Ordezko edo proxy gerlak (44)

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The Spectator Index@spectatorindex

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Paul Krugman@paulkrugman

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Dagny Taggart@DagnyTaggart963

abu. 3

Borrell: “Russia offers cheap grain to developing countries to make them dependent” “This is a cynical policy of deliberately using food as a weapon to create new addictions” These people have absolutely no shame.

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Arnaud Bertrand@RnaudBertrand

Jackson Hinkle @jacksonhinklle

abu. 4

The new government of Niger has reportedly cut diplomatic ties with France, Nigeria, Togo, and the United States.

abu. 3

India Denies Being Against BRICS Expansion

On Thursday, the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs refuted reports claiming that India was against the expansion of the BRICS organization.

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Arindam Bagchi clarified that they have previously expressed their position and that BRICS members are currently discussing the principles, standards, criteria, and procedures for expansion. He emphasized that India approaches this matter with an open mind and a positive outlook.

Bagchi dismissed the previous Bloomberg report stating that India would oppose new member admissions due to concerns about China’s influence, deeming it “baseless speculation” and “simply not true.”

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COMBATE |@upholdreality

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Carl Worker@carlworker

Lee Camp [Redacted]@LeeCamp

15 h

The US government is terrified of China’s Belt & Road Initiative – a global development plan that is already benefiting many nations around the world. The concept that “developing” nations could help their people without being indebted to the US empire is clearly unacceptable.

Bideoa, hemen: https://twitter.com/i/status/1687517875815272460

oooooo

0:00

Rana the first question I wanted to ask you if you could just explain to our viewers why is Taiwan this small island

0:06

off the coast of china such a point of contention the fate of Taiwan has been an issue now

0:13

for the best part of three quarters of a century in other words since 1949 that

0:18

was the year that Chairman Mao’s Communist Party conquered the mainland of China they established the People’s Republic of China but of course has been

0:25

the government ever since but the one Province they didn’t manage to conquer was the island province of Taiwan which

0:31

of course lies just a couple of hundred miles off the east coast of China and

0:36

essentially ever since then through the Cold War and through the post-cold war one of the issues of contention for the

0:42

Chinese government in Beijing and Chinese Communist party is the question of whether or not they will be able to

0:48

bring back what they regard as the last missing Province it’s contentious though because much of the rest of the world

0:55

has both political and security reasons for being concerned about the

1:01

unification essentially Taiwan has changed very considerably in those 75

1:07

plus years it started off essentially as a rather autocratic dictatorship under Chiang Kai-shek the Chinese nationalist

1:14

leader who fled the mainland in 1949 to go to the island with the Hope on his

1:19

part that he would be able to get back and reconquer the mainland that of course never happened but during the

1:25

1980s and 90s Taiwan changed it turned into a democracy actually a very Consolidated very wide range in

1:31

democracy Taiwan for instance today has a very free press it has uh freely functioning two-party or several party

1:37

system uh it’s actually the first place in Asia one of the few places first places in the world to have a minister

1:43

in government who’s trans so it’s a place that has a very very broad public sphere that’s very unlike the mainland

1:49

which of course continues to be an authoritarian State fairly socially conservative even though it’s actually run by a communist Society so there’s a

1:56

real values gap between the two that’s one reason why unifying the two sides is difficult and the other of course is

2:02

that the United States Japan a major Western allies in the Asia region fear that if Taiwan went back to China it

2:09

would send to become a security asset of China in other words warships from the Chinese Navy Fleet could essentially

2:16

Place themselves in Harbors on the island of Taiwan and essentially project themselves towards southeast Asia Japan

2:22

the Pacific and Beyond so there’s some of the issues that make the idea of bringing Taiwan and the mainland

2:28

together which is what Beijing wants very contentious overall but it’s also

2:34

about resources isn’t it aren’t there um kind of uh resources and things to do with

2:41

microchips that are found in Taiwan that are kind of making it it’s kind of a that both the US and China are very

