bank Of England Head: The European Depression Was A “Deliberate” Act1

(i) Europako atzerapena EBko eliteek ‘nahita egindako’ aukeraren ondorioa da2

(ii) Eurogunea desegin behar da3

(iii) Nahita egindako politika bat izan da4

(iv) Aurrean esandakoa 2008ko AIG txostenak iragarri zuen5

(v) Paradisua gero eta paradisuago bilakatu da6

(vi) Lehen egunetik planifikatua izan zen7

(b) Albistea: Central Bankers Admit that Central Banks Have Failed to Fix the Economy8

(vii) 2008tik 2015era, Banku Zentraletako nagusiek uste zuten ekonomia konponduta zegoela. 2016an hasi dira onartzen ez dagoela ezer konpondurik9

(viii) Ingalaterrako Bank of England-eko nagusiak dioenez10,

(1) Azken zazpi urteetan hazkunde ekonomikoa baxua izan da11

(2) Datu kezkagarriak BPG-z12

(ix) Ingalaterrako Bank of England-eko nagusi ohiak katastrofea iragarri du13

(3) Krisiaren kausak ezagutu behar dira14

(4) Beste krisi bat aurreikusten da15

(5) Eskaria agregatuaren gabezia16

(x) Alan Greenspan ere ildo beretik doa17

(6) Arazoan gaude18

(7) Ekonomia ez dago konponduta19

(8) Aspalditik ez naiz egon baikor20

(xi) The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) bide beretik doa21

Nothing new under the Sun.

izan ere, gure txoko honetan, gure Euskal Herri honetan, zertxobait plazaratu dugu guzti honetaz.

Ikus, besteak beste, ondoko linkak:


Erreformismo merke, zaharkitu eta ez-efektiboa krisian segitzeko

AEBetako bankuek berdintsu segitzen dute…

Finantza krisia: historia sekretua

Krisia: nondik zetorren, zerk bultzatua, nortzuek aurreikusi zuten edo nor den nor

Eta sistema osoak, berriz ere, krak egingo balu?

Ekonomialariek segitzen dute errealitatea ukatzen


Krisia nahita izan da induzitua:

2 Ingelesez: “As the Telegraph reports today, according to the former head of the Bank of England Europe’s economic depression “is the result of “deliberate” policy choices made by EU elites.”

3 Ingelesez: “Mervyn King continued his scathing assault on Europe’s economic and monetary union, having predicted the beleaguered currency zone will need to be dismantled to free its weakest members from unremitting austerity and record levels of unemployment.”

4 Ingelesez: ““But the biggest question about Europe’s depression has always been whether it was the result of sheer stupidity and poor economic decisions or deliberate. King’s answer was stunning: “it is appalling and it has happened almost as a deliberate act of policy which makes it even worse”.

5 Ingelesez: “The reason this statement is profound, is because it validates what “that” 2008 AIG report predicted long ago, and certainly years before the European crisis was unleashed, namely that Europe would specifically create a financial crisis (as well as an environmental crisis, as well as terrorism) in order to fortify “Empire Europe.“”

6 Ingelesez: “The tragedy for Europe is that it has all panned out just as Europe’s unelected, ruling oligarchy as expected, and while we should congratulate Brussels which has managed to not only preserve but solidify its power, it now rules over a decaying, economically insolvent continent, with an entire generation left unemployed, with millions of refugees scrambling to get in, and with Europe’s cultural “integration” back to levels not seen in decades.”

7 Ingelesez: “And whereas before we could speculate that all of this had been at most a chance occurrence, we now know better: it was premeditated from day one.”

9 Ingelesez: “Between 2008 and 2015, central banks pretended that they had fixed the economy. In 2016, they’re starting to admit that they haven’t fixed much of anything.

10 Ingelesez: “The current head of the Bank of England (Mark Carney) said last week…”

11 Ingelesez: “The global economy risks becoming trapped in a low growth, low inflation, low interest rate equilibriumFor the past seven years, growth has serially disappointed—sometimes spectacularly, as in the depths of the global financial and euro crises; more often than not grindingly as past debts weigh on activity ….

12 Ingelesez: “Since 2007, global nominal GDP growth (in dollars) has been cut in half from over 8% to 4% last year, thereby compounding the challenges of private and public deleveraging ….”

13 Ingelesez: “… the former head of the Bank of England (Mervyn King) is predicting catastrophe…”

14 Ingelesez: “Unless we go back to the underlying causes [of the 2008 crash] we will never understand what happened and will be unable to prevent a repetition and help our economies truly recover.

