Ikasleen eskutitz irekia (Maastricht University)

Ingeles errazean, plain English…

Open Letter to UM

An Open Letter to the Dean of SBE and all Economics Professors at Maastricht University (UM)

(https://pinemaastricht.wordpress.com/pine-open-letter/)

RE: Evidence suggests that UM’s teaching on how banks work is flawed – and why this matters a lot!

Dear Prof. Møllgaard,

Dear Economics Professors,

We are a student-driven initiative at Maastricht University that is eager to improve the economics curriculum. With this open letter, we want to raise your awareness that what is currently taught in economics at UM on how banks work and how money is created is contrary to existing evidence and does not fit with the high-quality education that UM offers. Professors and textbooks at UM teach the mainstream but faulty view of “loanable funds” and “money multiplier”, even though central banks and commercial banks openly admit that those concepts are misleading.

We’d like to present convincing peer-reviewed evidence to demonstrate that both the approaches of “loanable funds” and “money multiplier” are incorrect and unproven, and that teaching these concepts has implications for UM’s education in economics.

What is currently taught

The “loanable funds” approach, which is currently the most dominant one in economics teaching at UM, states that banks are merely intermediaries like other non-bank financial institutions, collecting savings in the form of deposits that are then lent out to willing borrowers. It implies two crucial things. First, it implies that money is a scarce resource and, second, that savings are necessary to grant loans, from which follows that savings finance investment.

According to the “money multiplier” approach, individual banks are mere financial intermediaries that cannot create money individually, but collectively end up multiplying reserves through systemic re-lending and thereby create money. However, the amount of money that could be created is limited by the amount of reserves, which is supply-determined by the central bank.

How banks actually work

Banks individually create money (liquidity) out of nothing by granting a loan. By granting a loan the individual bank extends its balance sheet by creating simultaneously a loan (asset) and a deposit (liability). If a loan contract is fulfilled and paid back, money is destroyed and drained from the monetary circuit. The money creation is neither constrained by savings nor by reserves, but rather by demand for loans as well as by profitability and solvency considerations. What is scarce, is not money nor deposits, but good borrowers.

Central banks contrast textbooks views

All relevant central banks contrasted both views in recent publications, from which we want to present but a few. Their take differs from that of the textbooks used by UM of which representative quotes are presented at the end of this letter. McLeay et al. of the Monetary Analysis Directorate of the Bank of England (2014, p.14) clearly denied the “loanable funds” and “money multiplier” by stating:

Money creation in practice differs from some popular misconceptions — banks do not act simply as intermediaries, lending out deposits that savers place with them, and nor do they ‘multiply up’ central bank money to create new loans and deposits” […] Whenever a bank makes a loan, it simultaneously creates a matching deposit in the borrower’s bank account, thereby creating new money.”.

Likewise has the Deutsche Bundesbank (2017, p.13) put it in one of their monthly reports:

[…] a bank’s ability to grant loans and create money has nothing to do with whether it already has excess reserves or deposits at its disposal. Instead, various economic and regulatory factors constrain the process of money creation. From the perspective of banks, the creation of money is limited by the need for individual banks to lend profitably and also by micro and macroprudential regulations. Non-banks’ demand for credit and portfolio behavior likewise act to curtail the creation of money.”.

Economists and textbooks conclude from the “loanable funds” theory that savings finance investment. A working paper by Kumhof and Jacab (2015, p.II) published by the Bank of England contradicts this view:

[…] if the loan is for physical investment purposes, this new lending and money is what triggers investment and therefore, by the national accounts identity of saving and investment (for closed economies), saving. Saving is therefore a consequence, not a cause, of such lending. Saving does not finance investment, financing does. To argue otherwise confuses the respective macroeconomic roles of resources (saving) and debt-based money (financing).”.

Those statements from central banks actually debunk the textbooks in use at UM as invalid on those points and on all conclusions based on it. However, we’d also like to present empirical evidence from an experiment at a commercial bank.

