From the River to the Sea: Ibaitik Itsasora (190)

oooooo

aza. 19

So now DC wants peace? After funding a neocon slaughterhouse for three years, laundering $400 billion through Ukraine’s corpse, is Trump agreement-capable? it’s the neocons swarming around him, who sabotaged every past deal. Suddenly, it’s time for a 28-point peace plan, not because reality sunk in, but because Russia won.

According to Axios, the U.S. and Russia are quietly sculpting a deal, four pillars: ceasefire, security guarantees, European architecture, and future relations. Sounds serious. But let’s call it straight, this isn’t some grand statesman’s moment. It’s panic dressed as diplomacy.

The battlefield dictated this, not diplomacy. Pokrovsk has defacto fallen. Zaporizhzye lines are collapsing, ditto for Kharkov. Desertions are four times higher than last year. Ukraine’s budget is so broken it needs a €140 billion fantasy loan secured on frozen Russian assets. And those assets? Unconfiscated. Because Europe knows if they cross that Rubicon, investor capital runs, saying bye bye to what remains or the postwar financial order.

Enter Steve Witkoff who reportedly met Kirill Dmitriev in Miami to breathe life into a deal rooted in the Trump–Putin talks in Alaska. Dmitriev was blunt, Moscow enters from a stronger position. That’s an understatement.

Ukraine is bleeding out. NATO is burning through stockpiles. Washington is looking for an off-ramp that doesn’t smell like the capitulation that it is. And so the idea is to float “peace” now, before the full collapse becomes undeniable.

But the choreography is obvious. Zelensky hasn’t even seen the final plan yet, because the White House is too busy briefing EU lapdogs, testing which way the wind is blowing in London and Berlin. The question isn’t whether they want peace. It’s whether they can sell defeat without completing owning it. An impossible feat.

And even if the plan exists, even if Trump means well, do the Russians trust a word of it? The Kremlin remembers Minsk. It remembers Istanbul. It remembers how every red line became a green light for escalation. And that’s why Russia’s doctrine calls the West what it is: Non-agreement capable.

So call it whatever you like, “peace plan,” “framework,” “28-point roadmap.” It’s not a treaty. It’s a white flag, carefully folded, quietly floated, and dressed up for Axios like it was a masterstroke of statecraft.

Because the truth is, there’s no victory to be found for the Empire. Just wreckage to manage. And the empire is trying to exit the funeral it paid for, without looking guilty.

oooooo

Dr. Omar Suleiman@omarsuleiman

aza. 19

Did you know that today alone:

Netanyahu was in the occupied Golan Heights of Syria.

Israel attacked southern Lebanon killing over a dozen people.

Israeli airstrikes in Gaza raised death toll to 280 since the “ceasefire”. Your media isn’t doing its job, or maybe it is.

aza. 19

“We all share one common goal,” Putin told the heads of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member delegations, “to enhance the authority and influence of the SCO, as one of the largest regional associations on the Eurasian continent and indeed the world as a whole.”

Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1991049998960849136

oooooo

Hamza Yusuf@Hamza_a96

Aaron Maté@aaronjmate

Bideoa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnnOQefj0Uc&t=7s

(1: 48: 27)

John Mearsheimer addresses the European Parliament on the topic of “Europe’s Bleak Future”

(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnnOQefj0Uc&t=7s)

Transkripzioa:

0:00

Ladies and gentlemen, colleagues and guests, on this day, November the 11th,

0:07

more than a century ago, the armistice was signed. That’s what that was meant

0:12

to end the war, to end all other wars. How, one may ask, did humanity ever wind

0:19

up there? After all, the concert of nations had secured nearly a century of

0:24

relative peace. The nations of Europe have never before traded so extensively with one another

0:32

or with the rest of the world. No one, it seemed, had any interest in war. And

0:38

yet it came. Sleepwalkers, as Christopher Cloud aptly described it,

0:45

the armistice was not an end, but proved to be only a temporary pass for the root

0:51

causes of the conflict, had not been addressed. The industrialized method by which

0:57

soldiers perished in the first world war would in the second world war be applied

1:04

to entire populations. The 30 years European brother war left our continent

1:11

utterly devastated, militarily destroyed, financially

1:16

ruined, morally bankrupt, and politically subjugated.

1:23

From the ashes of the second world war emerged a bipolar world order. European

1:28

nations became encased in political, military and economic structures that either belonged to the so-called free

1:35

west or to the communist east. With the collapse of communism, we entered a

1:41

uniolar world led by the United States and guided by liberal values, free trade

1:48

and international relations, institutions rather. That era has

1:54

however ended with the rise of China, the financial crisis and the scores of

2:00

Islamist terrorism. We have entered the age of multi-polarity. This means that

2:06

the structures that encapsulated the European nations, such as the European

2:11

Union, must inevitably adapt to this new era. Yet, the European Union seems

2:18

consistently to deny that reality. Ursla Vanderian’s policy claims to

2:24

strive for strategic autonomy in the European Union. But yet, the EU’s

2:29

climate policy makes us dependent on Chinese rare earth materials and pushes

2:35

our continent’s industrial production abroad. This leads to dependency and to

2:42

the degasses. The European Union has responded to

2:48

Russian aggression in Ukraine by a lofty liberal moralism. But we do not possess

2:53

the hard power require required to make such moralism credible. Consequently, we

3:00

are dependent on weapons supplied by the United States to continue the war effort.

3:06

This allows President Trump to impose highly unfavorable trade terms upon us,

3:12

leading once again to dependency and to the degragation of our middle class.

3:19

The European Union has become the prisoner of its own strategic choices.

3:25

Its founding promise was to ensure peace, security, and prosperity on our continent through economic

3:32

collaboration. Yet in reality, its policy has led to war, insecurity, and

3:39

impoverishment. As a member of the European Parliament, I have the dubious privilege of

3:46

traveling to Strasburg every month. These long car journeys can be boring or

3:52

are often considered a waste of time. But for me, these journeys are a true pleasure. For every time in the car, I

4:00

am accompanied by the insightful podcast of Professor John Mirshimer on his

4:05

Substack, which his sharp analyzes and profound insights rooted in deep

4:12

historical knowledge and academic expertise. He brings a necessary voice to the political debate, one essential

4:19

for understanding the complexity of modern conflicts. Professor M. Shimemer

4:25

is a true intellectual giant, one of the very few of his kind still walking the

4:31

earth today. Professor Mir Shmer graduated from West Point in 1970 and served five years in

4:38

the US Air Force. He received his PhD in 1980 from Cornell University and since

4:44

1982 he has been a professor at the University of Chicago. It is therefore

4:50

both an honor and a great pleasure to welcome you on behalf of the Patriots for Europe Foundation here in the heart

4:58

of the European Union to share your insights on the war in Ukraine and the

5:03

way forward for Europe. Professor Mshimer, the floor is all yours.

5:10

[Applause]

5:20

Thank you very much, Tom, for that kind introduction. It’s a great pleasure and an honor to be here today to speak at

5:28

the European Parliament. And I’d like to thank the Patriots for Europe for inviting me to speak here and thank all

5:36

of you for coming out to listen to me speak. Uh Europe is in deep trouble today.

5:45

mainly because of the Europe because of the Ukraine war which has played a key

5:50

role in undermining what had been largely a peaceful region.

5:56

Unfortunately, the situation is not likely to improve in the years ahead. In

6:02

fact, Europe is likely to be less stable moving forward than it is today. The

6:10

present situation in Europe stands in marked contrast to the unprecedented

6:16

stability that Europe enjoyed during the unipolar moment which ran from 1992

6:24

which is the year after the cold year after the Soviet Union collapsed until

6:29

about 2017 when China and Russia emerged as great

6:34

powers transforming unipolarity into multi polarity. We all remember Francis

6:42

Fukiamyama’s famous article, The End of History, written in 1989,

6:48

which argued that liberal democracy was destined to spread across the world,

6:54

bringing peace and prosperity in its wake. That that argument was obviously

7:00

dead wrong, but many in the West believed it for more than 20 years. Few

7:08

Europeans imagined in the heyday of unipolarity that Europe would be in so

7:14

much trouble today. So the question on the table is what

7:19

went wrong? The Ukraine war, which I will argue was

7:24

provoked by the West and especially the United States, is the principal cause of

7:31

European insecurity today. Nevertheless, there’s a second factor at

7:37

play. The shift in the global balance of power in 2017

7:44

from unipolarity to multiparity, which was sure to threaten the security

7:50

architecture in Europe. Still, there’s a good

7:58

there’s a good reason to think this shift in the distribution of power was

8:05

manageable. But the Ukraine war coupled with the coming of multipolarity

8:12

guaranteed big trouble which is not likely to go away in the foreseeable

8:17

future. Let me start by explaining how the end of unipolarity threatens the

8:24

foundations of European stability and then I will discuss the effects of the

8:29

Ukraine war on Europe and how they interacted with the shift to

8:34

multipolarity so as to alter the European landscape in profound ways.

8:41

The key to preserving stability in Europe during the cold war and all of

8:47

Europe during the unipolar moment was the US military presence in Europe which

8:54

was of course embedded in NATO. The US has dominated that alliance from the

9:01

beginning which has made it almost impossible for the member states

9:06

underneath the American security umbrella to fight with each other. In

9:12

effect, the United States has been a powerful pacifying force in Europe.

9:20

Today’s European elites recognize that simple fact which explains why they are

9:28

deeply committed to keeping American troops in Europe and maintaining a US dominated

9:37

NATO. It is worth noting that when the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union was

9:45

moving to pull its troops out of Eastern Europe and put an end to the Warsaw pact

9:53

that Moscow did not did not object to a US dominated NATO

10:02

remaining intact like the West Europeans at the time

10:08

Soviet leaders understood and appreciated pacifier logic. However,

10:15

they were adamantly opposed to NATO expansion. But more about that later.

10:21

Some might argue that the EU, this institution here, not NATO, was the main

10:28

cause of European stability during the unipolar moment. which is why the EU,

10:35

not NATO, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.

