(i) Troika ala Quadriga?
“As amusing – and somewhat sad – as this is, perhaps the most tragically ironic part of the entire rebranding effort is that one of the most significant representations of a quadriga the world over sits atop the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin.
Behold Greece, the new symbol of your perpetual debt slavery.”
(iii) Y. Varoufakis
Berriki Y. Varoufakis-i egindako elkarrizketan ‘Grexit’ edo dena delakoa ere azaltzen da.
Bi bertsioak daude, eta, nahi izanez gero, irakurleak berak badauka aukera Varoufakis-en hitz jarioaz eta ezjakintasunaz jabetzeko, ingelesez:
a) Yanis Varoufakis full transcript: our battle to save Greece5
“HL: You must have been thinking about a Grexit from day one…
YV: Yes, absolutely.
HL: …have preparations been made?
YV: The answer is yes and no. We had a small group, a ‘war cabinet’ within the ministry, of about five people that were doing this…”
b) Varoufakis unplugged: the London call transcript6
“The work was more or less complete, we did have a Plan B, (…)
We were planning to create, surreptitiously, reserve accounts attached to every tax file number without telling anyone. (…)
That would have created a parallel banking system while the banks were shut as a result of the ECB’s aggressive action, to give us some breathing space. (…)
It would become a functioning and functional parallel system. Then of course this would be euro denominated, but at a drop of a hat, it could be converted to a new drachma. (…)
Dr Schäuble and the IMF have a common interest: they don’t want this deal to go ahead. Wolfgang has quite clearly said to me he wants Grexit. (…)
Eta abar luze bat…
(iv) Bill Mitchell
Bill Mitchell-ek Varoufakis-en elkarrizketa horren inguruan esandakoa7, IT aferari dagokionez:
“It seems that the Columbia University IT professor helping the former Finance Minister had a system up and running within about a week and they had planned “a payment system that could operate in euros but which could be changed into drachmas ‘overnight’ if necessary”.
So much for all those IT problems.”
(v) Varoufakis-en adierazpena8
“In conclusion, during the five months of negotiations that gripped Europe and changed the debate throughout the Continent, the Ministry of Finance did everything possible to serve the public interest against many odds. The current media campaign to besmirch these efforts will fail to dent the legacy of a crucial five month struggle for democracy and common sense.
(vi) James K. Galbraith-en adierazpena9
“At no time was the Working Group engaged in advocating exit or any policy choice (…)
… it was known that forces within the Eurozone were planning the forced exit of Greece.
The existence of preliminary plans could not play any role in the Greek negotiating.”
Mercouris-ek puntuz puntu ukatzen ditu aurreko baieztapen guztiak:
2) Sasi ezkertiar batzuek bankuen ‘nazionalizazioa’ aldarrikatzen dute12
3) IOU delakoen jaulkipenaz, ikus Mosler-ek dioena (viii) atalean, behean
4) Grexit delakoaz, hoberena!13
5) Errusiaz eta Putin jaunaz14
7) Varoufakis-en 18 hilabeteak16
8) Zer dela eta ez zen Grexit gertatu?17
9) Varoufakis biluzik dago18
10) Tsipras eta Syriza19
11) Varoufakis eta Schauble20
12) Euroa eta austeritatea21
13) Kontuz Greziatik datozen albisteekin22
Zer geratzen zaigu afera guzti horietatik?
Gogoratu ondoko hau: W. Mosler eta Y. Varoufakis23
(viii) Warren Mosler-en kritika ekonomikoa
Varoufakis-en elkarrizketa New Statesman delakoan24:
“He said he spent the past month warning the Greek cabinet that the ECB would close Greece’s banks to force a deal. When they did, he was prepared to do three things: issue euro-denominated IOUs; apply a “haircut” to the bonds Greek issued to the ECB in 2012, reducing Greece’s debt; and seize control of the Bank of Greece from the ECB.”
Hona hemen Mosler-en iruzkina:
“Susmatu bezala, bertan egon zen bere buruaren gainean.
Nire erantzuna hauxe izango litzateke, alegia, bankuak irekita uztea, zirkunstantzien arabera, diru ateratzea likidezia eskuragarriari mugatuz. Likidezia aktiboen irabazietatik, aktiboen salmentetatik, eta gordailu berrietatik etor liteke. Bankuak libre izango lirateke, haien arteko adostasunaren bidez, IOU delakoak jaulkitzeko benetako eurorako itxaron nahi ez duten gordailugileei. Gobernuak IOU delakoak jaulki ahalko lituzke, baldin eta operazio gastuetarako eskudiru barik geratuko balitz. “EBZk Greziako Bankuaren kontrola hartzea” zentzu gabekoa da, zeren ez baitago ezer bertan ez bada konputagailu bat kalkulu-orri batekin. Ez lioke emango Greziari fondoak zuritzeko gaitasunik, kalkulu-orri horretan dauden Greziako banku kideetatik kanpo. Testuinguru horretan, EBZri jaulkitako bonoak moztea eta Greziako zorra gutxitzea ere zentzugabekoak izango lirateke.”
