Profesors of propaganda
Executive Summary: Professors of Propaganda: How the EU’s Jean Monnet Programme corrodes academia
Enormous reach and funding for political influence
The Programme channels around €25 million per year to universities and research institutes globally and reaches around 500,000 students annually across more than 70 countries. This is not for open-ended research; it’s an investment explicitly designed to influence academic curricula, align educational content with the EU’s political agenda and promote Brussels’s legitimacy. as former Jean Monnet Chair Joseph H. H. Weiler candidly admitted: ‘Part of our mission as [a] Jean Monnet Professor is to disseminate the values of European integration. The EU Commission “think of us openly as intellectual ambassadors of the Union and its values”.’ This directly challenges any claim of impartial academic freedom.
An explicitly political project – beyond academic study
While proponents often frame the Jean Monnet Programme as fostering excellence, our report demonstrates that its core purpose, as ‘openly acknowledged’ by the European Commission itself, is not merely to study European integration but to ‘promote’ it. The EU’s own directives require Jean Monnet Centres of Excellence and designated Institutions to maintain ‘continuous and frequent alignment’ of their teaching and research with EU policy priorities and to promote European identity. This goes far beyond neutral academic inquiry.
Explicitly pro-EU agenda
Direct quotes from funded projects reveal the ideological mission of supporting EU institu tions: funded projects openly aim to ‘promote EU integration’, ‘foster European identity’, ‘enforce EU values’, and ‘challenge the rise of euroscepticism and of populist, extreme right parties’. They are also designed to ‘counter anti-EU disinformation and propaganda’ and ‘reverse de-Europeanisation dynamics’.
Transforming academics into activists
Recipients of Jean Monnet funding are not just expected to produce EU-aligned research, but to act as ‘outreach agents’, organizing public events, engaging with media and ngos, and disseminating EU-approved narratives to the public. This creates a ‘self-reinforcing feedback loop’ where EU-funded research legitimizes EU policies.
Academic freedom under threat
The funding structure incentivises conformity with EU priorities, discourages critical perspectives, and promotes research with predetermined political outcomes. This ‘undermines the Humboldtian principles of academic autonomy’ and transforms students into ‘subjects to be moulded into “right-thinking” citizens’.
Narrative control
While the EU claims to combat ‘disinformation’, our report demonstrates that this is often a strategy to curtail dissenting views, narrow the spectrum of public debate and consolidate institutional control over the flow of information. Projects explicitly target ‘eurosceptic framing of EU activities’ and what are labelled as ‘denialisms and conspiracy theories’ related to EU policy positions on issues like climate change and CoVId-19. We highlight how this provides academic justification to the EU’s increasingly pervasive online censorship framework, exemplified by the bloc’s adoption, in 2022, of the digital Services act (dSa), which aims at secretly controlling the online narrative.
Professors of propaganda:
How the EU’s Jean Monnet
Programme corrodes academia
Thomas Fazi
(https://brussels.mcc.hu/uploads/default/0001/02/39e8927fbb1c64e9fce4cb4c2a2aedf2493d2a2c.pdf)
Contents
Executive summary 7
Report overview 8
Introduction 13
1 From exchange to influence: from Erasmus to Erasmus 14
2 The evolution of the Jean Monnet Programme 17
3 Embedding pro-EU narratives in the classroom – and society 21
4 Jean Monnet chairs: professorships in European integration 30
5 The Jean Monnet propaganda toolbox 39
6 The hubs of EU academic propaganda 56
Conclusion 60
Policy recommendations 62
End notes 64
Executive summary
Enormous reach and funding for political influence
The Jean Monnet Programme channels around
€25 million per year to universities and
research institutes globally and reaches
around 500,000 students annually across
more than 70 countries. This is not for
open-ended research; it’s an investment
explicitly designed to influence academic
curricula, align educational content with
the EU’s political agenda and promote
Brussels’s legitimacy. as former Jean Monnet
Chair Joseph H. H. Weiler candidly admitted:
‘Part of our mission as [a] Jean Monnet Professor
is to disseminate the values of European
integration. The EU Commission think of us
openly as intellectual ambassadors of the Union
and its values.’ This directly challenges any
claim of impartial academic freedom.
An explicitly political project –
beyond academic study
While proponents often frame the Jean Monnet
Programme as fostering excellence, our report
demonstrates that its core purpose, as openly
acknowledged by the European Commission
itself, is not merely to study European
integration but to ‘promote’ it. The EU’s own
directives require Jean Monnet Centres of
Excellence and designated Institutions to
maintain ‘continuous and frequent
alignment’ of their teaching and research
with EU policy priorities and to promote
European identity. This goes far beyond neutral
academic inquiry.
Explicitly pro-EU agenda
Direct quotes from funded projects reveal
the ideological mission of supporting EU institu-
tions: funded projects openly aim to ‘promote
EU integration’, ‘foster European identity’,
‘enforce EU values’, and ‘challenge the rise of
euroscepticism and of populist, extreme
right parties’. They are also designed to
‘counter anti-EU disinformation and propaganda’
and ‘reverse de-Europeanisation dynamics’.
Transforming academics into activists
Recipients of Jean Monnet funding are not
just expected to produce EU-aligned research,
but to act as ‘outreach agents’, organizing
public events, engaging with media and ngos,
and disseminating EU-approved narratives to
the public. This creates a ‘self-reinforcing
feedback loop’ where EU-funded research
legitimizes EU policies.
Academic freedom under threat
The funding structure incentivises conformity
with EU priorities, discourages critical
perspectives, and promotes research with
predetermined political outcomes. This
‘undermines the Humboldtian principles of
academic autonomy’ and transforms
students into ‘subjects to be moulded
into “right-thinking” citizens’.
Narrative control
While the EU claims to combat ‘disinformation’,
our report demonstrates that this is often a
strategy to curtail dissenting views, narrow
the spectrum of public debate and consolidate
institutional control over the flow of information.
Projects explicitly target ‘eurosceptic framing
of EU activities’ and what are labelled as
‘denialisms and conspiracy theories’ related to
EU policy positions on issues like climate change
and Covid-19. We highlight how this provides
academic justification to the EU’s increasingly
pervasive online censorship framework,
exemplified by the bloc’s adoption, in 2022,
of the digital Services act (dSa), which aims
at secretly controlling the online narrative.
Report overview
The Jean Monnet Programme, launched in 1989 and now part of Erasmus+,
was originally framed as an initiative to promote excellence in teaching
and research on European integration. It has since evolved into a powerful
instrument for embedding the EU’s political priorities and integrationist
agenda within academia and society at large.
Scope and reach
• The Jean Monnet Programme channels around €25 million per year
to universities and research institutes worldwide through professorial
chairs, modules, centres of excellence and designated institutions.
• Activities extend beyond classrooms into media, civil society and
policymaking circles.
• Jean Monnet activities are spread across more than 70 countries,
involving over 1,500 professors and reaching around 500,000
students annually.
Ideological alignment
• Many funded projects explicitly aim to ‘promote EU integration’,
‘foster European identity’, ‘enforce EU values’, ‘challenge the rise
of euroscepticism and of populist, extreme-right parties’, ‘reverse
de-Europeanisation dynamics in the EU and beyond’ and ‘counter
anti-EU disinformation and propaganda’.
• These are clearly designed to shape students’ perceptions of the
EU and to amplify pro-EU narratives, by embedding them in all the
fields of social sciences: history, law, political science, economy, etc.
• Jean Monnet activities are structurally aligned with the EU’s strategic
prioritises – from the Green Deal and ‘countering disinformation’
to rule-of-law initiatives and global governance.
• Overall, the programme transforms academic research – which should
be open-ended, free from political influence and ultimately aimed
at advancing knowledge and understanding – into advocacy research,
which begins from a value position (‘the EU is beneficial’) and aims
to produce ‘evidence’ in support for it.
Erosion of academic freedom
• Funding structures incentivise conformity with EU priorities,
discourage critical perspectives, and promote research with
predetermined political outcomes – that is, advocacy research.
• This undermines the Humboldtian principles of academic autonomy
and the pursuit of knowledge free from political interference.
Top-tier actors
• Jean Monnet centres of excellence and Jean Monnet designated
institutions are the central hubs of the EU’s academic propaganda
branch. They are formally required to maintain ‘continuous and
frequent alignment’ of their teaching and research with EU policy
priorities and to promote European identity.
• The seven designated institutions, such as the European University
Institute and the College of Europe, work closely with EU institutions
and receive substantial funding.
From the classroom to society at large
• Jean Monnet activities aren’t aimed at promoting the EU’s policies and
goals just within education, but also among society at large. Recipients
of Jean Monnet funding grants aren’t just expected to produce research
that aligns with the EU’s normative and geopolitical agenda, but also
to act as outreach agents – organising public events, engaging with
the media, NGOs and other civil-society organisations, and spreading
the content of their ‘research’ to the public. This is another trademark
of advocacy research, as opposed to academic research.
• This may be described as a form of ‘propaganda by proxy’, where
research is funded and shaped according to EU priorities, which then
produces EU-approved narratives that are subsequently disseminated
to the mainstream through conferences, media engagement and
outreach activities.
Integration into a wider propaganda network
• These academic entities form part of a larger EU-NGO-media-
academia complex, in which each sector amplifies and legitimises
the other’s narratives.
• Partnerships with media and civil society on initiatives like the
‘anti-disinformation’ European Digital Media Observatory blur
the lines between research, advocacy and institutional propaganda.
Public diplomacy
• The EU’s enlisting of academic institutions for political goals isn’t
limited to the Union itself. The Jean Monnet Programme today operates
in over 70 countries, where is it part and parcel of the EU’s broader
public diplomacy or soft-power efforts, shaping how the EU is perceived
internationally and promoting the bloc’s geopolitical interests.
• The programme’s foreign operations tend to focus on countries that
are pivotal to the EU’s geopolitical strategy: in recent years, for example,
hundreds of Jean Monnet projects have been implemented in Ukraine,
many explicitly aimed at furthering Ukraine’s integration into the EU
and the Euro-Atlantic bloc in general.
• The Jean Monnet Programme is also used to advance EU enlargement
by pre-aligning the national legal, regulatory and educational systems
of prospective member states with EU standards.
Key finding
• The Jean Monnet Programme, far from being just an educational
initiative, is explicitly structured, at all levels, as an academic tool
aimed at projecting and promoting the EU’s policy preferences –
by embedding pro-EU content in curricula, shaping discourse
around European integration and extending the EU’s ideological
reach far beyond its borders.
Policy recommendation
Safeguarding academic integrity requires ending politically driven
funding mechanisms, restoring institutional independence and
reaffirming the Humboldtian model as the cornerstone of higher
education, for example by:
• De-politicising research funding
• Respecting academic freedom and authority
• Allocating grants based on scientific and intellectual merit
• Encouraging diversity of views and critical inquiry
• Rejecting the use of academia as a tool of propaganda
• Promoting transparency and accountability in EU-academic relations
Introduction
The Jean Monnet Programme was launched by the European Commission
in 1989 to encourage teaching and research on European integration in
universities. Since then, it has evolved into one of the European Union’s most
effective – and least scrutinised – tools for shaping the way Europe is taught,
researched and understood. Under the respectable banner of ‘fostering
excellence in teaching and research on EU matters’, it channels millions
of euros into universities and research institutes, rewarding those that align
their work with Brussels’s political agenda.