10:41

But this is wrong. While the EU has been a remarkably successful institution,

10:48

its success is dependent on NATO keeping the peace in Europe. Turning marks on

10:57

his head, the political military institution. Here we’re talking about

11:03

NATO is the base or foundation and the economic institution here we’re talking

11:10

about the EU is super structure. All of this is to say that absent the American

11:17

pacifier, not only does NATO as we know it

11:23

disappears, but the EU will also be undermined in serious ways.

11:30

During unipolarity, which again ran from 1992 to 2017,

11:37

the US was by far the most powerful state in the international system and it

11:42

could easily maintain a substantial military presence here in Europe.

11:50

The unipolar world went away, however, with the coming of multipolarity.

11:56

The United States is no longer the only great power in the world. China and

12:03

Russia are now great powers, which means that American policymakers

12:09

have to think differently about the world around them. To understand what

12:15

unipolarity means for Europe, it’s essential to consider the distribution

12:21

of power among the world’s three great powers. The United States is still the most

12:28

powerful country in the world, but China has been catching up and is now widely

12:34

regarded as a peer competitor. Its huge population,

12:40

coupled with its truly remarkable economic growth since the early 1990s,

12:48

has turned it into a potential hegeimon in East Asia. for the United States

12:55

which is already a regional hegeimon in the western hemisphere.

13:00

Another great power achieving hegemony either in East Asia or Europe is a

13:09

deeply worrisome prospect. Remember that the United States entered

13:14

both world wars to prevent Germany and Japan from becoming regional hegeimons

13:22

in Europe and East Asia respectively. The same logic applies today to China in

13:30

East Asia. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers. And contrary to what many

13:38

Europeans think, I’m sure many Europeans in this institution, it is not a threat

13:44

to overrun all of Ukraine, much less Eastern Europe. After all, it has spent

13:51

the past three and a half years just trying to conquer the eastern 15 of

13:58

Ukraine. The Russian army is not the vermach and Russia is not the Soviet

14:06

Union during the cold war or the Chinese in East Asia today. In other words,

14:13

Russia is not a potential hegeimon in Europe.

14:19

Given this distribution of power, there’s a strategic imperative for the

14:25

United States to focus on containing China and preventing it from dominating

14:32

East Asia. There is no compelling strategic reason, however, for the

14:38

United States to maintain a significant military presence in Europe, given that

14:45

Russia is not a threat to become a European hegeimon.

14:51

Indeed, devoting defense resources to

14:56

Europe reduces the resources available for East Asia.

15:03

This basic logic explains the US pivot to Asia. But if a country pivots to one

15:11

region, it means that it’s pivoting away from another region. And of course, that

15:17

other region that we’re pivoting away from is Europe.

15:22

There’s another important dimension which has little to do with the global balance of power that further reduces

15:30

the likelihood the US will remain committed to maintaining a significant

15:35

military presence in Europe. Specifically, the United States has a

15:41

special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history.

15:48

That connection which is the result of the tremendous power of the Israel lobby

15:54

inside the United States not only means that the United States will support

16:01

Israel unconditionally, but it also means that American

16:07

forces will be involved in Israel’s wars either directly or indirectly.

16:15

In short, the United States will continue to allocate substantial

16:21

military resources to Israel as well as commit substantial military forces of

16:28

its own to the Middle East. This obligation to Israel creates an

16:35

additional incentive to draw down US forces in Europe and push European

16:43

countries to provide for their own security. The bottom line is that powerful

16:49

structural forces associated with the shift from unipolarity to multiparity

16:58

coupled with America’s peculiar relationship with Israel have the

17:03

potential to eliminate the US pacifier from Europe and NATO which would

17:10

obviously have serious negative consequences for European security.

17:17

It is possible, however, to avoid an American exit, which is surely what

17:24

almost every European leader desires. Simply put, achieving that outcome, i.e.

17:32

Preventing the United States from leaving Europe in a serious way

17:38

requires wise strategies and skillful diplomacy on both sides of the Atlantic.

17:46

But that is not what we have gotten so far. Instead, Europe and the United

17:52

States foolishly sought to bring Ukraine into NATO, which provoked a losing war

18:01

with Russia that marketkedly increases the odds that the US will depart Europe

18:08

and NATO will be eviscerated. Let me explain.

18:13

To fully understand the consequences of the Ukraine war, it’s essential to consider its causes. Because the reason

18:22

that Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, says a great deal about Russia’s

18:30

war aims and the long-term effects of the war.

18:35

The conventional wisdom in the west, as all of you know, is that Vladimir Putin is responsible for causing the Ukraine

18:42

war. His aim, so the argument goes, is to conquer all of Ukraine and make it

18:48

part of a greater Russia. Once that goal is achieved, Russia will move to create

18:53

an empire in Eastern Europe, much like the Soviet Union did after World War II.

19:00

In this story, Putin is a mortal threat to the West and must be dealt with

19:06

forcefully. In short, Putin is an imperialist with a master plan that fits

19:12

neatly into a rich Russian tradition.

19:17

There are numerous problems with this story. Let me spell out five of them.

19:23

First, there’s no evidence from before 204

19:29

February 2022 that Putin wanted to conquer all of Ukraine and incorporate

19:35

it into Russia. Again, I want to emphasize there is no evidence to support the conventional wisdom.

19:42

Proponents of this wisdom cannot point to anything that Putin wrote or said

19:48

that indicates he thought conquering Ukraine was a desirable goal, that was a

19:56

feasible goal, and that he intended to pursue that goal. I want to repeat this.

20:01

Putin never said that conquering Ukraine was a desirable goal. There’s no

20:07

evidence to support that. There’s no evidence that he said he thought it was a feasible goal. And there’s no evidence

20:14

that he said, this is all before February 24th, 2022, that he intended to

20:20

pursue that goal. When challenged on this point, and as you can imagine, I’ve had many discussions with people who

20:27

defend the conventional wisdom. uh they point to Putin’s claim uh that Ukraine

20:34

was quote unquote an artificial state and especially to his view that Russians

20:40

and Ukrainians are one people which of course is a core theme in his famous

20:46

July 12th 2021 article that people often

20:51

reference these comments saying that Ukraine is an art artificial state we’re

20:56

saying that the Ukrainians and Russians are one people say nothing about his

21:02

reason for going to war. In fact, if you read the July 12th, 2021 article that he

21:09

wrote, which I’ve read many times, there is zero evidence in there that he was

21:14

bent on conquering Ukraine. And in fact, he said exactly the opposite in that

21:20

piece. For example, he tells the Ukrainian people, and I’m

21:25

quoting from that July 12th, 2021 article, you want to establish a state

21:30

of your own, you are welcome. Regarding how Russia should treat Ukraine, he

21:36

writes, there is only one answer with respect.

21:41

There’s only one answer with respect. He concludes that lengthy article with the

21:47

following words. and what Ukraine will be. It is up to its citizens to decide.

21:53

That does not sound like somebody who’s bent on conquering Ukraine. In that same

21:59

12 July 2021 article and again in important in an important speech on

22:06

February 21st, 2022, this is three days before the Russians invaded Ukraine.

22:13

He wrote, “The new Russia accepts the new geopolitical reality that took shape

22:22

after the disillusion of the USSR.” He reiterated that same point three days

22:29

later on 24 February 22 when he announced that Russia would invade

22:35

Ukraine. All of these statements are directly at odds with the claim that

22:40

Putin wanted to conquer Ukraine and incorporate it into a greater Russia.

22:46

Second, Putin did not have anywhere near enough troops to conquer Ukraine. I

22:53

estimate that Russia invaded Ukraine with at most

22:58

190,000 troops. General Sirki, who as you all know is now the present

23:04

commander of the Ukrainian forces, estimates that the Russians invaded

23:09

Ukraine with a 100,000 troops. So John estimates that they invaded with

23:15

190,000. Sirki estimates that they invaded with a 100,000.

23:20

There is no way that a force numbering either a 100,000 or 190,000

23:27

could conquer, occupy, and absorb all of Ukraine into a greater Russia. Consider

23:34

that when Germany invaded the western half of Poland on September 1st, 1939

23:42

and you remember as a result of the von ribbonrop molotov pact, the Soviet Union

23:47

invaded the eastern part of Poland and the Germans invaded the western part. So the

23:54

Germans only invaded half of Poland. The Vermacht on September 1st, 1939 sent

24:03

1.5 million troops into Poland.

24:09

Ukraine is geographically more than three times larger than the

24:16

western half of Poland. And Ukraine in 2022 had almost twice as

24:24

many people as Poland did when the Germans invaded. If we accept Cersk’s estimate that a

24:32

100,000 Russian troops invaded Ukraine, and again this is General Cerski

24:37

speaking, that means Russia had an invasion force that was 115th

24:45

the size of the German force that went into Poland. And that small Russian army

24:51

was invading a country that was much larger than the western half of Poland

24:58

in terms of both territorial size and population. One might argue, and of course you often

25:05

hear this argument, that Russian leaders thought that the Ukrainian military was

25:11

so small and so outgunned that their army could easily conquer the entire

25:17

country. But this is not the case. In fact, Putin and his lieutenants were

25:23

well aware that the United States and its European allies had been arming and

25:30

training the Ukrainian military since the crisis first broke out in 2014.

25:39

Indeed, Moscow’s great fear at the time was that Ukraine was becoming a de facto

25:47

member of NATO. Moreover, Russian leaders recognized

25:53

that the Ukrainian army which was larger than the invasion force. I want to

26:00

emphasize this. The Ukrainian army was larger than the Russian invasion force.

26:05

It was armed and trained by NATO and it was becoming a de facto member of NATO.

26:12

They recognized that that force had been fighting effectively in the Donbass

26:18

since 2014. They surely understood the Russians that

26:23

is that the Ukrainian military was not a paper tiger that could be defeated

26:28

quickly and decisively, especially since it had powerful backing

26:33

from the West. And you remember before the war, the West, especially the United

26:38

States, made it clear that we would back Ukraine to the hilt if it was invaded by

26:44

Russia. Putin’s aim was to quickly achieve

26:50

limited territorial gains and force Ukraine to the bargaining table, which

26:57

is what happened. And this brings me to my third point. Immediately after the

27:03

war began, Russia, not Ukraine, Russia reached out to Ukraine to start

27:10

negotiations to end the war and work out a modus vendi between the two countries.

