Afera hau jadanik ukitu dugu blog honetan.
Hasteko, aipa dezadan Bill Mitchell-en artikuluari jarraituz[1], aspaldian egindako sarrera[2].
Eskozian argiago dago kontua, Euskal Herrian baino.
Eskozia batuta dago, ez dago gu bezala bi estatutan eta hiru komunitate ezberdinetan bananduta; banku zentrala dauka, moneta propioa (libra eskoziarra), altxor publikoa…
Moneta subiranoa edukitzea baldintza beharrezko eta nahikoa da Eskozia independentea izateko.
Hortaz, ez dute behar ez EBn sartu eta euro eta beste hamaika baldintza txar onartu, ezta Britainia Handiaren (BH) menpe egon (libra esterlinaren menpe, BHko Altxor Publikoaren menpe).
Afera hauxe da: ba ote dakite eskoziarrek horretaz?
Eta euskaldunok?
Oraintxe, Mitchell-ek beste artikulu eder bat plazaratu berri du[3].
Goazen Mitchell-en artikulu berriarekin…
Atzerritar moneta bat erabiltzeak (kasurako libra esterlina edo eta euroa) menpeko Eskozia bat sortzen du: Britainia Handiarekiko edo Europar Batasunarekiko, Europar Banku Zentralaren bidez).
Mitchell-ek “Eskoziari buruzko moneta aukerak”[4] izeneko lana aipatzen du, non Eskozia independenteko monetarako hiru aukera azaltzen diren:
(i) being part of a sterling currency union
(ii) adopting the euro
(iii) having an independent currency
eta horretarako, solbentzia fiskala aipatzen da, herrialde batek bere zor beharrak bete ditzakeen ala ez aztertuz[5].
Eskozia independente batek moneta ‘sendo’ bat behar du, eta horretarako gobernuaren solbentziak dudarik gabeko izan behar du[6].
Mitchell kritikatzen hasten da: aipatutako guztia gezurra dela[7] esanez.
Moneta jalkitzen duen gobernu baterako, bonu merkatuek ez daukate ezer egitekorik gobernuaren aurrean[8].
Izatez,
“The reality is that government debt-issuance supports the “long-term domestic debt market” not the other way around. That is one of the first myths that need to be dispelled if the public is ever to understand what has been going on before their eyes for decades.”
Solbentziari dagokionez, aipatutako NIESR paperean irakur daitekeenez, solbentzia zorrak ordaintzeko gaitasunari dagokio, zorrak aktibo fisikoen merkatu balioekin lotuta egonez[9].
Mitchell-en erantzuna: Moneta jaulkitzen duen gobernu batek ez du inoiz edukiko solbentziari buruzko arazorik. Sektore pribatuko aurreikuspenek ez dute inongo rolik horretan[10].
Izan ere, “moneta jaulkitzen duen gobernu batek beti bere pasiboak bete ahal ditu, baldin eta haren monetan badaude.[11]”
Eurolandian desberdina da:
“…. the only nations that have encountered any difficulty in terms of selling their government debt are those in the Eurozone, which do not issue their own currency.”
Kontua da desberdintasun hori moneta jaulkitzaile/moneta erabiltzaile dikotomiari dagokiola. EBko estatu guztiak moneta erabiltzaileak dira ez moneta jaulkitzaileak. EBko jaulkitzaile bakarra EBZ da.
Arazo sakonago bat:
“This loose reasoning is typical of the mainstream profession, which fails to understand the fiat monetary system.”
Analisiak segitzen du esanez Eskoziak EBn sartuko dela ahalik eta lasterren eta horretarako Maastricht-eko irizpideak bete behar dituela[12].
Mitchell-en erantzuna:
“They do not have to join the Euro, nor join the EU if they choose not to and the conditions of membership mean they have to impose fiscal austerity which will damage the living standards of its people.”
Fiskalitateari buruz: Eskoziaren kanpo jarduerari dagokio[13].
Eta Eskoziak aukeratzen badu bere moneta propioa jaulkitzea?
“If Scotland chose to issue its own currency … then it could, in theory, create an almost unlimited supply at virtually no cost.”
Mitchell-ek dioenez,
“Yes, that is true. So what is all the discussion about the need to pacify financial markets about?”
Paperak honela segitzen du:
“To assure citizens that it will not abuse this position and possibly cause inflation, states generally grant the central bank independence to deliver government targets.”
Mitchell-en erantzuna:
“No, that is not true. What is required is that the new Scottish government would have to assure its citizens that its fiscal policy aims were to achieve and sustain full employment and no more.”
Banku zentralaren eraketak ez dauka inongo zerikusirik horretan[14].
Hona hemen gogoratzeko puntu batzuk, ingelesez daude baina honezkero ulertzeko modukoak[15].
Eta Mitchell-ek inoiz baino argiago dioenez,
“If Scotland wants to be truly independent it has to have its own currency.”
Orduan, eta soilik orduan,
“Then all the issues about what ratings the public debt would get from the bond markets and the rating agencies and all the rest of the nonsense would fade away into irrelevance.”
Ondorioa: ukapena ala ezjakintasuna?[16]
[4] Ikus http://niesr.ac.uk/press/scotland%E2%80%99s-currency-options-11595#.UnIVSFNHpwv eta http://niesr.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Scotland%E2%80%99s%20Currency%20Options.pdf.