What began as an academic initiative has grown into a sprawling network
of professorial chairs, modules, centres of excellence and designated institu-
tions that now function as the EU’s academic outreach arm – embedding
pro-integration narratives across curricula, producing research that mirrors
official priorities and extending influence far beyond campus walls into media,
civil society and policymaking circles.
This paper examines how the programme operates, the ideological
assumptions built into its funding mechanisms, and its role in what can
be described as the EU-NGO-media-academia complex – a self-reinforcing
ecosystem that blurs the line between education and political advocacy.
It also explains why this politicisation of higher education represents not
just a distortion of scholarly priorities, but a direct challenge to academic
freedom itself.
1 From exchange to influence:
from Erasmus to Erasmus+
In 1987, the EU launched the Erasmus Programme. It was presented as
a pioneering initiative aimed at promoting cross-border mobility in higher
education by allowing students to spend a semester or year studying in
another European country. But the ambitions behind the project went far
deeper: from its very inception, Erasmus was conceived as a tool to foster
a shared European identity, helping to bind together what was then still
the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor to the EU.
The programme was launched in the political context of the Single
European Act (1986) and the preparations for the Maastricht Treaty (1992).
Given the top-down nature of the European integration project, and the
enduring strength of citizens’ attachments to their nation-states, European
leaders recognised the need to deliberately cultivate a post-national
‘European identity’ as a means of generating consensus for the supranational
political project they had in mind.
Erasmus was designed to achieve this through mobility. By enabling
students to spend some time studying abroad, the programme deliberately
took young people out of their national environments, immersing them in
different cultures, languages and academic traditions. The idea was that
participants would build cross-national friendships and networks, forming
ties that would outlast their exchange period. This lived experience of
European diversity was intended to weaken narrow national identifications
and nurture a generation that felt equally European in identity and outlook.
EU officials were remarkably candid about this intention. The
programme would ‘help to reinforce the spirit of European identity’,
the European Council noted at the time,i(1) while the European Commission
described it as ‘an essential element in developing the awareness of a
Community identity, thus fostering the implementation of the internal
market’. (2) The programme was explicitly linked to the idea of ‘European
consciousness’: if young people lived and learned together across borders,
it was thought that they would naturally develop a stronger attachment to
the European project.
The main driving force behind the creation of the Erasmus Programme
was Jacques Delors, the highly influential president of the European
Commission between 1985 and 1995, who gave the process of European
supranational integration a momentum lacking in the preceding decade.
Years later, he recalled having to overcome strong political resistance from
national governments in order to push the programme through. ‘Member
states were deeply suspicious – if not openly hostile – towards the idea of
European institutions intervening in university affairs’, he recounted.(3)
As we will see, those concerns were far from unfounded. After all,
one may very well describe the Erasmus Programme as a form of soft social
engineering, albeit a relatively benign one – at least in its original incarnation.
After all, being allowed to spend some time studying abroad doesn’t sound
particularly nefarious. Indeed, by the early 2000s, Erasmus had become a
symbol of the EU’s success: popular, visible and widely supported. By then,
more than one million students had already taken part in Erasmus exchanges.
As to whether the programme had actually fostered a sense of European
identity, however, the results were mixed.(4) Some studies concluded that
Erasmus had indeed strengthened the participants’ European identity,
calling this the ‘Erasmus effect’. Others thought it had not and still others
argued that it depended on where the students came from.
This is probably why, beginning in the 2010s – particularly in light of
the financial crisis and the subsequent decline in public confidence in the
European project and rise of anti-establishment populist parties across
member states – the decision was made to expand the Erasmus Programme
far beyond its original mission, and to significantly bolster its role as a vector
for political and ideological consolidation. This was part of a wider ideological
offensive targeting both civil society and the media, areas that the author
has examined in detail in previous reports.(5)
The pivotal transformation came in 2014 with the launch of Erasmus+,
which consolidated several EU programmes in education, training, youth
and sport under one umbrella. The programme now included not just
university exchanges, but also school and vocational education, adult learning,
youth and volunteer activities, policy reform and capacity building, and
international cooperation with non-EU countries. The budget also expanded
dramatically – from €2.7 billion over the 2007–2013 period to €14.7 billion for
2014–2020.(6) Since then, the scope of Erasmus+ has kept expanding, alongside
its budget, which rose to rose to over €26 billion for the 2021–2027 cycle.(7)
With this expansion came a strategic shift: Erasmus was now no longer
just about mobility and soft identity socialisation, but about active mobilisa-
tion – of values, policies and political alignment. As a result, what began in
1987 as a modest student-exchange programme aimed at fostering cross-
border mobility has evolved into one of the European Union’s most powerful
instruments of soft power, embracing a broad agenda of policy alignment,
strategic influence and normative promotion. At the heart of this shift lies
the Jean Monnet Programme
2 The evolution of the Jean Monnet Programme
The Jean Monnet Programme was launched by the European Commission
in 1989 to encourage teaching and research on European integration in
universities. Named after Jean Monnet – one of the founding architects
of the European project – the programme initially focused on supporting
law, economics and political science departments within the European
Economic Community (EEC). In a very basic sense, one might say that,
through the programme, the EEC sought to institutionalise the study of its
own development and governance across higher-education systems in
Europe – chiefly through the establishment of Jean Monnet chairs (professor-
ships in EU studies), modules (EU-related courses) and centres of excellence
(focal points of competence and knowledge on EU subjects).
But, just like Erasmus, the Jean Monnet Programme was conceived
as far more than just an academic initiative. Its purpose was not merely to
study European integration but to ‘promote’ it, as the European Commission
itself openly acknowledges.(8) In other words, it was an explicitly political
project designed to enlist academic institutions in the service of European
integration.
During the 1990s and 2000s, the programme expanded geographically
and structurally. It was opened to non-EU countries, particularly candidate
states and EU neighbours, as part of the EU’s broader pre-accession and
neighbourhood strategies. At the same time, the programme developed
more sophisticated funding lines, supporting not only professors and
courses, but also research networks, conferences and academic publications.
The incorporation into Erasmus+, in 2014, marked a turning point.
By then, the Jean Monnet Programme had become a familiar presence
in EU-affiliated academic circles. But under the new framework, the
programme was expanded even further – no longer limited to academia,
but extended to policy debates, civil-society engagement and even teacher
training. The geographical reach expanded dramatically as well. Today,
Jean Monnet chairs and modules operate in over 70 countries, including
the United States, India, Brazil, China and many others.
Under Erasmus+, the Jean Monnet Programme comprises the following
actions and activities (these may slightly change from one funding call
to another):
Jean Monnet Action in the field of higher education
This action, according to the European Commission, ‘supports higher-
education institutions inside and outside Europe in promoting teaching
and research on European integration and promoting policy debate and
exchanges involving the academic world and policymakers on Union policy
priorities’.(9) The following sub-actions are supported:
• Jean Monnet chairs: longer teaching posts with a specialisation in
EU studies for individual university professors
• Jean Monnet modules: short teaching programmes in one or more
discipline of EU studies
• Jean Monnet centres of excellence: focal points gathering knowledge
of experts in various disciplines of European studies, as well as
developing transnational activities and structural links with academic
institutions in other countries
• Jean Monnet designated institutions: this action supports institutions
that ‘play a crucial role in pursuing an aim of European interest and
European integration’.(10)
• Jean Monnet action in other fields of education and training: this action
‘promotes knowledge on the European Union in schools … in the EU
member states and third countries associated with the programme’.(11)
The following sub-actions are supported:
— Teacher training: training courses on EU subjects to teachers
— Learning EU initiative: training activities that aim to ‘promote
better understanding of the EU, in general education and
vocational training’.(12)
— Jean Monnet policy debate activities: these are mainly supported
through the Jean Monnet Networks in Higher Education and in
other fields of education. Their aim is to foster the establishment of
international networks in the area of EU studies to ‘build knowledge
and promote the European integration process around the world’.(13)
Since their creation, around 9,000 university teachers and more than 1,000
universities in around 100 countries have received financial support for nearly
7,000 actions.(14) The Jean Monnet Programme under Erasmus+ currently
includes approximately:
• 875 Jean Monnet chairs
• 1,000 Jean Monnet modules
• 160 Jean Monnet centres of excellence
• Seven designated institutions
These are spread across 72 countries, involving over 1,500 professors and
reaching around 500,000 students annually.(15) In 2025, the Jean Monnet
Programme was allocated a total indicative budget of €23.5 million,(16) divided
as follows:
• Funding for modules, chairs and centres of excellence: €12.3 million
• Funding for teacher training and Learning EU initiatives: €7 million
• Funding for policy debates: €4 million
More specifically, each Jean Monnet chair is eligible for a lump-sum
grant of up to €60,000 for a three-year period; modules (short courses)
are eligible for up to €35,000 per grant; and centres of excellence can receive
up to €100,000. Overall, since the integration of the Jean Monnet Programme
into Erasmus+, in 2014, total spending can be estimated at around
€220–275million (around €20–25 million annually), or around a quarter
of a billion euros.
The various Jean Monnet actions are analysed in detail below.
However, even from a cursory glance, it is evident that the Jean Monnet
Programme is much more than just an initiative to promote excellence
in teaching and research on European integration, as is often claimed.
Rather, it is a programme explicitly designed to influence academic curricula,
align educational content with the EU’s political agenda and promote
Brussels’s legitimacy.
3 Embedding pro-EU narratives
in the classroom – and society
While some of the teaching activities funded through the Jean Monnet
programme could be seen as relatively benign and politically neutral –
focused primarily on providing knowledge of technical subjects such as EU
law or AI regulation, which are increasingly relevant to many professions –
many projects (courses, textbooks, seminars and entire academic modules)
are explicitly normative in nature. In practice, they are designed to shape
students’ perceptions of the EU and to amplify pro-EU narratives, by
embedding them in all the fields of social sciences: history, law, political
science, economy, etc.
Jean Monnet-funded courses and initiatives often echo EU policy
priorities – from the Green Deal and disinformation to migration and foreign
policy – effectively promoting the EU’s normative positions within academic
and civil-society circles. In many cases, these projects aren’t even focused
on specific policies, but are simply aimed at championing the EU itself and
the very principle of supranational integration – that is, the need to move
towards post-national societies. In this sense, they are explicitly aligned with
the Commission’s vision of deeper European integration. The aim is clear:
to embed pro-EU narratives in the classroom. It’s interesting to note that EU
institutions are very candid about this. As a Commission report summarising
the results of a Jean Monnet cluster meeting succinctly put it, the programme
is an instrument to promote ‘European citizenship and integration’.(17)
The aforementioned Commission report acknowledges that ‘This type
of discourse is often branded as EU propaganda’, but nonetheless argues that,
given the existence of ‘a number of strong voices against the EU, systemati-
cally working to destroy the EU legacy’, the Jean Monnet Programme should
‘play an instrumental role’ to ‘counterbalance effectively’ these narratives.(18)
This is evident in the way these educational projects are presented. Some
of the recurrent stated aims include strengthening ‘citizens’ European identity
and their sense of belonging to the EU’,(19) ‘fostering European identity among
their students or training participants’,(20) challenging ‘the rise of euroscepti-
cism and of populist, extreme-right parties’,(21) to ‘reverse de-Europeanisation
dynamics in the EU and beyond’,(22)‘promoting EU values’,(23) counter the way
‘history is once more being successfully exploited by populist movements
to exalt one’s own nation and feelings of cultural superiority and to boost
Euroscepticism’,(24) etc. (Detailed examples are presented below.)
