Bill Mitchell-ek Europar Batasunaz liburu berri bat plazaratuko du laster[1]. Lana prozesuan dago[2]. Prozesu horretan, jadanik Alemaniaz gauza askotxo idatzi du. Hona hemen atal interesgarri bat[3].
Aurretik, aipatu ditzagun DTM-ko bi autorek Alemaniaz idatzi dutena:
(i) Randall Wray-k Alemania irabazle, politika deflaziogilearen bidez[4]
(Azken link horretan aipatu genuen bezala, Eurolandiako estatu kideak beren artean lehiatu ziren auzokoei esportatzeko. Lehia horretan Alemaniak irabazi zuen, politika deflaziogilearen bidez[5].
Ondorioa ezaguna da: austeritatea nonahi[6]. Alta, Eurolandiak behar duena, lanpostuak dira[7].)
(ii) Stephanie Kelton-ek Alemania garaile[8]
Orain, Bill Mitchell-ek dioena ikusiko dugu. Baina lehendabizi kontabilitatezko aferaz hitz bi.
Ordainketa balantza[9].
Ordainketa Balantza: Hona hemen, Europar Banku Zentralak Ordainketa Balantzari buruz emandako definizioa:
“Herrialde baten Ordainketa Balantza kontabilitate agiria da; bertan, herrialde horretako biztanle eta munduko beste biztanleen arteko transakzio ekonomiko guztiak jasotzen dira, gehienetan urtebeteko epean.
Ordainketa Balantza bi ataletan banatzen da: kontu korronte balantza eta kapitalen balantza. Eta lehena lau azpiataletan zatitzen da: merkataritza balantza, zerbitzuen balantza, errenten balantza eta transferentzia balantza.
Ordainketa Balantzak bi osagai nagusi ditu:
1. Kontu Korrontearen balantzan, herrialde baten ekonomiak bere jaduera arruntean sortzen dituen diru mugimendu guztiak islatzen dira: merkataritza, turismoa, errentak, mozkinak,….
2. Kapitalen Balantzan, berriz, kapital eraketa edo inbertsioarekin erlazionatutako diru mugimenduak azaltzen dira.”
Hortaz,
ORDAINKETA BALANTZA = Kontu korronte balantza + kapitalen balantza.
Herrialde batek azpibalantza batean desoreka izatea ez da arazoa, besteekin konpentsatzen den bitartean.
Baina, Ordainketa Balantza osoaren saldoa negatiboa bada, nazio horren moneta erreserbak murriztu eta haren kanpo zorra handituz joango da. Egoera honek epe luzean herrialde horren ekonomian ondorio latzak ekarriko ditu.
Azter dezagun, bada, Mitchell-ek dioena[10].
Aipaturiko azken link horretan ikus:
a) Figure X1 Domestic demand, Germany, Euro12 and PIIGS, 2000-2013, 2000=100
b) Figure X.1 Current Account Balance, 1991-2013, per cent of GDP
Alemaniako barneko eskaria: zertan datza mirakulua?
Irakur dezagun Mitchell-i:
Mini-job delakoaren eraginez, Alemaniako barneko gastua ito zen 2005 arte, ikus X1 irudia [linkean], Gerhard Schröder-en murrizketa politika dela kausa[11].
Alemaniako gobernuak bere defizita murrizteak esan nahi zuen Alemaniako ekonomia haziko zela kanpoko superabit dela medio, alegia, EB barruan EBko beste herrialdeetara esportatuz.
Zer gertatu zen EBko kontu korronte balantzekin?
Ikus X.1 irudia [linkean] eta Mitchell-ek dioena horretaz:
Kontu korronte balantzetan aldaketa dramatikoak (sic) egon dira[12].
Alemaniak EBren historian lehen urteetan egindako murrizketak Alemaniako langileen kaltetarako egin ziren, gainera EBko beste herrialdeetako ongizateak murrizten ziren bitartean[13].
Mitchell-en iritziz, Alemaniak bazeukan aspaldiko estrategia bat, EB martxan jartzeko[14], gutxienez 1980ko hamarkadatik.
Dirudienez, Alemaniako gobernua jakitun zegoen EBko diseinuaz eta beronen akatsez[15].
Are gehiago, kontu korronteen superabitek ondokoa ekarri zuten: EBko beste herrialdeei, bereziki Espainia eta Italiari, Alemaniako bankuek askoz gehiago ematea maileguz[16].
Negozio borobila. Orain arte, EB mauka bat izan da Alemaniarentzat.
Maiatzeko Europarako hauteskundeen atarian, EB paradisua izaten segitzen du jende askorentzat (politikari, ekonomialari, kazetari eta abar luze batentzat).