27:17

This move is directly at odds with the claim that Putin wanted to conquer

27:23

Ukraine and make it part of greater Russia. Negotiations between Kev and Moscow

27:30

began in Bellarus just 4 days 4 days

27:36

after the Russian invasion. And that Bellarus track was eventually

27:44

replaced by an Israeli as well as

27:50

an Istanbul track. The available evidence indicates

27:56

that the Russians were negotiating seriously and were not interested in

28:03

absorbing Ukrainian territory save save for Crimea which they had annexed in

28:10

2014 and possibly the Donbass region. The negotiations

28:16

ended when the Ukrainians with proddding from Britain and the

28:22

United States walked away from the negotiations

28:27

which were making good progress at the time. The Russians did not walk away

28:34

from the negotiations. Fourth, in the months before the war

28:40

started, Putin tried to find a diplomatic solution to the brewing crisis. On 17 October 2021, remember the

28:49

war begins February 2022. This is 17 December 2021. Putin sends letters to

28:56

both President Biden and to NATO chief Yen Stolenberg proposing a solution to

29:03

the crisis based on a written guarantee that does three things. Says number one,

29:09

Ukraine would not join NATO. Number two, no offensive weapons would be stationed near Russia’s borders. And

29:16

number three, NATO troops and equipment moved into Eastern Europe since 1997

29:24

would be moved back to Western Europe. Whatever one thinks of the feasibility

29:30

of reaching a bargain based on Putin’s opening demands, it shows he was trying

29:37

to avoid war. The United States, on the other hand, refused to negotiate with

29:43

Putin. It appears it was not interested in avoiding war.

29:50

Fifth, this is my fifth and final point. Putting Ukraine aside, there is not a

29:56

cintillaa of evidence that Putin was contemplating conquering any other

30:01

countries in Eastern Europe. And this is hardly surprising given that

30:07

the Russian army is not even large enough to overrun all of Ukraine,

30:12

much less to conquer the Baltic states, Poland, and Romania.

30:18

Plus, those countries outside of Ukraine are all NATO members,

30:24

which would almost certainly mean war with the United States and its allies.

30:30

in some while it is widely believed in Europe and again I’m sure here in the

30:36

European Parliament that Putin is an imperialist who has long been determined

30:42

to conquer all of Ukraine and then conquer additional countries west of Ukraine. Virtually all the available

30:50

evidence is at odds with this perspective. In fact, the United States and it eur

30:57

and its European allies provoked the war. This is not to deny, of course, that Russia started the war by invading

31:04

Ukraine. But the underlying cause of the conflict was the NATO decision to bring

31:10

Ukraine into the alliance, which virtually all Russian leaders saw as an

31:17

existential threat that must be eliminated. But NATO expansion is not the whole

31:24

problem as is part of a broader strategy that aims to make Ukraine a western

31:31

bullwark on Russia’s border. Bringing Keev into the European Union and

31:39

promoting a color revolution in Ukraine. You all remember the orange revolution

31:45

which was designed to make Ukraine a pro-western liberal democracy.

31:51

are the other two prongs of the policy. So I want to make it clear here there are three prongs to NATO to to uh the

31:58

west policy towards Ukraine. One is NATO expansion into Ukraine. Two is EU

32:03

expansion into Ukraine and three is uh uh regime change turning uh Ukraine into

32:11

a pro-western liberal democracy. Uh, Russian leaders fear all three prongs of

32:18

this policy, but they fear NATO expansion the most. As Putin put it,

32:24

Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist while facing a permanent threat

32:30

from the territory of today’s Ukraine. In essence, he was not interested in

32:36

making Ukraine part of Russia. He was interested in making it sure making it

32:42

sure it did not become part of what he labeled a springboard for western

32:48

aggression against Russia. To deal with this threat, Putin launched a preventive

32:54

war. This was a preventive war in my opinion on 24 February 2022.

33:00

Now what’s the basis of the claim that NATO expansion was the principal cause

33:06

of the Ukraine? What what’s the basis on which I make this line of argument?

33:13

First, Russian leaders across the board said repeatedly before the war

33:20

that they considered NATO expansion into Ukraine to be an existential threat that

33:26

had to be eliminated. Putin made numerous public statements laying out

33:31

this line of argument before 24 February 2022. Other leaders including the

33:37

defense minister, the foreign minister, the deputy foreign minister, and Moscow’s ambassador to Washington also

33:44

emphasize the centrality of NATO expansion for causing the crisis over

33:50

Ukraine. Sergey Lag Ser Sergey Lavrov, the

33:55

foreign minister, made this point succinctly at a press conference on 14

34:00

January 2022. This is approximately one month before the war started. He said,

34:06

quote, “The key to everything is the guarantee that NATO will not expand east

34:14

eastward.” Second, the centrality of Russia’s profound fear of Ukraine

34:20

joining NATO is illustrated by events since the war started. For example,

34:27

during the Istanbul negotiations, which I was talking about before,

34:33

Russian leaders made it manifestly clear that

34:39

Ukraine and the West had to accept quote unquote permanent neutrality and could

34:45

not join NATO. The Ukrainians actually accepted Russia’s demands without

34:51

serious resistance at Istanbul surely because they knew that otherwise it

34:57

would be impossible to end the war. More recently on 14 June 2024, this is

35:04

not this past June but last June, June 20 14 June 2024, Putin laid out Russia’s

35:11

demands for ending the war. One of his core demands was that Keev officially

35:18

state quote that it is that it abandons its plans to join NATO. None of this is

35:25

surprising as Russia has always seen Ukraine and NATO as an existential

35:30

threat that must be prevented at all costs. Third, a substantial number of

35:38

influential and highly regarded individuals in the West recognized

35:44

before the war that NATO expansion, especially into Ukraine, would be seen

35:50

by Russian leaders as a mortal threat and eventually would lead to disaster.

35:57

William Burns, who was recently Joe Biden’s head of the CIA, but he was the

36:03

American ambassador to Moscow in April 2008 when the decision was made to bring

36:11

Ukraine and Georgia into NATO. Wrote a very famous memo that I’m sure some of

36:16

you are familiar with to then Secretary of State Condisa Rice. This is a quite

36:22

remarkable memo and I’m going to quote extensively from it.

36:27

Ukrainian entry into NATO is the brightest of all red lines for the

36:33

Russian elite, not just Putin. In more than two and a half years of

36:38

conversations with key Russian players, from knuckle draggers in the dark

36:45

recesses of the Kremlin to Putin’s sharpest liberal critics, I have yet to

36:52

find anyone who views Ukraine and NATO as anything other than a direct

36:59

challenge to Russia’s interests. NATO, he said, quote, would be seen as

37:05

throwing down the strategic gauntlet. Today’s Russia will respond.

37:12

Russian Ukrainian relations will go into a deep freeze. It will create fertile

37:19

soil for Russian meddling in Crimea and eastern Ukraine. This was written by

37:25

Bill Burns in 2008. Burns was not the only western policy

37:31

maker in 2008 who understood that bringing Ukraine into NATO was fraught

37:36

with danger. This is at the Bucharest summit. This is where the decision is made to bring

37:44

Ukraine into NATO. Both Angala Merkel who was then the German chancellor and

37:50

French president Nicholas Sarcoi adamantly opposed moving forward to

37:55

bring Ukraine into NATO. And this is what Merkel said about her thinking at

38:02

the time. This is really truly remarkable. Merkel said, “I was very

38:08

sure that Putin is not going to just let that happen.” From his perspective, that

38:17

would be a declaration of war. That’s Angela Merkel speaking. She is saying

38:23

that the decision that was made in the April 2008 meeting in Bucharest

38:30

that saying Ukraine would be allowed to come in to NATO would be seen by the

38:36

Russians as a declaration of war.

38:44

Supporters of bringing Ukraine into NATO sometimes argue that Moscow should not

38:51

have been concerned about enlargement because quote NATO is a defensive

38:57

alliance and poses no threat to Russia. Mike McFall, who was the American

39:03

ambassador to Moscow at the time, has told me that he told Putin that on

39:08

numerous occasions that Putin had nothing to fear from NATO expansion. Uh

39:14

it was uh led by uh a benign hegeimon known as the United States and NATO is

39:20

not a threat. But that is not how Russian leaders think about Ukraine and

39:26

NATO and it is what they think that matters. I just want to quickly point

39:31

out to you I have a number of friends who deny that NATO expansion into Ukraine is an existential threat. My

39:38

response to them is it doesn’t matter what you think. All that matters is what the Russians think. And it’s manifestly

39:44

clear that the Russians see NATO expansion into Ukraine as an existential

39:49

threat. And as Angala Merkel said, they will see it as a declaration of war. and

39:57

some there’s no question that Putin saw Ukraine joining NATO as a

40:03

mortal threat that could not be allowed and was willing to go to war to prevent

40:09

it from happening, which he did, of course, in February of 2022.

40:15

Now, let me talk a bit about the course of the war, what’s happening in the war

40:22

after the Istanbul negotiations failed. This is in April 2022. Remember the war

40:28

starts February 22 2022 and then um the negotiations failed

40:34

by midappril 2022. The Ukraine conflict turned into a war of attrition bearing

40:40

actually mark similarities to World War I on the Western Front. Uh this war

40:47

which has been a brutal slugfest has now been going on for three and a half years. Uh and during that time, as you

40:55

all know, Russia has formally enexed four uh Ukrainian oblasts in addition to

41:03

Crimea, which it enexed in 2014. In effect, Russia has so far enexed

41:10

about 22% of Ukraine’s pre204 territory. And all of that, of course,

41:17

is in the eastern 1/5if of the country. The West has provided enormous support

41:25

to Ukraine since the war broke out, doing everything but directly engaging

41:32

in the fighting. It’s no accident that Russian leaders think

41:38

uh that their country is at war with the West. Nevertheless, as you well know,

41:44

President Trump is determined to sharply limit uh America’s role in the war and

41:50

shift the burden of supporting Ukraine onto Europe’s shoulders.