Greek banks reopening Monday with capital controls indicates there was no operational imperative to close them 3 weeks ago.
— Warren B. Mosler (@wbmosler) July 19, 2015
1 ESM: European Stability Mechanism: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Stability_Mechanism.
2 Troika rebranded? Greece’s creditors are now calling themselves the “Quadriga” to note the inclusion of the ESM: http://redpilltimes.com/troika-rebranded-greeces-creditors-are-now-calling-themselves-the-quadriga-to-note-the-inclusion-of-the-esm/.
3 Ikus Greziako irteeraz (Grexit delakoaz), zenbait iritzi: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/07/24/greziako-irteeraz-grexit-delakoaz-zenbait-iritzi/.
4 Ikus aurreko oharrean dauden iruzkinak.
7 IT matters and Greece: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=31441#more-31441.
8 Ikus Statement by Yanis Varoufakis on the FinMin’s Plan B Working Group & the parallel payment system: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/07/27/statement-by-yanis-varoufakis-on-the-finmins-plan-b-working-group-the-parallel-payment-system/.
9 Ikus Professor James K. Galbraith’s statement on the Ministry of Finance Working Group convened by former finance minister Yanis Varoufakis: http://yanisvaroufakis.eu/2015/07/27/professor-james-k-galbraiths-statement-on-the-ministry-of-finance-working-group-convened-by-former-finance-minister-yanis-varoufakis.
10 Ikus Getting to the truth behind modern day mythology. Beware the tall tales coming out of Greece: http://redpilltimes.com/getting-to-the-truth-behind-modern-day-mythology-beware-the-tall-tales-coming-out-of-greece/.
11 Ingelesez: “Ever since the latest bailout agreement, misinformation to justify it has been pouring out of Greece. Much of this centres on the impracticability of supposed plans for a Grexit and of the “revolutionary” nature of the individuals who hatched them.”
12 Ingelesez: “… they are already 80% state owned. “Nationalising” the banks would not therefore have been an act of revolutionary confiscation or of appropriation of private property. It would have simply meant the state taking operational control of the banks by replacing their managements by new managements appointed by and accountable directly to the government.”
13 Ingelesez: “Nothing could be further from the truth. Far from the introduction of a new currency being something that would have been resisted across Greece and Europe, we know it would have had the backing of the German Finance Ministry, of Wolfgang Schauble and of the IMF.
According to the British writer Tariq Ali, as long ago as February Schauble was offering Varoufakis 50 billion euros and help with an orderly Grexit. Tariq Ali describes the offer in this way:
“It is now known that Schäuble offered an amicable, organised Grexit and a cheque for 50 billion euros. This was refused on the grounds that it would seem to be a capitulation. This is bizarre logic. It would have preserved Greek sovereignty, and if Syriza had taken charge of the Greek banking system a recovery could have been planned on its terms. The offer was repeated later. ‘How much do you want to leave the Eurozone?’ Schäuble asked Varoufakis just before the referendum. Again Schäuble was snubbed. Of course the Germans made the offer for their own reasons, but a planned Grexit would have been far better for Greece than what has happened.”
No one in Greece is denying this story and in fact I am told it is true.”
14 Ingelesez: “…. I said that the claim that Putin rejected a request from Tsipras for $10 billion is – as the Russians say – pure fantasy. We now have indirect confirmation of this from what must ultimately be a Greek source (the one that gave the story to Tariq Ali). Why would Tsipras ask Putin for $10 billion to fund a Grexit when Schauble was offering him 50 billion euros to do the same?”
15 Ingelesez: “Even as late as the latest EU summit the option of an orderly Grexit was on the table. Schauble – with Merkel’s (alas temporary) backing – actually proposed it. If the Greeks had agreed to it, it would have happened. The IMF, which has made known its complete lack of belief in the viability of the latest bailout, would have backed it.
Greece would have got its 50 billion euros to help it support the new currency, Schauble and the Germans would have ensured that the ECB provided the necessary liquidity to the banks to keep the banks operating until the new currency was ready, the banks could have been nationalised by mutual agreement – there being as I have said nothing revolutionary about this – capital controls would have been imposed until the new currency was ready (the Germans agreed to this when Cyprus imposed them, so why would they refuse it if sought by Greece?) and control of the Bank of Greece, the mint and the revenue service would have been transferred back to the Greek government as an indispensable element in an orderly and agreed Grexit.”
