Britainia Handiko Alderdi Laborista dela eta, Jeremy Corbyn-en manifestuan (The Economy in 2020) PQE (People’s Quantitative Easing) azaltzen da.
Bill Mitchell-en PQE is sound economics but is not in the QE family1 izeneko artikulua erabiliko dugu hurrengo azterketan.
(Testuingururako, ikus ondoko linkean azaltzen dena2.)
a) PQE eta Banku Zentrala3
b) Mitchell eta Overt Monetary Financing delakoa4
c) PQEren aurkako erasoa5
d) PQE politika (fiskal)ona da6
e) Izena eta izana: PQE ez da QE7
f) Lan bermea, job guaranttee delakoa eta gobernuaren politika fiskaleko parametroen malgutasuna8
g) Corbyn-en kontrako eraso adierazgarri bat9
Hona hemen ukitzen ez diren puntu garrantzitsu batzuk:
(1) QE: jarduera monetarioa10
(2) QE eta ez-gobernuko finantzazko aktibo netoaren egoera11
(3) PQE ez da inolako QE12
(4) Transakzio bertikalak eta PQE13
(5) QE eta PQE: desberdintasunik handiena14
Aipatutako guztia beste era batera analiza daiteke:
Altxor Publikoa eta zorra jaulkitzea23
Joera nagusiko ekonomialariek esango luketena24.
Errealitatea, alta, honelakoxea da:
(B) The money multiplier process so loved by the mainstream does not describe the way in which banks make loans – Money multiplier and other myths
(C) Bilding bank reserves is not inflationary. Inflation is caused by aggregate demand growing faster than real output capacity. The reserve position of the banks is not functionally related with that process.
a) Bankuak gai dira kreditua sortzeko, kreditua merezi duten bezeroak aurkitzen dituzten heinean25
b) Horrek ez du esan nahi defizitek ez dutela ekarri inflazio arriskurik26
c) ‘Diru stocka’ heda daiteke % hainbestetan hilero27
I am clearly in favour of governments no longer issuing any debt and ending the practices that are legacies of the fixed-exchange rate, convertible currency world we (mostly) abandoned in 1972.
In that sense, PQE is not “bad economics”. It is the obvious extension of the government’s currency-issuing capacity in a floating exchange rate environment.
It might be inflationary but that risk is inherent in the spending side not the particular monetary operation that might accompany that spending. In fact, all spending – non-government or government – carries an inflation risk.
… the aim of government fiscal policy is to ensure that nominal spending growth keeps pace with the real capacity of the economy to produce goods and services and if that aim is managed well then there is little risk of inflation arising from PQE.
Hortaz, Corbyn-en manifestua aintzakotzat hartzekoa da, PQE politika fiskal egoki bat den aldetik.
2 Ikus Functional finance and modern monetary theory, Keep the helicopters on their pads and just spen, Government budgets bear no relation to household budgets, The consolidated government – treasury and central bank, Quantitative easing 101, Why history matters, Building bank reserves will not expand credit, Building bank reserves is not inflationary, The complacent students sit and listen to some of that.
3 Ingelesez: “PQE as enunciated is thus quite simple in conception. The idea that the central bank, which is one part of the consolidated government sector, the other being the Treasury, would use the currency-issuing capacity of the government to facilitate the purchase of real goods and services to build productive infrastructure is sound.”
4 Ikus Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale, OMF – paranoia for many but a solution for all eta ECB should start funding government infrastructure and cash handouts. Mitchell: “The concept of Overt Monetary Financing is a taboo in mainstream economics.” Are gehiago, “A truly progressive policy platform would wipe out corporate welfare and stop issuing public debt. In that sense, Overt Monetary Financing is the preferred Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) policy option.”
5 Ingelesez: “… the proposal has been attacked by all and sundry as being “bad economics”, as compromising the so-called “independence of the central bank”, as putting elected officials in charge of monetary policy, as being the path to hyperinflation or for others deflation, and more. (…) But if we cut through all the sophistry disguised as ‘economic theory’, which seeks to demonstrate that such a policy would be inflationary at least, the real reason the policy option is taboo is because: 1. It cuts out the private sector bond traders from their dose of corporate welfare which unlike other forms of welfare like sickness and unemployment benefits etc has made the recipients rich in the extreme. (…) 2. It takes away the ‘debt monkey’ that is used to clobber governments that seek to run larger fiscal deficits.”
6 Ingelesez: “These conservatives know that if the government just spent (as it can any time it likes given it issues the currency) and didn’t match that spending with any debt issuance or tax revenue increase, then it would be harder to mount a case against the fiscal intervention. People would soon see the benefits in the form of better schools, hospitals, public transport, green energy innovations, more jobs, more diverse cultural events etc and there would be no ‘negative’ association. So the conservatives prevent that sort of realisation from occurring by mounting these spurious claims about inflation, and compromising central bank independence etc to try to stop governments from using real resources to improve the well-being of the people. Conclusion: PQE is an excellent strategy for the British government to introduce. It exploits the currency-issuing capacity of the government directly and uses it to increase the potential of the economy to improve well-being.”
