Andrew Berkeley@spatchcockable
New article published with Neil Wilson, @jryancollins, @widespreadhaze, and @AskerVoldsgaard
The Self-Financing State: An Institutional Analysis of Government Expenditure, Revenue Collection and Debt Issuance Operations in the United Kingdom
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The Self-Financing State: An Institutional Analysis of Government Expenditure, Revenue Collection and Debt Issuance Operations in the United Kingdom
(https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00213624.2025.2533726?src=exp-la#appendixes)
Andrew Berkeley,Josh Ryan-Collins, Richard Tye, Asker Voldsgaard & Neil Wilson
In this article
This article provides the first detailed institutional analysis of the UK government’s expenditure, revenue collection, and debt issuance processes. We show that public expenditure is always financed through money creation rather than taxation or debt issuance. Spending involves the government drawing on a sovereign line of credit from a core legal and accounting structure known as the Consolidated Fund (CF). The Bank of England then debits the CF’s account at the Bank and credits other government accounts held at the Bank. This creates new public deposits, which are used to settle spending by government departments via the commercial banking sector. Only the UK parliament can mandate expenditures from the CF. Revenue collection, including taxation, involves the reverse process, crediting the CF’s account at the Bank, offsetting past injections. Similarly, gilts have been issued to temporarily withdraw money to assist monetary policy objectives. Under the current conditions of excess reserve liquidity, however, debt issuance is best understood as a way of providing safe assets and secure collateral to the non-bank private sector. The findings support neo-Chartalist accounts of the workings of sovereign currency-issuing nations and provide additional institutional detail regarding the apex of the monetary hierarchy in the UK.
The aggressive and expansive macroeconomic policy interventions during the Great Financial Crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the high inflation of the 2021–2022 period have led to growing interest in the limits to state spending. Yet, the actual mechanics of government expenditure, debt management, and their relation to the wider monetary and financial system remain areas of contestation, with relatively few scholarly analyses on countries other than the United States of America.
In this article, we undertake the first detailed institutional analysis of the UK Government’s expenditure, revenue collection, and debt issuance processes.1 The UK Exchequer (the legal and accounting entities which support the UK’s spending and revenue activities) is one of the oldest surviving institutions of its type in the world, with the key legislation being formed in the mid-nineteenth century. It therefore merits attention for its resilience and the relative economic success it has bequeathed the country over the past 150 years, as well as the fact that the UK remains one of the world’s major high-income economies.
Our analysis is based on an extensive review of current and historical primary legislation, additional pertinent literature describing the historical evolution of the system, official publications from public authorities including His Majesty’s Treasury (HM Treasury—the UK Finance Ministry), the Debt Management Office (DMO), His Majesty’s Revenue & Customs (HMRC), the Bank of England (the Bank—the UK’s central bank) and other relevant institutions, and requests made to the above-mentioned departments under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (Berkeley et al. 2021).2
In contrast to previous accounts of the UK government’s expenditure process (Hills and Fellowes 1932; Ryan-Collins et al. 2012; Pantelopoulos and Watts 2021), we pay particular attention to the role of the Consolidated Fund as the core legal and accounting construction, which is the focal point of all expenditure and revenue activity. The Consolidated Fund, we find, advances HM Treasury sovereign credit, backed by Parliament’s power to raise future tax revenues. Government “spending” should then be understood as a form of money creation. This contrasts with the predominant belief that government spending is financed through taxation or borrowing from the private sector or via central bank-initiated money creation. Furthermore, we show that it is the UK Parliament rather than the central bank or HM Treasury that governs the Consolidated Fund and thus authorizes spending, with the Bank of England automatically crediting commercial bank accounts when spending takes place.
The account presented broadly aligns with descriptions of Federal spending in the United States outlined by scholars in the neo-Chartalist or Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) tradition (Bell 2000; Fullwiler 2017; Tymoigne 2014). However, we provide important additional institutional detail regarding the apex of the “monetary hierarchy” (Bell 2001) in the UK case. Furthermore, while the neo-Chartalist literature emphasizes the role of debt management in achieving the central banks’ targeted short-term interest rate (Bell 2000; Tymoigne 2014), we argue that the main purpose of public debt instruments in the UK today is to support the non-bank private sector’s desire for a secure store of value and source of collateral, in particular in repo markets. Public debt issuance is no longer a key instrument for controlling the short-term interest rate since the introduction of interest on central bank reserves in 2006, and particularly after excess liquidity was created in the commercial banking system by the program of “Quantitative Easing” (QE) initiated in 2009; a process the Bank began to reverse by selling bonds back in to the market via “Quantitative Tightening” (QT) following the 2021–2022 inflation shock.3
Given this, HM Treasury’s current debt management regime of “fully funding” public expenditures, via either raising taxes or borrowing, appears anachronistic and at odds with the functional purpose of private sector bond purchases. This applies particularly given that QE has involved removing government bonds from the balance sheets of the private sector on a large scale, thereby offsetting the debt issuance required under the “full funding rule.”