41:56

Now, Russia is clearly winning this war and it’s likely to prevail. Uh and I

42:04

believe the reason is very simple. In a war of attrition, each side tries to

42:09

bleed the other side white, which means that the side that has more soldiers and

42:16

more firepower is likely to emerge victorious.

42:21

Russia has a significant advantage on both dimensions.

42:27

For example, General Searski says that Russia now has three times more forces

42:36

engaged in the fight than Ukraine does.

42:42

And he says that at some points along the front lines, the Ukrainians are

42:47

outnumbered 6:1. So it’s an overall ratio of 3:1 says Sir, and at some

42:54

points it’s 6:1. And in fact, according to numerous reports from the Ukrainian

42:59

side, the Ukrainians do not have enough soldiers to defend the front lines. They

43:05

can’t thickly populate the front lines with their combat forces. They have to leave open spaces that the Russians can

43:13

exploit or penetrate. In terms of firepower throughout most of

43:20

the war, Russia’s advantage in artillery, which is a critically important weapon in attrition warfare,

43:29

Russia has had an advantage reported to be either 3:1, 7:1 or 10:1.

43:36

Russia also has a huge inventory of highly accurate glide bombs which they

43:43

have used with deadly effectiveness against Ukrainian defenses.

43:48

Kev has hardly any glide bombs. Well, there’s no question that Ukraine has a

43:54

highly effective drone fleet, which was initially more effective than Russia’s

44:00

drone fleet. Russia has turned the tables over the past year, and Russia

44:07

now has an upper hand with drones as well as artillery as well as glide

44:14

bombs. It’s important to emphasize that Keev has no viable solution to its manpower

44:22

problem as it has a much smaller population than Russia and it is plagued

44:29

by draft dodging and desertion. Reports are that in October 20,000 Ukrainian

44:36

soldiers deserted from their frontline positions. That is a remarkable number.

44:43

Moreover, Russia has a robust industrial base

44:49

which produces vast quantities of weaponry while Ukraine’s industrial base

44:56

is poultry. To compensate, Ukraine

45:01

depends heavily on the West for weaponry, but Western countries lack the

45:07

manufacturing capability necessary to keep up with Russian output.

45:13

To make matters worse, Trump is slowing down the flow of American weaponry to

45:19

Ukraine. The bottom line is that Ukraine is badly outmanned, badly outgunned,

45:26

which is fatal in a war of attrition. On top of that dire situation on the

45:32

battlefield, Russia has a huge inventory of missiles, both ballistic missiles and

45:38

cruise missiles and drones that it uses to strike deep into Ukraine and destroy

45:45

critical infrastructure and weapons depots. For sure, Keefe has the capability to

45:53

hit targets deep inside Russia with its drones, but it has nowhere near the

45:59

striking power Moscow possesses. Moreover, striking targets deep inside

46:06

Russia is going to have little effect on what happens on the battlefield where

46:12

this war is being settled. What about the prospects for a peaceful

46:18

settlement? There’s been much discussion over the course of 2025 about finding a

46:25

diplomatic settlement to the end of the war. This conversation is due in good

46:30

part to President Trump’s promise that he would settle the Ukraine war even

46:38

before he moved into the White House. And if he didn’t solve it before he moved into the White House, he would

46:44

settle it shortly after he moved in. He

46:49

obviously failed. Uh indeed, he has not even come close to succeeding. The sad

46:55

truth is that there is no hope of negotiating a meaningful peace

47:01

agreement. This war will be settled on the battlefield where the Russians are

47:07

likely to win an ugly victory. I’m choosing my words carefully here. They’re going to win an ugly victory

47:14

that results in a frozen conflict with Russia on one side and Ukraine, Europe,

47:21

and the United States on the other side. Let me explain. Settling the war

47:27

diplomatically is not possible because the opposing sides have irreconcilable

47:33

differences. Moscow insists Ukraine must be a neutral country which means it not

47:40

only cannot be a NATO, it can’t have meaningful security guarantees from the west. Russians insist on that. Uh the

47:48

Russians also demand that Ukraine and the West recognize their annexation of

47:56

Crimea plus the four oblas that they’ve enexed in eastern Ukraine.

48:03

And their third demand is that Keev limit the size of its military to the

48:09

point where it presents no meaningful military threat to Russia.

48:15

Unsurprisingly, Europe and especially Ukraine categorically reject these

48:20

demands. Ukraine refuses to concede any territory to Russia, which you can understand.

48:29

While Europe and Ukraine continue to push to bring Ukraine into NATO, or at

48:35

least allow the West to give Ukraine meaningful security guarantees.

48:41

Disarming Ukraine to the point where it satisfies Moscow is also a non-starter.

48:47

There’s no way these opposing positions, the Russian position and the Ukraine

48:53

plus West position can be reconciled to produce a peace agreement. Thus, the war

49:00

will be settled on the battlefield. Although I believe the Russians will win

49:05

and are close to winning now, it is not it will not win. The Russians will not

49:12

win a decisive victory where they end up conquering all of Ukraine. I want to be

49:17

very clear on that. Instead, it’s likely to be, as I said, an ugly victory where Russia ends up

49:24

occupying somewhere between 20 to 40% of pre204

49:30

Ukraine. while Europe while Ukraine ends up as a dysfunctional rump state

49:38

covering the territory that Russia does not conquer.

49:43

Moscow is unlikely to try to conquer all of Ukraine because the western 60% of

49:50

that country is filled with ethnic Ukrainians who would mightily resist a

49:57

Russian occupation and turn it into a nightmare for the occupying forces.

50:05

All of this is to say that the likely outcome of the Ukraine war is a frozen

50:10

conflict between a greater Russia and a rump Ukraine backed by Europe.

50:17

Let me now explore the likely consequences of the UR of the Ukraine war focusing first on the consequences

50:24

for Ukraine itself and then on the consequences for relations between

50:30

Europe and Russia. And then finally, I’ll turn to the likely consequences

50:36

inside of Europe as well as for transatlantic relations.

50:41

Starting with Ukraine, Ukraine has effectively been wrecked. It

50:47

has already lost a substantial portion of its territory and is likely to lose

50:52

more land before the fighting stops. Its economy is in tatters with no prospect

50:59

of recovery in the foreseeable future. And according to my calculations, it has

51:05

suffer suffered roughly 1 million casualties.

51:10

A staggering number for any country, but certainly for one that is said to be in

51:16

quote a demographic death spiral. Russia has paid a significant price as

51:22

well, but it has suffered nowhere near as much as Ukraine.

51:29

U Europe will almost certainly remain allied with rump Ukraine for the

51:34

foreseeable future given some costs and the profound Russopobia that pervades

51:41

the West. But that continuing relationship between Europe and Ukraine

51:48

will not work to Kev’s advantage for two reasons.

51:54

First, it will incentivize Moscow to interfere in Ukraine’s

52:00

domestic affairs to cause it economic and political trouble so that it is not

52:07

a threat to Europe and is in no position to join either NATO or the EU.

52:16

Second, Europe’s commitment to supporting Keev no matter what motivates

52:22

Russia to conquer as much Ukrainian territory as possible while the war is

52:30

raging so as to maximize the weakness of the Ukrainian rump state that remains

52:37

once the conflict is frozen. In other words, if you’re playing Putin’s hand and you believe the Europeans are going

52:42

to be deeply committed to Ukraine for the foreseeable future, you have a deep-seated interest in grabbing Odessa,

52:49

grabbing Harkke, and grabbing all the oblas in between. You want to take 40%

52:54

of Ukrainian territory. You want to do everything you can to wreck Ukraine and then you want to keep Ukraine

53:02

weak for the foreseeable future because you understand the Europeans will be supporting the Ukrainians and they will

53:09

be interested in causing you Russia Trump. So the basic point I’m making

53:14

here is that maintaining close relations with Ukraine is not going to work to Ukraine’s advantage. What about

53:22

relations between Europe and Russia? Moving forward, they are likely to be

53:28

poisonous. As far as the eye can see, Europeans and surely the Ukrainians will

53:35

work to undermine Moscow’s efforts to integrate Ukrainian territories that

53:41

Russia has enexed, as well as look for opportunities to

53:46

cause the Russians economic and political trouble. Russia, for its part,

53:52

will look for opportunities to cause

53:58

economic and political trouble inside Europe. And between Europe

54:07

and the US, Russian leaders both will have powerful incentives to fraction,

54:13

excuse me, Russian leaders will have a powerful incentive to fracture the West as much as possible. Since the west also

54:21

will have its gun sights on Russia and one does not want to forget that Russia

54:27

be will be working to keep Ukraine dysfunctional while Europe will be

54:32

working to make it functional. Relations between Europe and Russia will

54:38

not only be poisonous, they will also be dangerous. The possibility of war will

54:44

be everpresent. In addition to the risk that war between Ukraine and Russia could restart, there

54:52

are six other flash points where a war pitting Russia against one or more

54:59

European countries could break out. First, consider the Arctic, where the

55:04

melting ice has opened the door to competition over passageways and

55:10

resources. Remember that seven of the eight countries that are physically

55:15

located in the Arctic are NATO members. Russia is the eighth country, which

55:22

means that it is outnumbered 7 to1 by NATO countries in that strategically

55:27

important area. The second flash point is the Baltic Sea, which is sometimes

55:32

referred to as a NATO lake because it is largely surrounded by countries from the

55:38

alliance. That waterway however is of vital strategic interest to Russia as is

55:45

Kinenrad the Russian enclave in Eastern Europe that is also surrounded by NATO

55:52

countries. The fourth flash point is Bellarus which because of its size and

55:57

location is as strategically important to Russia as Ukraine. The Europeans and

56:06

the Americans, however, will surely try to install a pro-american

56:12

or pro-Western government in Minsk after President Lucenko leaves office and

56:18

eventually hope to turn Bellarus into a pro-western bullwark on

56:26

Russia’s borders. The west is already deeply involved in

56:32

the politics of Muldova which not only borders Ukraine but contains a breakaway

56:37

region known as Transnistra which is occupied by Russian troops. The final

56:43

flash point is the Black Sea which is of great strategic importance to both Russia and Ukraine as well as a handful

56:50

of European countries which include Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Turkey. As

56:56

with the Baltic Sea, there is much potential for trouble in the Black Sea.

