Randall Wray-ri egindako elkarrizketa[1].
Galdera, Travis Strawn-ek eginda: emango al duzu MMT-z, hots, DTMz deskribapen soil bat?
R. Wray-k: Politikaren aldetik, gobernu subirano bat, bere moneta jaulkitzen duen gobernu bat, ez da familia edo enpresa bezalakoa. Hortaz, gobernu baten aurrekontuak ez du funtzionatzen familia baten aurrekontuak bezala.
G: Zer dela eta familiari buruzko ideia hori hain hedatua izatea?
W-k: Gutxienez, hiru arrazoia daude. Lehena, ekonomialari askotxok urre estandarri eusten die, beste batzuek Bretton Woods-eko dolar-urre estandarri. Urre estandarreko egoeran gobernuak urre barik gera daiteke, eta zeure moneta zuzenean urreari lotzen badiozu, zentzu batean, esan daiteke moneta barik gera zaitezkeela. Urre estandarraz pentsatzen duen batek gobernu subirano batek finantza muga bat daukala esatea uler daiteke.
Baina, noski, Bretton Woods abandonatu genuen 1970eko lehen urteetan, eta ez gara inoiz halako egoerara itzuli. Egoera hori ez zaio aplikagarria gaur egun mundu errealean dagoen moneta sistemari.
Bigarrena, jende asko nahastuta dago gobernu eta familiaren arteko analogiarekin. Analogia hori politikari askok erabiltzen dute, sinplea da, intuizioz ulergarria, baina erabat faltsua.
Hirugarrena, aipatutako analogia erabiltzen da jendea nahasteko, nahiz eta jakin analogia faltsua den, horrela jendeak behartuta dago egiteko egin nahi ez dituen gauzak, kasurako gastu soziala moztea. “AEBk ez dauka dirurik, beraz, gastu soziala moztu behar dugu”, diote defizit belatzek.
G: Badirudi DTM mehatxua dela statu quo ekonomikorako. Zer dela eta?
W-k: Oro har, ekonomialariak politikoki kontserbadoreak dira. Jendea gobernuaren tamainaz kezkatzen da, baita gobernuaren botereaz ere. Beraz, gobernua murriztu nahi dute. Ekonomialari horiei esaten badiezu gobernuak ez daukala inongo finantza mugarik, ekonomialari gehienak kezkatzen dira. Hori izan daiteke arrazoiaren parte bat.
Gainera ekonomialari gehienek ez dute teoria makroekonomikoa ikertzen: ez dute gehiegi ezagutzen sistema monetarioaz, moneta jaulkitzaileek dauzkaten aukerez. Eta ekonomialari gazteek ez dute inolako teoria makroekonomikorik beren kurtsoetan, eta doktorego ikastaroetan irakasten dena erabat matematikoa da eta esoterikoa, inongo harremanik gabe benetako mundu errealarekin. Erabiltzen diren modeloetan, moneta, dirua, finantza erakundeak, gobernua ez dira ukitzen azken 20/30 urteetako doktorego ikastaroetan.
G: Eta modelo matematikoez?
W-k: Matematikoki modeloak oso konplexuak dira, erabat irrealak eta oso sinpleak… non krisiak ezin diren gertatu[2].
…
Baina ekonomialari batzuek aurreikusi zuten krisia eta ongi adierazi zuten zehaztasun onekin[3].
G: Nortzuek ikusi krisia etortzen?
W-k: Badaude bi izen garrantzitsu. Bata Hyman Minsky da[4].
Bestea Wynne Godly da[5].
G: DTMren arabera, ekonomia halabeharrez ziklotan mugitzen al da, boom, burbuilak eta porrota?
W-k: DTMri segitzen dion jendea ados egongo litzateke horrekin. Baina ideia Minsky-rengandik dator.
G: Hortaz, uste duzu ziklo hori saihestezina dela?
W-k: Bai, Minsly-en esaera ospetsu bat honelakoa zen: egonkortasuna ezegonkortzea zen. Beraz, egonkortasun ekonomikoa lortzen baduzu, horrek ezegonkortasuna kausatuko du.
Arrazoia hauxe da: jendeak bere jokabidea aldatzen duela, baldin eta uste badute ekonomia sendoago, egonkorrago bilakatu dela, krisi sakon baten posibilitate gutxiagorekin. Beraz, portaera aldatzen dute eta arrisku handiagoak hartzen dituzte, ezegonkortasuna sortuz[6].