Empirical Evidence from a commercial bank

Richard Werner (2014) conducted an empirical test, whereby money was borrowed from a cooperating bank, while its internal records were being monitored. Similar to the statements above, the result was, that:

[i]n the process of making loaned money available in the borrower’s bank account, it was found that the bank did not transfer the money away from other internal or external accounts, resulting in a rejection of both the fractional reserve theory [“money multiplier”] and the financial intermediation theory [“loanable funds”]. Instead, it was found that the bank newly ‘invented’ the funds by crediting the borrower’s account with a deposit, although no such deposit had taken place. This is in line with the claims of the credit creation theory.”. (Werner, 2014, p.16)

The director of the cooperating bank, Mr. Rebl, also confirmed the results. (Werner, 2014, p.18)

Dear Prof. Dr. Werner,

Confirmation of Facts

In connection with the extension of credit to you in August 2014 I am pleased to confirm that neither I as director of Raiffeisenbank Wildenberg eG, nor our staff checked either before or during the granting of the loan to you, whether we keep sufficient funds with our central bank, DZ Bank AG, or the Bundesbank. We also did not engage in any such related transaction, nor did we undertake any transfers or account bookings in order to finance the credit balance in your account. Therefore, we did not engage in any checks or transactions in order to provide liquidity.

Yours sincerely,

M. Rebl (Director, Raiffeisenbank Wildenberg e.G.)”

The empirical results are at least representative for the commercial banking system in the EU since all banks conform to identical European bank regulations. However, there is little reason to assume that the fundamental logic does not apply to banks in other economic areas.

Implications for UM’s education in Economics

The consequences of teaching “loanable funds” and “money multiplier” are far-reaching for both economic theory as well as recommended and implemented policies.

First, economic theory based on “loanable funds” and “money multiplier” is not supported by empirical evidence. This applies especially and to a large extent to neoclassical economics, which is currently the most dominant theory in UM’s education in economics. Thus, we earnestly suggest that you – as dean and economics professors – consider conducting an independent investigation on the veracity of the “loanable funds” and “money multiplier” theories as well as of any supporting empirical evidence in an open arena where students and teachers are encouraged to engage in conversation about the progress and outcomes of your inquiry. If this inquiry leads you to come to the same conclusions as we have, we trust that you will adjust the curriculum. We see this to be in line with UM’s dedication to academic skepticism that has led it to deserve its celebrated reputation and international respect by following the principles of scientific inquiry.

Second, the teaching of “loanable funds” and its faulty implication that savings finance investment is likely to bring UM students to wrong conclusions in their future responsibility. As UM students at some point in their career are likely to have the responsibility to give policy recommendations or to reach an important economic decision, they are, unfortunately, bad advised to rely on what they have learned in their study in economics at UM so far.

Thus, we kindly want to ask you for considering to take the lead in making sure the curriculum of all related courses in economics stays fact-based and reflects the most up to date evidence on the processes that are at play in the modern economy. Below, we present evidence that the textbooks currently used don’t reflect the facts on how banks work, and therefore we argue that these books shouldn’t be used until the errata have been pointed out and corrected.

We would be very enthusiastic about discussing this letter and possible opportunities for progressive change with you.

Thanks a lot for considering this letter.

Yours Sincerely,

PINE UCM 

References:

Bundesbank, D. (2017). The role of banks, non-banks and the central bank in the money creation process. Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, 13-33.

Kumhof, M., & Jacab, Z. (2015). Banks are not intermediaries of loanable funds—and why this matters.

McLeay, M., Amar, R., & Thomas, R. (2014). Money creation in the modern economy, Bank of England’s Monetary analysis directorate. Quarterly Bulletin Q1.

Werner, R. A. (2014). Can banks individually create money out of nothing?—The theories and the empirical evidence. International Review of Financial Analysis, 36, 1-19.

Representative Quotes from Books currently in use at UM:

Mishkin (2016) – The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets

A financial intermediary does this by borrowing funds from lender-savers and then using these funds to make loans to borrower-spenders. The ultimate result is that funds have been transferred from […] the lender-savers […] to the borrower-spender with the help of the financial intermediary (the bank). […] The process of indirect financing using financial intermediaries, called financial intermediation, is the primary route for moving funds from lenders to borrowers.” (p. 80)

Szirmai (2015) – Socio-Economic Development

One of the typical problems of developed economies is the match between the willingness to save and the willingness to invest. Financial intermediaries play an important role here. Savings are often deposited with financial institutions such as banks […]. Through long and complex chains of financial institutions and financial markets, these savings are finally channeled to investors.” (p. 291)

Acemoglu et. al (2016) – Economics

Banks and other financial institutions are the economic agents connecting supply and demand in the credit market. Think of it this way: when you deposit your money in a bank account, you do not know who will ultimately use it. The bank pools all of its deposits and uses this pool of money to make many different kinds of loans […].  Banks are the organizations that provide the bridge from lenders to borrowers, and because of this role, they are called financial intermediaries. Broadly speaking, financial intermediaries channel funds from suppliers of financial capital, like savers, to users of financial capital, like borrowers.” (ch. 24.2)

