Roland Vaubel-en lanean[1] batez ere politika aipatzen da, ez ekonomia politikoa. Dena den, hona hemen lanaren punturik garrantzitsuenak:
a) Sezesioaren arauak nazioarteko mailan ezarri beharko lirateke baina nazioarteko erakundeek interes berezia daukate sezesioa ukatzeko.
b) Maila nazionalean errazagoa da sezesio eskubidea ezartzea.
c) Europar itunetan ez dago inongo oinarririk esateko EBko erakundeen arabera Kataluniak eta Eskoziak, sezesioa ondoren euroko kidea izateko berreskatu beharko luketela. Hori ez da azaltzen NBEko akordioetan, ezta Vienako Konbentzioan ere.
Hona, aldiz, ukitutako zenbait gai:
(i) Kanadako Epaitegi Nagusiak sezesio eskubideaz dioena[2], beste probintziei dagokienez[3]. Sezesioak alde bakarrekoa izan behar du[4]. Sezesio arauak nazioarteko mailan onartuak eta betearaziak izan behar dira[5], Bucheit-ek esaten duenez[6].
(ii) Nazio Batuen Erakundeak (NBE) ez du onartu sezesio eskubidea[7].
(iii) EBko Hitzarmenak esplizituki EB uztearen posibletasuna aipatzen du[8].
(iv) Soilik praktikak daude[9].
Sezesioaren bururatzeaz, hona zenbait puntu:
a) Viena Konbentzioak dioena[10]. Kasu, “If, say, Catalonia seceded from Spain or Scotland from the UK, both would remain members of the European Union.”
b) Sezesio estatuak eta lehendik geratzen denak akordio bat adostu behar dute[11].
c) Beste kide estatuekin libre izango dira akordioak berradosteko[12], EBko kide estatu guztiek Viena Konbentzioren kide bihurtu behar dira.
d) EBk berak ezin du Viena Konbentzioa berretsi, estatu bat ez delako nazioarteko erakundea baizik[13].
Gainera, eta praktikari dagokionez,
(i) Helburu praktiko guztiei begira, estatu baten sezesioa soilik erreferendum batek legitimatuko du[14], idealki bi erreferendum egon beharko lirateke[15].
(ii) Mendebaldeko demokrazietan bi erreferendum horiek nahikoak izan beharko lirateke gobernu zentralak eta beste probintziek sezesioa onar dezaten[16].
(iii) Horri begira, Kanadaren eta Quebec-en arteko litekeen akordioa adierazgarria da oso[17]. Sezesio partearekiko akordioak eta negoziazioak gainontzeko probintziek gidatu behar dute, ez gobernu zentralak[18].
Eta argi eta garbi:
“The present-day states of Europe are the result of centuries and millennia of arbitrary and coercive rule. Accidents of dynastic succession and brutal military conquests have shaped most of their current borders. The right of secession is necessary to arrive at political units reflecting the preferences of the people.”
(Jatorrizko lanean, segituan, Vaubel Britainia Handiko aferaz aritzen da. Irakurleak lanean bertan du informazio zehatza[19].)
[2] Ikus Supreme Court of Canada (1998), Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, August 20.
[3] Ingelesez: “The Supreme Court of Canada (1998) has affirmed the right of secession but only under the condition that all other provinces agree to the secession.”
[4] Ingeleez: “The required agreement should not be about each specific secession but about a constitutional right of unilateral secession.”
[5] Ingelesez: “The rules of secession may be agreed and enforced at the international level.”
[6] Ikus Bucheit, Lee C. (1978), Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
[7] Ingelesez: “The United Nations do not recognize the right of secession. A seceding state usually ceases to be a member. It has to file an application if it wishes to become a member.”
[8] Ingelesez: “The Treaty on European Union (in Art. 50) explicitly mentions the possibility of leaving the EU after a period of notice of two years but the EU institutions do everything they can to discourage secession not only of but also within member states.”
[9] Ingelesez: “The legal position taken by Barroso, Reding and van Rompuy has no basis in the European treaties. Nor is there a precedent in EU law. Nor has this question ever been settled in any UN agreement or Vienna Convention. There are merely practices, and they vary among international organisations.”
Izan ere, “…17 Art. 34 (1) of the Vienna Convention states that when a part of a state separates to form a state, any treaty in force at the time continues in force for both states. However, according to Art. 4, this is “without prejudice to the rules concerning acquisition of membership” in an international organisation. Art. 34 (1) is also inapplicable if “it would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions for its operation”. Crawford and Boyle (2013: 93) suggest that this might be the case if Scotland seceded from the UK. They do not substantiate this surprising claim. The Vienna Convention has been in force since 1996 but it has not been ratified by the UK and Spain.”
Eta NBE-ri dagokionez, “The UN almost always demands a new application for membership from the seceding state. However, there is an exception: when Syria seceded from the United Arab Republic (the union with Egypt) in 1961, both Egypt and Syria were automatically counted as UN members. But sometimes, as in the case of Serbia-Montenegro, not even the rump state was automatically recognised as a member.”
[10] Ingelesez: “Art. 34 of the Vienna Convention opts for the second solution: treaties in force at the time of secession remain in force in all successor states.”
[11] Ingelesez: “The seceding state and the rump state would have to negotiate an agreement on how they wished to share the rights and obligations of the predecessor state. If they did not meet their joint obligations, both could be expelled by the international organisation.”
[12] Ingelesez: “Subsequently, of course, they would be free to renegotiate their rights and obligations with the other member states. As all this is reasonable and feasible, all member states of the EU (including Spain and the UK) ought to join the Vienna Convention.”
[13] Ingelesez. “The European Union itself cannot ratify the Vienna Convention because it is not a state but an international organisation.”
[14] Ingelesez: “For all practical purposes, the secession of a part of a state may only be legitimised by a referendum. Thus, the constitutions of the member states ought to provide for such referenda and for popular initiatives demanding referenda.”
[15] Ingelesez: “Ideally, there would be two referenda. In the first referendum, people would be asked whether their constituency ought to secede. In the second referendum, when it is known which constituencies would secede, people would be asked whether their constituency ought to secede together with the other constituencies in which a majority wants to secede. This two-step procedure has two advantages. First, in the final vote, each citizen would know what the seceding region would look like. Second, the double referendum would make sure that the preference for secession is stable and well-considered.”
[16] Ingelesez: “In most western democracies, such a double vote in favour of secession is likely to be sufficient to convince the central government and the other provinces that they have to accept the secession.”
[17] Ingelesez: “Seen in this light, the opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada (1998) that Quebec has the right of holding a referendum on secession but that the secession itself must be negotiated, is wiser than may appear at first glance.”
[18] Ingelesez: “Negotiations with the seceding part ought to be conducted by the other provinces – not by the central government. This is because the anti-secession bias is more pronounced among the national politicians, who would lose power, than among the other regional politicians who may want to be able to secede as well, if necessary.”
[19] Ikus http://www.vwl.uni-mannheim.de/vaubel/pdf-Dateien/ThePoliticalEconomy09.04.13.pdf, 5.2 atala: Withdrawal of a member state.
joseba says:
Roland Vaubel on Catalonia, secession, and the EU (interview):
http://www.newscatalonia.com/2013/09/roland-vaubel-merkel-advisor.html