Our analysis suggests that two of the main purported constraints on government spending are not valid, namely: liquidity risk (the ability to repay debt and prevent default) and market risk (the ability to control the interest rate). Regarding debates about central bank independence, we find that HM Treasury’s dependence on the Bank of England’s monetary policy position to support spending is less constrained than is commonly thought, given the central role of the Consolidated Fund and the importance of government securities (including indemnities and guarantees) within the monetary and financial system. This undermines, in the UK case at least, critiques of neo-Chartalism and Modern Monetary Theory, which argue that the central bank and treasury should not be consolidated for analytical purposes on the grounds of the operational independence often granted to central banks (Lavoie 2013; Palley 2015).
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section examines related literature on the theory and institutional mechanics of government expenditure, revenue collection, and debt management in the UK and other countries. The third section constitutes the detailed case study of the UK Government’s expenditure and revenue collection process, and the fourth section focuses on the mechanics and modern purpose of public debt issuance. The fifth section discusses our findings concerning the constraints on government expenditure and central bank independence, followed by reflections on policy implications.
The Mechanics of State Financing: Neo-Chartalist and Post-Keynesian Perspectives
The most detailed accounts of the mechanics of state financing have come from neo-Chartalist and Modern Monetary Theory scholars in an effort to illustrate the key role of the state in defining and issuing state money (see, inter alia, Bell 2000; Tymoigne 2014; Fullwiler 2020). In this view, taxes drive demand for the currency rather than raising funds for the state to spend, and currency is a public monopoly designed to extract real resources and services to advance the central authority’s public purposes (Knapp [1924] 2013; Keynes [1930] 2011; Wray 1998; Bell 2000).
Since the state is the monopoly issuer of the country’s currency, the means to pay taxes and purchase bonds must either be spent or lent into existence by the government before taxes can be paid or bonds purchased (Wray 1998). Furthermore, bonds are not issued by governments to obtain the funds needed for spending, but to influence private credit conditions via interest rates (Lerner 1943; Wray 1998). While the private sector ends up holding public bonds as a consequence of fiscal deficits, it does not provide governments with the means of payment. Bond issuance, in this account, is instead a monetary policy tool that assists the central bank’s liquidity management to implement its monetary policy interest rate target (Bell 2000; Tymoigne 2016; Fullwiler 2020). This distinction can, in the Circuitist approach, be framed as “initial finance” versus “final finance” or “financing” versus “funding” (Tymoigne 2014, 643; Cesarotto 2016).
In modern monetary systems, central banks usually provide two standing facilities that they use to influence the interest rate environment: a lending rate above their target policy interest rate and a deposit rate below their target rate. As explained by the Bank of England (2015, 5), “Participants will typically be unwilling to deal in the market on worse terms than those available at the Bank. So, the [lending and deposit] rates act as a ceiling and a floor, forming an interest rate corridor for the rates at which … participants should be willing to deal in the market.” When the government spends or central banks buy bonds by issuing reserves, commercial banks experience a rise in their reserve balances, which lowers the interest rate in the interbank market; selling bonds has the opposite effect, draining such liquidity.