This thematic alignment is not incidental. Funding calls under the Jean
Monnet Programme now explicitly encourage the ‘alignment of study and
training programmes or capacity-building activities with EU and European
Commission’s policy agenda and priorities’,(25) creating a system where
applicants must align with EU policies to secure support – while critical
or alternative views on the EU and its policies have little to no chance of
receiving funding. As Georges Berthu, a former French senior civil servant,
put it: ‘Control by the European Commission takes the form of a scientific
committee carefully selected by the Commission, which validates the
attribution of the “Jean Monnet” labels and grants subsidies only to the
teachers who present sufficient political guarantees on the matter.’(26)
This system of ideological alignment within academia becomes even
more deeply entrenched in the case of the Jean Monnet centres of excellence
and, particularly, its designated institutions, which are explicitly expected
to embed pro-EU narratives across all EU-related areas of teaching.
This inevitably exerts a corrupting and distorting influence on the academic
system as a whole, fostering ideological conformity and skewing both
curricula and research towards euro-federalist or pro-integration viewpoints
– at the expense of pluralism and critical voices within academia. What
emerges is not a commitment to genuine education, but rather a form
of ideological indoctrination, in which universities are transformed into
vehicles of institutional propaganda.
In this context, students are no longer regarded as independent minds
to be trained in critical thinking about the world – which should include the
EU itself – but as subjects to be moulded into ‘right-thinking’ citizens aligned
with the official orthodoxy. One project proudly boasted that its goal was
to ‘instill the advantages and responsibilities of European citizenship’ in
students.(27) Indeed, the Commission report cited above goes as far as saying
that the Jean Monnet Programme should reconcile the ‘paradox of education
as necessary for democracy vs education as social engineering’.(28)
But the activities of the Jean Monnet Programme are by no means
limited to the classroom. These aren’t aimed at promoting the EU’s policies
and goals just within education, but also among society at large. Indeed,
recipients of Jean Monnet funding grants aren’t just expected to produce
research that aligns with the EU’s normative and geopolitical agenda, but also
to act as outreach agents – organising public events, engaging with the media,
NGOs and other civil-society organisations, and spreading the content of
their ‘research’ to the public. This is often a prerequisite for accessing funding,
as explained below
Indeed, the Commission report notes that Jean Monnet academics
and universities should ‘contribute to the public debate’ and play a key role
in shaping public opinion, by engaging with the media at all levels –
local, regional and national – and developing communication strategies to
reach a broader public. In particular, it suggests ‘recruiting’ journalists due
to their crucial role in ‘tendency setting’ and shaping public debate, which is
described as being ‘most often against the EU’. The strategy also encourages
cooperation between Jean Monnet chairs and businesses, think tanks and
political actors, promoting cross-sectoral collaboration. Jean Monnet centres
of excellence are expected to act as ‘multipliers’ within institutions, helping
to ‘shape favourably the public debate about the EU’ and promote outreach
to diverse audiences.
Jean Monnet research outcomes should be presented at ‘top-level
political forums and meetings’, leveraging the influence of institutions.
The programme is also framed as a tool for reshaping public perception on
sensitive topics, such as immigration. For example, the report notes that
Jean Monnet activities should ‘overcome the stereotypes on the refugees’
by fostering real encounters between society and immigrants, thereby
‘re-educating the perception of immigrants as people and not as statistics’,
further arguing that in this framework ‘teaching students about EU-
scepticism is not sufficient’; hence ‘studies on multiculturalism should
be stimulated within Jean Monnet activities’. It concludes by noting that
participants in the seminar ‘confirmed that Jean Monnet Community
can be seen as a lobby for the spread of European values’.(29)
This dynamic clearly reveals the existence of a pipeline: research
is funded and shaped according to EU priorities, which then produces
EU-approved narratives that are subsequently disseminated to the main–
stream through conferences, media engagement and outreach activities.
In other words, the Jean Monnet Programme functions as another form of
‘propaganda by proxy’, a concept the author previously applied in the context
of NGO funding. Just as the Commission strategically channels resources to
NGOs that align with its priorities in order to create a network of
‘independent’ actors that legitimise and promote its policies, it deploys
the same strategy in academia.
Universities, academics and research centres funded through the
Jean Monnet Programme are incentivised to amplify EU narratives while
appearing to do so autonomously, thus conferring an aura of neutrality
on the messages they propagate. This demonstrates how the EU operates
a multi-layered propaganda infrastructure spanning civil society, academia
and the media, each reinforcing and legitimising the other.
Recipients of Jean Monnet funding, and its chairs in particular, are
effectively expected to serve as ‘ambassadors’ for the EU.(30) Indeed, many
of them maintain a high public profile, frequently publishing op-eds
and giving media interviews. During the Brexit campaign, for example,
pro-Brexit campaigners accused the BBC of frequently relying on Jean
Monnet professors as supposedly impartial speakers on the EU, despite
the fact that they were ‘being paid by the EU to promote EU integration’.(31)
Moreover, the Commission – and in many cases national governments –
routinely rely on the outputs of Commission-funded academic studies as
evidence of support for their own agendas. As the Commission report put
it, Jean Monnet academics specialised in different policy fields should
‘be at the disposal of the European Union legislative and consultative
bodies, notably the European Commission, the European Parliament
and the Committee of the Regions’, in order to give a ‘sense of direction’
to the European Commission and act as ‘knowledge providers’ at the
political level.(32) This dynamic represents yet another clear parallel with
the way NGO funding operates, where legislators and policymakers cite
the advocacy and reports of EU-funded NGOs as independent validation
of their policies.
This creates a self-reinforcing feedback loop: research is funded in line
with EU priorities, the results naturally reflect those priorities and those same
results are then presented as impartial confirmation of the validity of EU
policies. As with NGO funding, the veneer of independence masks a circular
system in which the institutions effectively legitimise themselves through the
voices they finance.
Both these dynamics – propaganda by proxy and self-validating research
– are particularly evident in the case the Jean Monnet designated institutions,
which enjoy what can only be described as a structural relationship with the
EU’s institutions. These may be considered the central hubs of the EU’s
academic propaganda branch, participating as academic partners in
numerous EU-funded projects involving both the media and civil society.
The European University Institute (EUI) in Florence – through its School
of Transnational Governance, which ‘trains current and future leaders in
the methods, skills and theory of governance beyond the state’ – is a perfect
case in point.(33)
Among the numerous projects the institute is involved in, we find the
European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), an initiative established by
the European Commission, to the tune of almost €30 million, to ‘fight against
disinformation across Europe’ by bringing together fact-checkers, academic
researchers, media organisations and news agencies, many of which are
involved in several other media partnerships with the EU;(34) and Democratic
Odyssey, an initiative aiming to ‘embed citizen participation and deliberation
in the multi-layered ecosystem of representative democracy in the EU’,
involving dozens of pro-EU (and EU-funded) NGOs.(35)
This illustrates just how deeply Jean Monnet designated institutions,
like the EUI, are embedded within the Brussels machinery, providing both
ideological and academic support for the EU’s policies and agendas.
No wonder The Economist ironically described the EUI as ‘Europe’s
Hogwarts’.(36) In fact, what the author has previously described as the
EU-NGO and EU-media propaganda complexes – referring to the vast
sums of funding channelled by the EU into ‘civil society’ and the media to
promote its narratives – would perhaps be more accurately understood as
interlocking components of a single, sprawling EU-NGO-media-academia
complex that operates seamlessly across multiple areas of the infosphere,
with each component supporting and legitimising the others in a mutually
reinforcing cycle.
It’s worth noting that the EU’s enlisting of academic institutions for
political goals is by no means limited to the Union itself. As noted, the
Jean Monnet Programme today operates in over 70 countries, where it is
part and parcel of the EU’s broader public diplomacy or soft-power efforts,
shaping how the EU is perceived internationally and promoting the bloc’s
geopolitical interests. This is openly acknowledged by the European
Commission itself, which claims: ‘The Jean Monnet actions also strive to
function as a vector of public diplomacy towards third countries, promoting
EU values and enhancing the visibility of what the European Union stands
for and what it intends to achieve.’(37) This is a candid admission of the
programme’s promotional aims.
This means that instead of engaging foreign publics directly, the EU
relies on the Jean Monnet Programme to communicate the EU through
professors in target countries. In this process, the messages of EU public
diplomacy travel from the EU to its academic proxies and then from the
proxies to its end recipients, a process that has been described as ‘public
diplomacy by proxy’.(38) No wonder that many of the programme’s foreign
projects – including chairs and centres of excellence – are framed in
terms of ‘strengthening the role of the EU in the world’.
As one might expect, the programme’s foreign operations tend to focus
on countries that are pivotal to the EU’s geopolitical strategy. It is therefore
hardly surprising that, in recent years, hundreds of Jean Monnet projects
have been implemented in Ukraine, many explicitly aimed at ‘integrating
Ukrainian society into the European axiological framework’, as one project
candidly describes it.(39) This represents yet another blatant corruption of
academia, where professors are effectively transformed into vehicles of
institutional messaging and (geo)political instrumentalisation. Rather
than operating as independent scholars fostering critical inquiry, they are
incentivised to align their teaching and outreach with the EU’s priorities,
often under the guise of neutrality.
Overall, it is clear that the Jean Monnet Programme is explicitly
structured, at all levels, as an academic tool aimed at projecting and
promoting the EU’s policy preferences – by embedding pro-EU content
in curricula, shaping discourse around European integration and extending
the EU’s ideological reach far beyond its borders. Effectively, the programme
transforms academic research – which should be open-ended, free from
political influence and ultimately aimed at advancing knowledge and under-
standing – into advocacy research, which begins from a value position
(‘the EU is beneficial’) and aims to produce ‘evidence’ in support for it, which
is then spread to policymakers, journalists, activists and the general public
in order to promote specific policies and agendas. As such, it is a striking
example of how Erasmus+ has evolved into a tool of ideological alignment –
and of the corruptive effects that politics and money can have on academia.
It’s worth noting that the Jean Monnet Programme represents a small
portion of the overall money allocated by the EU to universities. The lion’s
share of the funding comes from the Horizon Programme, the EU’s flagship
funding programme for research, with a budget of around €95.5 billion for
the 2021–2027 cycle.(40) Though an analysis of Horizon is beyond the scope
of this report, it should be noted that, in many respects, Horizon also suffers
from the same biases as the Jean Monnet Programme: by conditioning grants
on alignment with EU strategies, it too shapes research agendas and embeds
EU priorities in scientific and technological development – mirroring how
Erasmus+ and Jean Monnet actions do the same in education and academia.
In the following section, the various Jean Monnet actions and projects
are examined in greater detail.