57:03

All of this is to say that even after Ukraine becomes a frozen conflict,

57:09

Europe and Russia will continue to have hostile relations in a geopolitical

57:16

setting filled with trouble spots. In other words, the threat of a major

57:21

European war will not go away when the fighting in Ukraine stops. Let me now

57:28

turn to the consequences of the war for inside of Europe and then turn to its

57:33

likely effects on the transatlantic relationship. For starters, it cannot be emphasized

57:40

enough that a Russian victory in Ukraine, even if it is an ugly victory, as I

57:47

anticipate, would be a stunning defeat for Europe. Uh, or to put it in slightly

57:54

different words, it would be a stunning defeat for NATO, which has been deeply involved in the Ukraine conflict since

58:01

it started. Indeed, the alliance has been committed to defeating Russia since

58:07

February 2022. NATO’s defeat will lead to recrimination between member states

58:14

and inside many of them as well. Who is to blame for this catastrophe will

58:20

matter greatly to the governing elites in Europe. And surely there will be a powerful tendency to blame others and

58:27

not accept responsibility themselves. The debate over who lost Ukraine will

58:34

take place in a Europe that is already racked by fractious politics both

58:40

between countries and inside them. In addition to these political fights, some

58:46

will question the future of NATO. Given that it failed to check Russia,

58:52

the country that most European leaders describe as a mortal threat, it seems

58:58

almost certain that NATO will be much weaker after the Ukraine war is shut down than before that war started. Any

59:07

weakening of NATO will have ne negative repercussions for the EU because as I

59:14

said earlier, a stable security environment in Europe is essential for

59:20

the EU to flourish and NATO is the key to stability in Europe. Threats to the

59:26

EU aside, the great reduction in the flow of gas and oil to Europe since the

59:32

war started has seriously hurt the major economies of Europe and slowed down

59:39

growth in the overall Euro zone. There’s good reason to think that economic

59:45

growth across Europe is a long way from recovering

59:50

after that war in Ukraine turns into a frozen conflict.

59:57

A defeat in Ukraine is also likely to lead to a transatlantic blame game,

1:00:04

especially since the Trump administration has refused to support Keev as vigorously as the Biden

1:00:12

administration and instead pushed the Europeans to assume more of the burden of keeping

1:00:19

Ukraine in the fight. Thus, when the war finally ends with a Russian victory,

1:00:24

Trump can accuse the Europeans of not stepping up to the plate, while the

1:00:30

European leaders can accuse Trump of bailing out on Ukraine in its greatest

1:00:37

moment of need. Of course, Trump’s relations with Europe have long been

1:00:42

contentious, so these recriminations will only make a bad situation worse.

1:00:49

Then there’s the allimportant question of whether the United States will significantly reduce its military

1:00:54

footprint in Europe or maybe even pull all of its combat troops out of Europe.

1:01:01

As I emphasized at the start of my talk, independent of the Ukraine war, the

1:01:08

historic shift from unipolarity to multiparity has created a powerful incentive for the

1:01:15

United States to pivot to East Asia, which effectively means pivoting away

1:01:22

from Europe. That move alone, right? that that that move alone has the

1:01:30

potential to put an end to NATO, which is another way of saying an end to the pacifier in Europe.

1:01:38

What has happened in Ukraine since 2022 makes that outcome more likely to repeat

1:01:45

more likely to repeat. Trump has a deep-seated hostility to Europe, especially its leaders, and he will

1:01:53

blame them for for losing Ukraine. He has no great affection for NATO and has

1:01:58

described the EU as an enemy created quote to screw the United States. That’s

1:02:04

Trump talking about the United States. It’s an enemy designed to quote unquote screw the United States. And he has

1:02:11

three and a half more years left in office. I will note. Furthermore, the fact that Ukraine lost the war despite

1:02:18

enormous support from NATO is likely to lead him, President Trump, to trash the

1:02:23

alliance as ineffective and useless. That line of argument will allow him to

1:02:28

push Europe to provide for its own security and not free ride on the United

1:02:34

States. In short, it seems likely that the results of the Ukraine war, coupled with

1:02:40

the spectacular rise of China, will eat away at the fabric of the transatlantic

1:02:47

relationship in the years ahead, much to the detriment of Europe. I’d like to

1:02:53

close now with a few general observations. For starters, the Ukraine war has been a

1:03:00

disaster. Indeed, it is a indeed it is a disaster that is almost certain to keep

1:03:07

giving in the years ahead. It has had catastrophic consequences for Ukraine.

1:03:15

It has poisoned relations between Europe and Russia for the foreseeable future

1:03:20

and it has made Europe a more dangerous place.

1:03:27

has also caused serious economic and political horn inside Europe and badly

1:03:33

damaged transatlantic relations. This calamity raises the inevitable question,

1:03:39

who’s responsible for this war? This question will not go away anytime soon,

1:03:45

and if anything, is likely to become more prominent over time as the extent

1:03:51

of the damage becomes more apparent to more people. The answer, of course, is

1:03:57

that the United States and its European allies are principally responsible. The

1:04:02

April 2008 decision to bring Ukraine into NATO, which the West has

1:04:09

relentlessly pursued since then, doubling down on this commitment at

1:04:15

every opportunity, is the main driving force behind the Ukraine war. Most

1:04:21

European leaders and I’m sure most people in the various European publics

1:04:29

uh will blame Putin for causing the war and thus for its terrible consequences.

1:04:34

But they are wrong. The war could have been avoided if the West had not decided

1:04:41

to bring Ukraine into NATO or even if it had backed off from that commitment once

1:04:48

the Russians made that their opposition clear. Had that happened, Ukraine would

1:04:56

almost certainly be intact today within its pre204

1:05:03

borders and Europe would be more stable and more prosperous. You just want to

1:05:08

think about what I’m saying here. Had we not made the decision to bring Ukraine

1:05:13

into NATO in April of 2008, or if once having made that decision, we saw how

1:05:20

clearcut Russian opposition was. Had we backed off, Ukraine would be intact

1:05:26

today inside its pre204 borders. Crimea would still be part of Ukraine. And

1:05:33

furthermore, Europe would be a more prosperous and more stable place than it

1:05:39

is. But that ship is sailed and Europe must

1:05:44

now deal with the disastrous results of a series of avoidable blunders. Thank

1:05:52

you.

1:05:59

[Applause]

1:06:16

Thank you professor Mhams for your very interesting speech and analysis. You now have time for round of questions. So

1:06:23

raise your hand and it gives him this different word then state your name and

1:06:30

the organization on job tit but

1:06:35

so we thank you professor Mirheimer for your very interesting insights. uh made some notice but you described what will

1:06:43

happen if things continue uh as they are but what if you today had the ability to

1:06:49

guide Europe right now the war in Ukraine has shown that Europe’s geopolitical weight has declined

1:06:55

significantly um do you see any chance of restoring that um what would your recommended

1:07:02

course of action be in the current situation I realize this is quite a short question but the answer can be

1:07:08

quite Thank you. Well, I certainly think from Ukraine’s point of view, and I’ve been arguing

1:07:13

this for a year and a half now, from Ukraine’s point of view, the best thing would be to get on an airplane, go to

1:07:19

Moscow, and work out a deal with Putin, where you accept the fact you have lost

1:07:25

those four oblass plus Crimea, that you can’t be in NATO, you can’t have

1:07:30

security guarantees from the West, and you will not build a military that threatens Russia. and do everything you

1:07:37

can if you’re Ukraine to make sure the Russians don’t take much more territory.

1:07:43

If I’m a Ukrainian, my greatest fear is they’re going to take Odessa, they’re going to take Harkke and a handful of

1:07:50

other oblas as well. And if I’m a Ukrainian, I want to prevent that. Furthermore, if I’m a Ukrainian, I don’t

1:07:56

want this war to go on because the end result is that more Ukrainians are going to die. I have been arguing for a long

1:08:03

time uh that this is the smart strategy. Now people will say is this a good is

1:08:09

this a good outcome? The one that I’m describing no it’s a terrible outcome.

1:08:14

What I’m suggesting Ukraine do and what I’m suggesting the Europeans support the Ukrainians in pursuing is a terrible

1:08:21

outcome, but it is the least bad outcome because the alternative is the war

1:08:28

continues. The Russians take more territory and they do uh uh they kill

1:08:35

more Ukrainians, right? and they have a greater incentive

1:08:41

to turn Ukraine into a dysfunctional rump state. Right? So I think the best

1:08:47

alternative is to do that and for the Europeans to support them. But it is almost impossible for me to sell this

1:08:54

argument. Hardly anybody wants to hear this argument. I I find this hard to

1:08:59

understand because I think it’s just common sensical. I think when you look at what’s actually happening in the war,

1:09:05

where things are headed, it makes sense to do what I said. And there are some Ukrainians, by the way, who accept this

1:09:12

line of argument, but they’re greatly outnumbered by the Zalinskis of the world. And certainly here in Europe,

1:09:18

that kind of argument doesn’t work. So, I think the war will go on and it will

1:09:24

end up as a frozen conflict. At some point the Ukrainian military forces on the front line will be unable to

1:09:30

continue the fight and uh then the only interesting question is how much territory does Ukraine uh lose and then

1:09:39

because of Europe’s deep commitment to remaining attached to Ukraine and

1:09:45

bringing Ukraine into the alliance or giving Ukraine security guarantees. I

1:09:50

think that for as far as the eye can see, uh, you’re going to have big trouble in Ukraine and in terms of

1:09:56

European Russian relations. All right, next, uh, question in the back.