Blanchard et al. (2017) – Macroeconomics, a European perspective

Modern economies are characterised by the existence of many types of financial intermediaries – institutions that receive fund from people and firms and use these funds to buy financial assets or to make loans to other people and firms. The assets of these institutions are the financial assets they own and the loans they have made. Their liabilities are what they owe to the people and firms from whom they have received funds. Banks are one type of financial intermediary.” (p. 75)

Gottfries (2013) – Macroeconomics

So far we have discussed the credit market as if households were lending directly to firms. In practice, however, households seldom do this. Instead, most of the lending goes through banks, which borrow from the households in the form of deposits and lend in the form of bank loans […]. Banks receive deposits from households and firms and lend the money in various forms.“ (p.501)

Varian (2014) – Intermediate Microeconomics

The amount of borrowing or lending in an economy is influenced to a large degree by the interest rate charged. The interest rate serves as a price in the market for loans. We can let D(r) be the demand for loans by borrowers and S(r) be the supply of loans by lenders. The equilibrium interest rate, r∗, is then determined by the condition that demand equal supply: D(r ∗ ) = S(r ∗ ).” (p. 306)

 Montiel (2011) – Macroeconomics in Emerging Markets

[…] financial institutions that act as intermediaries between borrowers and lenders. […] The central point is that in this environment, financial intermediation – the transformation of saving into investment and allocation of risk – is not automatic or costless. […] Their [Bank’s] main activity is on the asset side of their balance sheet […]. How can they do all this? Their key advantage over individuals arises from the benefits of pooling. Pooling gives banks advantages over individuals both as lenders and as borrowers.” (p. 476)

Feenstra & Taylor (2014) – International Macroeconomics

[…] a country ´s central bank controls the money supply. Strictly speaking, by issuing notes […] and private bank reserves, the central bank controls directly only the level of M0. However, […] central bank’s policy tools are sufficient to allow it to control the level of M1 indirectly, but accurately. (p. 77)

PINE Open letter_new

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Oharra:

UEUn badago Diru Teoria Modernoa (DTM), alegia, Modern Money Theory (MMT) zabaltzen eta dibulgatzen duen blog bat, begi aurrean daukazuna.

Iruzkinak (1)