2:48

interested in one of the major reasons that there is real concern in both the

2:54

Western World and China actually about the fate of Taiwan in the present day is one particular commodity that wasn’t

3:00

even thought of just a few decades ago but now is Central to taiwan’s place in the world that is semiconductor chips in

3:07

other words a form of very very high Precision technology which sits at the

3:12

heart of almost all of the Technologies which make everyday life possible in advanced parts of the economy uh

3:19

smartphones automobiles um all sorts of Machinery in general which has moved away from the mechanical

3:25

and takes uh the uses semiconductor chips as Central to operation now

3:31

semiconductor chips of various sorts are made all around the world and all sorts of factories but taiwan’s are special

3:37

they are amongst the most if not the most high specification in terms of the

3:42

sheer smallness of the size of what can be made and that’s not just because of a

3:47

particular Factory although a company called tsmc is very Central to this it’s also because the supply chain which uses

3:53

a particular type of lithography and also the scientific ecology that

3:59

sits around the manufacturer of those chips in Taiwan itself that has proved very very hard to reproduce anywhere

4:05

else the Chinese have tried the Americans have tried both are making some progress uh in Arizona for the

4:11

Americans and on the mainland in Shanghai for for the Chinese but most assessors from outside still think

4:17

there’s a ways to go the Taiwan uh bottleneck or the Taiwan Nexus for

4:22

production of semiconductors is currently unique in the world now if you

4:28

were choosing an ideal geopolitical scenario deciding that a small politically vulnerable Island that is an

4:34

unrecognized state in the wider world that is essentially in a danger zone for a geopolitical conflict might not be

4:41

where you would choose to place the only factories in the world that can produce chips that are essential for the entire global economy but that is where the

4:48

world has ended up and that’s why actually both the US and China are wary about provoking a conflict in the region

4:54

as the Taiwanese sometimes point out it’s a sort of blackmail trigger for

5:00

both of the countries that they have something to to do with obviously they’re close to the Americans and not to the Chinese but the Chinese also have

5:07

a lot of economic interests in Taiwan and vice versa and everyone knows that if the semiconductor supply chain were

5:14

blown up if it stopped suddenly if it were hampered then the economy of China

5:19

the US and the entire world would be deeply and negatively affected so Rana

5:25

we’re already seeing uh this militarization of the Taiwan strait between the US and China over Taiwan and

5:31

it’s being referred to as the next Cold War has this already begun well one of the figures who has put

5:39

forward the idea that we are entering a new cold war is Henry Kissinger uh now

5:44

100 years old actually 100 years and I think two months now uh still going pretty strong he was actually just visiting Beijing the other day as the

5:51

newspaper showed and he has talked about the US and China entering his words the foothills of a new Cold War now it’s a

5:58

bit of a mixed metaphor of course I’m not sure if a war can have a Foothill but I think we all know what what Kissinger means and because he is one of

6:05

the three or four people who was instrumental in opening up the uh Cold War era relationship between the US and

6:12

China he’s still taken very seriously in China itself is it a new Cold War

6:18

the phrase is heard more and more and I think one of the reasons it’s used is that it’s not something that gives that

6:26

gives an easy alternative analogy or metaphor I mean we as human beings love

6:31

metaphors we love analogies to try to explain what’s going on Cold War it turns out is one of the most brilliant phrasings of the modern historical era

6:40

um some Chinese Scholars uh like for instance professor wanchisor of Peking University have talked about it by

6:47

flipping the uh flipping the terms and saying it’s not a cold war it’s a hot piece and that actually is an

6:53

interesting way of thinking about it because it is clear that at the moment and let’s hope permanently the United

6:59

States and its allies which we shouldn’t forget includes Japan one of the most important economies and militaries in

7:04

the world um and China are not at War we very much hope they will not be at War at any

7:11

point in in our lifetimes but there’s no doubt the situation between them is not peace in the way that you know the board

7:18

of Italy and Switzerland is is peaceful it’s not that kind of uh of situation and so I think although there are some