Neo-Chartalists advocate the consolidation of the balance sheets of the central bank and the rest of the government as a “theoretical simplification that makes sense once one understands the logic of the interrelations between the central bank and the Treasury, and between the government and non-government” (Tymoigne and Wray 2015, 29). Consolidation implies that the government’s account at the central bank and the central bank’s holding of government securities cancel against one another, and this renders the central bank reserves and government securities held by the private sector as simply alternative monetary instruments issued by a single central authority.4
Some post-Keynesian economists have criticized the consolidated government balance sheet view for not being descriptively realistic, given the operational independence commonly granted to monetary policy authorities by governments from the late 1980s and 1990s, including prohibitions on direct monetary financing (Fiebiger 2012; Lavoie 2013; Palley 2015). Palley (2015, 4–5) states that the consolidation hypothesis is dependent on the willingness of the central bank “to provide the government with the initial money balances to finance its spending.” Therefore, it is argued that governments can “in principle, finance spending by printing money,” but this “requires a particular institutional arrangement between the fiscal authority and the central bank” (Palley 2015, 4-5). As such, the consolidation hypothesis is viewed as a normative prescription rather than an institutionally valid proposition; a prescription Palley does not share as independent central banks “must sometimes … take away the punchbowl in the middle of the party” (Palley 5, 4–5).5
Several neo-Chartalist scholars have examined how monetary institutions have found ways to bypass self-imposed constraints on central bank financing of government spending. Tymoigne (2014, 652–656) documents how the U.S. Department of the Treasury issues bonds to selected private financial institutions, the “primary dealers,” which are obligated to place bids in all bond auctions at a reasonable price. Meanwhile, the central bank stands ready to either lend to the primary dealers or supply more funds to the interbank market to offset the draining effects of bond sales. If the central bank does not participate in this way, it would create significant disruptions in the money markets and prevent federal authorities from acting in accordance with the budgets passed by Congress (Tymoigne Citation2016, 1323–1324).
In Canada, the central bank likewise maintains a corridor interest rate system and stands ready to “neutralize the net impact of any public sector flows” and finance the primary dealers in government bond auctions. On days with large anticipated monetary drains (e.g., from tax payments or bond sales), “The Bank will be providing central bank credit from the outset so as to maintain liquidity” (Lavoie 2019, 152–153). In one study of the Danish monetary system, the central bank governor supported the consolidated government view by stating, “We are the agent of the state. In this way, one can also consolidate the state’s balance and our balance” (Voldsgaard Ruge 2018, 61). Similar conclusions have been found in Southeast Asian economies during the COVID-19 pandemic, where the central banks smoothed market liquidity conditions for bond issuance and provided direct finance to the treasury via credit advances (Felipe and Fullwiler 2021). In another study of the actions taken by the People’s Bank of China, Zengping He and Genliang Jia (2020, 854) similarly find that the “The PBOC [Chinese central bank] creates a financial situation in which the Treasury bond auction is easily successful by keeping the financial market stable and supplied with enough reserves, [therefore] it is hard for commercial banks to refuse the Treasury bonds—which are not only profitable but also highly liquid.”
In the UK context, George Pantelopoulos and Martin Watts (2021) argue that the Bank of England and the HM Treasury can “finesse” around the full funding rule (discussed in more depth in the Debt Management section), which requires all fiscal deficits to be matched by bond sales over the year, by using HM Treasury’s Ways and Means overdraft account at the Bank. They therefore view the full funding rule as a voluntary constraint that can be bypassed if needed and note occasions when it has been used over the course of the twentieth century, including wartime. While the Ways and Means account is available in the background, the full funding rule is intended to subject HM Treasury and its Debt Management Office to fiscal discipline via the bond market. However, Pantelopoulos and Watts (2021, 238) argue that “[t]he Bank of England cannot be truly independent in an operational sense, as it must behave in an accommodative manner to defend its policy rate target.” As such, the authors conclude that the same indirect financing mechanism observed in the United States and elsewhere, wherein the central bank implicitly finances government spending by supporting the primary dealers of government debt, equally applies to the UK context.
In the sections that follow, we explore in much more depth the institutional dynamics of government expenditure, revenue collection, and borrowing in the UK. We conclude that in the UK case, in contrast to those mentioned in this section, a more direct form of financing of government expenditure takes place that renders discussions of finessing and accommodatory strategies less relevant in the UK context.
gives an overview of the institutions, accounts, and banking infrastructure within which the UK Government’s financial activities are undertaken. Within the public sector, the principal administrative body is HM Treasury, which encompasses the key institutions of the Central Funds, Government Banking Service, and the Debt Management Office. The Bank of England connects these entities to the commercial banking system, which services the private sector money-users (households, non-financial institutions, and non-bank financial corporations).
Figure 1. A “System Map” of the Institutions, Accounts, and Banking Infrastructure that Supports the HM Treasury’s Financial Activities
Note: The Consolidated Fund, National Loans Fund, and Debt Management Account all hold accounts directly at the Bank of England. Government Banking Service represents the banking infrastructure that supports the day-to-day activities of governmental departments. Government Banking Service is therefore depicted holding liability (deposit) accounts for individual departments, shown in grey, as well as asset accounts, shown in white. These asset accounts support the settlement of transactions with the banking system and include accounts at the Bank of England used distinctly for expenditure and revenue, as well as Parliamentary Supply Funding from the Consolidated Fund. The Ways and Means accounts shown are technically two accounts and are described in their own subsection below.