  • joseba

    Ikasle graduatuak eta ekonomia ikasketak
    Bill Mitchell-en The brainwashing of economics graduate students
    (http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=41542)
    I was reminded this week of an interesting studies published in 1987 by Arjo Klamer and David Colander on the influences that go into the training of a professional economist. This study was repeated by Colander in 2005. The results are rather disturbing although obviously I am an ‘insider’ in the sense I went through the process in one way or another myself (although not in a US graduate program). They demonstrate how far removed graduate students are from learning or being interested in the real world. They compete among each other for ‘technical excellence’ in mathematics so they can solve tricky technical problems but do not think it is important to know anything much about the real world economy nor about the economics literature and history of the discipline that has gone before them. They adopt classic Groupthink characteristics as they are moulded (socialised, brainwashed, choose your own word) by their professors (who then feed them into their own networks for employment etc). There is little wonder the profession has very little to say that makes any sense about the real world. It is largely a disgrace.
    Clearly, I have been through this mill myself. It was quite torrid though being a non-orthodox thinker getting through the process where homogenisation is largely expected and enforced (through grades if nothing else).
    In my case, I was good at mathematics and statistics and read widely so I found the orthodox material to be easy. This meant I could get top grades, given the technical nature of the mainstream material (especially in graduate studies), and still have plenty of time to read all manner of things in sociology, philosophy, history, political science etc.
    So I think I came out of it with my humanity somewhat intact.
    I was also from the ‘other side of the tracks’, whereas most of my class mates were from well-to-do backgrounds, mostly from private schools and higher income suburbs.
    So I already knew there was inequality and poverty and that unemployment ravaged households.
    The first study by Arjo Klamer and David Colander – The Making of an Economist – was published in the economics journal Journal of Economic Perspectives (Vol.1, No.2) in the northern Fall of 1987.
    The second study by David Colander – The Making of an Economist Redux – was published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives (Vol.19, No.1) in the northern Winter of 2005.
    Unlike most academic journals, “All issues of the Journal of Economic Perspectives (1987 – present) are now publicly accessible online at no charge, compliments of the American Economic Association.”
    In the earlier study, the authors were interested in:
    … the initiation process that turns students into professional economists.
    I think the term “initiation” is somewhat euphemistic.
    Two years earlier (1985), journalist Robert Kuttner had published an article – The Poverty of Economics – in the February edition of the The Atlantic Monthly that noted:
    Departments of economics are graduating a generation of idiots savants, brilliant at esoteric mathematics yet innocent of actual economic life.
    And that is definitely being euphemistic.
    I have written about how economics programs at university level nurture sociopathological tendencies in the students.
    For example:
    1. Economics curriculum is needed to work against selfishness and for altruism (September 19, 2018).
    2. Humans are intrinsically anti neo-liberal (May 22, 2017).
    Arjo Klamer and David Colander thus set out to examine what goes on in ‘graduate schools’ of economics in order to understand why economists engage in public discourse in the way that they do.
    They compiled a database from a survey of “six top-ranking graduate economic programs—University of Chicago, Columbia University, Harvard University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Stanford University, and Yale University”.
    They followed up with face-to-face interviews.
    Profile of students
    1. “The typical graduate student in economics at these selected institutions is a 26-year-old, middle class, nonreligious white male who is involved in a long-term relationship” (18.9 per cent were female).
    2. “Most had attended highly competitive undergraduate colleges and came from relatively well-to-do families.”
    3. “the majority see themselves as predominantly liberal.”
    This sort of profile is similar to many graduate programs that I have been aware of.
    4. “In terms of future jobs, 53 percent were planning to pursue an academic career, 33 percent were planning to go into policy-related work, 17 percent into business, 8 percent into research institutes, and 2 percent into journalism.”
    5. Peer group pressure was strong and militated against taken jobs with lower wages or less status (such as in public policy work).
    Impact of program
    1. “we can conclude that graduate economics education is succeeding in narrowing students’ interests.”
    2. “Another indication of the narrowing process is that students also felt that graduate school gave them little opportunity for interdisciplinary discussions.”
    The following Table (Table 3 in the article) showed the responses to the question: “Which characteristics will most likely place students on the fast track? Circle one.”
    The authors noted that:
    That question provided some of the most dramatic results of our survey.

    As you can see:
    1. “Knowledge of the economy and knowledge of economic literature do not make an economist successful, according to graduate students”.
    2. “Forty-three percent believed that a knowledge of economic literature was unimportant while only 10 percent felt that it was very important. Sixty-eight percent believed that a thorough knowledge of the economy was unimportant …”
    In the interviews that followed, the students confirmed this result.
    The authors note:
    Clearly these results raise significant questions about the nature of graduate school, what is being taught, and the socialization process that occurs.
    The most important things governing perceptions of success were “Being smart in the sense of being good at problem-solving” and “Excellence in mathematics”.
    Which raises the question – what problems are being solved? Certainly not those that relate much to the real world.
    In fact, what mainstream economics has come down to at the graduate level is a cute game, which former IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard summarised in his August 2008 article – The State of Macro as being an exercise in following:
    … strict, haiku-like, rules … [the economics papers] … look very similar to each other in structure, and very different from the way they did thirty years ago …
    Graduate students are trained to follow these ‘haiku-like’ rules, that govern an economics paper’s chance of publication success.
    So if an article submission does not conform to this haiku-like structure it has a significantly diminished chance of publication.
    So we get a formulaic approach to publications in macroeconomics that goes something like this:
    Assert without foundation – so-called micro-foundations – rationality, maximisation, RATEX.
    Cannot deal with real world people so deal with one infinitely-lived agent!
    Assert efficient, competitive markets as optimality benchmark.
    Write some trivial mathematical equations and solve.
    Policy shock ‘solution’ to ‘prove’, for example, that fiscal policy ineffective (Ricardian equivalence) and austerity is good. Perhaps allow some short-run stimulus effect.
    Get some data – realise poor fit – add some ad hoc lags (price stickiness etc) to improve ‘fit’ but end up with identical long-term results.
    Maintain pretense that micro-foundations are intact – after all it is the only claim to intellectual authority.
    Publish articles that reinforce starting assumptions.
    Knowledge quotient – ZERO – GIGO.
    This is why the publication bias problem in mainstream macroeconomics is so significant.
    As Klamer and Colander note, the students become experts at “problem solving”:
    … but it is technical problem-solving which has more to do with formal modeling techniques than with real world problems. To do the problems little real world knowledge of institutions is needed, and in many cases such knowledge would actually be a hindrance since the simplifying assumptions would be harder to accept.
    Klamer and Colander found in the interviews that students harboured:
    a strong sense that economics was a game and that hard work in devising relevant models that demonstrated a deep understanding of institutions would have a lower payoff than devising models that were analytically neat; the facade, not the depth of knowledge, was important.
    By the time these students graduate and enter the world as professional economists they become less questioning:
    … graduate students tend to qualify their conclusions … much more than do most American economists.
    One interview response in relation to the dearth of real world application of their studies was:
    If you really know your theory, the policy implications are pretty straightforward. It’s not really the really challenging meat and potato stuff for a really sharp theorist.
    This is a really outrageous statement. Because it suggests that an abstract theory, which is not even consistent internally, and lacks any correspondence to the real world, can deliver anything that will help governments advance the well-being of people.
    It cannot.
    The theory in question delivers self-fulfilling outcomes through the internal logic of the ‘theory’.
    If we set up the experiment such that the basic assumption is that Policy X will cause harm and then find Policy X causes harm in the constrained abstract world we play around with and think we have said anything about the real world then we are deluding ourselves.
    The Groupthink that dominates mainstream economics blinds the participants to any realisation of how far removed they are from the reality they, ultimately, prognosticate about.
    While I use the term Groupthink, Klamer and Colander refer to a “socialisation process” that permeates graduate school economics.
    Other words include: indoctrination, brainwashing … take your pick.
    In the followup article – The Making of an Economist Redux – published in 2005, David Colander sought to update the earlier study.
    Not much had changed with the profile of the students surveyed and interviewed.
    There were some changes in the “Perceptions of Success” outcomes.
    Here is a comparison of the 1987 and 2005 outcomes (Table 1 from David Colander’s paper).

