Gobernuak gastatzen du gure banku-kontuetan zenbakiak aldatuz[1]. Hori gizarte segurantzari ere aplikatzen zaio[2]. Esaten zaigunaren kontra, ez dago inolako mugapenik gobernuaren trebetasunean gizarte segurantzako ordainketak egiteko. Ez du axola zer-nolako zenbakiak dauden gizarte segurantzako funts-kontuetan, zeren funts hori gordetako dokumentua besterik ez baita.
Gizarte segurantzako ordainketak gauzatzeko garaia iristen denean, Gobernuak egin behar duen bakarra onuradunaren kontuetan zenbakiak gorantz aldatzea da, eta gero funts kontuetan zenbakiak beherantz aldatzea, egin duenaren aztarna uzteko.
Nonahi eztabaidarik handia hauxe da: ea gizarte segurantza pribatizatu behar den ala ez. Eztabaida osoak ez dauka inolako zentzurik. Ikus dezagun zer esan nahi duen gizarte segurantzak eta zer-nolako eragina daukan pribatizazio horrek ekonomian eta norberaren egoeran, gizabanako gisa.
Pribatizazioaren ideiaren atzean honelako iritziak daude: a) Gizarte segurantzako zerga eta mozkinak murriztuak dira; b) Zergen murrizketaren kopurua salgaiaren parte bat erosteko erabiltzen da; c) Gobernuak zergatan gutxiago bereganatzen duenez, aurrekontu defizita kopuru horretan handituko da, hortaz gobernuak Altxor Publikoko titulu gehiago saldu behar du, ‘hori ordaintzearren’. Hitz arruntetan: 1) Hilero zure alokairutik gutxiago kenduko zaizu gizarte segurantzarako; 2) Kendu ez dizutelako, funts gehiago izango duzu salgaiak erosteko; 3) Geroago, jubilatzerakoan, gizarte segurantzako ordainketa pixka bat gutxiago bereganatuko duzu; eta 4) Salgaien jabe izango zara, uko egiten diezun gizarte segurantzako ordainketek baino gehiago balio duten salgaiak.
Plan horren aldekoek esaten dutenez, defizita denbora bateko gehitzen da, baina gizarte segurantzako ordainketetan lorturiko aurrezkiek hori konpontzen dute, eta salgai-merkatura joaten diren ordainketek ekonomiari lagunduko diote hazteko eta hobetzeko.
Plan horren aurka daudenek esaten dute salgai-merkatuan oso arriskutsua dela hori egitea eta, etsenplu gisa, (AEBetan) 2008an egondako beherapen handia aipatzen dute. Baldin eta jendeak salgai-merkatuan erosteko ahalmena galtzen badu, gobernua behartua izango da gizarte segurantzako ordainketak handitzera, jubilatuak pobrezia mailatik aldentzearren. Beraz, ez badugu nahi gure adinekoen portzentaje handi bat pobrezia mailaren azpitik erortzeko arriskuan egoteko, gobernuak hartu behar du bere gain arrisku hori guztia.
Bi jarrerak oso oker daude, mikro-maila baitute aztergai, gizarte segurantzako partaide indibidualari dagokiona. Kontua, aldiz, makromailari dagokio, populazio osoari.
Ulertzeko zer dagoen txarto makro-mailan, lehendabizi ulertu behar da gizarte segurantzan parte hartzea funtzionalki gobernu-bono bat erostea bezalakoa dela. Izan ere, gaur egungo gizarte segurantzako programarekin, orain gobernuari zeure dirua ematen diozu, beranduago berak diru hori atzera emateko. Horixe da, hain zuzen ere, gertatzen dena gobernu-bono bat erosten duzunean. Gobernuari orain zeure dirua ematen diozu eta beranduago zure dirua gehi interes bat bereganatzen dituzu. Interesaren kontua kenduta, bi fenomenoak berdintsuak dira.
Pribatizazio proposamenarekin, gobernuak gizarte segurantzako ordainketak murriztuko ditu eta enplegatuek beren dirua salgai-merkatuan jarriko dute. Baina Altxor Publikoak titulu gehiago jaulki eta saldu behar du, murriztutako errentak estaltzeko. Enplegatuek salgaia erosten dutenean, beste pertsona batengandik erosten dute. Beraz, salgaiak eskuz aldatzen dira. Ez da diru gehiagorik sartu ekonomian. Eta salgaiak saldu dituen jendeak, orduan, salmentatik datorren dirua du, zeina gobernu-bonoak erosten dituen dirua baita. Beraz, ikuspuntu makroekonomiko batetik, gertatu den guztia hauxe izan da: salgai batzuek eskuz aldatu dute, baita bono batzuek ere. Hortaz, horrek guztiak ez du izango inolako eraginik ekonomian.
Kontua okerragoa da. ‘Generazioen’ arteko istorioak honela dio: arazoa da hemendik 30 urtera jende jubilatu askoz gehiago egongo dela eta proportzionalki langile gutxiago (zeina egia den!), eta gizarte segurantzako funtsa dirurik gabe geratuko da. Hortaz, arazoa konpontzeko, modu bat lortu behar dugu zaharrei diru nahikoa emateko, beraiek behar izango dituzten salgai eta zerbitzuak ordaintzearren.
