Hasierarako, ikus GARAko zipriztina (3)1.
Bill Mitchell-en lana: Mitterrand’s turn to austerity was an ideological choice not an inevitability2.
1983ko martxoan Frantzian egon zen aukera bere moneta, libera, erabiltzeko ala Europako Moneta-Sistemaren (EMS) azpian egoteko, Bundeskank-en agindupean. Zoritxarrez, frantziarrek ildo neoliberala aukeratu zuten, inflazioaren aurkako monetarismoa erabiliz, ondorioz langabezia sortuz.
Langabezia ‘egiturazko’ arazotzat hartu zen3. Politika neoliberala nagusia zen4 eta merkatu libreko zaleek gogor lan egin zuten ‘erakusteko’ langabezia ez zuela sortu politika fiskal murriztaile batek5.
1983ko maiatzaren 16an Europako Kontseiluak, libera egonkortzeko, Frantziari diru laguntza handi bat luzatu zion baldintza batekin: politika fiskala estutzea:
“The French had agreed to limiting the fiscal deficit to 3 per cent of GDP in 1983 and 1984, restraining social security and unemployment insurance payments and cutting the capacity of state owned enterprises to borrow.”
(Gogoratu Trinitate Sainduaren afera6.)
Politika hori ezaguna zen herrialde txiroei Nazioarteko Moneta Fondoak (IMF) luzaturiko baldintzapeko maileguekin, ondorioz langabezia agertuz.
Zergatik zen aipatutako hori guztia garrantzitsua?
Mitterrand-en hauteskunde manifestuan, 110 Propositions pour la France delakoan, neurri politiko keynestarrak azaltzen ziren, barne, eskala handiko lan publikoak, etxegintza sozialeko hedakuntza eta komunitate azpiegiturak eta zerbitzuak.
Denbora hartan ‘ezker’ ofizialeko liderra zen.
Baina 1983an aldaketa bat gertatu zen, ‘tournant de la rigueur’ izenekoa. Termino ekonomikoetan, ‘ezkerreko’ intelektualek aldaketa hori ikusi izan dute globalizazioaren eta nazio estatuaren autonomia bukaera moduan. Erantzun gisa, Helmut Kolh alemaniarrarekin batera, Maastricht Akordiora eramango lukeen indar gidatzailea martxan jarri zuten eta, horretarako, desastre hutsa den eurogunea antolatzeko Jacques Delors-en laguntza estimagarria behar zen.
Izan ere, ‘ezkerrak’ modu errepikakor batez, bi gauza azpimarratu ditu:
-
First, that globalization and the internationalisation of finance ended the era of nation states and their capacity to pursue policies that were not in accord with the profit ambitions of global finance
-
The second ‘belief’ that the ‘left’ adopted was that large blocks of states (that is, Europe) could have the capacity to counter some of the worst vicissitudes of globalization
Ondoko sasi argudioak erabili ziren:
(a) ‘Kapital ihesa’7
(b) Ihesa horren ondorioa: krisi ekonomikoa
(c) Narratiba: Mitterrand-ek ez zuen beste alternatibarik, politika keynestarrak uztea baino
Mitchell-en hitzez, Mitterrand-ek bere handinahiak lortu zituen, ez besterik8. Ez da inongo modelorik ezkerrarentzat9.
‘Ezkerreko’ politikariak beldurtu dira kapital globalaren boterearekin eta aldatu dira austeritatea sustengatuz eta enplegu osoa lortzeko tresna gisa estatuaren rola abandonatuz10.
Beraz,
“Europe as a political force is much stronger than France as a nation state and can introduce policies that impact on all nations which means that capital flight has reduced scope to create damage.”
Hauxe da Europaren aldeko ‘ezkertiarren’ posizioa. Horri, orain, gehitzen diote euroaren defentsa Europa batu baten aldeko baldintza bezala11.
Mitterrand-en gobernua elkarren kontrako bi politika handinahi kontraesankorren artean egon zen harrapatuta: alde batetik Raymond Barre-ren Planak Frantziako ekonomiari egindako kaltea ezabatu nahi zuten baina denbora berean Alemaniak menperatu zuen truke tasa finkoko sistema batean egon nahi zuten.
Izan ere,
“France was always going to face downward pressure on its exchange rate while it tried to maintain the currency peg with the mark.”
Arazoak nonahi azaltzen ziren libera markoari itsatsita egonik12. Eta antzeko arazoa ERM-ko (Exchange Rate Mechanism delakoa) kide guztietara hedatu zen. Hori dela eta, Britainia Handiak beste bide bat aukeratu zuen13.
Gauza bertsua egin zezakeen Mitterrand-ek 1983an14…
Ondorioa: austeritatea, kapital transnazionalaren aurrean, ezinbesteko aukera bezala planteatuta, nahiz eta afera bestelakoa zen: “… they fail to fully understand the capacities that a currency-issuing government posseses.”