    The author says that the Table “summarizes my perception of the changes that have occurred in the profession over the last 15 years … Economics … has become more consciously empirical”.
    Refer back to my haiku list as to what that actually means.
    One cannot, for example, do any sensible empirical work on financial stability, if there is no financial sector in the major models that inform the empirical analysis.
    That was the case of the dominant New Keynesian approach to macroeconomics – no banks, no unemployment.
    One can do ’empirical work’ until the cows come home but if one is just ‘counting the number of angels on the top of a pinhead’ then there is little worth to come from it.
    As you see in the last Table, a majority of graduate students in economics do not think a thorough knowledge of the economy to be important.
    Finally, David Colander noted that in the past:
    … the core macro course still focused on macro policy … The current study shows that that is no longer the case; today, most of the macro courses never discussed macro policy, and since micro students never take advanced field courses in macro, they are taught no macro policy …
    … the differences in policy views on macro that showed up in the survey did not reflect what they were taught about policy in macro, since they were taught almost nothing about macro policy, but reflected their undergraduate training.
    Which is a dire result.
    The simplistic undergraduate approach to macroeconomics delivers the sort of trash that we read in financial columns.
    You know with headlines like Zimbabwe, and now, Venezuela.
    The fact that macroeconomics is not necessarily considered part of “core” learning in economics and that “Eliminating macro from the core would free up resources” is a desperate thought.
    Each day, the news stories are about macroeconomics.
    Mass unemployment is a macro outcome. You cannot understand a systemic failure to create enough jobs by studying microeconomics, which tells us that all outcomes are the result of individual maximising behaviour in the face of income constraints.
    Conclusion
    I am hoping that the work the core MMT group have been doing over the last 25 odd years will eventually permeate into the mainstream curriculum.
    Our textbook comes out in a week or so.
    It is a two-year sequence in macroeconomics – full of theory, history, rhetoric, techniques, and policy.
    I hope to be able to launch the MMT University Project later in the year if I can raise sufficient funding.
    I will be conducting classes at the University of Helsinki on February 26-28 and March 5-7 in Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) using the book.
    While the lectures are part of a university degree (in my role as Professor of Global Political Economy at the University of Helsinki) – they are open to the public and I would welcome anyone to attend.
    It is now likely that I will also be in London to launch our text book on Friday, March 1 – more details to follow.
    There is hope as we duck and weave on a daily basis these days as the Zimbabwe or Venezuela darts come flying at us.

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