Europako demokraziak eurogunea apurtu behar du

Bill Mitchell-en artikulua: Democracy in Europe requires Eurozone breakup1.

Ukitutako punturik garrantzitsuenak:

(a) Euroguneko edozein herrialderen subiranotasun fiskala nahi baldin badugu, bide jasangarri bakarra herrialdeak bere moneta propioa berreskuratzea da, batasun monetariotik irtenez

(b) Europar federazio funtzional bat ez da martxan jarriko2

(c) Martxan jarriko balitz, moneta komunak funtzionatuko luke, defizitak ez gobernuko gastuarekin parekatuz3

(d) Historikoki behar hori ezagutzen zen, nahiz eta laster baztertua izan4

(e) Gaur egungo baldintzatan herrialdeak (estatuak) ez dira subiranoak5

(f) Gaurko Europako moneta sistema ez da inongo federazioa, gabeziak (gobernuen insolbentzia bereziki) nabarmenak izanik6

(g) Europa ezker ofiziala galduta dago, non eta neoliberalismoaren zurrunbiloan7, post nazionalismoa8 aipatzen den bitartean

(h) Demokraziaren nozioa moneta jaulkitzearekin lotu beharra dago9

(i) Ezkerra eta job guarantee delako, hots, lan bermeko programa10

(j) Eurogunearen birdiseinatzea? Nola?11

(k) Irtenbidea, eurogunetik irtetea!12

(l) Nazioarteko akordioak kritikatzen dira, autodeterminazioa aipatuz, baina funtsera joan barik…13

(m) Benetako federazioaren erronkak14 eta herrialde bakar baterako irtenbidea15

Ondorio zuzenak:

(1) Ezin da Europan inongo aginte fiskal federalik eraiki, aldez aurretik, Europan bertan dagoen defizit demokratikoa konpondu barik

(2) Eurogunea apurtzeak ez du esan nahi ‘Europako proiektua’ abandonatzea16

(3) Europako proiektuak ez du esan nahi, nahitaez, moneta komuna edukitzea17

Grexit zena Eurexit bilakatu da18.

2 Ingelesez: “Let’s be frank: there will never be a functional European-level federation where the fiscal responsibility coincides with the currency-issuing capacity of the single central bank and which seeks its policy mandate in broad elections with universal suffrage.”

3 Ingelesez: “If there could be such a organisation, then the common currency could clearly work despite the differences in economic structure of the Eurozone Member States.

The newly created, and popularly elected federal fiscal authority would then be able to run deficits commensurate with the non-government spending gap and address asymmetries in spending across the regional space. The Member States would then become identical to US or Australian states and would rely heavily on the federal ‘government’ to ensure that living standards were more or less equalised across the federal space.”

4 Ingelesez: “The necessity of this alignment was recognised by the early major studies into the viability of increased European integration, such as the Werner Committee in 1970 and the MacDougall Study Group in 1977. But it was ignored, for ideological reasons, by the Delors Committee in 1989 and the result was the Maastricht Treaty. The – Report To that Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of Economic and Monetary Union in the Community – (Werner Report) concluded that for EMU cohesion “transfers of responsibility from the national to the Community plane will be essential”.

Are gehiago, txostenak honela segitu zuen: “… the transfer to the Community level of the powers exercised hitherto by national authorities will go hand in hand with the transfer of a corresponding Parliamentary responsibility from the national plane to that of the Community. The centre of decision of economic policy will be politically responsible to a European Parliament. “

5 Ingelesez: “The current design of the Eurozone determines that the Member State governments are not ‘sovereign’ in the sense that they are forced to use a foreign currency and must issue debt to private bond markets in that foreign currency to fund any fiscal deficits.

Their fiscal positions must then take the full brunt of any economic downturn because there is no ‘federal’ counter stabilisation function. I disregard the small European-level transfers and bailout-type funds here. The former are too small and non-cyclical and the latter are so pernicious that they have the opposite effects to what is required.”

6 Ingelesez: “The EMU is a federation without the most important component.

The Member State governments thus can run out of money and become insolvent if the bond markets decline to purchase their debt.

Among other things, this means the elected governments cannot guarantee the solvency of the banks that operate within their borders.

It is a basic characteristic of any monetary system that government can only create risk free liabilities if they are denominated in its own currency.