1:10:04

Professor, would it be right if I would call this moment in 2018 the fix moment

1:10:10

of Russia, I mean the Kennedy crisis, the Cuba crisis? Is that to be compared or is it

1:10:17

different? Well, the Cuban missile crisis bears a

1:10:23

marked similarity to what happened in Ukraine in one very important way. You

1:10:29

all know that we and the United States have the Monroe Doctrine. And the Monroe

1:10:35

Doctrine says that no distant great power is allowed to come into the Western military into the Western

1:10:42

Hemisphere and put military forces its military forces in the Western

1:10:50

Hemisphere. And if you think about what happened in 1962, the Soviet Union put missiles in Cuba

1:10:59

right next to the United States. And by the way, when the deal was cut between

1:11:05

Cruchef and Kennedy, Kennedy insisted, of course, that the missiles be taken out of Cuba, which is

1:11:12

what happened. And the quidd proquo was that Cruchef insisted that we take the

1:11:19

Jupiter missiles out of Turkey because the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were

1:11:24

right on the Soviet Union’s border. The fact is that great powers do not

1:11:32

like other great powers coming great distances up to their doorstep.

1:11:40

And what happened with regard to Ukraine is analogous to what happened in the

1:11:46

Cuban missile crisis. Just to take this a step further because

1:11:52

it’s very important to understand what happened in the cold war with regard to missiles in Europe. Uh

1:12:00

it’s quite clear that the Reagan administration was pursuing a first strike capability in the 1980s. You all

1:12:07

know President Reagan got elected in 1980, took office in 1981. He had an

1:12:12

administration that was filled with hawks. Most of you probably don’t appreciate this, but at the time the

1:12:18

Soviet Union and the United States had massive nuclear arsenals and there was

1:12:24

no way they could use those nuclear arsenals to fight a nuclear war without

1:12:31

basically ending life on Earth because of nuclear winter and assorted other phenomena. Right? So what the United

1:12:38

States was very interested in doing was launching a decapitating strike. We

1:12:45

wanted to be able to decapitate the Soviet arsenal. It was a splendid

1:12:51

first strike in the form of decapitation. And many people viewed the Persian and

1:12:57

ground launch cruise missiles that we put in Europe as excellent decapitating weapons. These

1:13:05

are missiles that are right up on the Soviet Union’s doorstep. Okay.

1:13:12

Soviet Union went away, replaced by Russia. What the Russians really feared

1:13:19

was that we would put missiles in Ukraine. And those missiles in Ukraine could be used for a decapitation strike.

1:13:27

This is why the Russians were so upset with the ballistic missile defense

1:13:32

systems that we put in Poland and in Romania after the Cold War ended. You you

1:13:39

understand after the Cold War ended, the United States put ballistic missile defense systems in Ukraine and Poland.

1:13:47

But the problem is that those defensive systems can be used for offensive

1:13:52

purposes. In other words, you could put missiles into those defensive systems that can strike Russia and could be used

1:14:01

for a decapitation strategy. So when you talk about bringing an alliance,

1:14:08

right, that was a mortal enemy of the Soviet Union up to Russia’s doorstep in

1:14:15

Ukraine and putting missiles there that might be used for decapitation. The

1:14:20

parallels with the Cuban missile crisis are quite marked and you know how we

1:14:26

reacted in the Cuban missile crisis and unsurprisingly the Soviets excuse me the

1:14:33

Russians reacted the same way. Okay, next question and please state

1:14:38

your name before question. Hans Loyoff, alternative for Germany and um

1:14:44

severalist political group in his parliament, a full member of the committee for security and defense.

1:14:51

First of all, Professor Misha, let me inform you that um your approach to geopolitics makes part of our approach

1:15:00

in the parliament of political work and your arguments are regularly placed in

1:15:05

the plenary debates and in the committee debates by myself to the effect of being labeled actually as being radio Moscow.

1:15:13

Um now my question is um you rightly pointed out that bringing Ukraine into

1:15:21

NATO is neither interest of the United States nor of the European Union.

1:15:27

Nevertheless, it happened. So what according to you are the truly driving

1:15:33

forces behind this process? Yeah, Jonathan Hass has written a book

1:15:39

entitled Hubris. That’s his answer. What is hubris? Yeah, it was hubris

1:15:46

to some extent, but it that doesn’t go deep enough. Uh NATO expansion

1:15:54

uh became a serious issue when Bill Clinton moved into the White House. Uh,

1:16:00

Bill Clinton won the election in 92 and he moved into the White House in January

1:16:06

93 and I believe the decision to expand NATO was finally made in 19 late 1994.

1:16:16

Okay. And the first trunch of expansion was in 1999.

1:16:22

That’s when Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary come in. And then the second big trunch was 2004.

1:16:30

Now it’s very important to understand two things. One is that Russia was

1:16:36

remarkably weak in the 1990s and even in the early

1:16:41

2000s. Vladimir Putin resurrected the Russians from the dead. So, you want to

1:16:49

understand that when we started NATO expansion in the ‘9s, it was not

1:16:54

designed to contain Russia. Given the world that we live in today,

1:17:01

I’m sure lots of people think that NATO expansion when it started in 1994 was

1:17:07

designed to contain Russia, that Russia was seen as a threat. That is not true.

1:17:15

What was driving NATO expansion? This gets to my second point is that we were

1:17:21

the unipole. We were the only great power on the planet. And you all understand in a world where we’re the

1:17:27

only great power on the planet, there is no great power politics because there’s

1:17:33

only one great power. So for the first time in our history, we were in a

1:17:39

position to pursue a liberal foreign policy. And we pursued a policy that

1:17:45

many people call liberal hegemony. We pursued a foreign policy that was

1:17:52

designed to remake the world in America’s image. And the Europeans went

1:17:58

along with us. They were our sidekicks in this enterprise. You want to understand I talked about

1:18:04

the Chinese threat today. We helped create that threat because we helped

1:18:12

China to grow more and more powerful economically. And a realist like me said

1:18:18

at the time, China is going to translate that economic power into military power and

1:18:24

it’s going to try to dominate East Asia to the disadvantage of the United States. Virtually everybody I talked to

1:18:32

said, “John, you are a dinosaur. Your realist view of international politics

1:18:37

is outdated. We live in a new world. China’s going to grow economically. It’s going to get hooked on capitalism. It’s

1:18:44

going to get integrated into institutions like the WTO. It’s eventually going to turn into a liberal

1:18:51

democracy like the Asian Tigers did. And we’re going to live happily ever after because China’s going to look like us

1:18:57

and we’re the good guys. And if they look like us, the world is filled with good guys. We live happily ever after.

1:19:03

That was the belief. That was that was liberal hegemony applied to China. Now,

1:19:10

how does that apply to NATO expansion? What we were doing with NATO expansion?

1:19:16

It’s a liberal policy. It’s not designed to contain Russia. We’re taking those

1:19:21

institutions like NATO and the EU and we’re expanding or enlarging those

1:19:28

institutions. We’re moving them eastward, bringing in new members. They will become responsible stakeholders.

1:19:37

Furthermore, we’re making sure they’re all hooked on capitalism, right? Making

1:19:43

them economically interdependent. And if everybody’s economically interdependent, nobody’s going to fight because who

1:19:49

would want to kill the goose that lays the golden eggs? You know the whole argument. So institutions are spreading

1:19:55

eastward. Economic interdependence is spreading eastward.

1:20:01

And then very importantly the velvet revolutions,

1:20:06

right? Or the color revolutions, uh the orange revolution, the rose revolution. We’re going to promote revolutions in

1:20:14

Eastern Europe that are designed to turn those countries into pro-western liberal

1:20:20

democracies. And if you create a world that’s filled with liberal democracies, you live happily ever after.

1:20:27

For many of the younger people in the audience, you’re going to think this is hard to believe because in 2025, it

1:20:33

makes no sense. But I just want to say a word or two about Frank Fukiyama’s very famous article, The End of History,

1:20:39

which you should all go read if you haven’t read it. It’s a terribly important argument because it is the uh

1:20:46

it is the software that was in the heads of European elites and American elites and is still in the heads of many

1:20:53

European and American elites. Frank Fukyama’s argument was that liberal

1:20:58

democracy is the future. We liberal democracies have the wind at our back

1:21:03

and there going to be more and more liberal democracies around the world and the end result is peace. And in fact he

1:21:14

says at the end of the article that the biggest problem we face going forward is

1:21:20

boredom. Boredom. Just think about that. War is off the table. And it’s an

1:21:27

argument for creating democracy, spreading institutions, and spreading

1:21:33

capitalism, and fostering economic interdependence. That’s what was motivating us. We were not interested in

1:21:40

screwing the Russians. Clinton and company in the ’90s understood that the Russians were going to protest. There’s

1:21:46

no question about that. Lots of the planning documents are now available. The Clinton people understood that the

1:21:52

Russians were adamantly opposed, but they thought they could buy the Russians off because they thought we were a

1:21:58

benign hegeimot, right? That that’s what they thought was going on here. And by the way, just on talking about the color

1:22:06

revolutions, we wanted to spread a color revolution to Russia as well. There’s an

1:22:13

article in the New Yorker about Mike McFall who was the US ambassador to

1:22:18

Russia. as I was telling you before uh at the time of uh when the Ukraine

1:22:25

crisis broke out in 2014, but you should read the you can Google it, the New Yorker article on Mike McFall. He he was

1:22:32

basically trying to foster a color revolution inside of Russia when he was the US ambassador to Russia. Needless to

1:22:39

say, this made the Russians super angry and they insisted that he be withdrawn as ambassador, right? But it just gives

1:22:46

you a sense of what’s going on here. So it was the fact that we had this deeply

1:22:54

embedded liberal foreign policy that got this train out of the station

1:23:02

and it covered the first trunch 99 the second trunch 2004 and then it was

1:23:09

impossible to stop. Once NATO expansion started, it was just impossible to stop.

