Albistea: Bill Mitchell-en South Korea shows us a different way1
Gutxienez albiste on bat: Hego Koreak MERS delakoari aurre egin dio2.
Hego Koreako finantza ministroak arin identifikatu zuen ezen “the MERS virus” izurriteak haien ekonomiarako ondorio negatibo adierazgarriak izan ahalko zituela.
Hego Koreako ekonomia esportazio gutxiagoekin eta barneko eskari lauarekin borrokatzen ari da, familien aurrezkiak handitzen diren heinean.
MERS izurritearen eraginik garrantzitsuena turismoan izango zatekeen, ekonomiaren datu batzuk kezkagarriak3 ziren bitartean.
Finantza ministroa ondoko ondoriora iritsi zen, ‘Current Economic Situation, July 2015′ delakoan:
“The South Korean government will implement stimulus measures including a supplementary budget, and will step up efforts to promote investment, encourage exports and revitalize tourism.”
Alegia, ekonomiaren jaitsiera txiki batek Hego Koreako Gobernutik berehalako erantzun fiskala probokatu zuen, makroekonomiako testu sentikorraren ikuspuntuari segituz, “… stimulate as a counter-cyclical measure to avoid a major loss of private sector confidence and a slide into recession.”
Erantzuna hauxe zen:
“… the Hego Korean government announced that it would increase net public spending by 22 trillion won (which is about $US19.8 billion)4.
The – Supplementary Budget Proposal (July 3, 2015) said that the package would be funded by a mixture of government bond issuance, cash from the Bank of Korea (central bank) and other reserves.”
Pizgarri fiskalaren ondorioz, Gobernuaren hitzez:
“Fiscal deficits will increase by 0.9 percentage points from 2.1 percent of GDP to 3.0 percent of GDP.”
Oso argi izan dute afera: nahiz eta ekonomiaren jaitsierak zerga errentak murriztu (“by 4.9 trillion5”) horrek ez zuen ekarri gastu publikoa murriztearen beharra.
Alderantziz, gastu publikoaren handitzea beharrezkoa zen, “… to fill the spending gap left by the slowdown in export revenue and private domestic spending.”
Pizgarri fiskalak ondokoak hornituko lituzke:
1. “Support for overcoming the MERS outbreak and drought, and working class support … support disease prevention in hospitals, finance emergency aid for hospitals directly affected by the disease outbreak and help businesses suffering due to the disease outbreak, such as the tourism industry.”
2. “Small business support and working class housing support”.
3. “Investment made by public enterprises” in partnership with private investment.
4. Increase development funds available to industry via institutions such as the “Korea Credit Guarantee Fund, Korea Technology Finance Corporation”, etc.
Honela bukatzen du finantza ministroak:
“The extra budget will help revitalise the economy and stabilise the livelihoods of ordinary people who have been affected the most by the fallout from MERS.“
Beraz, adi mezuari!
Hego Koreako gobernuaren erantzuna da moneta jaulkitzailea den edozein gobernuk egin beharko lukeena ez-gobernuko gastu hazkundea moteltzen denean eta jarduera ekonomikoa jaitsi eta langabezia igotzen denean6.
Hego Koreako gobernuak ahalbidetu du bere defizit publikoa igotzea (gastu publiko netoa handitzea), berak badaki ezen gastuak errenta berdintzen duela eta baldin eta ez-gobernuko sektoreak bere gastua murrizten badu, orduan parte har dezakeen sektore bakarra gobernu sektore da.
Badakite defizit fiskalaren igoerak sortuko duen jarduera ekonomikoak errenta pribatu handituak hornituko dituela, lanpostu gehiago eta “… will break into the malaise immediately.”
Hitz gutxitan:
“They value their people and know how bad a rising unemployment is.
They have not prioritised any pre-conceived fiscal ratios or debt ratios. They care about economic growth, national income growth and maintaining low unemployment.
They care about the “working class”!”
Konparatu goiko jarrera Greziakoarekin…
Greziak gauza bera egin ahalko zukeen baldin eta eurogunetik alde egin izan balu!7
Grezian, “… the austerity fanatics have inflicted the largest fiscal shift on Greece of all the nations shown (20.5 per cent between 2009-14),…”
Hego Korean , “… dealt with the Great Financial Crisis and its aftermath by increasing its fiscal deficit over the same period – relaxed that it was caring for its people. (…) As a result, unemployment did not rise above 4 per cent in South Korea during the crisis.”
(Nazioarteko Moneta Fondoaz (IMF delakoaz) eta Hego Koreaz, ikus ondoko oharrean dagoena8.)