The Central Funds are foundational accounting structures maintained by HM Treasury that serve as the origin of departmental expenditures, the source of government securities issuance, and the destination for most government revenue. They comprise the Consolidated Fund, the National Loans Fund, the Contingencies Fund, and the Exchange Equalisation Account (not shown). Despite their principal importance to government accounting, their existence and functions are not widely known or understood by the general public, and economic and media commentators seldom mention them.
The Consolidated Fund was established in 1787 as “one fund into which shall flow every stream of public revenue, and from which shall come the supply for every service” (HM Treasury 2024, 5). It is often considered to be HM Treasury’s “current account,” handling day-to-day cash flows related to expenditures and revenues. The National Loans Fund, established by the National Loans Act 1968, separately accounts for HM Treasury’s lending and borrowing activities and records many of the UK Government’s financial assets and liabilities.6 The Contingencies Fund is used to enable urgent expenditure beyond that provided by the routine parliamentary supply procedure. The Debt Management Account, while not formally one of the Central Funds, functions as an agent of the National Loans Fund and shares characteristics with Central Funds, such as issuing securities. These funds are interconnected through mirror accounts,7 with each having a claim on the Consolidated Fund to offset net liabilities or assets.
The Consolidated Fund acts as a sovereign line of credit that only HM Treasury, with consent from Parliament, can draw upon to commence spending. The Consolidated Fund is governed by the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 (the “1866 Act”), which stipulates that, “this enactment shall not be construed to empower the Treasury or any authority to direct the payment… of expenditure not sanctioned by any Act whereby services are or may be charged on the Consolidated Fund, or by a vote of the House of Commons, or by an Act for the appropriation of the supplies annually granted by Parliament” (Exchequer and Audit Departments Act, 1866, s 11). In essence, Parliament holds ultimate authority over government spending, and individual departments cannot spend without the authorization of Parliament. Sections 13 and 15 of the 1866 Act specify the mechanism that links two forms of parliamentary authorization explicitly to the provision of money: Standing Services and Supply Services.
Standing Services are forms of government expenditure from the Consolidated Fund that are permanently authorized under specific acts of Parliament. For example, HM Treasury may issue from the Consolidated Fund to make urgent advances to government departments (Miscellaneous Financial Provisions Act 1946, s 3 [1]), for making interventions in the banking sector for purposes of financial stability (Banking Act 2009, s 228) and for making payments towards “the principal of and interest on any money borrowed” (National Loans Act 1968, s 12 [4]). Supply Services, in contrast, are voted annually and result in the passing of Supply and Appropriation Acts by Parliament. There are usually two such acts each year (in July and March)8 and they itemize what would typically be considered the routine expenditure of the government, including allowances for individual government departments and other public bodies (e.g., health, education, defense, etc.).
In both cases, the mechanism is, for all intents and purposes, identical. The first step is the passing of legislation through Parliament, which authorizes an issue from the Consolidated Fund. Next is a requisition by HM Treasury issued to the Comptroller and Auditor General, who is today the head of the National Audit Office, for access to funds granted by Parliament. It is the Comptroller’s responsibility to verify that the requisition is consistent with the terms under which Parliament authorized the expenditure. If satisfied, the Comptroller grants HM Treasury a “credit” on the Consolidated Fund account at the Bank of England,9 whereupon HM Treasury may order the Bank to make issues to Principal Accountants from that account. Principal Accountants are public entities holding other accounts at the Bank.
