Brexit-ez beste behin

Sarrera: Europar Batasunaz beste behin (gehi Brexit)


Bill Mitchell-en And Brexit…

The EU is neoliberal to its core and captured by corporate interests


There is some Twitter back and forth (I minimise my involvement) about Brexit – particularly, whether I still maintain that a no deal Brexit is a superior option.

The answer is Yes – but as regular readers will know – my position has always been conditional.

If you trace through my several blog posts on the topic dating back to June 2016 with these blog posts:

1. Britain should exit the European Union (June 22, 2016).

2. Why the Leave victory is a great outcome (June 27, 2016).

3. Brexit signals that a new policy paradigm is required including re-nationalisation (July 13, 2016).

and then several more, you will find no uncertainty or wavering in my view.

First, I have provided several examples of how the Project Fear predictions of immediate collapse were unfounded and just blatant lying.

That includes the predictions from the vast majority of professional economists working within the Academy and institutions such as HM Treasury and the Bank of England. They all got it wrong.

Second, my assessment that Brexit was the superior option has always been conditional.

In my immediate post-Referendum blog post – Why the Leave victory is a great outcome (June 27, 2016) – I wrote:

(Ikus Zer dela eta Brexit emaitza handia den)

the choice will not free Britain from neo-liberalism but it does bring the debate back into focus – voter face to face with the British politicians.

There are no guarantees that the decision to leave the European Union will lead to good outcomes, by which I mean help those who have been disenfranchised by the neo-liberal system.

There are scenarios that would lead to the conclusion that exactly the opposite might occur. Indeed, UKIP has every right to claim it ‘won’ and to further pursue its racist plans.

And the right-wing Tories who have always hated Europe might push for even greater ‘competition’ and cuts to government spending and services, which would further undermine the fortunes of the weak and precarious.

Bosses might push for further cuts to wages and conditions.

And I wrote:

When I tweeted it was a ‘great outcome’ I didn’t say that good would come out of it. I also didn’t suggest that it would be a short-term recovery of prosperity or that the workers would benefit.

I was referring to the fact that class struggle now has a clearer focus within the British political debate. There is now a dynamic for a truly progressive leadership to emerge and bring the disenfranchised along with them and wipe out the neo-liberal hydra once and for all.

That is why the Brexit vote is excellent. British politics is now in chaos. How it sorts itself out will determine what the outcome leads to.

But progressive leadership now has space to challenge the orthodoxy. That is a great outcome.

It might take time to emerge and crystallise. But class struggle does not yield instant rewards.

But I see the Brexit choice as one of those monumental outcomes similar to the OPEC oil crises in the early 1970s that change the course of history. I do not need to remind anyone that the Monetarists exploited the OPEC chaos to capture undeserved credibility and pursue the neo-liberal agenda.

So always conditional.

Since then I have consistently indicated that Brexit could turn out to be a disaster for Britain. But it won’t be because it leaves the European Union.

It will be because it maintains the neoliberalism of the EU and consolidates that within its newly freed legislative remit.

All the Project Fear claims about trucks being stranded, soccer teams not able to get players, cancer rates rising, shops running out of food and all the rest of it are pure lies.

I also don’t think it is in the interests of Britain to let the EU dominate the withdrawal agreement. The sort of outcomes that appear to be forthcoming from that process are inferior to a No Deal Brexit. I maintain that position.

Britain should tell the EU what it is going to do and leave it at that.

While the neoliberal bullies in the EU will make threats about closing borders to trade etc, the Bavarian motor vehicle manufacturers, for example, will ensure (through the corporate lobbying exposed by the CEO Report) that the German government and then its influence on the European Commission etc, will not fulfill those threats.

They know they have a lot to lose if Brussels was to play politics with a Britain intent on leaving without pernicious agreements.

And assessing that Brexit in the short-run might cause disruption does not mean it will be an inferior option in the longer term, once British politics reorients itself away form the EU capture.

And, I realise that as an Australian living away from Europe, I have no particular ‘skin’ in the game other than my overall global concern for humanity.

I am sympathetic to those caught up in the Brexit imbroglio.

But attacking me because of that misunderstands the role of an intellectual. As an academic, I have a responsibility to bring knowledge to public debates to ensure they are evidence-based.

I have spent years studying Europe and I would suspect I understand the situation there as well as most. I never write about topics I do not feel qualified to comment.

Which is one reason I haven’t written about Venezuela, for example. I am doing on-going research on that topic to bring myself up to speed on the history, culture, politics and economics of that situation.

It is also odd, that the ‘you don’t live here’ argument is made by so-called ‘internationalists’ who extol the desire to create cosmopolitan unities that span the borders of nation states.