[5] Ingelesez: “The NIESR researchers put their emphasis on fiscal solvency; whether a country can honour its debt obligations.”
[6] Ingelesez: “For an independent Scotland to prosper, it requires a ‘hard’ currency, one in which investors are willing to hold long-dated assets at a reasonable price. A necessary condition for a ‘hard’ currency is that government solvency must be beyond doubt. If this condition is met, then a long-term domestic debt market can develop which supports public finances and financial stability. If it is in doubt, then investors and citizens may choose to hold assets in another currency or simply no longer subscribe to government debt issues.”
[7] Ingelesez: “None of which is true. A truly independent Scotland, issuing its own currency doesn’t need any one to “hold it” other than the residents and others who are forced to pay taxes in that currency.”
“The link between the currency and other “long-dated assets” (that is, government debt) is erroneous. They make the link because they assume that the Scottish government should maintain the charade of issuing debt to feed the corporate welfare recipients as if, somehow, the Scottish government needs the private sector to give it its own currency before it can spend it.”
“Have you ever heard of such nonsense!”
[8] Ikus http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=7838. Ingelesez: “…it is quite clear that it is the sovereign government that is in charge rather than the bond markets.
The government (via the central bank) can simply enforce a yield structure onto bond markets. Like it or lump it. If the bond markets don’t like it then the central bank can buy the debt.
Better still, the government can simply avoid issuing debt altogether and deprive the “bond markets” of the corporate welfare.”
[9] Ingelesez: “Solvency is the ability to repay and service debts determined by the value of assets exceeding liabilities. The value of a nation’s assets is the marketable value of its physical assets and its expected future primary fiscal surpluses plus any seigniorage, while the value of liabilities is its current and likely future debts. Expectations play an important part in judging solvency. In the wake of the financial crisis, the debt burden of many countries has dramatically worsened, leading creditors to question the solvency of even advanced economies much more closely.”
[10] Ingelesez: “There is never a solvency issue for a currency-issuing government no matter how fancy you want to define the condition. Read: never. Expectations of the private sector play no role in that condition.”
[11] Ingelesez: “A currency-issuing government can always meet its liabilities as long as they are in its own currency. Its central bank can continuously run with negative capital (in accounting terms) and what we think about the capacity of that type of government to pay up is irrelevant.”
[12] Ingelesez: “The analysis presented also assumes that Scotland would “join the European Union at the earliest opportunity” and therefore be required to make a “commitment to join the euro, and that timing would be unspecified, but depend on meeting the Maastricht criteria”.
They then spend considerable time estimating that under these conditions, “Scotland would need to run primary surpluses of 3.1% annually order to achieve a Maastricht defined debt to GDP ratio of 60% after 10 years of independence”.”
[13] Ingelesez: “The fiscal position it would have to adopt depends on its external performance, the spending and saving decisions of its private domestic sector and the degree of real resource slack that it inherits.”
[14] Ingelesez: “The arrangements regarding the central bank are irrelevant in that regard.
Why not just say it – there is no liquidity or solvency risk facing a currency-issuing government (where the latter embraces the consolidated treasury and central bank)?”
[15] Ingelesez: “The following points are worth remembering:
A sovereign government in a fiat monetary system has specific capacities relating to the conduct of the sovereign currency. It is the only body that can issue this currency. It is a monopoly issuer, which means that the government can never be revenue-constrained in a technical sense (voluntary constraints ignored). This means exactly this – it can spend whenever it wants to and has no imperative to seeks funds to facilitate the spending.
This is in sharp contradistinctionwith a household (generalising to any non-government entity) which uses the currency of issue. Households have to fund every dollar they spend either by earning income, running down saving, and/or borrowing.
Clearly, a household cannot spend more than its revenue indefinitely because it would imply total asset liquidation then continuously increasing debt. A household cannot sustain permanently increasing debt. So the budget choices facing a household are limited and prevent permanent deficits.
These household dynamics and constraints can never apply intrinsically to a sovereign government in a fiat monetary system.
There is also a sharp distinctionbetween a state within a federal system (which uses the federal currency and has no central banking capacity) and a truly sovereign national government.
A sovereign governmentdoes not need to save to spend – in fact, the concept of the currency issuer saving in the currency that it issues is nonsensical.
A sovereign government can sustain deficits indefinitely without destabilising itself or the economy and without establishing conditions which will ultimately undermine the aspiration to achieve public purpose.
Further, the sovereign government is the sole source of net financial assets (created by deficit spending) for the non-government sector. All transactions between agents in the non-government sector net to zero. For every asset created in the non-government sector there is a corresponding liability created $-for-$. No net wealth can be created. It is only through transactions between the government and the non-government sector create (destroy) net financial assets in the non-government sector.
This accounting reality means that if the non-government sector wants to net save overall in the currency of issue then the government has to be in deficit $-for-$. The accumulated wealth in the currency of issue is also the accounting record of the accumulated deficits $-for-$.
So when the government runs a surplus, the non-government sector has to be in deficit. There are distributional possibilities between the foreign and domestic components of the non-government sector but overall that sector’s outcome is the mirror image of the government balance.”
[16] Ingelesez: “Denial or ignorance – major changes are required within my profession before it starts to serve the people with sound advice that will advance their well-being.”