Today, the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs are the key Principal Accountants, not only because they oversee HM Revenue and Customs, but also because they supervise the Government Banking Service. This service, established in 2008, streamlined the UK Government’s banking arrangements into a single, shared function that uses commercial banking partners for retail banking transmission services. NatWest currently handles payment services for most government departments, while Barclays primarily manages HMRC’s revenue collection. Although operated by these commercial partners, the accounts appear on the Government Banking Service’s balance sheet, with payment settlement flowing through the principal accounts shown in
: accounts historically administered by the Office of HM Paymaster General for expenditure, and the General Accounts of HM Revenue and Customs for revenue. As such, any impact on the commercial partners’ balance sheets is transient or non-existent, depending on the type of transaction undertaken (BACS or CHAPS protocols).10
Interpretation of the Accounting Tables
In the Government Spending and Debt Management sections, we describe the expenditure, taxation, and security issuance processes. The descriptions are supported by a set of fully balanced accounting tables that detail the financial flows that happen at each step, and the composition of each financial flow. Each column is a consolidated journal across the parties involved in the transaction. Each entry in the asset or liability row of a given party describes both the amount and the counterparty with which it is held. Here we follow the approach used by William Mitchell et al. (2019, 93), whereby the balancing items held by the private sector (“payee” in) represent the financial sector’s net financial wealth and the balancing items held by the public sector (Consolidated Fund and Dept in) balance the net financial liabilities issued by the government sector. The balancing asset at the government’s Consolidated Fund reflects the implicit value of future tax receipts (Finance Act 1954, s 34 [3]), as elaborated in the Government Expenditure subsection below.
Throughout, we have kept the accounting narrative to a minimum, highlighting only the primary banking transactions that achieve the outcome of each step. This is to help the reader follow the flow and understand what is driving the process. In the Appendix, we also provide supplementary graphical balance sheet representations of the key transactions, showing government spending (Figure A 1), the Exchequer sweep (Figure A 2), and Cash management (Figure A 3).
In the Debt Management section below, the daily cash management procedure is outlined, which aims to align spending peaks with taxation peaks through market transactions involving short-term government securities. Debt management, the sale of longer-term securities via gilt auctions, is not explicitly shown but can be thought of as a subsequent step where the costless, automatic borrowing is refinanced into more expensive borrowing in line with government policy.
Table 1 outlines HM Treasury’s expenditure process, showing the series of transactions occurring across the balance sheets of all parties when a government department (Dept.) seeks to make a payment to a private sector payee (see also Figure A 1 in the Appendix).
Table 1. Accounting Transactions Involved when a Department of the UK Spends in Accordance with Expenditure Authorized by the UK Parliament.
The first step (“Monthly Treasury Requisition”) follows the legal process mandated by section 15 (2) of the 1866 Act. HM Treasury raises a monthly requisition for the approval of the Comptroller and Auditor General to allocate Parliamentary funding. Once approved, the Comptroller grants HM Treasury “a credit on the Exchequer account at the Bank of England.” An amount equal to the value of the credit is transferred from the Consolidated Fund’s account at the Government Banking Service to the accounts of each of the government departments that have requested funds. These sums are “Exchequer credits”; they are not sterling at this point; hence, the Bank of England’s balance sheet remains static (represented via the blank entries). Note that the allocation of spending balances within the Government Banking Service is conducted entirely by balance sheet expansion and is contingent only upon the authority of Parliament.
In step 2 (“Daily Cash Drawdown”), government departments draw on this monthly allocation of Exchequer credits on a day-to-day basis based upon anticipated cash flows. HM Treasury provides for the settlement of this expenditure via a daily cash drawdown from the Consolidated Fund, known as “issues.” HM Treasury, following Section 15 (3) of the 1886 Act, “cashes in” some of the Exchequer credit at the Government Banking Service and transfers an equivalent amount from the Consolidated Fund account at the Bank of England to the Government Banking Service’s clearing account,11 also at the Bank. The exchange is done by HM Treasury on a one-for-one basis and is not discounted.
Consequently, the Bank of England’s balance sheet expands, whereas the balance sheet of the Government Banking Service remains the same size. It is worth noting that these public sector accounts at the Bank are not recognized within the “Sterling Monetary Framework”12 as reserve accounts. Instead, they are recorded on the Bank’s balance sheet as “public deposits” (Bank of England 2024, 151).
Departmental spending then takes place. The balance in the Government Banking Service’s clearing account at the Bank is used to settle payments into the banking system by transfer to the reserve accounts of commercial banks. At this point, the balance sheets of the Government Banking Service and the department have contracted, having expended a proportion of Exchequer credits previously granted. The reduction of public deposits held on the Bank of England’s balance sheet is matched by a corresponding increase in reserve liabilities, leaving its balance sheet unchanged.