7:25

you know issues with that phrase too thinking about Professor Wang and other people he’s one of the most probably there are others who’ve used this hot

7:31

peace idea might be a way to get to what that metaphor is doing for us in other

7:36

words trying to say what is the situation between the United States its allies and China is it a war well no not

7:44

exactly is it a cold war well not exactly that either because tensions are ramping up and clearly the possibility

7:51

for something more dangerous is there um but is it just peace and Harmony obviously that’s not the uh not the case

7:59

who do we think that the Allies will be for China because it’s quite clear that you know the Allies for the United

8:05

States and for Taiwan would be you know ocus the UK um in Australia

8:11

um you know Singapore Japan but and it does seem like a long China’s Coastline

8:17

there is kind of a chain of of Western allies but I’ve not really seeing anyone

8:24

that would come to defend China in that conflict China makes a big

8:30

um China really stresses the fact that it doesn’t do alliances in the way the

8:37

United States does just to be clear what we mean by Alliance and it is often used as a sort of shorthand to mean you know

8:42

people working together but actually there’s quite a technical set of expectations and something like the NATO alliance or indeed the U.S Japan

8:48

security Alliance involve Mutual deterrence in other words an attack on one is an attack on all that’s become

8:55

very evident when thinking about why countries in Europe want to be in NATO uh in the light of the Russian invasion

9:01

of of Ukraine China has very few alliances of that sort and even those are slightly

9:07

compromise the nearest thing is North Korea uh but for various reasons North Korea is rather unpredictable politics

9:12

means that China is unlikely to want to take up that particular partnership um it also has what it calls deep and

9:18

strategic Partnerships and relationships the word partnership is sometimes closer there aren’t that many of those but one

9:24

actually is a country that people sometimes forget which is Pakistan Pakistan has a very long-standing relationship with China

9:30

uh some of China’s generals military generals refer to Pakistan as China’s Israel in other words the analogy for

9:36

the United States and Israel so there are these sorts of relationships out there but the question you asked is whether or not this would actually be

9:42

useful to China in terms of Confrontation I don’t think there’s any expectation almost none I think in China that if

9:51

there were to be a conflict in the Asia Pacific over Taiwan or in the South China Sea where China continues to be

9:57

indisputable at the moment it’s legal not military dispute with Southeast Asian Neighbors about who actually gets

10:02

to control the seas in that uh in that area uh or indeed the East China Sea

10:08

where China has Maritime disputes with Japan as well I don’t think that anyone in Beijing in military or civilian

10:14

planning would expect that there would be a swift or easy um appeal to allies of any sort uh or

10:23

Partners North Korea was not I think in most exercise it’s going to come in the bit the one that people think about of course is Russia because Russia and

10:30

China now have a much closer relationship but again I find it hard to

10:35

see a scenario in which Russia actually actively brings military power to Bear to assist China in an East Asian crisis

10:43

a they haven’t got the capacity a lot of it’s being used obviously at the moment on the Ukraine war and when we think

10:49

about things that aren’t being used so much there like the Pacific Fleet again my question would be how much having

10:56

essentially uh declared a form of Undeclared conflict um on uh NATO Russia

11:02

would also essentially want to take on us allies in the Pacific as well I just don’t see it happening in that that

11:08

sense so China’s depending really on its own resources and they are formidable China has the second biggest military in

11:14

the world has the second biggest economy in the world and also an economy that’s not just large but through Supply chains

11:20

is very very connected to many of the uh um uh Pathways of economic production

11:27

around the world if you take many smartphones whatever the brand on the front even it’s an American brand a

11:33

European brand most of the components will either be Chinese or have come through China at some uh at some point

11:39

beyond that China’s Market continues to be very very attractive to many people and I think that um

11:44

one of the things that China would seek to do is to try essentially and go to what it perceives as perhaps the more

11:51

neutral or uncertain actors in a confrontation with the United States so go to the Europeans and say Germany do

