Europak ekaitz intelektual bat behar du

Bill Mitchell-ek analizatu ditu Draghi-k ‘E’ egunean esandakoa[1], 1945eko Normandiako lehorreratzea gogoratuz eta 1930eko hamarkadan ekonomian gertatutako zenbait proposamen berriz aipatuz.

DMT-ko batek, berriz ere, gauzak beren tokian jarri ditu.

Ikus ditzagun punturik garrantzitsuenak:

(i)                Gaur egunean Alemanian dagoen ideologia nagusia dela-eta, ondorio ekonomikoak suntsitzaileak izan dira. EBZ-k atzo erakutsi zuen zer-nolako itogarria izan daitekeen zapalkuntza hori, aldaketa ‘historikoak’ egin zirenean, “which any reasonable assessment would conclude will do very little to stimulate growth.

(ii)              Ez dago inolako logika ekonomikorik. Ideologia neoliberalak proposatzen duen politika fiskalarekin ez dago inongo lekurik hazkunderako.

(iii)             Europako beste inbasio handi bat behar da, hondartzetako ekaitz intelektual bat: “That is the only way the euro-zone nations will liberate themselves from the current malaise.”

(iv)             Ezaguna denez, krisi honetan, AEBko FED eta Britainia Handiko Bank of England sartutik egon dira QE programa masiboetan, alferrik.

(v)              QE delakoak zerikusia du banku zentralak zero edo oso baxuko intereseko aktibo bat, handiagoko edo epe luzeko aktibo batzuen truke aldatzean[2].

(vi)             QE banku zentralaren eta sektore pribatuaren swap bat, truke bat, besterik ez da[3].

(vii)            QE bankuen funtzionamendu oker batez oinarritzen da[4].

(viii)          Izan ere, bankuek beste era batera funtzionatzen dute: bankuen mailegatzea ez dute erreserbek mugatzen. Kontua bezero bat topatzean datza, ez erreserba kontuetan bankuek zenbat funts daukaten. Funts nahikorik ez izatekotan, ‘bankuen arteko merkatuan’ batak besteari maileguz hartzen baitio[5].

(ix)             Aipatutakoa posible ez bada, orduan, azkenik, banku horiek banku zentraletik maileguz hartu dezakete. Izan ere, banku zentral baten zereginetako bat da finantza egonkortasuna mantentzea, sistema erreserba nahikoak (likidezia aski) daudela segurtatzeko[6].

(x)              Arazoa da banku erreserbek ez dutela bankuaren mailegatzeko ahalmena areagotuko, QE zaleek uste duten moduan.

(xi)             Errealitatea da maileguek gordailuak kreatzen dituztela, eta horiek gero erreserbak sortzen dituztela, ez alderantziz.

(xii)            Orain banku mailegatzea mugatuta dago, kreditu prestuko bezero gutxi daudelako.

(xiii)          QE delakoak ez du sektore pribatuko finantza netoko egoera aldatzen[7].

(xiv)          Euro-gunean eta nonahi dagoen arazorik handiena hauxe da: sektore pribatuak ez du gastatu nahi krisi baino lehenago gastatu duen bezala. Gastatze zuloa betetzeko bide bakarra gobernuek beren defizit gastua areagotzea da. Euro-guneko herrialde guztiek behar dutena da gobernu defizitak areagotzea.

Aipatutako testuinguru horretan, EBZ-ren politika monetarioen erabakiak, zeintzuk déjà vu modukoak diren, azaldu dira.

Mitchell-en ustez:

(a)    Goian aipatutako antzeko estrategia ergelak hartzen ari dira, ez balute bezala inongo botererik edukiko krisiaren ibilbidea aldatzeko.

(b)    EBZ-k hobe onartuko balu bere botererik handiena: bera da euroa jaulkitzen duen bakarra.

(c)    EBZ-k Bruselari esan beharko lioke Overt Monetary Financing (hots, Finantzaketa Monetario Irekia) delako denbora dela: alegia, euro-gunean zehar defizit fiskala areagotzea, behar den edozein mailataraino, gastu totala enplegu tasa altuetako eta hazkunde egonkorreko mailaraino itzultzeko[8].

Hona hemen EBZ-k hartutako erabakiak, linkean[9].

Zein da aldaketa guzti horien helburua?

(d)    Draghi-k dioenez, aldaketak “ekonomia errealera mailegatzea“ babesteko dira. EBZ kezkatuta dago deflazioaz eta jarduera ekonomikoa bultzatu nahi du inflazio tasa %2ra itzultzeko.

(e)    Errealitatea da bankuek ez dituztela erreserba horiek mailegatzen inongo bidetatik. Egia da erreserbak behar dituztela beren mailegua sustengatzeko, baina kausalitatea honelakoa da: “…the causality is very much loans driving a need for funding not the other way around.”

(f)     EBZ itxaroten ari da bankuak beren mailegatze jardueretan ausartagoak izan daitezen. Baina, sektore pribatua, krisia den moduan delako, maileguz hartze modu apalean egonik, bankuek maileguz ematea areagotuko ahalko duten bide bakarra berriz ere ‘sub-prime’ maileguko munduan sartzea da, hau da, arrisku balorazioa gutxitzea eta kualifikaziorik ez daukaten bezeroei mailegatzen hastea.

(g)    Aldaketen logikak ematen du bankuak fondotan labur daudela, izatez, banku erreserbak markako mailan dauden bitartean.

Ondorioak:

(1)    Politika monetarioan konfiantza ergel horrek, salbatzaile moduan, ez dauka inongo aurrekari historikorik. Izatez, alderantzikoa da afera.