4 Jean Monnet chairs: professorships
in European integration
As noted, since its launch in 1989, the Jean Monnet Programme has played
a key role in embedding EU studies, and pro-EU narratives, within academia
and society at large. At the centre of this initiative are the Jean Monnet
chairs – professorships awarded to university academics who specialise
in topics related to the EU. Although framed as a way to promote excellence
in teaching and research, the programme’s underlying purpose is openly
normative: to promote the values, policies and priorities of the European
Union through the academic sphere.
A Jean Monnet chair is a three-year teaching and research position
awarded to a single named professor with recognised expertise in European
Union studies. The chairholder, who is eligible for a lump-sum grant of
up to €60,000, must be a permanent member of staff at a higher-education
institution and is required to deliver a minimum of 90 teaching hours
per academic year on EU-related topics. The programme supports the
development of courses, public lectures, publications, student supervision
and outreach activities. Chairs are expected not just to teach but also to
actively promote the EU within and beyond the university. Hosts range
from major EU integration hubs like the College of Europe to national
universities and partner-country institutions worldwide.
Since the programme’s creation, more than 1,500 chairs have been
granted to over 1,300 professors in 700 universities in more than 70
countries.(41) Between 1990 and 2022, the countries that were awarded
the most chairs were Spain (203, 13 per cent), Italy (182, 11.5 per cent),
France (139, nine per cent), the United Kingdom (133, 8.5 per cent)
and Germany (110, seven per cent).(42)
The universities with the most chairs awarded were
Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain) 25
Alma Mater Studiorum – Università di Bologna (Italy) 16
Università degli Studi di Milano (Italy) 15
Universidad de Valencia (Spain) 14
University of Maastricht (Netherlands) 11
Université de Strasbourg (France) 11
University College Dublin (Ireland) 11
Universiteit Leiden (Netherlands) 10
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Spain) 10
Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences (Greece) 10
Università degli Studi di Genova (Italy) 10
Charles University (Czech Republic) 9
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (Spain) 9
Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands) 8
Universidad Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain) 8
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (Greece) 8
Universidad de Granada (Spain) 8
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Netherlands) 8
Università degli Studi di Siena (Italy) 8
Università degli Studi di Firenze (Italy) 8
Università degli Studi di Trento (Italy) 8
Sapienza Università di Roma (Italy) 8
Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Spain) 8
There are currently over 875 Jean Monnet chairs active worldwide, hosted
by universities in both EU and non-EU countries.(43) Topics covered by
Jean Monnet chairs span a wide range of EU-relevant areas, including:
• EU law and fundamental rights
• European political economy
• Foreign and security policy
• Climate action and digital regulation
• Democratic values, identity and citizenship
A 2022 report noted that the most popular chair subjects among applicants
were EU Legal Studies (427 chairs, 30 per cent), EU Political and Administra-
tive Studies (250, 18 per cent) and EU Economic Studies (209, 15 per cent).(44)
It was observed that, until 2006, the traditional Jean Monnet subjects had
a greater presence: EU Legal Studies, EU Political and Administrative Studies,
EU Economic Studies, EU Interdisciplinary Studies and EU Historical
Studies. Since then, new subjects have emerged, gaining more prominence,
including STEM subjects related to EU strategies.
Chairholders are also encouraged to adopt interdisciplinary approaches
that tie EU studies to fields such as public policy, technology, environmental
studies and social cohesion. In recent years, this thematic scope has increas-
ingly mirrored the EU’s strategic priorities – from the Green Deal and
digital transition to rule-of-law initiatives and global governance. Crucially,
as noted above, Jean Monnet chairs are not confined to academic instruction.
Professors are expected to engage in research and publication aligned
with EU policy objectives, policy outreach (through seminars, workshops
and conferences, media engagement and civil-society collaboration) and
curriculum development that integrates EU-focused content into broader
academic programmes.
This often entails ‘lobbying’ European institutions by pushing for policies
that reflect the priorities of Brussels elites, while presenting these efforts as
the work of ostensibly ‘independent’ academic voices. For example, in 2018,
nearly 30 Jean Monnet chairs signed an open letter to EU leaders to express
their ‘profound disappointment and outrage about the EU’s failure to respond
more robustly to recent developments in Hungary’ – namely the Orbán
government’s decision to force the Central European University (CEU),
founded by George Soros, to shift most of its activities abroad.(45)
Chairholders are thus transformed into both educators and informal
ambassadors of the EU and its agenda, responsible for shaping how students –
and by extension, the wider public – understand the European project.
Moreover, in non-EU countries – from India to Brazil, Turkey to China –
the programme is increasingly used as a tool of public diplomacy, exporting
EU narratives abroad under the banner of academic cooperation. While
framed as academic in nature, the chairs often function as part of a broader
communications strategy, embedding pro-EU perspectives in national
and international academic discourse.
The Jean Monnet chair programme is emblematic of the European
Union’s use of education as a strategic instrument. Far from being a neutral
academic initiative, it serves as a key mechanism for advancing the EU’s
political and normative agenda through the university system. While it
undoubtedly supports academic work on European integration, it does
so with a clear expectation: that recipients will not only study the EU,
but also help to promote it. In this sense, the chair system contributes
to the instrumentalisation of academia, transforming universities into
platforms for EU soft power rather than spaces for independent thought,
encouraging ideological conformity and discouraging critical perspectives
on European integration.
This bias becomes apparent when looking at some real-world examples
of Jean Monnet chairs, both the actual chairholders as well as chair projects.
Evidence of bias in (current and former) Jean Monnet chairholders
R. Daniel Kelemen, former Jean Monnet Chair in EU Politics at Rutgers
University (United States)
Kelemen, who has since moved to Georgetown University, has written
frequently about the need for the EU to respond more aggressively
to the rise of ‘autocratic member state governments’ – in other words,
eurosceptic governments in countries like Hungary and (formerly) Poland(46)
– while praising ‘the European Union’s status as a regulatory superpower’.(47)
On X, he frequently posts against the Orbán government.(48)
Laurent Pech, former Jean Monnet Chair of EU Public Law at Middlesex
University (United Kingdom)
Before leaving X for Bluesky in 2024, Pech, who now teaches at UCD
Sutherland School of Law, would frequently write and post about the
‘rise of democratic illiberalism across Europe and the West’(49) – that is,
growing ‘populist’ and eurosceptic sentiment in countries like Romania,
Poland and Hungary.(50)
Joseph H. H. Weiler, Jean Monnet Chair at New York University School
of Law (United States)
In a 2014 essay, Weiler, then president of the European University Institute
in Florence, openly described the goals of his position in ideological terms:
‘Part of our mission as [a] Jean Monnet professor is to disseminate the values
of European integration. The EU Commission think of us openly as intellec-
tual ambassadors of the Union and its values’. He also acknowledged
that defending the EU sometimes conflicts with scholarly impartiality:
‘Most of us become Jean Monnet professors because, in complicated ways,
we believe in European integration’, he wrote. ‘It is not only a professional
commitment to many of us, but also a kind of credo; for example, when
the European Union is criticised, our instinct is to defend it.’(51)
Michael Dougan, Jean Monnet Chair in EU Law at the University
of Liverpool (United Kingdom)
Dougan gained notoriety during the Brexit debate for his strongly pro-EU
commentary. In a widely shared lecture video, he harshly criticised Leave
campaign arguments. He described them as ‘degenerat[ing] into dishonesty
on an industrial scale’.(52) Moreover, Dougan leveraged his expertise in EU
law to provide evidence in UK parliamentary hearings, further aligning his
public persona with pro-EU advocacy.
Evidence of bias in Jean Monnet chair projects(53)
Chair in Democratic and Effective Governance led by Eva Heidbreder
at Otto von Guericke University Magdeburg (Germany)(54)
The chair rather ominously aims to address ‘how key EU policies can be
delivered against the background of rising contestation, dissent and active
anti-EU positioning … [by] shifting emphasis from participatory governance
to policy delivery in the digital and green transformation’.
The description reflects a clear anti-democratic bias by framing public
dissent and political contestation as obstacles to be overcome, rather than
legitimate components of democratic debate. The shift from ‘participatory
governance’ to a focus on ‘policy delivery’ suggests a technocratic approach
that sidelines citizen involvement in favour of top-down implementation –
especially troubling given the sweeping scope of the digital and green
transformations.
Chair in ‘Judges vs Illiberalism: Legal Mobilization for the Rule of Law’,
led by Pola Cebulak, assistant professor at the Transnational Legal Studies
Department at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (Netherlands)(55)
The chair ‘fosters teaching and research on the potential of using law as a
tool to put a break [sic] on illiberal tendencies in Europe’ – a clear reference
to the EU’s growing recourse to rule-of-law arguments in recent years to
counter eurosceptic governments in Poland and Hungary. It argues that
‘courts can be an important arena for such challenges’ and focuses on ‘how
judges can become institutional actors that help transform the society’.
Cebulak frequently posts or organises debates about the threat of
‘right-wing populists’(56) and ‘Russian interference’(57) to democracy.
Chair in ‘Bridging Pathways of EU Accession – Perspectives from Romania,
Ukraine, and the Republic of Moldova’, led by Iordan Gheorghe Bărbulescu,
professor at the National School of Political and Administrative Studies
(Romania)(58)
The chair aims to ‘contribute to strengthening the role of the EU in the
world’: ‘For the students, the chair will bring an important contribution
to their formation as future experts and will bring the EU closer to them.
They will not only understand the process of accession but they will be
trained to become multipliers of that knowledge.’
Chair in ‘Crises and Solutions in the European Union’, led by Krisztina
Arató, professor at Eötvös Loránd University (Hungary)(59)
The chair ‘aims to pass on science-based information on the EU and
apply up-to-date teaching methods to address … the presence of extreme
eurosceptic framing of EU activities by the majority of media outlets’.
Chair in ‘Contesting the Past of the EU: The Uses of History in
(De-)Legitimating Narratives’, led by Gabriele D’Ottavio, associate
professor of Modern History at the Department of Sociology and
Social Research of the University of Trento (Italy)(60)
The chair ‘engages with the pressing need to build a European historical
consciousness’ as a response to the fact that ‘history is once more being
successfully exploited by populist movements to exalt one’s own nation
and feelings of cultural superiority and to boost euroscepticism’.
Chair in ‘EU Fundamental Values in the Online Digital Environment’,
led by Raffaele Torino, professor of Comparative Law at Università Roma
Tre (Italy)(61)
The chair argues that ‘the fundamental values of the European Union …
are an essential element of the European integration process and an indis-
pensable component of its fair implementation, to be protected from new
challenges and implemented in all areas (public, private) and activities
(work, social life)’. In this context, it proposes to ‘disseminate knowledge
about the new online challenges (and possible protections) to fundamental
EU values at every political and social level’, arguing: ‘It is necessary to
thoroughly study how the multilevel European legal system and that of
the member states recognise, implement and enforce these EU core values,
considering the specificities of the online digital context.’
It’s hard not to see this chair as providing an academic justification to
the EU’s increasingly pervasive online censorship framework, exemplified
by the bloc’s adoption, in 2022, of the Digital Services Act (DSA) – the
most sweeping internet regulation ever implemented in Europe, obliging
platforms to rapidly remove content deemed illegal by EU authorities
or face fines of up to six per cent of their global annual revenue. Marketed
as a way to ‘make the internet safer’,(62) its aim is quite clearly that of secretly
controlling the online narrative, by compelling platforms to police online
speech according to broad, politically charged definitions of ‘harm’ and
‘disinformation’.