(Ustea da langile gutxiagoko eta jubilatu gehiagoko benetako arazoa konpondu daitekeela segurtatzen baldin bada jubilatuek funts nahikoa edukitzea beraiek nahi dutena erosteko.)
Arazo erreala hauxe da: baldin eta gainontzeko langileak ez badira nahiko emankorrak, salgaien eta zerbitzuen gabezia orokorra egongo da. Diru gehiago edukitzeak soilik prezioak altxaraziko ditu, ez ondasun eta zerbitzu gehiago ekoiztea.
Istorio nagusia gehiago okertzen da hauxe gehitzen dutenean: Hortaz, gobernuak gaur gastuak moztu behar ditu edo zergak handitu, biharko gastuetarako funtsak metatzeko. Hori guztia barregarria da.
Izan ere, badakigu gobernuak gastatzen duela gure banku-kontuetan zenbakiak goratuz. Eta zergapetzen du gure banku-kontuetan zenbakiak jaitsiz. Eta zergak handitzeak gure gastatzeko ahalmena gutxitzea esan nahi du, ez gobernuari ezer ematea gastatzearren. (Egia da gastua oso altua baldin bada, ekonomiari gehiegi ‘berotzen’ diola.)
Baina hori ez bada kasua, eta de facto, outputaren enplegu osoko mailan saltzeko, eskaintzen dena, erosteko behar dena baino gutxiagokoa bada gastua, orduan zergak handitzeak eta gure gastu-ahalmena gutxitzeak egoera okertzen du.
Diru-sistemak nola funtzionatzen duen ez jakitea da funtsezko arazo nagusia[3]. Ekitate soziala eta litekeen inflazioa dira arazoak baina inoiz ez gobernuaren solbentzia. Baldin eta helburua bada zaharrek edozein denboratan errenta gehiago edukitzea, irtenbidea oso sinplea da: mozkinak handitzea. Benetako galdera hauxe da: zein kontsumo-maila hornitu nahi dugu gure zaharrentzat? Zenbat esleitu nahi diegu jateko? Zenbat jantzietarako? Elektrizitaterako? Gasolinarako? Zenbat etxerako? Osasun-zerbitzuetarako?
Horiek dira benetako arazoak, eta, noski, zaharrei ondasun eta zerbitzu horietatik gehiago emateak esan nahi du gutxiago daukagula guretzat. Zaharrei esleitzen dizkiegun ondasun eta zerbitzuen kopuruak dira guretzako benetako kostua, ez ordainketak, zeren azken horiek banku-kontuetan zenbakiak besterik ez baitira.
Politikariak etorkizunaz benetan arduratuta egongo balira, helburu horretarako baliagarriagoa den heziketa mota sustatuko lukete. Baina sistema monetarioa zertan datzan ulertzen ez dutenez, ondorioz, gizarte segurantzaren inguruko gezurrek zutik diraute. Noiz arte?
[1] Ikus aurreko sarrera: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/zazpi-gezur-politika-ekonomikoan-2. Sarrera honetan aurreko sarreran esandakoa gehiago sakontzen dugu.
joseba says:
Gizarte segurantzaz hitz bi
Social Security: Another Case of Innocent Fraud? (http://cfeps.org/pubs/sr/sr0501/sr0501.html)
By Warren Mosler[1] and Mathew Forstater[2]
In his recent book, The Economics of Innocent Fraud, John Kenneth Galbraith surveys a number of false beliefs that are being perpetuated among the American people about how our society operates: innocent (and sometimes not-so-innocent) frauds. There is perhaps no greater fraud being committed presently—and none in which the stakes are so high—as the fraud being perpetrated regarding government insolvency and Social Security. President Bush uses the word “bankruptcy” continuously. And the opposition agrees there is a solvency issue, questioning only what to do about it.
Fortunately, there is a powerful voice on our side that takes exception to the notion of government insolvency, and that is none other than the Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The following is from a transcript of a recent interview with Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan:
RYAN… do you believe that personal retirement accounts can help us achieve solvency for the system and make those future retiree benefits more secure?
GREENSPAN: Well, I wouldn’t say that the pay-as-you-go benefits are insecure, in the sense that there’s nothing to prevent the federal government from creating as much money as it wants and paying it to somebody. The question is, how do you set up a system which assures that the real assets are created which those benefits are employed to purchase. (emphasis added)
For a long time we have been saying there is no solvency issue (see C-FEPS Policy Note 99/02 and the other papers cited in the bibliography at the end of this report). Now with the support of the Fed Chairman, maybe we can gain some traction.
Let us briefly review, operationally, government spending and taxing. When government spends it credits member bank accounts. For example, imagine you turn on your computer, log in to your bank account, and see a balance of $1,000 while waiting for your $1,000 Social Security payment to hit. Suddenly the $1,000 changes to $2,000. What did the government do to make that payment? It did not hammer a gold coin into a wire connected to your account. It did not somehow take someone’s taxes and give them to you. All it did was change a number on a computer screen. This process is operationally independent of, and not operationally constrained by, tax collections or borrowing.