The fact that the political leaders chose this design was astounding given it stood no chance of withstanding a major event such as the GFC [Global Fiscal Crisis]. The design of the Eurozone ensured it was a disaster waiting to happen.”

7 Ingelesez: “… when one talks with the educated Left in Europe, one always walks away with an ear full of ‘pan Europe’ – this glorious construct that, once completed, will rewrite the Continent’s history, do away with its sordid military past, create a new era of intellectual activity. And so it goes …

This idea of a unified Europe is so entrenched that, it is in some sense, as much a Groupthink trap, as neo-liberalism is for the political classes.”

8 Ingelesez: “There is a lot of talk about a “post-national framework”, but (…) what actually constitutes a ‘post-national framework’ or ‘pan-European social democratic’ movement is rather amorphous and riddled with internecine conflicts.”

9 Ingelesez: “… any notion of democracy has to correctly aligned the policy-making responsibilities with the currency-issuing capacity and those responsible for both should be elected through universal suffrage and accountable as such.”

10 Ingelesez: “Trying to change the Treaty to fix the obvious design errors of the Eurozone is a pipe dream.

It reminds me of those so-called hardliners on the Left who criticise me for being a so-called ‘apologist’ for capitalism because I advocate a Job Guarantee, which they consider to be a palliative, at best. They spend their time plotting the glorious Revolution in between quaffing croissants and sipping latte, while doing a bit of on-line banking when their handsome salaries come in from their secure and interesting jobs.”

11 Ingelesez: “There is no mention of the way in which the monetary union could be redesigned here. The authors talk about introducing “stringent control of the power of corporations, and robust, ecologically sound job creation and redistribution schemes”, which all sounds fantastic but imply, either restoring Member State currencies, or, establishing a federal fiscal authority as above.

The latter will not happen. So a progressive politics, … (Ikus hurrengo oharra).

12 Ingelesez: “… So a progressive politics, in my view, has to articulate a European vision, where individual Member States have full currency sovereignty and their elected legislatures have full responsibility for policy, but co-operate through supra-national mechanisms on the wider issues, such as climate change.”

13 Ingelesez: “they invoke the notion of “self-determination”, which they say “is at the heart of the modern quest for freedom” and requires “a society of citizens who can all effectively participate on equal terms in a living democracy”.

It is clear that the indecent haste in which these secret agreements have been stitched up, which guarantee corporations ridiculous power to usurp the rights of national states to determine policy, undermine democracy.

But equally, the self determination argument also applies to the right of the citizens to hold their elected representatives accountable for fiscal and monetary policy decisions. In the context of the Eurozone, this, once again, implies breakup or a creating a true federal fiscal capacity.”

14 Desafio batzuk aipatzearren, ingelesez: “… , when there is a major dilemma facing one state (perhaps a natural disaster or a significant economic downturn), it is assumed, without question, that the federal government will offer financial assistance to the beleaguered state.

The point is that the citizens within an effective federal system have to share a common sense of purpose and togetherness to ensure that the monetary system works for all states/regions rather than those that have powerful economies.

That capacity and required tolerance is largely non-existent in the Eurozone, which is why talk of a fiscal union will be largely inconsequential.

(…) For the federal fiscal authority to provide effective fiscal support for growth and prosperity in the Eurozone, a major paradigm shift in economic thinking is required.

When the old hatreds and suspicions in Europe combined with the emergence of neo-liberal economic thinking, the outcome was the Delors Report and the subsequent unworkable design of the Maastricht Treaty.

That mindset biases the Eurozone towards stagnation. A new way of economic thinking, which recognises the opportunities that a truly sovereign federal government has if it utilises its currency appropriately, is required.

15 Ingelesez: “In that context, it will be easier for a single nation to exit and build a new culture of growth with a new economic policy making approach.”

16 Ingelesez: “There has to be a recognition that breaking up the Eurozone is not the same thing as abandoning the ‘European Project’, where the latter should be redesigned conceptually to relate to issues that are better conducted on multi-lateral levels and benefit from geographic proximity.

In other words, some multi-lateral concerns are better off done through world organisations (for example, climate change). The European Project can represent the nations on that Continent.

17 Ingelesez: “But this ‘Project’ should never have been pushed to running a common currency. That was a step too far … and it needs to be taken back and sovereignty restored at the Member State (democratic) level.

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