7 Izan ere, “... the policy proposal should never have been called PQE because it is not similar at all to Quantitative Easing and the false analogy only opens the proposal to further, unwarranted criticism.” Mitchell-en hitzez: “… there is a huge “difference between the two” proposals, such that if we want QE to have meaning, then PQE should be abandoned as terminology to describe the idea that governments should deficit spend without issuing debt whether it be on infrastructure or something else.”
9 Mitchell-en hitzez, “… the article by the British New Keynesian academic economist Simon Wren-Lewis (August 16, 2015) – People’s QE and Corbyn’s QE – … is being used by many commentators on the progressive side of the debate to attack Corbyn’s position. The claim is that Wren-Lewis is a “respectable economist” and so his view carries weight. The essence of the article rests on this paragraph:
With an independent central bank, that means that they, not the government, get to decide when helicopter money happens. In contrast, if your goal is to increase either public or private investment (or both) for a prolonged period, then its timing and amount should be something the government decides. While QE is hopefully going to be something that is unusual and rare, the goal of an investment bank is generally thought to be more long term, and not something that only happens in severe recessions.
Note the use of the term “helicopter money”, (…). But this also avoids the main question – who should be in charge of economic policy – the democratically-elected members of the government who are fully accountable every electoral cycle or a group of unelected and unaccountable technocrats in the central bank? Of course, even that dichotomy is strained because the treasury and central bank arms of governments have to work closely together on a daily basis to ensure the monetary system functions effectively. For example, the treasury makes it clear to the central bank what the daily implications of their spending and taxation patterns are for the state of liquidity in the banking system, which allows the central bank to design liquidity management strategies each day which are necessary if it is to achieve its target cash rate (the statement of monetary policy). In this way, the idea that the central bank is ‘independent’ is a ruse that allows politicians to divert responsibility for unpopular interest rate decisions onto the faceless central bank board. (…) read The sham of central bank independence …”
10 Ingelesez: “Quantitative Easing is a monetary operation that can be distilled down to being asset swap – bank reserves for a government bond (Quantitative easing 101). By bidding up the price of government bonds in the secondary markets, the central bank forces yields (interest rates) down, given the inverse relationship between the effective yield and the price of the bond in fixed coupon assets. Therefore, the only way it can impact positively on aggregate spending is if the lower interest rates it brings in the maturity range of the bond being bought stimulates borrowing and spending. The problem is that borrowing is a function of aggregate spending itself (and expectations of where demand is heading) and if unemployment is persisting at high levels and governments are imposing harsh net spending cuts, the sentiment that might lead to increased borrowing is absent – lower interest rates notwithstanding. But QE was based on a false premise – that the banks need reserves before they can lend and that quantitative easing provides those reserves. Mainstream macroeconomics create the illusion that a bank is an institution that accepts deposits to build up reserves and then on-lends them at a margin to make money. The conceptualisation suggests that if it doesn’t have adequate reserves then it cannot lend. So the presupposition is that by adding to bank reserves, quantitative easing will help lending. This is clearly an incorrect depiction of how banks operate in the real world. Bank lending is not ‘reserve constrained’. Banks lend to any credit worthy customer they can find and then worry about their reserve positions afterwards. If they are short of reserves (their reserve accounts have to be in positive balance each day and in some countries central banks require certain ratios to be maintained) then they borrow from each other in the interbank market or, ultimately, they will borrow from the central bank through the so-called discount window. They are reluctant to use the latter facility because it carries a penalty (higher interest cost). The point is that building bank reserves will not increase the bank’s capacity to lend. Loans create deposits which generate reserves. (…) … read Building bank reserves will not expand credit …The major formal constraints on bank lending (other than a stream of credit worthy customers) are expressed in the capital adequacy requirements set by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) which is the central bank to the central bankers. They relate to asset quality and required capital that the banks must hold. These requirements manifest in the lending rates that the banks charge customers. Bank lending is never constrained by lack of reserves.”
11 Ingelesez: “… QE does not change the net financial asset position of the non-government sector at all. It is an asset swap. The non-government sector just rearranges is wealth portfolio – more cash, less bonds. No net change. That is the essence of a – monetary policy operation – which alters the liquidity in the economy. It does it by portfolio swaps and in doing so influences the interest rates and the term structure.”
What does that mean?
PQE (like a helicopter drop) would increase the net financial assets in the non-government sector because it would increase national income (via spending on infrastructure). That is the hallmark of a fiscal operation.