That is what Chairman Greenspan was telling us: constraints on government payment can only be self-imposed.
And what happens when government taxes? If your computer showed a $2,000 balance, and you sent a check for $1,000 to the government for your tax payment, your balance would soon change to $1,000. That is all—the government changed your number downward. It did not “get” anything from you. Nothing jumped out of the government computer into a box to be spent later. Yes, they “account” for it by putting information in an account they may call a “trust fund,” but this is “accounting”—after the fact record-keeping—and has no operational impact on government’s ability to later credit any account (i.e., spend!).
Ever wonder what happens if you pay your taxes in actual cash? The government shreds it. What if you lend to the government via buying its bonds with actual cash? Yes, the government shreds the cash. Obviously, the government doesn’t actually need your “funds” per se for further operational purpose.
Put another way, Congress ALWAYS can decide to make Social Security payments, previous taxing or spending not withstanding, and, operationally, the Fed can ALWAYS process whatever payments Congress makes. This process is not revenue constrained. Operationally, collecting taxes or borrowing has no operational connection to spending. Solvency is not an issue. Involuntary government bankruptcy has no application whatsoever! Yet “everyone” agrees—in all innocence—that there is a solvency problem, and that it is just a matter of when. Everyone, that is, except us and Chairman Greenspan, and hopefully now you, the reader, as well!
So if solvency is a non-issue, what are the issues? Inflation, for one. Perhaps future spending will drive up future prices. Fine! How much? What are the projections? No one has even attempted this exercise. Well, it is about time they did, so decisions can be made on the relevant facts.
The other issue is how much GDP we want seniors to consume. If we want them to consume more, we can award them larger checks, and vice versa. And we can do this in any year. Yes, it is that simple. It is purely a political question and not one of “finance.”
If we do want seniors to participate in the future profitability of corporate America, one option (currently not on the table) is to simply index their future Social Security checks to the stock market or any other indicator we select—such as worker productivity or inflation, whatever that might mean.
Remember, the government imposes a 30% corporate income tax, which is at least as good as owning 30% of all the equity, and has at least that same present value. If the government wants to take a larger or smaller bite from corporate profits, all it has to do is alter that tax—it has the direct pipe. After all, equity is nothing more than a share of corporate profits. Indexation would give the same results as private accounts, without all the transactional expense and disruption.
Now on to the alleged “deficit issue” of the private accounts plan. The answer first—it’s a non-issue. Note that the obligation to pay Social Security benefits is functionally very much the same as having a government bond outstanding—it is a government promise to make future payments. So when the plan is enacted the reduction of future government payments is substantially “offset” by future government payments via the new bonds issued. And the funds to buy those new bonds come (indirectly) from the reductions in the Social Security tax payments—to the penny. The process is circular. Think of it this way. You get a $100 reduction of your Social Security tax payment. You buy $100 of equities. The person who sold the equities to you has your $100 and buys the new government bonds. The government has new bonds outstanding to him or her, but reduced Social Security obligations to you with a present value of about $100. Bottom line: not much has changed. One person has used his or her $100 Social Security tax savings to buy equities and has given up about $100 worth of future Social Security benefits (some might argue how much more or less than $100 is given up, but the point remains). The other person sold the equity and used that $100 to buy the new government bonds. Again, very little has changed at the macro level. Close analysis of the “pieces” reveals this program is nothing but a “wheel spin.”
Never has so much been said by so many about a non-issue. It is a clear case of “innocent fraud.” And what has been left out? Back to Chairman Greenspan’s interview—what are we doing about increasing future output? Certainly nothing in the proposed private account plan. So if we are going to take real action, that is the area of attack. Make sure we do what we can to make the real investments necessary for tomorrow’s needs, and the first place to start for very long term real gains is education. Our kids will need the smarts when the time comes to deal with the problems at hand.
Bibliography
Galbraith, John Kenneth, 2004, The Economics of Innocent Fraud: Truth for Our Time, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Wray, L. Randall, 1999, “Subway Tokens and Social Security,” C-FEPS Policy Note 99/02, Kansas City, MO: Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, January, (http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/pn/pn9902/).
Wray, L. Randall, 2000, “Social Security: Long-Term Financing and Reform,” C-FEPS Working Paper No. 11, Kansas City, MO: Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, August, (http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp/wp11/).
Wray, L. Randall and Stephanie Bell, 2000, “Financial Aspects of the Social Security ‘Problem’,” C-FEPS Working Paper No. 5, Kansas City, MO: Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, January, (http://www.cfeps.org/pubs/wp/wp5/).
[1] Associate Fellow, Cambridge University Centre for Economic and Public Policy;
Distinguished Research Associate, Center for Full Employment and Price Stability
[2] Associate Professor and Director, Center for Full Employment and Price Stability, University of Missouri-Kansas City