11:58

you really want to lose the market for Mercedes or BMW automobiles uh Japan uh

12:04

you know do you really want your Toyota factories and your Matsushita factories in eastern uh China to basically be put

12:09

out of out of contention and Southeast Asia which is an area of the world that is Keen to grow its economy and not get

12:15

involved in anyone’s Wars you know they’re not pro-china but they’re not really dying to get into a huge stouch

12:21

with them uh with the US’s uh um priorities at the front of that uh of

12:27

that of that line so that all being the case I think China is calculating that if it can find the right moment and the

12:34

right pivot it can use its economic power backed up by military Cloud to prevent other people getting involved

12:39

yeah and I guess that’s what makes what makes this conflict so much more different from you know people do

12:45

compare it to the Cold War but that was a war of you know ideology really

12:51

between you know communism and capitalism whereas this has a huge financial aspect to it which will

12:57

certainly kind of change it changed the relations that’s that’s right I think it’s much more real

13:03

politique I mean some people compare the world we’re in now to before World War one uh actually there’s a great essay by

13:08

the historian Margaret McMillan in the latest edition of the journal Foreign Affairs which people can find online and

13:14

she’s one of the greatest historians of that period um and has made some really interesting analogies

13:19

um but that having been said of course every period is of course its own period uh we have issues to do with technology and Supply chains that weren’t the case

13:25

in the same way before World War One when the world was was very different but I think in this case it’s worth

13:31

noting that um there is this wider sense I think in

13:37

China that China’s rise is inevitable that there is this growing sense that

13:44

China should have for the dominant role in East Asia in a way that they would argue the United States has done in the

13:50

western atmosphere the term which means literally Monroe doctor doctrinism is something that you’ll hear

13:58

in or read in a lot of particular types of policy documents in China and their

14:03

point is the Monroe Doctrine just reminded people that’s basically the idea that’s existed since the 19th century in the US that the US has the

14:11

first right of influence um in terms of its own backyard that was part of the logic for instance for the

14:16

1962 Cuban Missile Crisis Cuba was and he’s an independent country but the

14:22

United States still felt that it was its business if the Soviet Union decided they were going to build a missile base on Cuban territory just a few miles away

14:29

so China uses a similar sort of argument when it comes to its own backyard not

14:36

just the question of Taiwan but also the wider Asia region arguing that it should have power there the difference is that

14:44

unlike the old Soviet Union there’s no sense that there’s a particular Chinese ideology certainly not a Chinese

14:50

Communist ideology but China wants to spread and reproduce directly in these

14:55

other countries that is different you’d say both from actually the United States and the USSR whether it’s liberal

15:01

democracy or um classic um kind of Soviet communism in the case of china say it’s rather more an ideological

15:07

tendency than ideology in other words China is mostly interested in economic influence first and foremost bringing

15:14

and technological influence it would like countries to use Chinese Tech which bring them into the sort of Chinese world of norms and uh markets and so

15:22

forth but if something happens to overthrow a government uh like in Burma

15:28

two years ago when there was a coup uh China got on perfectly well with the robust uh and uh in some ways rather uh

15:36

um majoritarian democratic government of all San tsuchi but China got on quite well with them but then when there was a

15:42

coup and also tsuchi disappeared into prison China protest or say uh you know this is this is wrong they just say well

15:48

you know it’s up to the public to Myanmar as to what its government’s going to be and they’ve been dealing perfectly happily with the military

15:54

government since then I think it’s a stretch to say that China had anything direct to do with that Myanmar coup I

16:00

don’t think they did um it was an internal issue but China’s ideological position is that it’s none

16:05

of its business as to whether or not a country is an authoritarian dictatorship or a liberal democracy as long as

16:11

they’re working with China yeah I mean and therefore you can really

16:17

understand why a lot of countries in the global South would kind of choose to align themselves with China now because

16:22

I mean you know when they were aligning themselves with the United States it was on the understanding that you know you

16:28

have to sign up to our Norms of liberal democracy and you know everything along

16:34

those lines but then some of them could have argued that that’s kind of hypocritical at some points of um U.S