Hartutako erabakiaren kaltea eta ‘ezkerraren’ sasi argudioak, korporazio transnazionalak, merkatu libreko ideologia eta gobernu subiranoak,… hori guztia zen aztergai, hori guztia ez zen aztertu. Hori guztia baztertu zen eta Britainia Handiak hartutako bide aproposa (ERM abandonatuz) alboratu zen15.
(Hori guztia daukagu gaur egun ere, aztergai, Britainia Handiko Alderdi Laboristako Jeremy Corbyn-en inguruan blog honetan egindako azterketek erakutsi duten moduan.)
Bukatzeko eta oraingoz esan dezagun hau garbi:
a) The ‘left’ should thus abandon their eulogisation of Mitterrand and understand his turn to austerity and neo-liberalism was a choice rather than an inevitability.
b) Mitterrand’s regime became dominated by the growing Monetarist/neo-liberal ideology that held out the panacea was to deregulate, cut fiscal deficits and impose the anti-inflation policies of the Bundesbank.
c) Mitterrand was seduced by his “Finance Minister (and future European Commissioner) Jacques Delors to adopt “strong franc” policy at the expense of rising unemployment. It suited the neo-liberal ideologues to weaken the state.
d) But it was a choice not something that was unavoidable.
(TNC-z, korporazio transnazionalen aferaz ere zertxobait esan beharra dago. Horretarako, Mitchell-i segituko diogu16.)
3 Ingelesez. “The rising unemployment was reconstructed by the political and bureaucratic spin doctors as a ‘structural’ problem reflecting a failure of individuals to be self reliant and assiduous in job search and skill development. A bevy of securely employed and highly paid economists pumped out a massive number of ‘research’ papers, which served to give authority and legitimacy to this ideologically tainted and empirically bereft view.”
4 Ingelesez:”The socialists were abandoning their principles to become part of the neo-liberal political convergence that captured social democratic parties in most advanced nations during this period.”
5 Ingelesez: “Various bureaucrats, supported by free market orientated academics worked overtime to convince everyone that the unemployment was not a result of a lack of jobs created by excessively restrictive fiscal and monetary policy, but rather a sign that people were not searching for work hard enough and were lulled into a welfare dependent lassitude.”
6 Ikus Trinitate saindua: % 3a: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2013/05/17/trinitate-saindua-3a/ eta Trinitate saindua: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/05/22/trinitate-saindua/ .
7 Ingelesez: “… if a government tries to pursue full employment and redistributive policies then the financial markets will punish such a government through so-called ‘capital flight’ which would cause the currency to depreciate and the share markets to collapse.”
8 Ingelesez: “Mitterrand was never a champion of the left. He just used that platform to achieve his presidential ambitions and the 110 Propositions were just a political vehicle to demonstrate a start departure from the deeply unpopular policies that Barre had pursued in the late 1970s.”
9 Ingelesez: “He is not a role model for the left. He could have taken quite different decisions – the first of which would have been to abandon the fixed exchange rate policies and to give the French rural lobby a reality check. Far from being helpless against the power of international capital, a sovereign, currency-issuing state like France at the time still held all the cards.”
10 Are gehiago, “To preserve some semblance of their attachment to the past they adopt ‘austerity-lite’ positions which are smothered in statements about fairness and reducing inequality but they essentially support policy structures that undermine both fairness and increase inequality as well as leaving economies mired in high unemployment and underemployment.”
11 Mitchell-en hitzez, “Mitterrand was a master at cultivating this leftist adulation of an integrated Europe – as a symbol of sophistication and modernity.”
12 Ingelesez: “Any domestic policies that sought to expand employment and increase domestic spending were always going to come up against the Current Account constraint while the central bank was responsible for managing the fixed peg. With rising imports and a widening external deficit, especially in the context of the mercantilist policies of Germany, central bank policy was biased towards higher than preferred interest rates and domestic recession.”
13 Ingelesez: “That was the problem that plagued all the members of the ERM and is why Britain, wisely, bailed out after Black Wednesday – which occurred in September 16, 1992 when the Chancellor Norman Lamont was confronted with an unmanageable pressure on the pound, and wisely restored his own power by leaving the ERM. Britain could then escape the anti-inflationary bias that the German Bundesbank imposed on the currency block and pursue domestic policies.”
14 Ingelesez: “In the same way, the solution for Mitterrand in 1983 was not to abandon full employment policies but to rid the nation of the external constraint imposed on it by the exchange rate arrangement. It would have meant a struggle with the rural lobby as the CAP would have become difficult to manage much less sustain but the French people would have been much better off than they have subsequently become.”
15 Ingelesez: “There is no doubt that if the French had have abandoned membership of the EMS as Britain did in September 1992, it would have been able to implement a substantial proportion of the 100 Propositions. The ‘left’ seem to have formed the view that global finance rules and the nation state is dead. There is no doubt that the development of transnational corporations, which preceded the ideological shift towards neo-liberalism as the free market economists re-emerged from the slime, posed new challenges for sovereign governments.”
16 Blog honetako hurrengo sarreran.