Gogoratu ondoko hauek:

Brexit-ez, hitz batzuk

Britainia Handia eta Katalunia, Brexit tartean

Iruzkinak (1)

  • joseba

    Bank of England eta Brexit
    Bill Mitchell-en Bank of England backtracks on its doomsday Brexit scenarios
    Earlier this month (March 5, 2019), the Governor of the Bank of England fronted the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs for his annual grilling. The details of his evidence, covered in the transcript produced – Uncorrected oral evidence: Annual session with the Governor of the Bank of England – should have generated headlines in all the major British press outlets but the UK Guardian, noticeably, avoided reporting the details. The Guardian has jumped on every negative projection since before the 2016 Referendum and published volumes of Op Ed pieces from various correspondents amplifying the negativity. But it largely failed to report the Mark Carney’s backtracking. Turns out that the Bank of England thinks Brexit will be considerably less damaging than its headlined Project Fear estimates published last November, And that is without factoring in any fiscal response from government. It seems that the Bank now believes that a no-deal (disorderly) Brexit won’t be all that damaging at all and an orderly Brexit would be associated with an over-full employment boom over the next three years. Quite a different story to that offered in November 2018. The latest revelations will give Remainers some headaches – their collapse scenarios are evaporating.
    I have long held the view that the real problem confronting the British economy has been the neoliberal policy positions taken by the current government which has reduced the incentive of British firms to invest in new productive infrastructure and equipment.
    While the Remainers have been hysterical in their focus on the damage that the Brexit decision has ’caused’ (their assertion), and, seize on all the ridiculously overblown estimates coming from the likes of HM Treasury, the Bank of England and other private groups, such as the NIESR, to prosecute their case, the real game has been the decline in business investment and the reliance on increasing household debt as the austerity straitjacket has been tightened.
    Note, that, unlike many of the Remainers who just want to overturn the Leave decision in any way they can, I distinguish between the decision to leave (the Referendum result) and the incompetent process that the Tories have pursued in implementing that decision.
    I continue to fully support the Leave decision but find the process so ridiculously mismanaged that it is little wonder that the long-standing pessimism of investors (firms), driven by the painful austerity, has been exacerbated.
    In other words, I do not believe the decision to leave, itself, would not have undermined confidence in any significant way had the British government displayed even the most basic of negotiating skills against the EU, which was intent on making it as hard as possible to leave.
    Before I consider the Governor’s remarks, I recap what the real problem in Britain is – and it is not Brexit!
    The British Investment ratio
    The next graph shows the UK investment ratio (total capital formation as a percent of GDP) from the March-quarter 1997 to the December-quarter 2018.
    The dotted red line is the average ratio over that period.
    The drop associated with the GFC is quite stunning. It went from 18 per cent of GDP in the December-quarter 2007 to 14.8 per cent by the December-quarter 2009.
    This huge cyclical swing tells us how deep the GFC recession was in the UK. Real GDP growth was negative for 5 successive quarters starting in the June-quarter 2008.
    The British economy shrunk by 6.3 percentage points between the March-quarter 2008 to the September-quarter 2009.
    But the current sluggishness does not bode well for future growth, given that potential GDP growth will be slowing as a result of the weak investment performance.
    Investment expenditure contributes to aggregate demand (spending) now and builds productive capacity (supply) for the future.
    The investment ratio, however, is around the same level as it was when the Brexit referendum was held in June 2016. It has fallen from 16.9 per cent to 16.7 per cent since the Referendum and is now at the average level for the period shown in the graph.
    So while the GFC and subsequent austerity certainly has damaged the investment ratio, it is hard to implicate the Brexit decision and subsequent process in the performance of the investment ratio to date.

    The British Productivity Slump
    How has the investment slump impacted on productivity growth?
    While not part of the current National Accounts release from the ONS, their January 9, 2019 update of the productivity data is related to the investment slowdown. Note that this data only goes to the third-quarter 2018. The next update will be on April 5, 2019.
    I analysed the productivity slump in Britain in this blog post – British productivity slump – all down to George Osborne’s austerity obsession (October 18, 2017).
    I have updated that analysis today using the latest ONS data available – HERE.
    The following graph shows UK Whole economy output per hour worked from the first-quarter 1990 to the September-quarter 2018. The same sort of pattern emerges if we use the output per person employed measure.
    The cyclical swings throughout this extended period are evident and the size of the GFC downturn is obvious.
    The point is that British labour productivity growth slumped during the GFC, and, then stalled as a result of the austerity that was imposed in the aftermath of the recession.
    A shallower slump followed and pre-dates, by some years, the Brexit referendum.
    Further, in recent quarters, British productivity has actually been rising steadily and has consistently done so since the June 2016 Referendum, albeit at a modest rate, although it fell slightly (0.4 points) in the September-quarter 2019.
    In other words, the poor British productivity performance has little to do with the Brexit referendum outcome or what has followed.