1:23:15

And it’s quite amazing that nobody in the West except for maybe Trump on

1:23:20

occasion says no more NATO expansion, right? Europeans ought to be saying at

1:23:26

this point in time, we’ve had enough NATO expansion. This has led to enough trouble. We have got to get our house in

1:23:32

order. The last thing we want to do is keep provoking the Russians because it’s not going to work to our benefit here in

1:23:37

Europe. But nobody says that or I shouldn’t say nobody. Hardly anybody says that. That’s certainly not the

1:23:42

mainstream view. Uh so I think it’s actually it’s the pursuit of a liberal

1:23:48

foreign policy. And by the way, just one more point on this. I talked about engagement with China. How foolish that

1:23:55

was. How’s that’s liberal hegemony. Second example, expansion of NATO,

1:24:01

expansion of the EU, color revolutions, Eastern Europe. That’s the second example. The third example is the Middle

1:24:07

East. The Bush doctrine. The Bush doctrine was all about democratizing the Middle East. Again, most people have

1:24:13

forgot that we thought we were going to go into Iraq, knock Iraq off, then well,

1:24:19

maybe we’ll do Syria, maybe we’ll do Iran next, go in, knock that regime off,

1:24:24

going to turn it into a liberal democracy, right? You know, it didn’t

1:24:30

work out. None of this worked out. You you the Bush doctrine, it failed. It

1:24:36

crashed and burned in Iraq. Uh, China, we created, we created a peer

1:24:42

competitor. I’m not sure it’s a pure competitor. It may surpass us at one point in the not too distant future,

1:24:49

right? Uh, and then the whole subject of NATO expansion. This was a thoroughly liberal foreign policy. And it comes out

1:24:55

of unipolarity. It comes out of the fact again once you go to a world where you have one great power, great power

1:25:03

politics by definition is taken off the table. That means that people like me, realists who think of the world in

1:25:09

balance of power terms are going to be put in the closet. They’re going to lock the door and keep me there and the

1:25:15

liberals are going to dominate, right? Which is exactly what happened. And now the world has changed. This is the

1:25:21

transition which I think was reflected in Tom’s comments and in John’s presentation. Going from unipolarity to

1:25:28

multipolarity really matters and that’s the world we’re in and it’s not going away.

1:25:35

Okay, next question. Thank you, professor. It’s a real

1:25:40

pleasure to hear from you. I’m was professor of international relations at Portuguese University for 20 years

1:25:48

almost 20 years. So I spend part of my life reading your books and your articles and get lots of books and

1:25:54

articles and an Morgans and others. So it’s a real pleasure. Thank you.

1:26:00

But allow me to to in respectful way to put in question your main argument using

1:26:07

your own theory. Yeah. Yeah. Please do. I will use offensive realism uh and you are the

1:26:13

father of offensive realism uh to not not to impress but to to to think about

1:26:20

your argument. So your main argument is the Ukrainian war is NATO fault.

1:26:26

So uh using offensive realism I think that’s what it was what nato did after

1:26:32

the end of the cold war. So they NATO took advantage of the victory war the of

1:26:39

Russia weakness to enlarge to uh to western Europe. So it makes it makes

1:26:46

sense in offensive realism perspective. It’s rational and they they use the power they have or NATO use the power

1:26:53

they have to enlarge to h so using the

1:26:58

Russian weakness to enlarge to Eastern Europe and u

1:27:04

doing that they use power in a way to uh to enlarge their goals but also to and I

1:27:11

think you said that containment it’s not good a good concept to to explain what happened but the terance is and you

1:27:19

wrote that in an article uh about the nuclear arms Ukrainian nuclear arms as

1:27:25

an important way to contain to to the terrors to of of Russia. So, in trying

1:27:32

to to to be more simple, uh I’m I’m not sure if it’s because Ukraine is near to

1:27:40

NATO that the war started, but because Ukraine is not in NATO, because if it

1:27:46

was in NATO like the like the the Baltic states or the others, we don’t see that

1:27:52

in the Baltic States. So, I’m not sure. Of course, I’m just reflecting about this issue, but I think if we the

1:27:58

problem is that we not not go to until the end because if they were in NATO, I’m not sure if Russia will do what they

1:28:06

do what they did. So the question for you is do do you think that

1:28:15

the the the thought of the the the beginning of the Ukrainian war is not

1:28:20

because the NATO enlarge but because of but

1:28:25

because NATO didn’t enlarge enough. Okay. Thank you very much. Okay. Uh three points. I think there’s

1:28:32

no question if Ukraine was uh in NATO that the Russians would not have

1:28:38

invaded, but Ukraine was not in NATO. Uh second point is I I don’t know how many of you know this, but I wrote a piece in

1:28:45

1993. It was in foreign affairs that said Ukraine should keep its nuclear

1:28:50

weapons. Uh I don’t know how many of you know this but when the Soviet Union broke apart uh four parts or four of the

1:28:58

new countries had nuclear weapons. Russia, Kazakhstan, Bellarus and Ukraine. Bellarus and Kazakhstan gave up

1:29:06

their nuclear weapons. But Ukraine gave a lot of thought to keeping their nuclear weapons. And I wrote a piece um

1:29:13

that said Ukraine should keep its nuclear weapons because it might need them for a rainy day when the Russians

1:29:20

came knocking. Um and uh of course apppropo response to this gentleman

1:29:25

here. Everybody thought that I was crazy, right? That uh and Bill Clinton

1:29:30

in particular has recently said that and he of course Bill Clinton was responsible for making the Ukrainians

1:29:37

give up their nuclear weapons. He said that he made a mistake. Clinton did uh

1:29:42

forcing Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons. But I want to deal with the heart and soul of your question which is

1:29:49

directly opposite the argument that this gentleman made, right? Or at least my

1:29:55

response to this gentleman, what you’re saying is that NATO expansion may have

1:30:02

caused the war, but it was done according to the dictates of my theory.

1:30:08

NATO expansion is consistent with my theory. It wasn’t a liberal foreign

1:30:13

policy. As I said to this gentleman, as he’s saying, a number of people make this argument, by the way, and they say

1:30:20

that I should adopt this argument because it makes my theory more powerful.

1:30:26

I’m conceding to you that my theory didn’t really matter. They locked me in the closet. He’s saying, “No, no, no.

1:30:32

They acted according to your theory.” Uh let me just make a couple points. One

1:30:38

is my theory says that you can only be a

1:30:43

regional hedgeimon, right? You cannot be a global hedgeimon. But in other regions

1:30:48

of the world, all you want to do is make sure there’s no other regional hedgeimon. That’s my imperial Germany,

1:30:55

Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, Soviet Union argument. Okay? And Russia in the 1990s was not a potential regional

1:31:03

hegeimon. And as you know, I said today it’s not a potential regional hegeimon.

1:31:08

It’s just it’s just too weak. Right? So according to a strict interpretation of

1:31:15

my theory, we actually should have gotten out of Europe. Okay? Because

1:31:20

there’s no potential regional hegeimon. We were Godzilla. We could go home. Uh

1:31:26

that’s point one. But point two is my theory says states should maximize

1:31:34

their relative power and it’s a theory that says you should take advantage of

1:31:40

other states at every turn. the the name of the game in a system where there’s no

1:31:47

higher authority and you have to take care of yourself is to be as powerful as

1:31:52

possible and therefore you look to take advantage of other sides. This is

1:31:58

consistent with this with with what you’re saying. But it it doesn’t call

1:32:03

for doing stupid things. And one could argue even let’s say my theory applies.

1:32:09

We’re looking for opportunities. Russia’s weak. Let’s begin to push.

1:32:15

The problem that you face is that there’s going to be a blowback.

1:32:20

Now, the counter to that is we got away with the first trunch, 1999. We got away

1:32:26

with it. We got away with the second trunch was 2004, but then comes 2008.

1:32:32

That’s the Bucharest decision. The argument would be if you’re really smart, stop there. You you you’ve gotten

1:32:39

really quite far, right? two big tanches of expansion, right? Ukraine and

1:32:46

Georgia. It’s a bridge too far or two bridges too far. And you all understand

1:32:51

the April 2008 decision said bring in Ukraine, bring in Georgia. And in August

1:32:57

of 2008, there was a war over Georgia, right? That should have been the first harbinger of trouble coming on Ukraine.

1:33:04

And you could say a good offensive realist like me should have pushed NATO expansion, right? but should have been

1:33:11

well aware that you know you’re feeling your way around in the dark but when you run into resistance stop there but again

1:33:18

my argument is that there’s no potential hegeimon therefore no need uh to really

1:33:25

contain the Russians okay

1:33:30

thank you very much professor for a fantastic speech my name is Peter Bister I represent the strongest party in

1:33:36

Germany the AFD and I think I speak also So for many of my colleagues who are

1:33:42

here in high number from the group if I say thank you very much Tom thank you very much and from the patriots

1:33:48

foundation that you organized this fantastic event. I can remember uh seeing um site event in the European

1:33:57

Parliament this full people standing because they have no places obviously you invited a rock star. Thank you very

1:34:03

much for that. Um, professor the question you you you

1:34:09

name all the negative consequences of the war. You said also that the US were

1:34:14

very aware of what is coming when the war will start. But you didn’t say who

1:34:21

really profit of this war. You know we are in a situation people saying like h

1:34:26

the US they cause this war but I don’t think this is in the interest of the United

1:34:33

States of America or the people living in the United States of America. So who are the groups who are really profiting

1:34:39

from it? Is it the is it the military complex? Is it the NATO? You remember

1:34:45

that that um M said the NATO is brain dead. So does NATO need a new enemy to

1:34:52

justify its its existence or is it a military complex who needs

1:34:59

new new contracts? So who name the elephant in the room? So who is our

1:35:06

well uh let me just say a few more words about how I see it developing uh the the

1:35:13

conflict. 2008 is the decision to bring uh Ukraine into NATO. Okay. And uh uh

1:35:23

the Georgia war happens a few months later. We don’t back off. We continue to

1:35:29

push and push. And then the crisis breaks out in February

1:35:35

2014. Okay. That that’s when the Ukraine crisis breaks out. The crisis starts in

1:35:42

2014. And the war is 8 years later, 2022, February 2014. Okay. What’s going

1:35:49

on here all along is that we think we could shove NATO expansion down their

1:35:55

throat. We we think that they complained, the Russians complained bitterly about the 99 trunch. They

1:36:03

complained bitterly about the 2004 trunch, but we just pushed it down their throat. We think that that’s what we’ll

1:36:10

do in 2008. Okay. And then when the

1:36:15

crisis breaks out in 2014, we don’t back off, right? Between 2008 and 2014 uh

1:36:23

2014, sorry, 2014 when the crisis breaks out and the eight years in between when the

1:36:30

war breaks out, we don’t back off. And as I said to you in my formal comments, what’s really amazing is the Americans

1:36:38

who are saying that war is likely before it happens before February 24th, 2022.