15 Ingelesez: “The world economy today seems incapable of restoring the prosperity we took for granted before the crisis. (…) Further turbulence in the world economy, and quite possibly another crisis, are to be expected.

16 Ingelesez: “Since the end of the immediate banking crisis in 2009, recovery has been anaemic at best. (…) There was a continuing shortfall of demand and output from their pre-crisis trend path of close to 15pc. Stagnation – in the sense of output remaining persistently below its previously anticipated path – had once again become synonymous with the word capitalism. Lost output and employment of such magnitude has revealed the true cost of the crisis and shaken confidence in our understanding of how economies behave

17 Ingelesez: “Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan said today that the Dodd-Frank financial bill didn’t fix anything [d’oh!], that we’re in real trouble, and that he’s been pessimistic for a long time…”

18 Ingelesez: “ [Alan Greenspan who blasted the state of the economy saying that] we’re in trouble basically because productivity is dead in the water…Real capital investment is way below average. Why? Because business people are very uncertain about the future.”

19 Ingelesez: “The [Dodd-Frank] regulations are supposed to be making changes of addressing the problems that existed in 2008 or leading up to 2008. It’s not doing that. “Too Big to Fail” is a critical issue back then, and now. And, there is nothing in Dodd-Frank which actually addresses this issue.

20 Ingelesez: “I haven’t been [optimistic on the economy] for quite a while.”

21 Ingelesez: “… the world’s most prestigious financial agency – called the “Central Banks’ Central Bank” (the Bank for International Settlements, or BIS) – has consistently slammed the Fed and other central banks for doing the wrong things and failing to stabilize the economy.”

Iruzkinak (2)

  • joseba

    What Caused The Global Financial Crisis?
    Professor L. Randall Wray, discussing the global financial crisis in broad strokes. The economist Hyman Minsky developed a theory of financial fragility and the long-run evolution of the economy, summarized briefly as “stability is destabilizing.” In the aftermath of the Great Depression, the worst banks had failed, the remaining ones were scarred by the memories of the disaster, and the government had put in place extensive regulation to ensure they behaved, and this variety of capitalism (what Minsky called “paternalistic capitalism”) proved very stable.

    But stability is destabilizing. As time wore on and memories faded, people changed their outlook and changed their behavior. Banks took on greater risk, and fringe financial institutions (which came to be known as shadow banks) put increased pressure on the traditional banks by taking on even bigger bets. Politicians came to view financial regulation as burdensome, and academic economic theory became so far removed from reality that the models used by the top economists at the central banks didn’t even allow for the possibility of a financial crisis.

    As a result of World War 2, government debt ballooned, and these safe government bonds served as private wealth which was leveraged in order to grow and keep full employment in the post-war era. But as fiscal policy tightened (the focus shifted from “full employment” to “balance the budget”), and real wages stagnated, further growth could only be accomplished by piling on private debt, which grew to astounding heights by the mid-2000s. These debts are liabilities for the borrowers, but assets for the holders, and so the huge increase in debt meant huge increases in financial wealth for the top 1%, and all this money needs to be managed, hence Minsky’s term “money-manager capitalism.” Important changes were also happening to the way financial institutions were operating. The mid-century bank business model consisted of issuing deposits (bank money) in order to finance purchase of mortgage notes from borrowers, which the bank would then hold and collect the interest income. But to evade regulations, compete with shadow banks, and avoid a potential adverse change in the interest rate, banks shifted to a new much more fragile business model. In the new model, banks would make loans with the intent to package them into securities and sell them as quickly as possible, and as a result, the bank didn’t care very much whether you could pay back the loan, and didn’t bother to find out (which is sort of the whole point of having banks). Other institutions would then issue short-term or even overnight debt to yet other financial institutions, in order to finance their purchase of these packages of mortgages. These mortgage-backed securities would then be carved into sections and sold to yet other financial institutions. As a result of all of this, debt between financial institutions rocketed upward.

    All of this private debt makes the system increasingly fragile, leading to what Minsky called “Ponzi finance.” If you are dependent on your income to be able to make your debt payments, then an unexpected fall in income could force you to default. If your creditors were counting on your debt payments to be able to make their own debt payments, then now they are forced to default as well. And so on. The result is a ripple of contagion, leading to bankruptcies, fire-sales of assets, and possibly bank runs. As financial institutions stop lending or even close down, normal business investment falls, and the result on Main Street is unemployment and people losing their homes.

    To get more detail on the causes of the crisis and the long-run evolution of the financial system, as well as suggestions for what to do about it, read Wray’s book on Minsky’s work, entitled “Why Minsky Matters”:


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