1937an idatzitako poema eta hil eta gero, 1939an, argitaratutakoa1.
Ekonomian hala Espainia una, grande y libre-n nola Hego Euskal Herrian hamaika txorakeria aipatzen dira, etengabe gainera. Ekonomia ongi doa, krisia gaindituz doa, ez dakit zenbat esportazio egin diren edo zer nolako aldagai ekonomikoak ‘onerako’ aldatu diren…
Funtsean daturik garrantzitsuenak ‘ahazten’ dira, ez dira aipatzen, eta oro har, estatistika kaskarrak erabiltzen dira aurretik frogatu nahi duguna ‘frogatu’ ahal izateko…
Greziaren azken gorabeherak direla eta, honako artikulu labur, sakon eta interesgarria2 topa dut, non Espainia aipatzen den.
Aipamen batzuk.
1) Erreformak
A quick quiz: which four countries do you think have done the most to reform their economies over the last seven years?
(…) according to the OECD, the country that has done the most to reform its economy over the last seven years—that is, from before the 2008 economic crisis until well after it—is Greece. Followed at some distance by Portugal, Ireland and Spain.
(…) on page 111 of the OECD’s publication Going For Growth 2015, (…) Unemployment in Greece is 27%; in Portugal it’s 15%, Ireland 12%, and Spain 25%. Those are very, very sick economies. And yet they are also the OECD’s top reformers.
Figure 1: The four basket cases of Europe are top of the reform pops for the OECD
You are, I hope, wondering “how come? Isn’t reform supposed to be good for you?”
Well, that’s the fairy story—sorry, theory—purveyed and fervently believed in by mainstream economists: reform your economies according to our recommendations, and—whatever else happens—your economy will grow more rapidly and be more stable to boot.
2) Istorioak eta errealitateak
Unfortunately for those purveying this fairytale, (…) a decade later, we can compare the fairy story to the reality. (…)
I’ll cover at length someday soon why economic reform as recommended by mainstream economists will normally make your economy more dysfunctional and unstable.
(…) consider the pressure that is being applied to Greece to get it to “stick with the program” invented for it by the EU.
The EU program that Greece is currently refusing to continue implements part of what is known as the ”Stability and Growth Pact” or SGP (…) And the other countries that are also under the control of GSP include… Portugal, Ireland and Spain.
Greece is refusing to continue with this program, not because it is “refusing its medicine”, but because the medicine is actually poison. And Greece itself is not the proof of that: the other countries on this list are—especially Spain.
3) Espainiaren kasua
Spain did everything that the GSP and mainstream economics recommended, not merely after the crisis but before it as well. The GSP required that member countries of the Eurozone have a government debt to GDP ratio of 60% or below, and run a maximum deficit of 3% or less of GDP.
Spain was doing both before the crisis. Its government debt ratio was below 60% from early 2000, and trending down—hitting a low of below 40% shortly after the crisis began—see Figure 2.
Figure 2: Spain had a falling government debt level before the crisis and below 60% of GDP
Its deficit was even better—not only was it below 3% of GDP at the introduction of the Euro, by 2001 it was in surplus—hitting a peak of 2.5% of GDP in 2007 (Figure 3).
Figure 3: A government surplus for 2001-2007, and then crashing into deficit
Before the crisis hit, Spain was being lauded as a success story for the GSP, and superficially for good reason: not only was it following the GSP program by running surpluses, and reducing its government debt, its economy was booming.
Unemployment, which had always been high, trended down from 12.5% at the start of the Euro to 8% by 2007. And then it all went pear-shaped, as Figure 4 indicates.
Figure 4: From star performer to basket case
4) Galderak
a) How did Spain appear to be doing so well, and then collapse so badly?
b) Did the EU’s policies contribute to Spain’s problems?
The answer to the first question involves what happened to the debt that GAP ignores (as do conventional economists everywhere): private debt.
While the GSP imposed strict controls on government debt, it ignored the blowout in private debt on the erroneous argument that private debt is economically unimportant (“Nobody Understands Debt — Including Paul Krugman” and “Beware Of Politicians Bearing Household Analogies”).
(This raises two questions, the answers to which cement the case that the EU’s austerity program should end everywhere—and not just in Greece.)
Private debt rose from about 120% of GDP in early 2000 to over 200% by the time the crisis began, and peaked at 225% of GDP when the GSP’s austerity program kicked in, as Figure 5 shows.
Figure 5: EU ignores private debt while obsessing about government debt
The growth in private debt gave the economy an enormous boost as it financed Spain’s housing bubble, and the tax revenue from this bubble was the main reason that the government was in surplus from 2000 until the crisis hit.
The rise in private debt dwarfed the decline in government debt, and the huge stimulus from private sector borrowing more than compensated for the drag on the economy from the government surplus.
As the government was “salting away pennies”, the private sector was wallowing in new debt-financed spending.
Figure 6: Change in private debt swamps government debt change
But to do so, the private non-bank sector had to get more indebted to the banks—as Figure 5 shows.
When growth in private debt turned around, the housing bubble collapsed and private sector borrowing went into free-fall.
Then, and only then, did government debt rise—as increased government spending slightly compensated for the plunge in private debt-financed spending.
Ultimately, by 2010, the stimulus from rising government spending slowed down the decline in private borrowing. But then austerity kicked in and the government stimulus stalled.
Consequently the private sector went from mild deleveraging into heavy deleveraging—reducing its debt by as much as 20% of GDP per year.
5) Zor pribatua
I am a critic of private debt financed spending when it finances Ponzi Schemes like Spain’s housing bubble, and I believe that sustained recovery will not happen until private debt levels are drastically reduced.
But when a private debt bubble bursts, government spending attenuates the downturn. To limit the growth in the government deficit makes the crisis worse, without doing much to reduce private debt compared to GDP because GDP collapses along with the falling private debt.
6) Krisien zergatiak
So these crises—in the OECD’s pin-up countries of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal—are the product of the EU’s policies.
The only way out of the crisis is to end the policies themselves, as Greece is demanding now.
And if Syriza gives in and the EU’s policies are maintained? Then this will go from being an economic and social tragedy to a political one as well.
7) Beraz…
Espainiarrak ez garenok, aldiz Espainia una, grande y libretik askatu nahi dugunok, separatu nahi dugunok, Espainiaren eta Hego Euskal Herriaren krisiaren kausak kontuan eduki beharko ditugu, baldin eta krisiari benetako irtenbidea eman nahi badiogu.
Gai izango ote gara Hego Euskal Herriaren krisiaren zergatiak ulertzeko eta azken horien irtenbideak topatzeko?
(Baita Ipar Euskal Herriarenak ere, noski!)
Ala ibiliko gara biraka ohiko ekonomialariei, politikariei eta kazetariei kasu eginez, sasi-estatistikei begira eta ez zergatiei?
2 Ikus For Greece And Many Others, Economic Reform Is Bad For Your Economic Health: http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevekeen/2015/02/17/for-greece-and-many-others-economic-reform-is-bad-for-your-economic-health/.