Hego Korean egondako politika makroekonomikoaren ikuspuntuaren eta Europar Batasunean dagoen austeritate maniakoaren arteko kontrastea ezin da espantuka azaldu…
Ikasiko ote dugu inoiz?
Ikasiko ote dute inoiz sasi ezkertiarrek zertan zetzan Grexit?
Hego Korea eta Grezia bi eredu oso desberdinak dira: bata moneta subiranoduna izanik, ekonomian ongi samar aritzen den bitartean, bestea Eurolandiako infernuan segituz, erabat itota bukatuko da.
(Zabaldu, arren.)
1 Ikus Friday lay day – South Korea shows us a different way: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=31384.
2 Ingelesez: “While all the focus has been on Greece in the last few weeks, Korea has been battling the – Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) – which has claimed the lives of 36 people to date and as of today, 186 confirmed cases have been identified. 39 of the cases are medical staff who have been treating the other casualties.(…) MERS is a nasty infection, which was first detected in Korea in May 2015 when a 68-year old male who had been visiting Bahrain on agricultural products business became sick when he returned to Seoul. This excellent mapping application – MERS Corona map – allows you to track the incidence of the MERS virus across the globe.”
3 Hona zenbait datu, ingelesez: “Statistics Korea (KOSTAT) – reported that in May 2015, industrial production fell by -1.5 per cent while retail sales were flat. The fall in mining and manufacturing production (mainly in automobiles, semiconductors and machinery) was largely due, according to the Ministry of Finance press release (July 8, 2015) – Current Economic Situation, July 2015 – to “sluggish exports”. The inflation rate is zero (reflecting the flat domestic demand and low international oil prices) and the unemployment rose by 0.4 percentage points over the last 12 months to June 2015 to 3.9 per cent. Unemployment – rose from 949 thousand persons in June 2014 to 1,050 thousand persons in June 2015.”
4 Amerikar bilioi bat = europar 1.000 milioi.
5 Amerikar trilioi bat = europar bilioi bat.
6 Izan ere, “The costs of allowing an economy to slow down to the point that unemployment starts to rise because there are not enough jobs being created overall are huge. They can persist for decades if action is not swift. A national government should always intervene before the slowdown then causes psychological changes (increased pessimism) in the non-government sector. Once private firms and households become pessimistic about the future they cut back spending further and require stronger evidence of future growth before they will resume spending. A pessimistic non-government sector is very hard to budge.”
7 Mitchell-ek dioenez, “Please read my blog – Greece should not accept any further austerity – full stop! – (…). In that blog, you will also see that … the austerity fanatics have inflicted the largest fiscal shift on Greece of all the nations shown (20.5 per cent between 2009-14)...”
8 Ingelesez: “The Korean example allows me to make another important point. The likes of the IMF would claim that Korea has more ‘fiscal space’ to introduce stimulus measures because it has a record of running small fiscal surpluses. I dealt with the IMFs last entreaty into this discussion in this blog – The ‘fiscal space’ charade – IMF becomes Moody’s advertising agency. The Korean economy receives significant external spending stimulus (although this wavers) as a result of its strong export position. The fiscal balance is often in surplus, even though the private domestic sector can often save overall as a result of the export strength. But a currency-issuing nation such as Korea can always increase its fiscal deficit irrespective of whether it has been running prior surpluses or deficits. There is no sense that the prior fiscal outcome provides more or less opportunities to net spend in the current period. Fiscal surpluses are not akin to private saving. The private domestic sector saves by postponing current spending in order to expand future spending possibilities. It does this because it uses the currency and is thus financially constrained in its spending in each period. But when a currency-issuing government runs a surplus it is not increasing its future spending possibilities. It is, rather, destroying non-government purchasing power and running down non-government wealth. Such a government can buy whatever is for sale in the currency it issues at any time irrespective of how much it bought last period. Please read the following introductory suite of blogs – Deficit spending 101 – Part 1 – Deficit spending 101 – Part 2 – Deficit spending 101 – Part 3 – for basic Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) concepts.”
joseba says:
Country for sale? Buffett buys a Greek island for 15 million euros…so does Johnny Depp:
http://redpilltimes.com/country-for-sale-buffett-buys-a-greek-island-for-15-million-euros-so-does-johnny-depp/
joseba says:
Australia eta Grezia
Australia might join the Eurozone, apparently
http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=31395#more-31395
(…) the fiscal balance should not be a policy target in its own right. The government in fact has very little control over the final fiscal outcome in any period.