1:36:46

The Americans are saying loudly and clearly war is going to break out. Putin’s going to invade Ukraine. And the

1:36:52

Americans are complaining that the Ukrainians won’t take that argument seriously. Yet we do nothing.

1:37:00

We do nothing to prevent the war. No diplomacy. And then when the war starts,

1:37:06

we are the ones who encourage the Ukrainians to walk away. So you say to yourself, what’s going on here? Right?

1:37:13

Really, what what’s happening? We thought we could defeat the Russians. As

1:37:18

I said, we that’s why we didn’t back off. So I think what’s happening here is that

1:37:25

when Putin comes to power in 2000, all right, and you ramp forward up till

1:37:31

2014, certainly up to 2022, the Russians are beginning to contest the West in

1:37:40

really serious ways over that time period. The first big uh first big piece

1:37:47

of evidence of how angry Putin is at us is the uh the annual security conference

1:37:55

in Munich 2007. Go back and read Putin’s speech 2007. Then 2008 is the NATO

1:38:02

decision on uh Georgia and Ukraine. And then you get the Georgia war in 2008.

1:38:08

Then you get the crisis in 2014. Now we Nobody thought that we were going to

1:38:16

get a war. I should That’s too strong. The people who were pushing this trade

1:38:22

down the tracks did not think we were going to get a war. And then when they thought they’d get a war, they thought

1:38:28

we would win like that. And I think that

1:38:33

it wasn’t like the military-industrial complex was pushing it or there were sort of uh a set of economic or

1:38:40

political incentives to do that. The United States is filled with people who

1:38:47

believe in the mailed fist and they believe that the United States is an

1:38:52

incredibly powerful country that can use its mailed fist to get its way. This is

1:38:57

especially true of the neoconservatives who are very powerful element in the decision-making process in the United

1:39:03

States. This is why we didn’t back off, right? We just thought we would win and it would be relatively costfree. And

1:39:10

from an American point of view, by 2022, remember we’re in a multipolar world.

1:39:16

Just think about this. We’re in a multi-polar world starting about 2017.

1:39:21

So the Ukraine crisis breaks out in 2014. And that’s in the unipolar world.

1:39:26

The war is 2022. By the time the war comes, Russia is now

1:39:32

a great power. Putin has resurrected it from the dead. So what we think we can do is we could defeat the Russians and

1:39:40

knock them out of the ranks of the great powers. That’s our basic thinking uh at

1:39:46

the time. And the Europeans go along with this. The Europeans, the Europeans

1:39:51

used to offer resistance to the Americans when I was young. Uh there people like uh Helmet Schmidt who was a

1:39:58

real tough cookie as my mother would say and uh he’d stand up to the Americans.

1:40:03

You all remember Charles de Gaulle and there were all sorts of other leaders either Conrad Adau and so forth and so

1:40:09

on. The Europeans were willing to argue with the Americans to put up resistance.

1:40:15

And this was true even in the Iraq war in 2003. As I’m sure you remember, the

1:40:20

French and the Germans were opposed to the Iraq war. But something happened

1:40:25

after that and the Europeans reached a point where they were just incapable of

1:40:31

putting up any resistance to the Americans and in fact they became cheerleaders.

1:40:36

So when it came to, you know, uh, the 2008 decision and what happens

1:40:43

moving forward, the Europeans just went along with the Americans and the Americans are

1:40:50

the Americans are u addicted to war. You all understand the United States is

1:40:55

addicted to war. We we believe that the mailed fist can solve almost every problem. This is like the Israelis. the

1:41:02

Israelis and the Americans that they don’t believe that there’s a political problem out there that can’t be solved

1:41:08

with military force. My view is most political problems can only be solved with a heavy dose of uh a political

1:41:15

settlement or political calculations, not just military calculations. But I I

1:41:22

think that that’s basically what drove the train here. Uh the belief that we could get away with it. There was going

1:41:27

to be no costs, right? Just benefits. Uh, and that didn’t turn out to be the case. As I said in the very beginning, I

1:41:35

think most Europeans had no idea we would be where we are today. Uh,

1:41:40

certainly in the 1990s, but even in the run-up to the Ukraine war, right?

1:41:45

There’s nobody I shouldn’t say there’s nobody, there’s hardly anybody who was saying, “Oh my god, you know, this is a

1:41:52

disastrous decision. We’re going to get ourselves in real trouble.”

1:41:59

Unfortunately, uh time flies, especially when you’re having fun. But I have also some good news that afterwards we will

1:42:05

have a a cocktail reception and John will be present. So questions can be

1:42:10

asked and they can continue. Uh I will now give the floor that the program will

1:42:16

be at the third floor at the hem bar right afterwards. You just take the elevator downstairs to the third floor

1:42:22

and there some drinks and Thank you very much.

1:42:28

The Patriots for Europe Foundation is the European think tank that is ready to discuss many of the subjects deemed

1:42:35

taboo in the European Union and today’s conference, today’s speech is no

1:42:40

different. Thank you very much, Professor M. Shimer, for that. The Ukraine, the war in Ukraine is the most

1:42:46

severe war that the European continent has seen in decades. The policy of the

1:42:52

EU and its member states with regards to the war has had a major impact on our

1:42:57

security. Our economy and the outcome will largely

1:43:03

determine the future of Europe. The gravity of this situation, its impact on our lives should warrant in-depth

1:43:10

discussions like the one today. The EU has adopted almost 20 sanctions packages

1:43:15

against Russia in hope of stopping the war. Sanctions have failed to deliver what leaders have promised. As an honest

1:43:23

uh an honest assessment of previous packages before a new one being adopted

1:43:29

never actually took place until this day. EU leaders also failed to convince

1:43:35

non-western countries to sign up to sanctions. EU elites blindly followed

1:43:41

the US’s Ukraine policy pushed by the B administration as professor you have just mentioned despite the fact that our

1:43:48

economy our military our strength and our weaknesses are radically different from that of the United States. The

1:43:55

economic burden and therefore therefore has also been much greater on Europe. The Patriots Foundation organized an

1:44:02

event in September to do just that, to talk about the cost of the war and potentially the membership of Ukraine in

1:44:09

the EU. The impact of our energy security, the impact on our energy security is impossible to estimate

1:44:17

accurately at this moment, but we have talked about the impact on our farmers, on our agriculture, and on our budget.

1:44:24

And as I said generally the cost of EU’s EU membership of Ukraine with Europe’s

1:44:30

dependent Europe’s with Europe’s high dependence on energy imports European

1:44:35

energy prices make European industry uncompetitive compared to US and Chinese counterparts.

1:44:42

Europeans have the greatest interest in restoring peace in Europe. I come from

1:44:48

Hungary and Hungarians are amazed that Prime Minister Orban’s efforts for a peace deal or ceasefire in Ukraine are

1:44:55

met with enormous hostility here in Brussels and many European capitals. If

1:45:00

we just think about the last plannary session of the European Parliament, a potential Budapest summit was also on

1:45:07

the agenda and heavily criticized by many. Most leaders, in fact, categorically refuse to engage in

1:45:14

diplomacy and expect others to conclude the war in Ukraine in a way that that

1:45:19

benefits Europe, which is insane. It’s foolish and totally unrealistic. Europe

1:45:26

simply lacks a coherent and realistic strategy for its own security and future. No one will defend European

1:45:33

interests if we don’t. Today it was an honor, Professor Mishaner, to have you

1:45:39

with us. Most often you describe yourself as a realist, someone who

1:45:45

analyzes global politics based on power relationships as opposed to the ideological approach we hear most often

1:45:52

from politicians and mainstream media. Thank you, professor, because you have not failed us. Thank you, professor, for

1:45:59

accepting our invitation. Thank you for your honest analysis and debate uh

1:46:05

provoking thoughts uh here today and I’m glad that so many of you accepted our

1:46:11

invitation. It shows that Europeans want to know more and hear more than emotionally charged oneliners from EU

1:46:18

leaders. I would like to thank also my friend Tom Fondona for taking the initiative on inviting

1:46:24

professor Mir Shimemer. I think it was a very very fruitful uh event. It was a

1:46:30

very thought-provoking event and as many have asked during the Q&A session, you

1:46:36

know, why did this happen? And of course, everyone has their explanations and it’s very important to understand

1:46:44

why this war happened and why it keeps raging. It came to my mind that there was an

1:46:51

episode many of you might know from South South Park called Captain Hindsight with a character who always

1:46:58

went to a disaster struck area and said what people should have done differently

1:47:03

to avoid it. Unfortunately, this is not a luxury we have. The history we write

1:47:09

is not reversible. Fortunately, I believe that we can write

1:47:15

our own history. I very much hope that we can avoid what professor you described as an ugly Russian victory and

1:47:21

a frozen contra conflict in Europe. It is European interest to avoid that

1:47:28

future and as we have just heard through the Q&A session as well, it is by

1:47:34

misunderstanding the intentions of others that we arrive to to such a point. It’s ignorance which arrives

1:47:40

there. So I hope you will join us at future events where we will discuss more

1:47:46

on issues about the future of Europe so we can shape our own future and not

1:47:51

expect others to shape it for us. I think this is our mission. This is the mission of the Patriots Foundation and

1:47:58

this is how we will keep going. Thank you very much for attending and I hope to see you next time at our conferences

1:48:05

as well. And a big applause for Professor Mirshimer.