13 Ingelesez: “Vertical transactions – such as government spending, taxation – create national income changes which change the net financial position. PQE as envisaged is a fiscal operation, not a monetary operation, whereas QE as practiced by the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve Bank of America, the Bank of Japan etc are not fiscal operations. That is why I would not have called PQE, PQE. PQE would involve the government instructing the central bank to credit some account so that the National Investment Bank could put in purchase orders for contractors etc. The accounting to support this operation is largely irrelevant – it could be a simple instruction to expand the treasury overdraft, for example. At any rate it is just one government hand putting liquidity into the other and then pushing that liquidity out into the non-government sector. The spending would boost the contractor’s bank deposits (which increases their net financial assets or net worth) and the bank now has more reserves and matching liabilities (the contractor deposits). That is the hallmark of a fiscal operation.”
14 Ingelesez: “In QE, the central bank would buy a bond and exchange it for a bank deposit. The Assets of the bond holder would be unchanged but altered in composition (more cash less bonds). For the bank of the bond holder, deposits rise (liabilities) as do assets (reserve balances). The essential difference is in terms of the impact on the net wealth of the non-government sector. QE leaves that position unchanged, whereas PQE increase net wealth via the net spending effects.”
15 Ingelesez: “Another way of thinking about this is to ask the question: What would happen if a sovereign, currency-issuing government (with a flexible exchange rate) ran a fiscal deficit without issuing debt? That is engaged in Overt Monetary Financing?”
16 Ingelesez. “… governments spend in the same way irrespective of the monetary operations that might follow. There is no sense in the claim that the government gathers money from taxes or bond sales in order to spend it.”
17 Ingelesez: “If they didn’t issue debt to match their deficit, then like all government spending, the Treasury would instruct the central bank to credit the reserve accounts held by the commercial bank at the central bank. The commercial bank in question would be where the target of the spending had an account. So the commercial bank’s assets rise and its liabilities also increase because a deposit would be made.”
18 Ingelesez: “The transactions are clear: The commercial bank’s assets rise and its liabilities also increase because a new deposit has been made. Further, the target of the fiscal initiative enjoys increased assets (bank deposit) and net worth (a liability/equity entry on their balance sheet).”
19 Ingelesez: “Taxation does the opposite and so a deficit (spending greater than taxation) means that reserves increase and private net worth increases.”
20 Ingelesez: “This means that there are likely to be excess reserves in the ‘cash system’ which then raises issues for the central bank about its liquidity management. The aim of the central bank is to ‘hit’ a target interest rate and so it has to ensure that competitive forces in the interbank market do not compromise that target.
When there are excess reserves there is downward pressure on the overnight interest rate (as banks scurry to seek interest-earning opportunities), the central bank then has to sell government bonds to the banks to soak the excess up and maintain liquidity at a level consistent with the target.”
21 Ingelesez: “Alternatively, the central bank can offer a return on overnight reserves which reduces the need to sell debt as a liquidity management operation.
There is no sense that these debt sales have anything to do with ‘financing’ government net spending. The sales are a monetary operation aimed at interest-rate maintenance. So M1 (deposits in the non-government sector) rise as a result of the deficit without a corresponding increase in liabilities. It is this result that leads to the conclusion that that deficits increase net financial assets in the non-government sector.”
22 Ingelesez: “What would happen if there were bond sales? All that happens is that the banks reserves are reduced by the bond sales but this does not reduce the deposits created by the net spending. So net worth is not altered. What is changed is the composition of the asset portfolio held in the non-government sector.”
23 Ingelesez: “The only difference between the Treasury ‘borrowing from the central bank’ and issuing debt to the private sector is that the central bank has to use different operations to pursue its policy interest rate target. If private debt is not issued to match the deficit then it has to either pay interest on excess reserves (which most central banks are doing now anyway) or let the target rate fall to zero (the long-time Bank of Japan solution).
There is no difference to the impact of the deficits on net worth in the non-government sector.”
24 Ingelesez: “Mainstream economists would say that by draining the reserves, the central bank has reduced the ability of banks to lend and restrains the growth in the money supply. This is claimed to reduce the inflation risk.”
25 Ingelesez: “So the banks are able to create as much credit as they can find credit-worthy customers to hold irrespective of the operations that accompany government net spending.”
26 Ingelesez: “This doesn’t lead to the conclusion that deficits do not carry an inflation risk. All components of aggregate demand – government and non-government – carry an inflation risk if they become excessive, which can only be defined in terms of the relation between spending and available productive capacity.”
27 Ingelesez: “The ‘stock of money’ can expand by some percent per month without there being any additional inflation risk if real productive capacity is also expanding at a rate sufficient to absorb the extra nominal aggregate demand.
The idea that debt-issuance to the private sector in some way is less inflationary (for a given injection of government spending) is totally fallacious.