Chair in ‘European Union for Peace, Prosperity and Security’, led by
Guranda Chelidze, professor at the Caucasus University (Georgia)(63)
The chair ‘emphasises the importance of the EU’s role worldwide’ by
‘creating new knowledge about the EU against background of current
changes in world and Europe, to strengthen understanding of role of the
EU for Georgia’. This is a clear example of how the EU uses its chairs in
non-EU countries such as Georgia to promote its geopolitical interests –
in this case, EU enlargement.
These examples demonstrate that the work of Jean Monnet chairs goes
well beyond neutral academic analysis. Instead, their activities actively
reinforce EU integration narratives in public and institutional fora.
Admittedly, some chairs do also, on occasion, criticise the EU. Alberto
Alemanno, Chair in EU Law and Risk Regulation at HEC Paris, is one
example of a Jean Monnet professor who has often criticised the EU’s
democratic deficit.(64) But the emphasis of such criticisms is always on
‘improving’ the EU, generally through greater integration, rather than
questioning its foundational structure.
5 The Jean Monnet propaganda toolbox
Modules, policy debates and training activities
Jean Monnet chairs are by no means the only tools through which the EU
embeds its narratives and agendas into academic curricula. As noted above,
it also does so through other kinds of actions, including teaching modules
(shorter EU-related courses), policy debates and training activities. An
analysis of such projects reveals an ideological bias as pervasive as that found
in the chairs programme. In this section, several illustrative examples will
be provided.
Module: ‘EU against Disinformation through Investment in Information
and Communication’(65)
Institute: Università degli Studi di Teramo (Italy)
This module ‘aims at establishing in-depth knowledge and relevant skills
on the connection between the EU action against disinformation and
sustainable investments’ as a response to ‘military propaganda, misinforma-
tion in relation to political elections, infodemia and climate change denial’.
The module’s description reads less like a coherent academic proposal and
more like a string of fashionable Brussels policy buzzwords stitched together
to tick funding boxes. The supposed connection between EU action against
disinformation and sustainable investments is never explained, making
the module’s intellectual foundation appear tenuous at best. Instead,
disparate issues – military propaganda, election misinformation, ‘infodemia’
and climate change denial – are lumped together under a vaguely defined
umbrella, as if their mere inclusion would demonstrate relevance to
EU priorities. This is a classic example of grant-speak: aligning with multiple
high-profile EU agendas (digital policy, climate action, democracy defence)
without providing a clear causal or conceptual link between them. The
result is less an academic inquiry than a strategic funding pitch, reflecting
how universities often tailor project descriptions to Brussels’s current
lexicon in order to secure Jean Monnet or related EU funding.
Module: ‘Rule of Law as a core standard to access the EU – the role of
the media in the EU enlargement process’(66)
Institute: Sapienza Università di Roma (Italy)
This module proposes to ‘investigate the threats posed by the spreading
of disinformation, fake news and illiberal thoughts (particularly, with the
use of digital technologies and of social media) around and inside the EU,
as a tool interfering with the Rule of Law and undermining the integration
process in candidate countries’. Furthermore, it aims to ‘involve not only
the academia, but also NGOs, journalists, civil servants, practitioners and
civil society at large in raising awareness and sound information of EU
values in the enlargement process’.
This module’s bias is built into its framing, which treats ‘illiberal
thoughts’ as inherently illegitimate and links them directly to threats against
the EU’s integration agenda. By positioning disinformation and dissent
in the same category, it pre-defines the EU’s political objectives as the
standard of legitimacy. The outreach plan illustrates how academia and
civil society often operate symbiotically in such projects, with universities
partnering with NGOs, journalists and officials to circulate and legitimise
the same pro-integration narratives under the banner of ‘raising awareness’
of EU values.
Module: ‘Democracy For You in the EU’67
Institute: Universidade de Coimbra (Portugal)
The objective of this module is ‘to study, debate and understand the threats
to democracy in the EU, and to sustain proposals to face the problem and
strengthen democracy, delivering innovative scientific knowledge to the
academic community, to policymakers and civil society. It addresses low
levels of knowledge about the EU political system and awareness of its
importance in citizen’s life, promoting civic engagement and participation
in political and democratic processes.’
This module’s bias is evident in its underlying assumption that ‘threats
to democracy’ within the EU stem primarily from citizens’ insufficient
understanding or appreciation of the Union, rather than from any structural
flaws or democratic deficits within the EU itself. By framing the problem
as one of public ignorance and by omitting any consideration of the EU as
a potential source of democratic erosion, it implicitly equates strengthening
democracy with strengthening support for the EU. The subtext is that rising
euroscepticism is a symptom of misinformation or disengagement, to be
remedied through greater promotion of the EU’s supposed benefits –
thereby aligning academic inquiry with institutional self-justification.
Module: ‘Understanding European Identity Through Reflexion
on European Citizenship’68
Institute: Université Savoie-Mont-Blanc (France)
The premise of this module is that by ‘increasing awareness and knowledge
in the EU citizenship and identity will allow to foster the democratic
dimension of the EU as well as open-mindedness and excellence in higher
education’.
This module’s bias is evident in its underlying assumption that ‘threats
to democracy’ within the EU stem primarily from citizens’ insufficient
understanding or appreciation of the Union, rather than from any structural
flaws or democratic deficits within the EU itself. By framing the problem
as one of public ignorance and by omitting any consideration of the EU as
a potential source of democratic erosion, it implicitly equates strengthening
democracy with strengthening support for the EU. The subtext is that rising
euroscepticism is a symptom of misinformation or disengagement, to be
remedied through greater promotion of the EU’s supposed benefits –
thereby aligning academic inquiry with institutional self-justification.
Module: ‘Understanding European Identity Through Reflexion
on European Citizenship’68
Institute: Université Savoie-Mont-Blanc (France)
The premise of this module is that by ‘increasing awareness and knowledge
in the EU citizenship and identity will allow to foster the democratic
dimension of the EU as well as open-mindedness and excellence in higher
education’.
This description appears like another example of grant-speak: ticking
multiple ideological and thematic boxes (democracy promotion, European
identity, educational quality) that are likely to resonate with Brussels
funding bodies, often at the expense of basic logic: it’s unclear, for example,
why greater awareness of ‘EU citizenship and identity’ should foster
‘excellence in higher education’.
Module: ‘Revitalization of European Integration: Policies and Actorness
under the Process of de-Europeanization’69
Institute: Mardin Artuklu University (Turkey)
The purpose of this module is ‘to strengthen European dimension of re-
search and teaching in a way to understand and reverse de-Europeanisation
dynamics in the EU and beyond’.
This description is a textbook example of normative framing rather
than neutral academic inquiry. By stating that its aim is to ‘reverse
de-Europeanisation dynamics’, the module assumes from the outset
that de-Europeanisation is inherently negative and that re-Europeanisation
is the desired and correct outcome. This is not the language of open-
ended, critical scholarship; it is the language of policy advocacy
embedded in academia.
Module: ‘Transformative Power of Theatre in Fostering European
Eco-values’70
Institute: Fırat University (Turkey)
This module ‘aims to explore the relationship between culture and science
that distinctively manifests itself within theatre and performance studies’,
by showing ‘theatre’s role in transforming humanity’s attitude towards the
environment as its textual and visual possibilities render it a crucial venue
for the articulation of ecological issues’.
This module is a clear illustration of how even the performing arts
can be repurposed as a vehicle for political messaging – in this case,
to promote the EU’s green agenda. By framing theatre explicitly as a tool
for ‘transforming humanity’s attitude towards the environment’, the project
moves beyond studying artistic expression to actively using cultural
production as an instrument of behavioural and attitudinal change.
Learning EU project: ‘Una mirada a las estrellas’71
Institute: Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Castilla y León (Spain)
The project is aimed at ‘strengthening the European Identity of its students’,
‘to increase the number of curricular activities related to the European
Identity’, and ‘develop a content curriculum linked to the fostering of the
European Identity’.
It is part of the Jean Monnet Learning EU initiative, which is targeted
at secondary institutions and aims to ‘contribute to strengthen European
identity and active citizenship among students and teachers’.72
Learning EU project: ‘Europa: Ayer, Hoy y Mañana’73
Institute: Hermanas de Nuestra Señora de la Consolación (Spain)
The aim of the project is ‘to create citizenship and a feeling of European
belonging throughout the educational community, raising awareness of
the importance of being part of this Union’.
Learning EU project: ‘Vote for Europe’74
Institute: Közgazdasági Politechnikum Alternatív Gimnázium (Hungary)
The project states: ‘The EU faces numerous challenges these days,
including the rise of euroscepticism and of populist, extreme-right parties,
threatening with exit from the community. Educating young people about
Europe, its common values and active European citizenship at school might
help solve these issues.’
Learning EU project: ‘Dare to Ask the Right Questions’75
Institute: Colegiul Național Spiru Haret (Romania)
The project is aimed at countering ‘anti-EU propaganda’ by ‘addressing
to our teachers and students as well in order to raise knowledge on EU
values, to strengthen the sense of belonging to the European community
and reveal all the advantages that come along [with it]’.
Learning EU project: ‘EU-PH.ORIA: European Union for Progress and
Harmony, Organization for Responsibility, Innovation and Awareness’76
Institute: Perifereiaki Dyethinsi Protovathmias Kai Defterovathmias
Ekpaidefsis Kentrikis Makedonias (Greece)
The project aims to ‘reinforce the European dimension … and strengthen
European identity and active citizenship among students and teachers’.
Learning EU project: ‘Let’s be Europeans’77
Institute: Lycée Général et Technologique Jean Moulin (France)
The project states: ‘We want to make the complex subject of European
citizenship attractive and understandable, so that our students become
its best ambassadors!’
Learning EU project: ‘We are European Citizens’78
Institute: Liceul Teoretic Ionita Asan Caracal (Romania)
The project aims to challenge ‘euroscepticism, as well as in the influence
of fake news’ and ‘instill the advantages and responsibilities of European
citizenship in all the participants’.
Teacher training project: ‘Empowering European Union Citizenship:
Sustainable Integration of EU Content Through Experiential, Action-
Oriented and Multidisciplinary Teaching’79
Institute: Ministry of General and Vocational Education, Science,
Research and Culture of the State of Schleswig-Holstein (Germany)
The project ‘aims to systematically and sustainably integrate EU content
into school curricula, utilising experiential and action-oriented pedagogical
approaches’.
This project is part of the Jean Monnet teacher training initiative, aiming
to ‘build knowledge about the EU among their teaching staff ’ and ‘foster
the confidence of teachers in integrating an EU angle in their daily work’.80
Teacher training project: ‘Wider and Deeper EU’81
Institute: ADN Akademia Biznesu Sp Zoo (Poland)
The project ‘wants to equip Polish teachers and trainers to become
ambassadors of EU values by acquiring innovative skills, competence and
knowledge about the European Union, the process of European integration,
the European institutions and their functioning in shaping the long-term
European policies and strategies that affect (and improve!) the life of
European citizens. WIDE has a strong connotation of enlargement, in the
spirit of a Union that will become deeper by widening to new countries and
by welcoming new Europeans in joining the dream of European integration.’