16:40

history and what they did abroad and the way that China’s been doing it is kind

16:45

of you know we’re not going to place that on you we’re just going to do economic deals to my understanding and

16:51

you can’t blame countries for for working with China for allowing themselves to China

16:57

well I would say that these days both the Western Alliance the United States but other European countries too and

17:03

China have both I think to some extent made the same mistake when dealing with sub-Saharan Africa Latin America and

17:10

other parts of the emerging Global South which is that they’ve forgotten that in the last 20 30 years

17:17

those countries owned publics now have a voice not all those countries are

17:23

electoral democracies and of the Electoral democracies some of them are partial democracies or democracies that are not very stable we’ve just seen a

17:29

coup in Niger in the last few days and that was a country that was moving towards electoral democracy president

17:35

bazoom had actually been elected and then was um ousted in the coup but it’s worth noting that actually you know 40 50

17:41

years ago Tales of military coups in Africa were a very frequent sort of

17:47

occurrence actually the Niger situation is relatively um unusual because now if you think you

17:52

know off the top of your head of the 50 countries of Africa how many have somewhat or significantly Consolidated

17:58

democracies uh Kenya uh butini South Africa you know the list

18:04

goes on or even ones where there’s you know more fluidity but nonetheless Benin might be a good example of that phase

18:09

there is still significant cynical significant uh Democratic structure there and when things don’t happen when

18:15

there aren’t coups it doesn’t get into the news you don’t the headlines saying oh no coup in Senegal today you know Democratic structures continue to

18:22

operate now that is in part because of the Norms that were engaged in by the

18:29

World Bank by the IMF by a whole variety of western actors the difference being that in the last few decades more of the

18:36

publics and the political Elites in sub-Saharan Africa and even Latin America too were brought into the

18:42

conversation rather than being told you’ve got to do this that and the other I think China spotted an opportunity

18:47

quite successfully in some places where clearly publics did feel resentful that they were you know being told what to do but always went too far in the other

18:54

direction because China’s tendency is to only go to the elite and say you’re the

19:00

president basically we’ll shove a whole bunch of money away we’ll build some roads and you know this is the return we

19:05

expect on investment sometimes it works out okay and other times it doesn’t

19:11

um what I’d say is that one of the most notable elements of China’s overseas

19:16

investment strategy it’s called the Belton Road initiative people have probably heard of this idea of it sort of spreading huge amounts of foreign

19:22

investment over the last 10 years over much of the world is that it’s really been reigned in largely because a couple

19:27

of two or three years ago China started doing the accounts and realizing that actually lots of these Investments didn’t didn’t work out the story that’s

19:35

often been sometimes true but not always true is that the Chinese were trapping various countries into debt actually

19:41

what was happening in many cases was the Chinese had gone into something thinking that they were actually going to make a bunch of money and then realizing that

19:47

the project itself simply was never going to work out um many listeners to this podcast based in the UK you’ll be aware of they’ll be

19:54

aware of something called hs2 the high-speed Railway which seems like it’s never going to get built between Birmingham and London and huge amounts

20:01

of money has been spent on it well the Chinese had their own version but it’s not in China it’s in East Africa it’s the East Africa high-speed Railway

20:08

between Kenya and Uganda and it’s not between those two places because essentially the building workers has stopped because China realized that they

20:14

could pour as much money as they wanted into it but it would take decades centuries to get the money back so that

20:21

kind of more complicated story that isn’t about China is a hero and U.S is the villain or you know China is trying

20:28

to take over the world and you know the West has to stop them but actually bringing back the combination of

20:33

understanding that the global South has its own voice in these questions and secondly people just sometimes screw up

20:39

they invest in stuff that doesn’t work out I mean goodness knows that happens in the west as well and a lot of the things where China hasn’t done very well

20:46

are a combination of actually not being terribly culturally sensitive in the places that they go you still don’t get

20:52

that many Chinese major investors who are really seriously learning indigenous languages of sub-Saharan Africa there