    Structural explanations of this slump are also unlikely to have traction. The massive cyclical contraction pushed British productivity growth of its past trend. Structural factors work more slowly and we would not witness such a fall if they were implicated.
    Why would that cause productivity growth to slump then fail to recover?
    A major driver of productivity is investment – both public and private.
    While business investment is cost sensitive (so may respond to interest rate changes), mainstream economists usually ignore the fact that expectations of earnings are also important as are asymmetries across the cycle.
    Cyclical asymmetries mean (in this context) that investment spending drops quickly when economic activity declines and typically takes a longer period to recover. So fast drop and slow recovery.
    The cyclical asymmetries in investment spending arise because investment in new capital stock usually requires firms to make large irreversible capital outlays.
    I also discussed that phenomenon in detail in the blog post – British productivity slump – all down to George Osborne’s austerity obsession (October 18, 2017) – which gives additional references to earlier academic work I have published on this topic.
    The point is that when the economy experiences a sharp contraction, there is a necessity for strong fiscal support to rebuild confidence among firms that it will be worthwhile investing in new capacity.
    Exactly the opposite happened in the UK with George Osborne pursuing his ideological obsession for fiscal surpluses (and failing).
    Imposing pro-cyclical fiscal austerity of the scale that George Osborne initiated when the Tories came took government in May 2010 is the last thing a government should do when non-government spending is in retreat.
    Fiscal austerity in these circumstances exacerbates the typical asymmetry associated with investment expenditure and is a major reason why business investment in the UK has been so weak.
    We often focus on the short-term negative impacts of fiscal austerity, but in this case, it also has serious long-term impacts on both the rate of business investment and the potential growth rate (which falls as capital formation stalls).
    The longer it takes for business investment to recover, the worse will be the long-term impact on potential GDP growth. In turn, this means that the inflation biases are increased because full capacity is reached sooner in a recovery – often before all the idle labour is absorbed.
    So, while George Osborne is long gone, the negative impacts of his policy folly will reverberate for a long time to come. His failings will continue on for many years and the flat productivity growth is one manifestation of that failing.
    What the Governor said
    During his oral evidence to the Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs, the Bank of England governor was interrograted about the Bank’s view of the Brexit situation.
    In the – Transcript – we read that:
    1. “the bulk of the speech was about the global outlook” – in other words, the Governor thought the fact that “the global economy has been slowing over the last half of the year” was a more significant focus for attention than being sidetracked by domestic issues (Brexit).
    2. He noted that “Less than a third of the globe is growing above trend, investment growth is quite modest and indeed is stagnant in some economies, and trade growth has slowed quite markedly as well.” – which mostly explains, together with the on-going fiscal austerity in Britain, why British growth has been stalling.
    3. He mentioned Brexit in the context of “the short-term global outlook”.
    4. He noted that “Any trade globalisation creates tensions in terms of inequalities; there are winners and losers and there is a requirement for redistribution or, at a minimum, reinvestment” and that fiscal austerity, of the scale introduced in Britain, exacerbates these losses for some workers and their communities.
    5. He agreed that his preference was that the UK becomes “a rule-setter” rather than “being a rule-taker within an international context”.
    The discussion then focused on the Bank’s own Brexit assessments.
    It was noted that “in November the Bank published its assessment of different withdrawal scenarios for Brexit” which I considered, in part, in this blog post – Britain’s austerity costs are larger than any predicted Brexit losses (March 4, 2019).
    On November 28, 2018, the so-called independent Bank of England published its own horror story to go with the HM Treasury’s report released in the same month – EU withdrawal scenarios and monetary and financial stability.
    The Report presented various “scenarios” relating to Brexit – a “disruptive” scenario and a “disorderly” scenario (distinguished by the extent to which trade agreements were sustained) – with the real GDP loss of 5 per cent and inflation rising to over 4 per cent in the first case; and real GDP contracting by 8 per cent and inflation rising to 7.5 per cent in the second case.
    The period over which these losses would be sustained over a period of “up to five years”.
    In formulating these ‘scenarios’, the Bank assumed that:
    1. “no discretionary changes in spending or tax policy are assumed” – in other words, the Government passively watches the economy plunge into recession.
    2. The central bank hikes interest rates “mechanically” and in some scenarios the interest rate rises to 5.5 per cent.
    It was, of course, a ridiculous exercise but fuelled the Remain hysteria.