The pro-EU bias in this project is evident from the outset. Even its
name, ‘Wider and Deeper EU’, echoes the long-standing Brussels slogan for
expansion and deeper integration, signalling alignment with the EU’s own
political vision. The description makes the normative intent explicit: the
goal is to turn Polish teachers and trainers into ‘ambassadors of EU values’,
equipping them not simply to teach about the EU, but to actively promote
its integrationist agenda. By framing EU policies and strategies as inherently
beneficial (‘improve!’ the life of citizens), the project eliminates any space
for critical evaluation, embedding a one-sided, celebratory narrative of
the Union into teacher training and, by extension, into classrooms across
the country.
Teacher training project: ‘Let’s Make Available EU Topics For Everybody’82
Institute: Konya Provincial Directorate of National Education (Turkey)
The aim of the project is ‘to enhance understanding of the EU topics and
create awareness of the topics that threaten the unity and EU values such as
fake news, disinformation, misinformation, extremism, xenophobia, racism
and Islamophobia by creating innovative and digital resources for educators
and students’.
Networks and Policy Debates project: ‘Post-truth Politics and the Future
of Democracy in Europe’83
Institute: Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
This seminar – organised by the Centre for European Policy Studies
(CEPS), a well-known Brussels-based think tank that has received
€25 million from the EU over the past 10 years84 – aimed to analyse what
impact ‘post-truth politics had on the (de-)legitimation of European
integration and on European politics and democracy more broadly’.
The bias here lies in the framing of ‘post-truth politics’ as a factor in the
‘(de-)legitimation’ of European integration, implicitly suggesting that
challenges to the EU’s legitimacy are rooted in misinformation rather than
in substantive political or policy disagreements. The seminar’s premise
aligns with the institutional narrative that declining support for integration
stems from distorted public discourse, thereby sidestepping any critical
examination of the EU’s own actions or democratic shortcomings.
These cases illustrate how the Jean Monnet Programme is routinely deployed
to advance the cause of European integration under the veneer of neutral
academic work. In some instances, however, the programme goes further,
serving as a vehicle for specific strategic priorities of the Union. A notable
example is the EU’s growing support – under the banner of ‘combating disin-
formation’ – for initiatives that curtail dissenting views, narrow the spectrum
of public debate and consolidate institutional control over the flow of
information.
It’s no surprise that academia has also been drawn into this effort, lending
both ideological legitimacy and scholarly justification to ‘anti-disinformation’
and ‘anti-fake news’ policies that, in practice, are aimed at reinforcing institu-
tional narratives. Indeed, since 2021, the Jean Monnet Programme has
supported close to 60 ‘anti-disinformation’ projects.85 These are just a few
examples:
Centres of Excellence project: ‘European Security and Disinformation
in Multicultural Societies’86
Institute: George Emil Palade University of Medicine, Pharmacy,
Science and Technology of Târgu Mureș (Romania)
The project ‘addresses the need to combat disinformation in multicultural
societies, where disinformation can be targeted towards the national
integration policy and also EU institutions and policies’ and aims to ‘create
a focal point of competence and knowledge on European Union security
and to disseminate content by bringing EU facts and knowledge to the
general public, authorities and academia’.
The bias is clear in the project’s conflation of disinformation with
criticism of national or EU policies, implying that such criticism is
inherently false or harmful. By aiming to ‘bring EU facts and knowledge’
to the public authorities and academia, the project positions the EU’s own
narrative as the authoritative truth, effectively framing its policies as beyond
legitimate contestation.
Chair in ‘Information and misinformation in European integration:
a historical approach’87
Institute: Université de Strasbourg (France)
The project aims to combat ‘fake news, infoxes and disinformation’ and
their negative ‘impact on the construction of Europe’.
Module: ‘Debunking Political Uses of Denialisms and
Conspiracy Theories in EU’88
Institute: Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna (Italy)
The project states that ‘in recent years the political uses of new denialisms
and conspiracy theories have played a crucial role in the European Union’,
particularly insofar as it relates to climate change and the Covid-19
pandemic, and therefore aims at ‘increasing knowledge and critical skills
to debunk political uses of climate change denial’ and ‘tackle disinformation
linked to the spread of new conspiracy theories, including the field of
digital transformation’.
The bias is evident in the project’s selective focus on ‘denialisms’ and
conspiracy theories in areas – climate change and Covid-19 – where the
EU has well-defined policy positions, effectively treating opposition or
scepticism toward those policies as misinformation to be ‘debunked’.
This frames academic inquiry as a tool for reinforcing official narratives
rather than fostering open debate.
As noted above, the Jean Monnet Programme is not limited to EU countries.
In non-EU countries – from India to Brazil, Turkey to China – the
programme is increasingly used as a tool of public diplomacy, exporting the
EU’s narratives and strategic priorities (including the bloc’s enlargement
drive) abroad under the banner of academic cooperation, as the following
examples make clear:
Module: ‘The Western Balkans at the crossroads: EU integration and
external actors’ influence’89
Institute: University of Tirana (Albania)
This module ‘aims to analyse the influence of non-European external
actors in the Western Balkans, as well as identify key potentially malign
influences such as corruption of political decision-makers, economic and
financial activities, and disinformation campaigns, all of which have fuelled
the rise of nationalism, extremism and radicalism in the region, and to
explain how they contribute to the region, including integration into
the European Union’.
This module’s bias is evident in its framing of nationalism and
extremism as equivalent pathologies and in its attribution of these
phenomena primarily to ‘malign’ non-European influences. By
externalising the causes of political discontent – rather than considering
domestic grievances, governance failures or socio-economic conditions –
it advances a narrative in which the EU is implicitly cast as the legitimate
corrective force, with integration presented as the natural solution.
This framing aligns seamlessly with EU geopolitical objectives.
Module: ‘The European Union’s external action in Africa: the practice
of promoting European values and interests’90
Institute: Universidad de Valencia (Spain)
The aim of this module is ‘to deepen the knowledge and dissemination
of EU-Africa relations, given the progressive loss of influence of the
EU in Africa, to the detriment of new players such as China and Russia’.
It explicitly refers to the EU’s Strategic Agenda in relation to the ‘promotion
of the EU’s interests and values in the world’ – a clear example of how
the Jean Monnet Programme employs academia in the service of public
diplomacy.
Module: ‘Defending constitutional democracy against online attacks’91
Institute: Universidad Católica de Pernambuco (Brazil)
This module ‘disseminates to the Brazilian university community European
initiatives in defence of constitutional democracy, which address online
threats, seeking to encourage reflection, based on these experiences, on
the crisis of democracy and possible ways to overcome it and to make
the Brazilian constitutional democratic regime more resilient’.
The module appears designed to export the EU’s restrictive approach
to online speech to a non-EU context, in this case Brazil. By promoting
‘European initiatives’ that address so-called online threats under the banner
of defending democracy, it implicitly endorses the EU’s regulatory model,
which often conflates harmful content with dissenting or controversial
viewpoints. Framing these measures as tools to ‘overcome’ a democratic
crisis positions the EU’s approach as both correct and transferable,
effectively using academic channels to legitimise and spread a governance
model that narrows the boundaries of permissible online expression.
Module: ‘Towards European Union Legal Framework: Health Acquis’92
Institute: Kolegji AAB (Kosovo)
The module focuses ‘on the European Union (EU) health acquis,
emphasising the importance and necessity for Kosovo’s healthcare sector
to align with EU health acquis’.
This is yet another clear example of how the Jean Monnet Programme
is used to advance EU enlargement by pre-aligning the regulatory systems
of prospective member states. In doing so, it turns academic instruction into
a mechanism for regulatory convergence, smoothing the path for accession
and embedding EU norms well before any formal membership negotiations
are concluded.
As one might expect, the programme’s foreign operations tend to focus
on countries that are pivotal to the EU’s geopolitical strategy. It is therefore
hardly surprising that, in recent years, hundreds of Jean Monnet projects
have been implemented in Ukraine, many explicitly aimed at furthering
Ukraine’s integration into the EU and the Euro-Atlantic bloc more generally.
The number of Jean Monnet projects in Ukraine has increased since 2023,
when the European Council decided to open accession negotiations.93
In the 2014–2023 period, the Commission funded 342 Jean Monnet projects
in Ukraine: 279 modules, 29 chairs, nine centres of excellence, 10 projects and
seven networks. These have involved 130 organisations from all over Ukraine,
including 118 higher-education institutions, plus research institutions, profes-
sional networks and NGOs. In 2024 alone, 35 Jean Monnet projects were
funded. As the Commission stated, these were explicitly aimed at promoting
‘the implementation of the European integration home task of Ukraine’.94
Module: ‘Integrating the future-proof EU cybersecurity
ecosystem in Ukraine’95
Institute: Kharkiv National University of Radio Electronics (Ukraine)
The module aims to contribute to the creation of ‘a future-proof EU
cybersecurity ecosystem’ – and to Ukraine’s integration into such a system –
as a response to foreign state-sponsored cybercrimes and disinformation.
The module is a clear example of how the Jean Monnet Programme can
be used to enlist academia in advancing the EU’s geopolitical and security
agenda, thereby compromising its independence. By framing its purpose
as the creation of a ‘future-proof EU cybersecurity ecosystem’ and explicitly
linking this to Ukraine’s integration, the project positions academic
activity in direct support of EU strategic objectives in a highly politicised
and security-sensitive domain. In doing so, the module transforms the
university’s role – from fostering critical, dispassionate inquiry into that
of a policy-implementing partner, effectively erasing the line between
scholarship and institutional propaganda.
Module: ‘The EU cyber standardization strategy for connectivity
and digital infrastructure: Experience for Ukraine’96
Institute: Kharkiv National University of Economics (Ukraine)
The module aims ‘to empower the emerging generation of students
and stakeholders by bolstering their hands-on expertise in cybersecurity
and artificial intelligence (AI) standards, with a particular emphasis on
advancing euro integration’. ↘
Once again, the module’s normative agenda is explicit: the stated aim
is not simply to build skills in cybersecurity and AI standards, but to do so
‘with a particular emphasis on advancing euro integration’. This makes EU
integration not an incidental context, but a core objective of the teaching
and training provided. The development of technical expertise is thus
framed as a means to a political end: furthering Ukraine’s alignment with
EU norms and structures.
Module: ‘EU Counteraction to Foreign Information Manipulation
and Interference’97
Institute: Lesya Ukrainka Volyn National University (Ukraine)
The module ‘is aimed to deliver advanced and critical knowledge on how
the EU counteracts foreign information manipulation and interference
(FIMI) operations’ and ‘contribute to maturing conscious, knowledgeable
citizens of Ukraine, who share common European values and democratic
principles, are keen supporters of the euro-integration process and
understand that the EU counteracts the FIMI operations for the benefit
of whole Europe’.
Once again, the bias here is explicit: the module’s stated goal is to
produce citizens who are ‘keen supporters of the euro-integration process’
and who uncritically accept the EU’s framing of its actions as serving ‘the
benefit of whole Europe’. Rather than fostering open-ended critical inquiry,
the course predefines both the values students should hold and the political
positions they should support, effectively using academic instruction to
reinforce a predetermined pro-EU narrative.
