Bill Mitchell-ek Greziako banku gordailuen ‘migrazioaz’

Aurretik, Bill Mitchell-ek bankugintzaz izeneko lana ikusi dugu1.

Jadanik oso ezaguna dugunez2,


the “fiscal situation in several EU Member States resulted from the decision to adopt a single currency” and then refuse to create a single federal fiscal authority and, in its place, impose absurd fiscal rules on the fiscal operations of the Member States.”


Orain, gordailuen migrazioaren mitoa aipatzen dutenez, horri lotuko gatzaizkio, Mitchell-en laguntzarekin.


Like all elite hegemonies, the Troika benefits from the mindless financial and economics commentary in the mainstream media. The story about deposit migration is, of course, one such beneficial narrative. It reinforces the claim that market forces will destroy the banking and financial systems of any nation that dares buck against the Troika orthodoxy of austerity and rectitude.


DTM-koen teoriaren arabera, “maileguek sortzen dituzte gordailuak”, ez alderantziz:


Ortodoxiak alderantzizkoa irakasten du3.


Argi: Ikusi dugunez4, bankuek erreserbak behar dituzte beren operazioei eusteko. Beraz, gordailu migrazio bat problematikoa izan daiteke…

the fact remains that the Greek banks need to have reserves to maintain their operations and a major run on deposits would be problematic.”

Baina,

This is not the same thing as saying, as mainstream economic theory claims, that banks are institutions that take in deposits which then provides them with the funds to on-lend at a profit. According to this flawed view, the ability of private banks to lend is considered to be constrained by the reserves they hold.”

Izan ere, errealitatea bestelakoa da:

While students find it hard to think outside of this construction, the reality is very different. Banks do not operate in this way. From the perspective of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) private bank lending is unconstrained by the quantity of reserves the bank holds at any point in time. We say that loans create deposits.5

Dena den, aipatu bezala,

the migration of deposits in the Greek banking system, if it occurs in any substantial way, will alter the costs of generate necessary reserves and potentially create a liquidity crisis should there be a major run on the banks deposits.”

Greziak badauka banku zentrala, Greziako Bankua, eurosistemaren parte bat dena. Beraz, banku zentral horrek EBZ-rekin zenbait operazio egin ditzake.

Izan ere,

As part of its monetary policy operations, the ECB provides – Emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) – which is described in this document – ELA Procedures.”

ELA delakoren rolak:

  1. ELA delakoak EBZ-ri ahalbideratzen dio ‘banku zentraleko dirua’ hornitzea (alegia, erreserbak) edozein finantza erakunde solbenteri, baldin eta erakunde horrek behin-behineko likidezia arazoak badauzka, “without such operation being part of the single monetary policy”.

  2. Arauek debekatzen dute ELA erabiltzea “overdraft facilities for official bodies“ hornitzea, hots, EBZ-k zuzenean gobernu bonoak erostea.

  3. Greziako bankuak konpontzea, gain-behererako gordailu oinarri baterako, bete-betean egongo litzateke ELA-ren zereginetan.

Orain dela gutxi, EBZ-k hartutako erabakia, hots, Greziako gobernu bonoak likidezia eskuratzeko berme gisa erabiltzeari uko egitea erabat oldarkorra zen. Baina erabaki horrek ez du aldatzen Greziako bankuek ELA-ra heltzeko daukaten ahalmena, Greziako Bankuaren bidez, alegia, banku zentralaren bitartez.

Mitchell-ek dioenez, “EBZ-k ez zuen behar inoiz izan Troikaren partaidea”, Troikaren rola politika fiskalaren diziplinari eustea baita. Interferentzia maila hori Europako epaitegietan salatu behar izan zen, aspalditik gainera.

Greziako bankuek likidezia eskaria Greziako Bankuaren bidez etorriko da. Afera erraza da.

Kontua da EBZ-k ELA errebisatzen duela bi astean behin. Hortaz, EBZ-k ELA-ren bide hori moztu dezake.

Horrela egingo balu, Greziako bankuek porrot egingo lukete, eta finantza krisi bat jarraitu. Baina horrek suposatzen du EBZ-k bere finantza egonkortasuna segurtatzeko arautegia haustea. Izan ere, Greziako bankuei porrot egitera nahita behartzea, finantza krisia sortuz, ez dago bat EBZ-ren arautegiarekin.

Halaber, EBZ-k ez dauka botere legegilerik gai fiskaletan erabakiak hartzeko. Greziak BPG-ren %10ko defizita badauka zein %1koa, egoera hori ez dagokio EBZ-ren erabaki ahalmenari, ez bada EBZ-k uste badu ekintza horrek inflazioaren azelerazioa sortuko duela.

Gainera, EBZ-k Greziako bankuei ELA bidea moztuko balio, EBZ-k gobernu greziarrari behartuko lioke eurogunetik irteteko, eta orduan Alemaniako eta Frantziako bankuetarako ondorioak adierazgarriak eta negatiboak izango lirateke, baita European Stability Mechanism delakorako ere.

Greziarako, gobernuak legeak egin ditzake Greziako Bankua, banku zentrala, EBZ-ren sistematik kanpo jartzeko, eta banku zentral horren kontseiluari agindu eman defizita moneta berrian izendatzeko, langabetuentzako lana sortzen duen bitartean, eta eskuragarri dauzkan baliabideen mugarekin azpiegitura publikoa indarberritzen duen artean.

Mitchell-ek ez du espero drakma berrian truke tasa aldaketa handirik epe laburrean, zeren hornikuntza mugatua izango den6.

Ondorioak:

i) “The Greek bank deposits stories are in my view not particularly significant. There are no runs on the banks as there were in the UK at the onset of the crisis.

ii) “Bank deposits have been shifting around a lot anyway.”

iii) “But unless the ECB abandons its charter, the Bank of Greece will supply as much liquidity as is needed to maintain financial stability under the ECB’s own policy frameworks.”

iv) “Should the ECB board go crazy and cut the Greek banks out of the ELA then they would be playing a very dangerous card for the rest of Europe. Greece would exit and restore its true sovereignty and end up winners by a long way.”


2 Ikus Greek bank deposit migration – another neo-liberal smokescreen: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=30132.

3 Ingelesez: “… mainstream economic theory claims, that banks are institutions that take in deposits which then provides them with the funds to on-lend at a profit. According to this flawed view, the ability of private banks to lend is considered to be constrained by the reserves they hold.”

6 Honela gehituz: “The examples often used, such as Iceland and Argentina, all relate to currencies that were already supplied in volumes to the foreign exchange markets.”

Utzi erantzuna

Zure e-posta helbidea ez da argitaratuko. Beharrezko eremuak * markatuta daude