20:59

are a few but not very many um and the realization that sometimes the reason that nobody else is investing

21:05

in a particular entity is because it’s not investable um explains quite a lot of what’s been going on and I mean do you think that

21:12

maybe the kind of the precarious state of U.S politics at

21:18

the moment I I mean you were describing kind of what uh Africa would have looked like you know 50 years ago you know coup

21:24

is happening all the time but in the US right now we’re seeing a president that

21:30

um you know yesterday was in an ex-president that yesterday was in court that has many serious allegations made

21:35

up against him um he’s been indicted and you know who

21:41

um and there was a Insurrection on the capital I mean it’s not really something that you would have expected to happen

21:47

in the U.S even like 10 years ago that I guess it kind of plays into China’s hand

21:52

that this isn’t exactly the most you know stable number one country anymore most observers of what’s been happening

22:00

in global politics for the last 10 to 15 years particularly those who are concerned that China uh is rising in

22:07

influence and Power in the United Nations uh in transnational Society in terms of control of resources

22:13

are also if they’re objective noting that democracies have not been doing a good job in essentially advertising

22:20

their own qualities in the last 10 to 15 years you mentioned the United States obviously that’s been extremely up and

22:26

down and we still don’t know quite where that will will end up um uh but you know I think we could look

22:33

at large parts of Europe um at the moment it’s clear that populist politics is having a moment in

22:39

a whole variety of places and even in places where you don’t necessarily have um you know highly authoritarian parties

22:45

in power the move towards a politics that is technically Democratic but

22:50

actually in practice majoritarian is I think much more notable and that is helpful to China for the following

22:56

reason majoritarian politics essentially says that if you get 50 of votes plus one you could do anything you want

23:03

and most liberal democracy supposed illegal democracies are said that isn’t all democracy about of course you have to win the vote uh or in some countries

23:10

when a minority of the vote but nonetheless but then Civil Society where people have alternative viewpoints uh

23:16

the ability to be able to protest uh the ability to essentially go about your business without being oppressed by the

23:22

government you know if you uh take this particular position we won’t give you a contract that sort of thing is also

23:27

constitutive of what makes us successful and functioning democracy and most surveys suggest that in the world the

23:34

Nordic countries have actually always scored very high in in those sorts of uh sorts of areas the open door that it gives China which

23:41

has no intention of becoming a democracy and has made it very clear it’s not going to be a liberal democracy of any sort at any point as long as the Chinese

23:47

Communist Party are in in power is it enables them to say that the difference in political system is a difference of

23:54

degree rather than of type China itself has actually started to push a line in its

24:00

own terms it’s actually quite a clever line which is that it doesn’t matter whether a country happens to have an

24:07

electoral democracy or a ruling party that’s very technocratic as in China the

24:12

main thing is that quotes it’s a good government and of course your definition of what good government is is going to vary but China cross wants to move the

24:18

argument away from the system of governance to the results of governance and then at least until recently they

24:25

could point to a growing economy uh emergent middle class you know lots of people basically driving cars buying

24:31

Apartments living a middle class lifestyle and say well this is what China can do what do you guys do post

24:36

covid of course China finds it hard to tell that story and the story the last six months in China is a faltering

24:42

economy which currently has high youth unemployment and it’s not producing the kind of technically uh Superior jobs

24:49

technologically enabled jobs that were promised essentially to today’s youth so

24:54

whether China can continue to fulfill the so-called Chinese dream is another question but the point is that the

24:59

moment the Democratic world is not putting its best foot forward as it did during the height of the Cold War to

25:06

suggest that actually democracy isn’t just better in values terms it produces better results and it produces better

25:12

governance that’s a harder case to make now than it might have been say 30 or 40 years ago I mean I guess along that line

25:19

of thinking would you say that you know we’ve already exited the period of a unipolar world would you say that now

25:27

we’re in a bipolar world with the US and China

25:33

I think we’re in a multi-polar world but I think I’d say two things first of all U.S power even at its highest in the