Module: ‘Developing and implementing a new methodology of teaching
and studying EU Law as part of Ukrainian National Legal Order’98
Institute: Ukrainian Catholic University (Ukraine)
The module ‘aims to provide students with a holistic perspective on the
legal landscape within the EU and its application in the Ukrainian national
legal system’.
This is a clear example of how Jean Monnet modules are used to
prepare the ground for EU enlargement by embedding EU law into a
candidate country’s legal framework. By familiarising students with
both the EU’s legal system and its direct application within Ukraine’s
national context, the module facilitates legal and institutional alignment –
an essential step in the accession process – while normalising EU
integration as the natural trajectory for the country.
Module: ‘Building European Identity Resilience for Ukrainian Society’99
Institute: Zaporizhzhia National University (Ukraine)
The module is premised on the assumption that ‘building a multicultural
and multinational society based on the concept of a common European
identity is an extremely useful practice that can be transferred to Ukraine’,
and to this end aims to contribute to ‘the crucial process of integrating
Ukrainian society into European axiological framework’.
Once again, the bias here is overt: the module assumes, without
question, that constructing a ‘common European identity’ is inherently
positive and should be replicated in Ukraine. By framing integration
into the ‘European axiological framework’ as a ‘crucial process’, it treats
EU value-alignment as both necessary and desirable, closing off space
for critical debate about the cultural, political or societal implications of
such an identity project.
Module: ‘Participatory democracy and multilevel governance in the EU’100
Institute: Kharkiv National University of Economics (Ukraine)
The module ‘is aimed at popularising the European constitutional values
and spreading of knowledge on the peculiarities of European democratic
governance’, in order to contribute to ‘the strategic goal of Ukraine –
the acquisition of EU membership’.
This module is yet another unambiguous example of how Jean Monnet-
funded activities are used to explicitly promote the political goal of EU
accession. By framing its teaching around ‘popularising European constitu-
tional values’ and ‘spreading knowledge’ of EU governance, the module
directly links its academic content to advancing Ukraine’s ‘strategic goal’
of EU membership. This makes integration not a subject of scholarly inquiry,
but the intended outcome of the educational process – turning the
classroom into a tool for promoting a specific, institutionally endorsed
political objective .
6 The hubs of EU academic propaganda
Centres of excellence and designated institutions
The EU’s strategy of embedding its political and ideological agenda within
academia reaches its most entrenched form in the Jean Monnet centres of
excellence and, even more so, in the Jean Monnet designated institutions.
Unlike ordinary Jean Monnet chairs or modules, these entities are explicitly
tasked with integrating pro-EU narratives across all EU-related areas of
teaching, while maintaining a close, structural relationship with Brussels.
They can be considered the central hubs of the EU’s academic propaganda
branch, functioning as institutional partners in EU-funded projects that
extend far beyond the university sector, often involving the media,
civil-society organisations and public administrations.
Jean Monnet centres of excellence
There are currently 160 Jean Monnet centres of excellence, each eligible for
grants of up to €100,000. Officially described as ‘focal points of competence
and knowledge on European Union subjects’,101 they are tasked with
pooling expertise across disciplines, fostering cross-border cooperation
and – critically – ensuring outreach beyond academia.
Their role is not limited to students: centres of excellence are expected
to ‘become the academic reference for EU subjects’102 and to engage directly
with policymakers, civil servants, organised civil society and the general
public through lectures, workshops and public events at both the national
and European levels. This outreach function means that they act not only
as teaching centres but also as nodes of public communication, channelling
EU-aligned narratives into the broader infosphere.
Well-known examples include:
• Universität Osnabrück (Germany) – Jean Monnet Centre of
Excellence in European Studies
• King’s College London (UK) – Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence
on Next Generation EU-UK Relations
• University of Essex (UK)
• Erasmus University Rotterdam (Netherlands) – Jean Monnet Centre
of Excellence in Digital Governance (2019–2023)
• European Union Center at the University of Illinois (US)
Jean Monnet designated institutions
At the top of this hierarchy sit the seven Jean Monnet designated institutions,
explicitly named in the Erasmus+ regulation as entities ‘pursuing an aim
of European interest and European integration’.103
They are:
• European University Institute (EUI), Florence (Italy) –
including its School of Transnational Governance
• College of Europe, Bruges (Belgium) and Natolin (Poland) campuses
• European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), Maastricht
(Netherlands)
• Academy of European Law (ERA), Trier (Germany)
• European Agency for Special Needs and Inclusive Education
(EASNIE), Odense (Denmark)
• International Centre for European Training (CIFE), Nice (France)
While precise budget allocations for each are not public, the amounts are
substantial. The EUI alone costs the EU over €20 million annually, with
member states contributing an additional €30 million.104 These institutions
are explicitly mandated to ensure the ‘continuous and frequent alignment
of study and training programmes or capacity-building activities with the
EU and European Commission’s policy agenda and priorities’, as well as
to focus on ‘fostering European identity’ among students.105 Their remit
includes graduate education, training for legal and public sector professionals,
policy-relevant research and public outreach. Governments and the
European Commission directly influence their activities, both by commis-
sioning specific training and by participating in governance and strategic
decision-making.
The Jean Monnet designated institutions are not merely educational
institutions; they are deeply embedded in the EU’s operational ecosystem,
often partnering with EU bodies, media outlets and NGOs on high-profile
initiatives. The EUI’s School of Transnational Governance is a prime example,
training current and future political elites in ‘governance beyond the state’
and collaborating on projects like the European Digital Media Observatory
(EDMO), a €30 million European Commission initiative to combat ‘disinfor-
mation’, and Democratic Odyssey, aimed at promoting ‘citizen participation’
in EU governance, working alongside numerous pro-EU NGOs.
Such partnerships illustrate how Jean Monnet designated institutions
serve as intellectual and operational extensions of EU institutions,
legitimising and amplifying the Union’s priorities across multiple
spheres – from academia and policymaking to media and civil society.
Taken together, the Jean Monnet centres of excellence and designated
institutions represent the most institutionalised form of ideological alignment
between academia and the EU. They not only shape curricula but also project
Brussels-approved narratives into public debate, policymaking circles and the
media. In this sense, they are crucial nerve centres of a wider EU-NGO-me-
dia-academia complex, in which each sector reinforces the others, creating a
mutually validating ecosystem that blurs the line between education and
political advocacy. The result is a highly effective – and taxpayer-funded –
apparatus for sustaining the EU’s political project under the guise of academic
excellence and civic engagement.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper demonstrates that the Jean Monnet
Programme, and in particular its centres of excellence and designated institu-
tions, have evolved into powerful instruments for embedding the European
Union’s political priorities into academia. Through a combination of funding
incentives, explicit ideological mandates and outreach activities that extend
far beyond the classroom, these initiatives systematically align teaching,
research and public engagement with the EU’s integrationist agenda and its
policy priorities – thereby transforming academic research into advocacy
research. This doesn’t just have a deeply corruptive effect on academia;
it also represents a colossal waste of resources, channelling scarce public
funds into what is essentially subsidised propaganda rather than genuine
scholarship. From a scientific perspective, such politicisation undermines the
very purpose of research. Instead of supporting inquiry that is open-ended,
curiosity-driven and free from political interference, it rewards conformity,
discourages intellectual risk-taking, and diverts talent and resources away
from the pursuit of knowledge and understanding.
This politicisation of higher education represents a profound departure
from the principles that have historically underpinned the university as
an institution. In the Humboldtian model, as articulated by Wilhelm von
Humboldt, universities should be autonomous centres of knowledge creation
where teaching and research are inseparable, where academic freedom is
paramount and where scholarship is guided not by political imperatives
but by the pursuit of truth. The unity of science and the cultivation of
well-rounded, critically minded individuals lie at the heart of this vision.
Politically driven funding mechanisms such as the Jean Monnet
Programme undermine these principles by promoting ‘research’ with
predetermined political outcomes and by rewarding ideological conformity
over open inquiry. In doing so, they distort the academic ecosystem,
marginalise dissenting perspectives and transform universities from
independent arenas of debate into conduits for institutional propaganda.
Reversing this trend is urgent. Safeguarding the integrity of academia
requires restoring the autonomy of universities, insulating research agendas
from political influence and reaffirming the Humboldtian commitment to
critical inquiry. Only by reclaiming these principles can higher education
fulfil its essential role: to produce knowledge that is independent, rigorous
and genuinely in the service of society – not the political ambitions of
any institution or government.
Policy recommendations
De-politicise research funding
• EU funding programmes such as the Jean Monnet Programme should
end the practice of conditioning grants on alignment with political
priorities.
• Academic research must be insulated from institutional propaganda aims,
with funding calls written in politically neutral language that does not
presuppose desired conclusions.
Respect academic freedom and authority
• Safeguard the Humboldtian principle of universities as autonomous
centres of knowledge creation, free from state or supranational interfer-
ence.
• Ensure that scholars are free to pursue inquiry without pressure to
conform to official EU narratives or strategic priorities.
Allocate grants based on scientific and intellectual merit
• Research funding should be awarded solely on the basis of methodolog-
ical rigour, originality and potential contribution to knowledge.
• Independent peer-review committees, composed of diverse and unaffili-
ated experts, should evaluate proposals. Political bodies should not
dictate or influence outcomes.
Encourage diversity of views and critical inquiry
• Funding structures should explicitly reward pluralism of perspectives,
including research that critically examines the EU, integration and
related policies.
• Programmes should recognise that disagreement, dissent and competing
interpretations are essential to the progress of knowledge.
Reject the use of academia as a tool of propaganda
• Universities should not be conscripted into public diplomacy campaigns
or required to act as ‘ambassadors’ of political institutions.
• Outreach activities should focus on disseminating knowledge and
fostering debate, not on promoting predetermined political narratives.
Promote transparency and accountability in EU-academic relations
• All funding arrangements between universities and EU institutions
should be fully transparent, with clear disclosure of political or
ideological conditions.
• Universities should be accountable to their academic communities –
not to political bodies – for the direction of their teaching and research
End Notes
1 European Commission, ‘Erasmus adopted by
the Council’, 14 May 1987 ec.europa.eu
2 European Commission, ‘The Erasmus
Programme Moves Ahead – A First Series
of Community Aids to 240 Inter-University
Cooperation Programmes’, 14 October 1987
ec.europa.eu
3 Jacques Delors, ‘Happy birthday and best
wishes, Erasmus!’, Institut Jacques Delors, 22
February 2022 institutdelors.eu
4 Kristine Mitchell, ‘Rethinking the “Erasmus
Effect” on European Identity’, Journal of
Common Market Studies, 2015 Volume 53.