    If one thought about it for a second: the scenarios posited that external trade would collapse, credit availability would tighten, macroeconomic uncertainty would increase and choke off household consumption spending and business investment, and, as a result GDP growth would nose-dive and inflation would rise.
    And while that was happening, they were assuming that the Treasury would sit idle while the Bank of England would hike interest rates to 5.5 per cent.
    It was not believable.
    In reply to the question about the November ‘scenarios’, the Governor noted:
    1. “these are scenarios, not forecasts”.
    2. “we did the scenarios, apart from the fact that we were asked to divulge them. The reason we do the scenarios is to test the system … so we can be assured that financial institutions will be in a position to withstand a shock like that, however unlikely.”
    I found that interesting – the Treasury required the Bank to “divulge” the scenarios and knew them to be highly political. This demonstrates the obvious point I make often that the central banks are not independent institutions.
    Claiming independence is just an act of depoliticisation. The Treasury knew that their own estimates would be given a credibility boost if the Bank was forced to disclose similar estimates.
    It was a jointly coordinated stunt to put further pressure on the Brexit process.
    3. The Governor then disclosed that:
    Since we released those scenarios in November, there have been some constructive developments in preparedness … procedures—have been put in place, plus an initial approach in the UK, which would reduce security and other checks at the border, in effect creating the prospect of roll-off behaviour at the border for a period of time …
    There has been progress on the financial side: material progress in the derivative markets. Alongside the ECB and ultimately the Commission, with the Treasury’s help, there has been important progress on cleared derivatives, which has reduced some of the financial risk …
    And the implication of these developments?
    … would pull back somewhere between 2% and 3.5% of those losses depending on the scenario … My point is that there has been progress in preparedness, which reduces … the level of economic shock. Again, it is a matter of judgment. There is false precision in all these numbers.
    In other words, even on the Bank’s own terms a disorderly, no-deal Brexit would be only result in 50 per cent of the GDP losses predicted in November 2018.
    A Lord Kerr noted that “the labels ‘disruptive’ and ‘disorderly’” should be dropped because they “may be a bit emotive” and then asked Carney “which of the scenarios now seems more plausible”.
    The Governor replied:
    … it depends on the extent to which we are in control of events … whether … clear steps are taken to mitigate and manage it.
    So if the assumptions noted above relating to government inaction did not hold, and the Government, instead, used its fiscal capacity to support aggregate spending, it is entirely possible (and likely) that real GDP growth would remain positive even with a no deal Brexit.
    The Bank can no longer rule that out.
    He was also asked about the inflation estimates in the November Brexit scenarios.
    Lord Sharkey noted that “in the Bank’s February inflation report suggested an interest rate rise of 0.25% over the next three years compared to the 0.75% rise that was expected in November 2018”.
    The Governor responded by saying that the global slowdown has altered the expected trajectory of inflation for Britain and created “a degree of slack … in this economy” which “would be consistent with a reduced degree of interest-rate tightening”.
    But then he said that:
    In our forecast, inflation is above target throughout the horizon and remains above target at year 3. By the end of the forecast, which of course is presumed on some form of Brexit deal and a smooth transition to that, the economy is growing at 2%, above our estimate of trend; the economy is in excess demand, so it is more than in full employment and factories are running hot, if I can put it that way, and inflation is above target. In other words, the path of interest rates is not firm enough or quite high enough to be consistent with us fulfilling our mandate, which sends a broad signal about the stance of policy.
    So while he admitted that it would be “foolish” for the bank “to raise interest rates … when the economy was weak and inflation was under control” the likely outcome is that once Britain transitions to “some form of Brexit deal” the economy will be growing strongly and all the rest of it.
    So the Remain argument that Brexit per se is a disaster for the British economy is not shared by the Bank of England. In fact, Carney claims the economy will be “running hot” under an orderly exit.
    The UK Guardian did not give this evidence much scope at all whereas The Times and Bloomberg featured the hearing.
    That should pose questions for bias in the editorial policy of the UK Guardian. They are quick to headline doomsday scenarios such as when the Bank first published its November ‘scenarios’ but reluctant to give space to pro-Brexit or nuanced-Brexit analysis.
    The fact that in the Bank’s assessment, a worst-case Brexit scenario would lead to 3.5 per cent GDP loss over three years, without any government response, suggests that with a strong government intervention, the losses would be small if at all.
    And, with an orderly Brexit, the Bank estimates boom-time conditions.
    Where is the Remain argument then?
    Tweet away.
    Of course, I don’t see any of these impacts. The real problem is not Brexit (one way or another) but the austerity bias choking the economy.
    That has to be relaxed for Britain to return to more robust growth.

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