It is non-government spending and saving decisions that drive the fiscal balance. The government can try as it might to reduce its deficit via spending cuts but if private sector spending does not increase commensurately to offset the loss of aggregate demand then it is likely the deficit will increase (or not fall by as much as intended). And what is left is rising unemployment and stagnant growth.
Greece is in the parlous situation at present because it surrendered its currency sovereignty when it joined the Eurozone in 2001. At that point it began to use a foreign currency (the euro) and was unable to guarantee the liquidity of its banking system.
It was forced to issue public debt in the foreign currency to match its fiscal deficits and because the debt attracted credit risk (because the government could no longer guarantee its repayment in the foreign currency), the bond traders had the upper hand and could drive yields up according to their assessment of the risk attached to that debt.
The GFC hit the nation hard and the fiscal deficits rose sharply as a result of the automatic stabilisers. But given the increasing risk of the debt, the Government was unable to access bond markets to fund itself. Then the bailouts came and things went downhill sharply as the Troika imposed the insane and extremely damaging austerity onto the nation.
All of that could have been prevented and the GFC hit on national spending contained if the Greek government had not entered the Eurozone and had instead retained sovereignty over its own currency.
That is what Australia, for example, proved in 2009 when it introduced its massive fiscal stimulus which stopped the decline in real GDP in its tracks within one quarter.
(…)
But Australia can never become like Greece (in the economic sense) because we issue our own currency and the Government can always spend it into existence to redress any sharp decline in non-government spending, whether that come from the external sector or the private domestic sector.
(…)
Australia, as a currency-issuer, can ‘afford’ whatever public debt it cares to issue. There is never a shortage of willing purchasers of the debt lining up for their dose of corporate welfare.
(…)
However, to wean the bond markets off their corporate welfare hit (the purchase of risk free Australian government debt with a guaranteed flow of income), the Australian government should stop issuing public debt altogether and just credit bank accounts (government spending) as usual and do some accounting entries with the central bank so the books balance.
That is, get the central bank to ‘fund’ the deficit spending.
When assessing the desirable ‘level’ of government spending at any point in time the only question that is of relevance is how close the economy is to full employment (the inflation barrier). If it is close then that is about the right level of government spending relative to non-government spending decisions.
If there are still concerns about equity at that point, then the composition of net spending has to change to redistribute more to those in need.
Of-course, that is not what has happened to Greece, Spain and Italy and the other recessed Eurozone nations. The three Eurozone nations are not even comparable themselves bar the fact they all surrendered their currency sovereignty.
Greece is in trouble now because basic rules of macroeconomic policy have been deliberately violated. They were forced into Depression because the fiscal capacity that can arrest a sharp decline in private aggregate demand was denied to them.
It is clear that the current account can only remain in deficit for as long as foreigners seek to accumulate financial claims in the currency of the nation in question. That desire can change – and sharply at times.
But while the trade component remains in deficit a nation enjoys the real terms of trade in their favour – which means it has to ship less real goods and services abroad to get more from abroad, presumably of things they do not produce themselves and which bring use.
From an Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) perspective, it is the local residents that are ‘financing’ the foreign desire to accumulate financial claims in the local currency, not the other way around.
If that desire changes then the real terms of trade can turn quickly against the local nation. That can be painful and reduce the real living standards of the nation.
But those movements do not negate the fact that the government can always maintain sufficient aggregate demand to avoid recessions and sustain high employment levels.
It is the failure of governments to fulfill that responsibility in Greece that is the problem. And then you ask why? And the internal failures of the Euro monetary system become the main topic of discussion.
Only with the ECB’s explicit consent (via funding the net spending) could the Eurozone nations offset major private sector spending collapses. The politics of the Eurozone are currently preventing that commonsense fiscal option from being pursued and the consequences are obvious and tragic in their fullness.
But Australia does not face these problems. The Australian government always has the capacity to run deficits to offset non-government surpluses and maintain growth should it so choose.
It is impossible on financial grounds for us to become like Greece. It is possible that our standard of living might decline in real terms if our rising dependency ratio is not met with plans to increase the productivity of the workforce. But that is an entirely separate issue.
Even if Greece was highly productive it would still be in bad shape given it is facing a full frontal attack from the Troika on its aggregate demand growth.
(…) the only lessons that can be drawn from Europe are those outlined above – spending equals income equals output. If you cut overall spending you cut growth. If the non-government sector spending cannot support growth then government spending has to fill the gap. Beyond those simple macroeconomic facts there are no lessons for Australia from the Euro crisis.
We issue our own currency and float it on international markets.