Albiste onak: Syrizak irabazi du.
Pena: ez du lortu gehiengo absolutua: 149 aulki, 151tik.
Zorionak, beraz.
Baina Syrizaren programa politikoarekin oso kritikoak izaten segitzen dugu…
Hona hemen Bill Mitchell-en gaurko artikulua, berak emaitzak oraindik jakin gabe: Greek elections – a solution doesn’t appear to be forthcoming1.
Aipu batzuk in progress, (eguneratzekoa):
a) Syriza ez da koherentea, sendotasunik gabekoa baizik2.
b) Greziak behar duena3.
c) Zorraren ezabatzea ala zorraren berrizendatzea moneta berri batean?4
d) Euroa, moneta propioa, zergak5.
e) Zorraren afera nagusia6.
f) EBZ, herrialde desberdinetako finantzaketa, arauen aldaketak…7
g) EBZ-ren azken QE-z hitz pare bat8.
h) Draghi, QE berria eta Alemania9. Politika fiskal berria behar da.10
i) Syriza: politika11.
j) Syriza eta ekonomia: Syriza ez da alderdi erradikal bat12.
k) Bonoen merkatu pribatua eta Syriza13.
l) Syriza eta bankuen nazionalizazioa14.
m) Syriza eta politika fiskala15.
n) Greziak behar duena, berriz16.
o) Greziako defizit publikoa:
“Greek public deficit has to rise substantially – by multiples of the current Stability and Growth Pact fiscal limits of 3 per cent.”
“A balanced budget position doesn’t resolve that issue.”
p) Eurogunetik irtetea?17
Ondorioak:
“The only reasonable conclusion is that Syriza’s stated policy aims are not mutually consistent. They cannot achieve the (motherhood) aspirations of higher growth and increased incomes and equity while allowing Brussels to dominate the magnitude of their fiscal deficits.
They cannot achieve their aims with a fixed exchange rate (effectively no independent exchange rate) with Germany as a partner in the monetary union.
Their policy pledges resonate with the suffering population. But the reality is that the population is not being educated by progressive forces about the self-inflicted damage that retaining the euro as their currency is causing.
Letters by economists that avoid that issue do not help.
Political parties that make it a root-and-branch commitment to remain in the Eurozone do not help.”
Mitchell-ek dioenez, “I don’t see Syriza as the solution as they shift to the centre (which is really the right). I would love to be proved wrong!”
Ezin adosago egon Mitchell-ekin!
PS: Telebistan
a) Bihar goizean, 11:00etan, grabatuko didate Hamaika TB-koek Santurtzin, Ertzak progamarako.
b) Etzi, 16:30etan ETBko Azpimarra programan egongo naiz.
Let’s see what happens in Greece …
2 Ingelesez: ”… Syriza talks bit about freeing Greece from the Troika-yoke but has a set of proposals that are mutually inconsistent. They might help around the edge and redistribute income a bit but what is needed is a massive boost in national income and that can only come from a massive increase in spending.”
3 Ingelesez: “Repeat: a massive fiscal boost is required, which means deficits above 10 per cent of GDP for many years forward. Repeat: that can only be accomplished within the current political reality if Greece leaves the Eurozone. It should have done that in 2008. It should never have joined. It should do it next week.”
4 Mitchell-en hitzez: “… I do not support the cancelling of the debt. I support a redenomination of it in a new currency, which is the sole right of the democratic country who issues that currency under monopoly conditions.”
5 Ingelesez: “…There is thus no question that a nation currently using the euro could abandon it, introduce its own currency, and require all taxes to be paid and all contracts to be denominated in that currency.”
6 Ingelesez: “... the principle also means that if a government changes its currency and re-denominates at some given parity, all contracts must be honoured at the re-denominated rate … (…) the discussion suggests that all public debt should be re-denominated into the local currency at the going parity on day one.”
7 Ingelesez: “…most Eurozone nations will not be able to run the necessary magnitudes for their fiscal deficits (to favour ‘pro-growth’) under the current terms that restrict the ECB – the monopoly-issuer of the euro – from funding such deficits.