16 Ingelesez: “The Financial Times in its hit piece says the process of introducing a new currency would have taken 6-8 months, which is much less than the 18 months Varoufakis has claimed.
Actually that is far too pessimistic. The former British cabinet minister John Redwood has guesstimated it would have taken no more than 3 months. In my opinion, given financial help from the EU and the IMF and technical support e.g. from Russia, the whole process could have been carried out from beginning to end in the space of a few weeks.
Once Greece was out of the eurozone it could have agreed – if it wanted – a formal restructuring as part of a package negotiated with the IMF (the alternative of a default on the entire debt might have done irreparable damage to relations with the creditor countries). The conditions would doubtless have been tough but they would hardly have amounted to the psychopathic agreement we have now. With Greece outside the eurozone and able to regain competitiveness through a devaluation there would have been a real chance that whatever was agreed would succeed.”
17 Ingelesez: “… the reality has to be faced: a Grexit did not happen not because it was difficult to do but because the Syriza government didn’t want it.
All claims to the contrary are fairy tales, whilst the malicious spreading of stories about the various plans that were hatched in the desperate final hours before Greece’s final capitulation is being done purposefully by those who want to discredit the idea of a Grexit and those who support it.”
18 Izan ere, “Varoufakis has in fact now admitted that the real Plan B if the negotiations for a debt write-off failed was not a Grexit – his claims to have prepared for one is so much smoke and mirrors – but a resignation of the government and the formation of a “government of national unity” consisting of the old oligarchic pro-EU parties to sign a bailout package in place of Syriza. In Varoufakis’s own words:
“We are going to do all it takes to bring home a financially viable agreement. We will compromise but not be compromised. We will step back just as much as is needed to secure an agreement-solution within the Eurozone. However, if we are defeated by the catastrophic policies of the memorandum we shall step down and pass on the power to those who believe in such means; let them enforce those measures while we return to the streets.”
No word here of any plan for a Grexit.”
19 Ingelesez: “… a resignation of a government elected just a few months before to bring an end to austerity would have been an extraordinary act of abdication of responsibility.
Regardless it is not what Tsipras and Syriza did.
Instead of resigning when they failed to secure a debt write-off they chose to remain in power and negotiated for Greece an even worse deal than the one they had previously rejected.
Instead of admitting that Schauble offered him a dignified way out, Varoufakis is now also busy spreading a fantastic story that Schauble was throughout plotting to expel Greece from the eurozone so that he could terrorise France to accept the economic medicine he supposedly wants to impose on it. Varoufakis is actually claiming that Schauble told him as much.”
20 Ingelesez: “Varoufakis’s precise words are:
“Schauble believes that the eurozone is not sustainable as it is. He believes there has to be some fiscal transfers, some degree of political union. (…)
“And he said explicitly to me that a Grexit is going to equip him with sufficient terrorising power in order to impose upon the French, that which Paris has been resisting: a degree of transfer of budget making powers from Paris to Brussels.”
Does anybody seriously believe that if Schauble really did have such a plan he would have shared it with Varoufakis of all people?
The reality, as I have always said, is that Schauble adamantly opposes a debt write-off for Greece whilst it remains part of the eurozone not because he wants to terrorise France into submission but because of the disastrous precedent such a write-off might provide to other heavily indebted and bailed out eurozone states like Portugal, Spain, Cyprus and Ireland.
Obviously that is not sinister enough for Varoufakis – who has never shown the slightest understanding of Schauble’s position – which is why he attributes this bizarre plan to him.
Sad to say it seems Varoufakis was already spreading his fable about Schauble’s wicked plan to use Greece in order to terrorise France whilst the negotiations were actually underway – one reason surely why Schauble came to dislike him so much.”
21 Ingelesez: “In fairness to Tsipras, Varoufakis and Syriza, though their tactics were manipulative and duplicitous, their objective was always what they said it was: to keep Greece in the eurozone whilst securing an end to austerity and a debt write-off.
Most people – including me – assumed that as it became clear this was impossible they would drop the euro in order to end austerity and secure the debt write-off.”
22 Izan ere, “…I would ask people to keep a cool head in the face of all the nonsense that is now coming out of Greece. I am afraid that it is not without good reason we are known as the land of myths, legends and wondrous tales.“
24 Ikus W. Mosler-en China trade, Greece comment: http://moslereconomics.com/2015/07/13/china-trade-greece-comment/.