Grezia: hauteskunde osteko albiste gehiago

Hasteko, ikus Grezia: hauteskunde osteko lehen albisteak1.

Segida:

(i) Nork irabazi eta nork galdu?2

And the big winner of the Greek elections last night…New Democracy. The big loser was the winner of the elections, Alexis Tsipras and SYRIZA.
In an election that no one wanted to win,
SYRIZA was given the honor of running the German colony known as the Hellenic Republic for a few more years
.”

(ii) Syrizak irabazi ote zuen?3

(…) I think that part of the popular disenchantment that I described earlier carried over to this new party. Laiki Enotiti or Popular Unity was hoping that it would capitalize on a certain percentage of voters who had voted no in the referendum back in July and who were likely not represented anymore by Syriza and its policies, or by any of the other major parties.
(…) The reality is that
there’s numerous Greek and non-Greek economists who have presented very detailed proposals for how a country like Greece could depart from the eurozone, return to a national currency, do this in an orderly manner, and to allow–and these proposals have included policies, policy proposals, that would be geared toward allowing the Greek economy to recover after such an event
.
And the reality is that such proposals have gotten absolutely zero airplay in Greece on TV, on the radio, in the newspapers, in the press. Basically any discussion of any sort of alternate policy that differs in any way from what the mainstream parties have been enforcing for the past few years, and that includes Syriza as we saw in the past few months, any alternative debate is essentially stifled by the Greek media. And as a result Greek voters go to the polls, this was the case in January and this is the case again today, with a very incomplete set of information upon which they can base their selection.
(…)
There have been many efforts by both politicians and the media in Greece to essentially terrorize Greek voters about the consequences of what would happen if they chose a different path politically. And of course there’s also the apathy that we talked about before, the fact that almost half of the registered voters did not vote
…”

(iii) Greziako hauteskundeak: lehen pentsamenduak4

Popular Unity underestimated that a great part of the defeated and betrayed “people of the No” voted not to signal continued resistance but within the limits of a “nothing can really change” mentality, opting to accept Tsipras’s call for a “second chance” and let Syriza rather than New Democracy oversee the new memorandum.
Popular Unity thought that the split in the party would have also meant a proportional split in the electoral following of Syriza. But in reality, the relations of representation proved to be more complex. The fact that there was a delay and backtracks regarding the exit from Syriza never helped things either.
Popular Unity also failed to effectively appeal to the anger of a youth with no future and to the silent feeling of despair and disappointment that led many voters to abstention or choices such as the Center Union.
We did not manage to turn Popular Unity into the necessary new front, the kind of front that would engage seriously in debate and in action about the problems inherited from Syriza. We seemed more like a variation of a Syriza that would have been faithful to its principles, rather than a new front coming organically from the movement and the dynamics of social antagonism. The lack of self-criticism regarding the participation of Left Platform members in the Syriza government also contributed to this image.
We failed during the campaign to insist on what perhaps was our strongest point, namely the fact that we had an alternative narrative regarding the annulment of debt and exit from the eurozone. People wanted to hear a complete program and a road map for the exit from the eurozone, not simply anti-austerity and anti-memoranda rhetoric.
Popular Unity failed to open up to all forms of radicalism emerging out of the crisis of Syriza and also from the experiences of the movement. Moreover, the actual problems of communication between different sensitivities and varieties of left radicalism, both inside and outside Syriza, remained, including the fact that the Left Platform leadership was more suspicious than it should have been of other tendencies and failed to realize the need for an open appeal to all potential Popular Unity participants. Moreover, the formation failed to offer enough guarantees that it would be open and democratic, free of the bureaucratic logic that plagued Syriza.
However, the elections are over. Ahead of us are the implementation of the third memorandum and a new round of aggressive austerity and neoliberal reforms. We are facing the challenge of rebuilding the movement and also the confidence in the ability of the movement to win.”

(iv) Berri emango dio Greziako gobernuak Greziako jendeari ala Alemaniako gobernuari?5

It’s a government with as much power to make decisions as you and me.
Does it matter who is in what ministry? Not really.
All decisions are now made by Brussels technocrats and in specific German officials
. This cabinet is for show.”

(v) Tsipras eta Greziako zorra6

“… Alexis Tsipras, is out with more promises to save the country he betrayed by signing the memorandum number 3 only a few months ago.
Tsipras 1.0 was all about destroying EU austerity
.
Tsipras 2.0 was all about how he saved the country by having to sign the most brutal austerity program to date
.
Tsipras 3.0 seems to be about cutting Greece’s massive debt with the zero leverage that SYRIZA commands over Greece’s German rulers
.”

Paradisu galdua, eta ez gara ari Marcel Proust-i buruz!


2 Ikus Congratulations New Democracy, you lost the Greek elections. 45% of Greeks did not care enough to vote: http://redpilltimes.com/congratulations-new-democracy-you-lost-the-greek-elections-45-of-greeks-did-not-care-enough-to-vote/.

5 Ikus Greece’s new cabinet will be sworn in on Wednesday. Will they report to the Greek people or German government?: http://redpilltimes.com/greeces-new-cabinet-will-be-sworn-in-on-wednesday-will-they-report-to-the-greek-people-or-german-government/.

6 Ikus Tsipras’ new election promise…cut the Greek debt. Good luck with that Alexis: http://redpilltimes.com/tsipras-new-election-promise-cut-the-greek-debt-good-luck-with-that-alexis/.

Iruzkinak (3)

  • joseba

    The total Greek election farce – RIP democracy

    http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=31939

    Last weekend, the Greece people (or a declining proportion of them) elected a new national government. It was a farce. There was no competing electoral mandates sought. The population know what is in store for them. The policy mandate in force wasn’t even supported by popular vote. It comes from the Troika, which now effectively governs the Colony of Greece. The new Prime Minister, who sold the people out prior to the election, is now talking about making changes. Yeh, right! He is now just a tool for the Troika. National elections where the people do not vote for anything much don’t look like a healthy democracy to anyone who isn’t in denial as to what has been going on. Democracy is about the people being able to change governments that do them harm. In the Eurozone that is an old-fashioned idea. National elections have become a sop, a pretense. And the people knew it and stayed away in droves. The Greek election was a total farce – democracy died.
    (…)

    … that the ‘left’ (by which I mean those who advocate progressive views on almost everything) are lost when it comes to economic understanding about the alternatives to membership of the Eurozone.

  • joseba

    Beyond Reform vs. Rupture

    https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/09/tsipras-greece-eurozone-election-austerity/

    “After the Great Panic of 2010, certain safeguards were set up to protect the European payment and banking systems in the event of a default. By 2015 the major losers would have largely been German and French taxpayers; the political costs of such an outcome were not the preoccupation of key eurozone managers like German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, Eurogroup President Jeroen Dijsselbloem, and European Central Bank President Mario Draghi. And hence, though elites might have been scared by the mere threat of a Greek exit at the start of the crisis, within several years, that threat was mostly contained.
    The only remaining fear, then, was around the potential domino effect of a Grexit. This would have been a real possibility had Syriza made the necessary preparations to ensure that an exit wouldn’t be disastrous. Only then would Spanish, Irish, Portuguese, and Italian electorates have considered a break. This was the troika’s gamble in the negotiations, and it should have been Syriza’s, too.
    But by the end of February, as Syriza refrained from imposing capital controls and instead accepted a deal on its creditors’ terms, it was clear that exit preparations were not in the cards.
    (…)
    If we are to give workers hope in this climate of defeat and exhaustion, we need to reckon with these risks while finding real openings in a difficult context. And that starts with thinking and speaking not only programmatically but above all strategically.”

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