Countries such as Greece already ran foul of the private bond markets who are required to fund the deficits under current rules.
So why not call for the rules to be changed to allow the ECB to properly act as a currency-issuer? The reason is obvious. Germany would never allow it and it, basically rules the Eurozone.”
8 Ingelesez. “The latest announcement of quantitative easing while unconstrained from the prior conditionality that accompanied the – Security Markets Program – which began in May 2010.
That program saw the ECB demonstrate categorically that by purchasing specific government bonds in the secondary markets (to get around Treaty rules) it could eliminate the private bond markets from the picture and control bond yields to whatever rate it chose.
It was a salutary lesson about the power of the currency-issuer. The problem with the program is that the ECB insisted that the fiscal austerity be imposed and followed as a condition for it buying a beleaguered nation’s debt in the secondary markets.
So they controlled yields and dealt the private bond markets out of the equation but wrecked the economies in question at the same time.”
9 Ingelesez: “The German ‘tolerance’ of Draghi’s QE announcement this week is limited I suspect. They know that as long as the fiscal deficits are prevented from rising and austerity is maintained that QE will not do much to stimulate growth.”
10 Ingelesez: “But if QE was [were] combined with large-scale expansion of fiscal deficits in several countries targetted at public sector job creation and infrastructure development then the German ‘tolerance’ (currently given through gritted teeth) would quickly vanish and there would be a political crisis.
11 Ingelesez: “I have no doubt this political messaging is a genuine attempt to engender optimism. I agree with that a major shift in Greek politics is required and that Syriza appears to be achieving that a shift. But is it the shift that is required?
I doubt it – and I am sorry to say that as I have friends in the Syriza movement.”
12 Ingelesez: “First, don’t get the idea that Syriza is a radical party. Its public statements and the proposal it has taken the Greek people is not radical at all and would see it operate within the mainstream (neo-liberal) rules that are set and enforced by Brussels.
Syriza is not proposing a restoration of currency sovereignty.Rather it is proposing that Brussels goes soft on Greece for a while and writes down a proportion of the outstanding public liabilities as part of a negotiated easing of the repayment conditions.
Thatis not radical. It ensures that Greece remains within the Eurozone, the dynamics of which are dominated by Germany
They talk about “going to the markets” (private bond markets) to fund government spending. That is about as mainstream as it gets. “
13 Ingelesez: “What happens when the private bond markets turn against the government again (as they did in 2010)? Then what?
Syriza talks about restoring the creditworthiness of public debt? What? Who are they representing – the private bond dealers and their assessments? The IMF? The people?”
14 Ingelesez: “Syriza used to advocate the nationalisation of banks in Greece as a recognition of the centrality of banking for financial stability.”
(…) The government has pumped billions into the private banks but the same financial elites continue to run them.
And now? The so-called radicals have abandoned the commitment to nationalise the banks. Why? Who are they proposing to serve?”
15 Ingelesez: “...More telling, is that Syriza plans to ‘stimulate’ the Greek economy within an effectively neutral
fiscal position. (…)
Yiannis Dragasakis – has stated several times that a Syriza government would adopt a balanced fiscal position.
(…) … insisted that the leftists would run a balanced budget. “We are not going to return todeficits,” he said.Well, one couldn’t be more categorical than that?”
16 Ingelesez: “As I explained in this blog – Greece – two alternative views – Greece will not achieve growth with balanced fiscal positions.
How does the Party plan to fill the massive output gap that Greece has? Output gaps can only be closed by increasing output. That requires increased spending.Greece has lost 25 per cent of its real GDP since 2008. While potential output has also surely declined (as firms have scrapped productive capital) in the face of a massive decline in the investment ratio, it remains there is a huge unused capacity in the country. The mass unemployment is testament to that.”
17 Ingelesez: “Running a fiscally-neutral policy to help people will only partially stimulate overall spending in the nation.
The reality is that Greece needs a public stimulus that is way beyond anything that is allowed under the current rules.
But the Greeks can fix that in a single decision – leave the Eurozone and restore currency sovereignty.”