25:39

1990s was never as unipolar as some of particularly the American you know policymakers at that time wanted to put

25:45

forward we know now that they were an awful lot of other emerging uh Powers

25:51

just bubbling under the under the surface so that power was always was contingent and second I think it’s

25:57

important not to underestimate the United States now the United States still has uh I mean well let me put it

26:02

this way one of the wiser sets of Chinese commentators who have been speaking in China over the last six

26:10

seven years are the group of people usually a bit older they’re usually based in universities rather than the

26:15

government but they you know the new international relations very well they’re all you know Chinese Patriots nationalists who might say in some cases

26:21

um but they say one thing they say the mistake that a lot of young Chinese particularly on social media don’t know

26:27

the outside world very well are making is that they think the United States is down and out and it’s not

26:32

amongst the reasons and you know depending who it is they’ll have different justifications but they can point out that the United States still

26:38

has immensely powerful economic tools at its disposal it may be the case it may

26:44

not it may be the case that China outdoes the US in 10 years 15 years time

26:49

as the world’s largest economy although at the moment it’s not guaranteed that that will be the case but right now it’s not China it is the US and there are

26:56

reasons for uh for that beyond that the US and this would be sort of more me rather than you know necessarily Chinese

27:02

thinkers but you know they can see the stats as well there are lots of things the United States has going for it that

27:07

aren’t reproduced in China uh it has despite the effects of certain politicians high levels of immigration

27:13

which means high levels of skilled immigration Silicon Valley wouldn’t exist without the fact that huge numbers

27:18

of people from around the world have gone to centers of excellence there and then set up companies um if you look at

27:25

the surnames of you know large numbers of the people who have run the tech majors in the US you get the story a lot

27:31

of them of course Chinese that’s not accidental either beyond that you also have the fact that despite the ups and

27:38

downs and there are plenty of downs as well as up the United States is a country which genuinely allows its

27:44

economy of scale to combine with local initiative you know California is as it is Texas as it is Massachusetts is as it

27:52

is for a reason as well and well what Washington DC says has profound effects not least in terms of foreign policy it

27:59

is also the case that there is flexibility within the system China has more than sometimes people think but

28:05

it’s not the case that they can be a simple delegation or derogation of

28:10

powers to the regions in the way that actually you can see the United States has benefited from so in that sense I

28:16

think the question almost moves from being you know the US versus China to

28:21

being you know does China have a California or does China have a Texas

28:28

um or you know what is it that Texas has that Sichuan doesn’t or vice versa and looking at those sorts of granular

28:34

questions I think will tell us more about what’s going to happen in the late 2020s early 2030s than a simple National

28:39

comparison right now for very good reasons I think the world is nervous about the possible confrontation that

28:46

might exist in the Pacific I think it’s worth noting that one of the if not the

28:52

greatest problem the world has at the moment is that economics is proving rather the economics of the

29:00

world has proven you know very difficult at the moment uh societies do not seem to be growing in the way that people

29:05

expected climate change obviously is a major issue that is existential and

29:10

needing to be dealt with right now there are huge numbers of motivations that mean that all the major actors in the

29:17

world are likely if they look at the sort of spread of issues that they have to deal with to decide that military

29:22

confrontation in the Pacific is an extremely bad idea I think that sensible heads in all parts of the world realize

29:30

that this is the case and therefore it’s worth noting that preventing that sort of Confrontation which would be

29:36

absolutely devastating not just for the Pacific but actually for the wider world is a key geopolitical goal it’s less

29:43

exciting often to basically be involved in preventing something that doesn’t hit the headlines as opposed to something

29:48

hugely spectacular which does but over time I think policy makers in Beijing in

29:54

Washington in Europe and Beyond as well as in southeast Asia do need to consider that to be an absolutely top priority

30:03

brilliant I will stop the recording there thank you so much to Ron amida and thank

30:10

you for watching if you want to hear more from Fantastic voices like ranamita

30:16

Please Subscribe today thank you and I’ll see you soon

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