Baina…
Mario Draghi-ren helburua Bangladesh-erako bidea[17] diseinatzea da, hango langileekin lehiaketan egoteko asmoz…
Deflazioak, eskari eskasiak eta eskari eskasia betetzeko politika fiskala erabiltzeko aukerak gidaturiko Draghi-ren alokairu murrizketa masiboa salatu dugu[18].
Orain ikusi dugu, Bill Mitchell-en laguntzaren bidez, Alemaniak erabili zituela EBn deflazioa, eskari eskasia eta geroago politika fiskal oso berezia (Draghi-ren laguntzarekin), hots, alokairu murrizketa masiboa, zertarako eta Bangladesh-erako bidea aspalditik diseinatzeko. Gainera, diseinu horretan, mozkinak ateratzeko.
[1] Ikus https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/01/03/bill-mitchell-en-liburu-berria/.
[2] Euro book delakoaz, ikus http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?cat=44.
[3] Ikus Options for Europe – Part 62: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=27481.
[4] Ikus https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/12/08/randall-wray-k-eurolandiaz-berriz/.
[5] Ingelesez: “…the EMU was set up to foster competition among the member states to see who could export the most to neighbors. Germany won. How? Through painful deflationary policies to keep wages in check, assisted by the fortune of the fall of the Berlin Wall that brought in waves of low wage and high skilled East Germans to the labor force.”
[6] Ingelesez. “And so now Germany chastises the hapless Greeks, Italians, Spanish and Portuguese (…). The proposed solution is austerity everywhere. The inevitable outcome will be race-to-the-bottom dynamics to slash wages and living standards.”
“Here’s the most important conclusion. If you want to create a monetary union, you need to forget the internal current account outcomes and focus instead on employment. The trade flows all take place in the same currency and can always be financed. Internal deficits are sustainable. But unemployment is not.”
[7] Ingelesez: “Euroland needs jobs, not austerity.”
[8] Ikus https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2013/02/05/europan-zer-alemania-garaile/.
[10] Ikus Options for Europe – Part 62: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=27481.
[11] Ingelesez: “Germany didn’t experience the same credit explosion as other nations. The suppression of real wages growth in Germany and the growth in the (very) low-wage ‘mini-jobs’ meant that Germany severely stifled domestic spending up to 2005. Figure X1 shows the index of domestic demand (total spending on goods and services by residents – includes imports) for Germany, the first 12 Eurozone nations and the PIIGS from 2000 to 2013, with the index set at 100 in 2000. The domestic restraint forced onto German workers and other consumers by the austerity policies of Gerhard Schröder and the fact the Government was seeking to reduce its own deficit meant that the only way the German economy could grow would be through widening external surpluses.”
[12] Ingelesez: “As the European nations started to share a currency, there were dramatic shifts in the current account balances (which reflect trade and income flows between nations). With the loss of its exchange rate flexibility, Germany adopted a ‘mercantilist’ strategy by exploiting its rising international competitiveness that arose from the dramatic suppression of domestic costs and domestic spending in the early days of the EMU. Germany started to record very large external surpluses which were mirrored by expanding external deficits in the peripheral economies (the PIIGS) (see Figure X.1). The two movements were intrinsically linked.”
[13] Ingelesez: “The dramatic suppression of domestic costs and domestic spending in the early days of the EMU by Germany, not only meant that the Germans would ultimately undermine the welfare of the other EMU nations but also meant that the living standards of German workers were being driven down in the process.”
[14] Ingelesez: “Large current account disparities emerged between nations in the 1980s as capital flows were deregulated and many currencies floated after the Bretton Woods system collapsed. European nations such as Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland were typically recording large and persistent current account surpluses and with a significant proportion of their trade being with other European nations, the imbalances grew within Europe as well as between Europe and elsewhere. German government policy deliberately created widening imbalances in Europe by undermining the competitiveness of the other nations through the harsh attack on their own workers.”
[15] Ingelesez: “To some extent the German government understood the logic of the flawed design of the EMU more fully than the other nations. They knew the monetary system encouraged a race to the bottom and exploited the ‘solidarity’ of its workers to game the other nations, who, in turn, could not have been accused of living vicariously. But in a relative sense that is the comparison that emerged as the crisis hit.”
[16] Ingelesez: “The huge current account surpluses resulted in German banks accelerating their lending to other nations, in particular Spain and Italy, and less so Ireland.(…) In June 1999, at the onset of the EMU, total German bank lending to the PIIGS was $US 188.7 billion or 14 per cent of the total foreign lending by German banks. By 2009, this total had reached $707.3 million and was 20.4 per cent of the total foreign lending by German banks.”
joseba says:
Ikus
https://www.unibertsitatea.net/otarrea/gizarte-zientziak/ekonomia/alemania-europar-batasunean