G: Baldin eta DTM aplikatu eta erabiliko balitz makroekonomian maila handiago batean, sistema egonkorragoa lortuko genuke? Non jendea enplegatuta egongo litzateke, eta langabezia murriztuta, eta atzerapenak ez litzateke egongo? Uste duzu DTM are zabalagoa izango balitz, atzerapenak arinago baliogabetuko liratekeela, gu hobeto egongo ginatekeela atzerapenak gertatzen direnean?
W-k: Ezin dugu negozio zikloa baztertu, baina krisia ez hain gogorra izatea lortu dezakegu. Susperraldirako askoz arinago joan gaitezke, eta garrantzitsuagoa dena, enplegu galerak baztertu ditzakegu. Hortaz, “eliminating instability is going to be impossible and that shouldn’t be our goal, but reducing instability is something we can do.”
Finantza sistema erreformatu behar dugu, politikoki erraza ez dena, gainera ekonomikoki nola egitea eztabaidan dago. Afera handia da.
Beste puntu bat, politika fiskala aldatzea egonkortasunerantz, ez ezegonkortasunerantz, eta hori lortzea erraz samarra da. Behar dena hauxe da: gobernuaren gastua kontra ziklikoki mugitzea[7]: zergak beheratuz eta gastua altxatuz atzerapenean zaudenean, eta garrantzitsuena: atzerapenean desenpleguaren igoera baztertzea.
Izan ere, lan bermeko programa eduki behar da, hots, azken baliabideko enplegatzaile bat edukitzea[8].
Horretarako, zerga sistema progresibo bat eduki behar da[9].
(Zabaldu, arren.)
[2] Ingelesez: “…They then try to make policy recommendations based on these completely unreal and far too simplistic models. The Queen of England asked her economic advisers, “Why didn’t any of you [economists] see the financial crisis coming?” The reason is really obvious: [it’s] because they were using these models in which crises cannot happen.
So economists have models of economies that cannot exist.”
[3] Ingelesez: “But there were economists who saw it coming and explained in pretty good detail what we know after-the-fact, which actually fit what happened. These economists didn’t use these models, they used heterodox economics and they all saw it coming.”
[4] Ingelesez: “…Minsky started developing theory in the 1950s of the long-term transformation of the financial system from a very robust system, that we had in the early postwar period, to finally a highly fragile unstable financial system that we got in the 80′s, 90′s, and 2000′s. Minsky died in 1996 so he actually didn’t live to see this crisis, but all along he was updating his theories. His explanation of what was going on would allow anybody to see that a big crisis was going to occur.”
[5] Ingelesez: “… Godly’s writings from ‘96 to about 2000 really spelled out in detail what was wrong and why the whole thing was going to crash. So he really focused on the processes that actually led directly to the crash. He did live long enough to see the crash so I think that he got the specifics right and Minsky got the general right.”
[6] Ingelesez: “…Chairman Bernanke in 2004 wrote a paper announcing that we’ve entered the period of the great moderation, central bankers are so clever now that they have managed to stabilize the economy, so that from now on you have a much more stable economy. We would still have some swings, but they wouldn’t be very big and of course, if people believe that, then they might take on more risks because there is less chance things might go bad. That’s exactly what they did and that led to the crisis.”
Are gehiago:
“It’s just like when Irving Fisher in 1929, I think in September, wrote that the stock market has entered a new permanent plateau and it would never go down and of course one month later it collapsed. Bernanke wrote this in 2004 [and] three years later we collapsed. Paul Samuelson wrote in, I think, 1968 that economists have figured everything out and government knew how to fine tune the economies so we would never have any more recessions or inflations and immediately of course, we got inflation and then a very deep recession. So whenever economists make statements like this we know we are looking at the beginning of the next crisis.”
[7] Ingelesez: “…What you need is for the government’s spending and taxing to move counter-cyclically. So you want taxes to go down and spending to go up when you are moving into a recession and the most important thing is to prevent unemployment from rising in recession.”
[8] Ingelesez: “…. What we propose to do which handles all of the spending side is to have an employer of last resort, or job guarantee program, in place so that when people start losing their jobs in the private sector they can always go into the government direct job creation program, job guarantee, or employer of last resort, whichever you would want to call it.”
Are gehiago: “…They don’t become unemployed and continue to earn some of their income which helps put a floor on how bad the recession will get and it helps the recovery begin because government spending automatically goes up as you hire those people. When the economy does recover the private sector will start hiring those people away from the government’s program. Government spending automatically goes down, so you get government spending going in the right direction counter-cyclically.”
[9] Alegia, “The only other thing you need to do is have a progressive tax system that is based on the performance of the economy, so that when people’s incomes go up, you tax more and then when incomes stop rising or go down you tax less, which is a progressive income tax.”