(2)    SGP-rekin eta Itun Fiskalak hazkundean beherantz joz, aldaketa horiek  ez dute ezer egingo euro-gunean traiektoria aldatzeko.

(Zabaldu, arren. Be sociable, share.)


[1] Ikus An intellectual storming of the beaches is required in Europe: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=27980.

[2]  Ingelesez: “QE involves the central bank exchanging a non- or low-interest bearing asset (that is, adding funds to the reserve accounts that banks have to hold with the central bank to facilitate the clearance of cheques) for some higher yielding and longer-term assets (for example, 10-year government bonds or commercial bonds.”

[3]  Hona hemen mitologia, ingelesez: “Proponents of QE claim it adds liquidity to a system where lending by commercial banks is seemingly frozen because of a lack of bank reserves.

They say that giving the banks more reserves will stimulate more lending to the private sector with commensurate higher rates of investment and economic growth.

The mainstream belief is that it will stimulate the economy sufficiently to put a brake on the downward spiral of lost production and the increasing unemployment.”

[4] Ingelesez: “It is based on the erroneous belief that a bank is an institution that accepts deposits in order to build up reserves, which, in turn, provides it with the funds to on-lend at a margin in order to profit.”

[5]  Ingelesez: “But this is not how banks operate. Bank lending is not ‘reserve constrained’. Banks lend to any credit worthy customer they can find without, initially, worrying about how much funds they have in their reserve accounts. They know that if they are short of reserves (their reserve accounts have to be at least in positive balance each day) then they borrow from each other in the so-called ‘interbank market’.”

[6]  Izan ere, ingelesez:”If that is not possible, then, ultimately, they know they can borrow from the central bank, which always stands ready to provide funds to meet reserve shortfalls. Ensuring there are adequate reserves (liquidity) in the system is part of the central bank’s charter to maintain financial stability.”

[7]  Izan ere, ingelesez, “When the central bank exchanges one type of financial asset (an increase in a private bank’s reserve balance) for another type of financial asset (private holdings of bonds, etc), the net financial assets in the private sector is unchanged although the portfolio composition of those assets is altered.”

[8]  Aspaldian beste DTM-ko batek, Warren Mosler-ek, proposamen dotorea plazaratu zuen: https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/05/21/warren-mosler-en-proposamenak/.

[9]  “In its Monetary policy decisions (June 5, 2014) the ECB:

1. The interest rate on the main refinancing operations of the Eurosystem will be decreased by 10 basis points to 0.15%, starting from the operation to be settled on 11 June 2014.

2. The interest rate on the marginal lending facility will be decreased by 35 basis points to 0.40%, with effect from 11 June 2014.

3. The interest rate on the deposit facility will be decreased by 10 basis points to -0.10%, with effect from 11 June 2014.”

Iruzkinak (5)

  • joseba

    D-Day and deficits:

    http://mikenormaneconomics.blogspot.com.es/2014/06/d-day-and-deficits.html

    After the reading of that article, try this one:

    An intellectual storming of the beaches is required in Europe, http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=27980

    “Seventy years ago today there was a major mobilisation – D Day – designed to free Europe from the German military (and ideological) oppression. The allied troops stormed the beaches at Normandy as part of the so-called ‘Operation Overlord’, which quickly liberated France and set up the campaign that would end Germany’s dominance. Unfortunately, modern day Europe is caught up in a different form of German ideological oppression and the economic consequences have been devastating. The European Central Bank showed yesterday how stifling this oppression is when they made what were considered ‘historic’ changes to policy, which any reasonable assessment would conclude will do very little to stimulate growth. The policy mentality is in denial of history and economic logic. But with fiscal policy bolted down by the neo-liberal ideology there is no room to grow. Another major invasion of Europe is needed – an intellectual storming of the beaches. That is the only way the euro-zone nations will liberate themselves from the current malaise.”

    Possible people needed to invade Europe for the intellectual storming at the beaches:

    Bill Mitchell, Warren Mosler and Randall Wray.

    (Here something in Basque:
    https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2013/11/09/dtm-ortodoxiaren-aurkako-aukera-bakarra/)

    More people? What for?

  • joseba

    Monetary farce:

    Draghi’s Horrible Threat: “Are We Finished? The Answer is No” !

    http://davidstockmanscontracorner.com/draghis-horrible-threat-are-we-finished-the-answer-is-no/

    “Taken at face value yesterday’s action by the ECB amounted to a monetary farce. How could any adult believe that a benchmark rate cut of 10 bps from an already microscopic level of 25 bps would move the needle in an economic zone that is already groaning under of the weight of $60 trillion in public and private credit market debt?”

  • joseba

    Europe’s Good, Bad, & Ugly Reality (In 3 Simple Charts):

    http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-06-08/europes-good-bad-ugly-reality-3-simple-charts

    “But, as Bloomberg notes, not even the European establishment believes Draghi’s efforts will have any impact…

    President of the German Institute for Economic Research Marcel Fratzscher tells Handelsblatt that large and not unlikely risk remains that euro zone economies may fall into stagnation and deflation from which it may be difficult to exit.

    “Newspaper also cites Fratzscher as saying:
    ECB measures won’t solve the fundamental problems of the banking system and lack of structural reforms.
    More expansionary fiscal policy may be helpful in short term but won’t resolve fundamental problems, including excessive national debt.”

    “DekaBank economist Ulrich Kater also tells newspaper that politically generated economic upswing may collapse into sluggish economy and higher debt when it expires, warns against implementing large scale, debt-financed spending programs”

Utzi erantzuna

Zure e-posta helbidea ez da argitaratuko. Beharrezko eremuak * markatuta daude