Ezkerra Portugalen

Albistea: Hope for the Portuguese Left1

Hauteskundeak Portugalen.

Emaitzak2:

Garaileak eskuinekoak (botoen % 36,9): “German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble celebrating the victory of austerity policies.”

Sozialistak: % 32,4

Ezkerra erradikala, Left Bloc, igoz (% 10,2)

Iruzkinak:

(i) EBZ-k emandako diru laguntza (Greziak jaso ez zuena)3

(ii) Langabeziaren balizko jaitsiera4

(iii) Alderdi sozialistaren porrota5

Eta ezkerra?

Left Bloc, Ezkerreko Blokea: % 10,2

Alderdi komunista6: % 8,2

Iruzkina:

Ezkerreko Blokea igoz joan da7, programa argi batekin8.

Europako Batasunari buruz eta euroaz aritzen den azken puntua garrantzi handiko izan da, Syriza-ren esperientzia kontuan hartuz9.

Euroarekiko oso kritikoak izan dira10, “with a clear anti-austerity program11.”

Eta alderdi sozialista? Galduta eta eskuinekoekin batera, laster12.

Ezkerra dela eta, etorkizunerako esperantza bakarra Ezkerreko Blokean omen datza…


1 Ikus https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/10/left-bloc-portugal-austerity-social-democracy/.

2 Ikus Portugal election: centre-right coalition retains power but could lose majority: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/04/portugal-election-ruling-centre-right-coalition-headed-for-victory.

3 Ingelesez: “The first factor was the Public Sector Purchase Program, which the European Central Bank introduced just before the elections and which reduced interest rates, allowing Portugal to fulfill the criteria imposed by the troika without having to ask for a second bailout. Greece, of course, never received help of this sort. This was a political maneuver by the European institutions to prevent a destabilizing upsurge from the Left.”

4 Ingelesez: “Another factor was the perceived drop in unemployment (“perceived,” because the reports were based on dubious accounting), a market upsurge (even while debt grew from 80 to 120 percent of GDP), the government’s clever, non-confrontational election strategy, and the country’s lack of a strong anti-austerity movement over the past two and a half years capable of resisting mainstream narratives about the need for shared sacrifice and support for the austerity program.”

5 Ingelesez: “… The Socialist Party completely failed to assert themselves as a strong opposition party, fueling the sense that there was no real alternative. Not only was their political program unclear and hardly any different from the Right’s, their electoral campaign was weak, filled with mistakes and contradictory statements. The PS’s leadership — expected to be strong and able to capitalize on social discontent — proved itself incompetent.”

6 Ingelesez: “The PCP’s results are not a surprise. The party has maintained steady electoral support for many years.”

7 Ingelesez: “… the Left Bloc is the only “winner” of this election. Coming off a bad showing in the 2011 elections  — in which it netted only 5.2 percent, losing almost half its support from 2009 — and a serious internal political crisis, the organization seems to be slowly recovering, disproving many who thought it would disappear from the Portuguese political map. “

8 Ukitutako gaiak: “…l abor and precarity, migration, social security, dismantling of the social state and privatizations, pensions, and — crucially — questions around debt restructuring, Europe, and the euro.”

9 Ingelesz: “This last point is crucial. The Left Bloc has been refining its position toward the European Union (EU) and the euro. The expectation that the “Syriza effect” would harm the growth of the Left turned out to be mistaken. Although the other political forces tried to frame the Left Bloc as irresponsible and lacking credible solutions — stating that even the Syriza-led government had to accept that there are no other alternatives to austerity — the Left Bloc was capable of shifting this narrative by placing the political responsibility on the European elites, while at the same time strengthening its critique of the EU and the euro.”

10 Ingelesez: “… denouncing the democratic limitations of the EU and stating clearly that we will make no more sacrifices for the euro, while at the same time growing electorally, means that there is a fundamental opening of political space for the euro-critical radical left.”

11 Are gehiago, “…  also trying to reach out to those who are disillusioned with the current political system…” Ikus Asking the Right Questions (https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/greece-syriza-tsipras-elections-euro-left-strategy-die-linke/):

The Limits of the “European Project”:

Negotiating” from a left-wing stance has yielded little, and the margin for maneuver has shrunk exponentially. The only alternative is to think outside the bounds of the eurozone. This is not an easy task. What some have called “euro-fetishism” has a very concrete material basis — it is the result of thirty years of destruction of the periphery’s productive sectors, and their substitution by credit and over-dependency on European funds.

Understanding that there is more than one way to exit the eurozone is to recenter the discussion on the political level. How do we build a popular movement of the Left that can link with common projects in the rest of the continent, imagine alternatives to this financial prison we have been stuck in, and fight the emerging far right and nationalist tendencies throughout Europe?

12 Ingelesez: “What’s clear is that a government will be formed (…) This means that it’s only a matter of time before the PS compromises itself by voting in parliament for the right wing’s austerity. Once again, they have proven that they are no alternative.”

Iruzkinak (1)

Utzi erantzuna

Zure e-posta helbidea ez da argitaratuko. Beharrezko eremuak * markatuta daude