Number 2. pp. 330–348 samuelbhfaure.com
5 See Thomas Fazi, The EU’s Propaganda
Machine: How the EU funds NGOs to promote
itself, MCC Brussels, 12 February 2025
brussels.mcc.hu; Thomas Fazi, Brussels’s media
machine, June 2025 brussels.mcc.hu
6 Peta Lee, ‘Erasmus to expand programme after
record figures’, University World News, 13 July
2013 universityworldnews.com
7 European Commission, ‘Erasmus+ 2021–2027
programme brings over €26.2 billion to support
mobility and cooperation’, 5 March 2021
erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu
8 European Commission, ‘Combined evaluation
of Erasmus+ and predecessor programmes:
Final Report – Jean Monnet programme
evaluation (Volume 3)’, October 2017
ec.europa.eu
9 European Commission, ‘What is the structure
of the Erasmus+ Programme?’ erasmus-plus.
ec.europa.eu
10 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet Actions:
stimulating teaching and research on the
European Union’ erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu
11 European Commission, ‘What is the structure
of the Erasmus+ Programme?’ erasmus-plus.
ec.europa.eu
12 European Commission, Ibid.
13 European Commission, ‘Combined evaluation
of Erasmus+ and predecessor programmes:
Final Report – Jean Monnet programme
evaluation (Volume 3)’, October 2017
ec.europa.eu
14 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet Actions:
stimulating teaching and research on the
European Union’ erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu
15 Jean Monnet Programme, Wikipedia
en.wikipedia.org
16 Monika Bochenek, ‘Erasmus+ Programme,
Jean Monnet Actions: Call for proposals 2025’,
European Commission erasmusplus.org.pl
17 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet:
Good practices in the context of “A Union of
shared values – The role of Education & Civil
Societies”’, Jean Monnet Cluster Meeting,
Brussels, 15 April 2016 erasmusplus.org.ua
18 Ibid.
19 ‘Dare to Ask the Right Questions’, EU Funding
& Tenders Portal ec.europa.eu
20 Publications Office of the European Union,
‘Are Jean Monnet designated institutions
unique?’, 2025 op.europa.eu
21 ‘Vote for Europe’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
22 ‘Revitalization of European Integration:
Policies and Actorness under the Process of
de-Europeanization’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
23 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet actions
in the field of higher education’ erasmus-plus.
ec.europa.eu
24 ‘Contesting the Past of the EU: The Uses of
History in (De-)Legitimating Narratives’, EU
Funding & Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
25 Publications Office of the European Union,
‘Are Jean Monnet designated institutions
unique?’, 2025 op.europa.eu
26 Quoted in Martin Ball, Robert Oulds, Dr Lee
Rotherham, ‘Federalist Thought Control: The
Brussels Propaganda Machine’, Bruges Group
brugesgroup.com
27 ‘We are European Citizens’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.
eu
28 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet:
Good practices in the context of “A Union of
shared values – The role of Education & Civil
Societies”’, Jean Monnet Cluster Meeting,
Brussels, 15 April 2016 erasmusplus.org.ua
29 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet:
Good practices in the context of “A Union of
shared values – The role of Education & Civil
Societies”’, Jean Monnet Cluster Meeting,
Brussels, 15 April 2016 erasmusplus.org.ua
30 ‘Wider and Deeper EU’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated August 2025
ec.europa.eu; see also: European Commission,
‘Jean Monnet: Good practices in the context
of “A Union of shared values – The role of
Education & Civil Societies”’, Jean Monnet
Cluster Meeting, Brussels, 15 April 2016
erasmusplus.org.ua
31 ‘EU subverting UK Education, as UKIP
reveals EU funded University Professors’,
UKIP, 27 July 2015 web.archive.org
32 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet:
Good practices in the context of “A Union of
shared values – The role of Education & Civil
Societies”’, Jean Monnet Cluster Meeting,
Brussels, 15 April 2016 erasmusplus.org.ua
33 ‘24 in ’24: A year at the EUI in review’,
European University Institute eui.eu
34 See author’s previous report: Thomas Fazi,
Brussels’s media machine, MCC Brussels, June
2025 brussels.mcc.hu
35 ‘Who we are’, Democratic Odyssey
democraticodyssey.eui.eu
36 Charlemagne, ‘Europe’s Hogwarts has a new
Dumbledore’, The Economist, 7 August 2025
economist.com
37 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet actions
in the field of higher education’
erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu
38 Yifan Yang, ‘Does the Academic Programme
Work? The Jean Monnet Programme and
European Union Public Diplomacy’, Journal of
European Integration, Volume 37, 2015 – Issue 6
tandfonline.com
39 ‘Building European Identity Resilience for
Ukrainian Society’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, update May 2025 ec.europa.eu
40 ‘Horizon Europe (HORIZON)’, EU Funding
& Tenders Portal ec.europa.eu
41 European Education and Culture Executive
Agency, ‘Jean Monnet Chairs: Data analysis
of Jean Monnet Chairs awarded between
1990 and 2022’, 2024 eu.daad.de
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Alberto Alemanno, R. Daniel Kelemen,
Laurent Pech, ‘Europe’s Shameful Silence –
An Open Letter to EU Leaders from Jean
Monnet Chairs, Verfassungsblog, 10 December
2018 verfassungsblog.de
46 R. Daniel Keleman, ‘Will the European Union
escape its autocracy trap?’, Journal of European
Public Policy, 32(2), 341–364. doi.org
47 Anu Bradford, R. Daniel Kelemen, and
Tommaso Pavone, ‘Europe Could Lose What
Makes It Great’, Foreign Affairs, 21 April 2025
foreignaffairs.com
48 R. Daniel Keleman, X x.com
49 Tocqueville Review on X x.com
50 Laurent Pech, X x.com
51 David Matthews, ‘EU-funded professors
deny claims of bias from Brexit campaigners’,
Times Higher Education, 31 May 2016
timeshighereducation.com
52 Adam Lusher, ‘EU Referendum: European
Law expert compares Brexit campaigners
to creationists’, Independent, 22 June 2016
independent.co.uk
53 These project all relate to the 2024 Jean
Monnet Programme call.
54 ‘Democratic and Effective Governance’,
EU Funding & Tenders Portal, updated
May 2025 ec.europa.eu
55 JUDILL Jean Monnet Chair, Vrije
Universiteit Amsterdam vu.nl
56 Pola Cebulak, X x.com
57 Pola Cebulak, X x.com
58 ‘Bridging Pathways of EU Accession –
Perspectives from Romania, Ukraine and the
Republic of Moldova’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, update May 2025 ec.europa.eu
59 ‘Crises and Solutions in the European Union’,
EU Funding & Tenders Portal, updated May
2025 ec.europa.eu
60 ‘Contesting the Past of the EU: The Uses
of History in (De-)Legitimating Narratives’,
EU Funding & Tenders Portal, updated
May 2025 ec.europa.eu
61 ‘EU Fundamental Values in the Online Digital
Environment’, EU Funding & Tenders Portal,
updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
62 See, for example: European Commission,
‘Together for a better internet’, 11 February
2025 commission.europa.eu
63 ‘European Union for Peace, Prosperity and
Security’, EU Funding & Tenders Portal,
updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
64 See, for example: Alberto Alemanno, ‘The EU
won’t fix its democratic deficit with another
top-down “conference”’, Guardian, 21 January
2020 theguardian.com
65 ‘EU against Disinformation through Investment
in Information and Communication’, EU
Funding & Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
66 ‘Rule of Law as a core standard to access the
EU – The role of the media in the EU enlarge-
ment process’, EU Funding & Tenders Portal,
updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
67 ‘Democracy For You in the EU’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated July 2025 ec.europa.eu
68 ‘Understanding European Identity Through
Reflexion on European Citizenship’, EU
Funding & Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
69 ‘Revitalization of European Integration:
Policies and Actorness under the Process of
de-Europeanization’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
70 ‘Transformative Power of Theatre in Fostering
European Eco-values’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, update May 2025 ec.europa.eu
71 ‘Una mirada a las estrellas’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated July 2025 ec.europa.eu
72 ‘Jean Monnet Actions for other fields of
Education and Training: Learning EU’, EU
Funding & Tenders Portal ec.europa.eu
73 ‘Europa: Ayer, Hoy y Mañana’, EU Funding
& Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
74 ‘Vote for Europe’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
75 ‘Dare to Ask the Right Questions’, EU Funding
& Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
76 ‘EU-PH.ORIA: European Union for Progress
and Harmony, Organization for Responsibility,
Innovation and Awareness’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
77 ‘Let’s be Europeans’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
78 ‘We are European Citizens’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
79 ‘Empowering European Union Citizen-
ship: Sustainable Integration of EU Content
Through Experiential, Action-Oriented and
Multidisciplinary Teaching’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
80 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet Actions
for other fields of Education and Training:
Teacher Training’ ec.europa.eu
81 ‘Wider and Deeper EU’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated August 2025
ec.europa.eu
82 ‘Let’s Make Available EU Topics For
Everybody’, EU Funding & Tenders Portal,
updated July 2025 ec.europa.eu
83 ‘Post-truth Politics and the Future of
Democracy in Europe’, CEPS event, 2 May
2023 ceps.eu
84 See author’s previous report: ‘The EU’s
Propaganda Machine: How the EU funds NGOs
to promote itself’, MCC Brussels, 12 February
2025 brussels.mcc.hu
85 Search results for projects on ‘disinformation’,
EU Funding & Tenders Portal ec.europa.eu
86 ‘European Security and Disinformation in
Multicultural Societies’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
87 ‘Information et désinformation dans la con-
struction européenne: approche historique’,
EU Funding & Tenders Portal, updated May
2025, ec.europa.eu
88 ‘Debunking Political Uses of Denialisms and
Conspiracy Theories in EU’, EU Funding &
Tenders Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.
eu
89 ‘The Western Balkans at the crossroads:
EU integration and external actors’ influence’,
EU Funding & Tenders Portal, updated
May 2025 ec.europa.eu
90 ‘The European Union’s external action in
Africa: the practice of promoting European
values and interests’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
91 ‘Defending constitutional democracy against
online attacks’, EU Funding & Tenders Portal,
updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
92 ‘Towards European Union Legal Framework:
Health Acquis’, EU Funding & Tenders Portal,
updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
93 ‘Ukrainian universities won 35 new Jean
Monnet European integration projects
within EUs Erasmus+ Programme’, National
Erasmus+ Office in Ukraine, 27 August 2024
erasmusplus.org.ua
94 Ibid.
95 ‘Integrating the future-proof EU cybersecurity
ecosystem in Ukraine’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated June 2025 ec.europa.eu
96 ‘The EU cyber standardization strategy for con-
nectivity and digital infrastructure: Experience
for Ukraine’, EU Funding & Tenders Portal,
updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
97 ‘EU Counteraction to Foreign Information
Manipulation and Interference’, EU Funding
& Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
98 ‘Developing and implementing a new method-
ology of teaching and studying EU law as part
of Ukrainian national legal order’, EU Funding
& Tenders Portal, updated May 2025
ec.europa.eu
99 ‘Building European Identity Resilience for
Ukrainian Society’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
100 ‘Participatory democracy and multilevel
governance in the EU’, EU Funding & Tenders
Portal, updated May 2025 ec.europa.eu
101 ‘Jean Monnet Actions in the field of Higher
Education: Centers of Excellence’, EU Funding
& Tenders Portal ec.europa.eu
102 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet Centres
of Excellence’ erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu
103 European Commission, ‘Jean Monnet Actions:
stimulating teaching and research on the
European Union’ erasmus-plus.ec.europa.eu
104 Publications Office of the European Union,
‘Are Jean Monnet designated institutions
unique?’, 2025, page 40 op.europa.eu
105 Ibid., page 44