These transactions automatically trigger the other balancing transfers shown within the tables, which leads to some interesting observations. For example, “government borrowing” first arises after parliamentary authorization of spending, when the Consolidated Fund “borrows” from (issues a liability to) the Government Banking Service to allocate funding to departments. This happens automatically and costlessly as a simple consequence of balance sheet expansion within a double-entry bookkeeping framework. A fundamental design feature of the modern-day system (the mechanics of which we explore in the Consolidation of Balances subsection below) is that the account of the Consolidated Fund at the Bank of England starts every day with a zero balance, yet orders for issues out of the account are nevertheless made and fulfilled. It follows that transfers to the account of the Government Banking Service from the Consolidated Fund arise as newly issued money by way of balance sheet expansion within the Bank of England (described as “intraday credit”). Once the full suite of transactions is completed, this new, net monetary asset is held by the private sector recipient of the spending but is still ultimately balanced by the Consolidated Fund liability to the Bank. This process of money creation operates under the order of HM Treasury but with ultimate provenance in Parliament.
The terms under which the Bank of England makes issues on behalf of Parliament pre-date the 1866 Act and have never been constrained by available cash balances.13 Indeed, this feature is codified in legislation: “Any sum charged by any Act, whenever passed, on the Consolidated Fund shall be charged also on the growing produce of the Fund” (Finance Act 1954, s 34 [3]). Such phrasing serves to connect issues with “all the revenues to be received in the future” (Brittain 1959, 16), thereby framing expenditure as a form of credit advanced on the security of future tax revenues, and aligning with the Chartalist theory of money which asserts that fiat currency has value in exchange because of the sovereign’s tax-raising power (Innes 1914; Keynes [1930] 2011; Ingham 2004; Knapp [1924] 2013).
We conclude, therefore, that it is the expenditure that causes a matching, future tax liability and there is no “intertemporal budget constraint,” as is commonly proposed in the orthodox view (see, e.g., Fischer and Easterly 1990), that imposes an ex-ante limit on the quantity of current or future spending.
The Exchequer and Audit Departments Act (1866, s 10) states: “All public moneys payable to the Exchequer shall be paid into the Consolidated Fund,” while the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act (2005, s 44) reaffirmed that principle: “The Commissioners shall pay money received in the exercise of their functions into the Consolidated Fund.” As such, the Consolidated Fund represents the legally mandated, final destination for most of the Government’s revenue. The chain of transitions that support this revenue collection process is depicted in Table 2)
Table 2. Accounting Transactions Involved when Tax is Paid by a UK Taxpayer
Following the establishment of the Government Banking Service, and with the current commercial banking contracts in place, HMRC’s revenue collection activities are processed initially by Barclays Bank PLC. HMRC’s receipt accounts remain within the Government Banking Service, with Barclays acting as processing agent for their sort codes. To pay taxes, taxpayers need to instruct their bank to send a payment to the specified sort code and account. This causes a deletion of the taxpayer’s bank deposit at the commercial bank and a corresponding transfer of central bank reserves from the taxpayer’s bank to Barclays. Barclays then credits HMRC’s tax collection accounts within the Government Banking Service with the appropriate amounts, allowing HMRC to account for the various types of taxes (step 1, table 2).
Several times a day, HMRC transfers amounts from their accounts at the Government Banking Service to their general account at the Bank of England.14 ensuring that any funds in Barclays’ reserve account, held on HMRC’s behalf, are transferred to HMRC’s account at the Bank (, step 2). Finally, these tax receipts are transferred to the Consolidated Fund account at the Bank at the end of each day as part of the daily consolidation “sweep” process (table 2, step 3).
This process shows that UK taxes are finally settled with HMRC using Bank of England money held by the commercial banks in their accounts at the Bank. This means that while the private sector can create commercial bank deposits at its discretion, these deposits cannot be used to pay taxes. Rather, the private sector must also hold an adequate amount of government-issued money for this purpose, also in accordance with the Chartalist perspective, which asserts that taxes are fundamentally connected to state money.
The end-of-day consolidation of the public deposit accounts at the Bank of England is known as the “Exchequer sweep” and results in all balances being consolidated into the Central Funds and ultimately into the National Loans Fund account at the Bank.15 All the other public transaction accounts at the Bank are returned to a zero balance by the end of the day.
The sweep process is summarized in table 2 and see also figure A2 in the Appendix. HM Treasury collects the daily tax takings from HMRC’s general account at the Bank of England and transfers them to the Consolidated Fund Account at the Bank (table 3, step 2), combining them with the result of the day’s cash drawdown to give a final net balance for the day. At the same time, any remaining cash balances held by the Government Banking Service at the Bank of England are transferred to the National Loans Fund Account at the Bank, representing an overnight loan between the Government Banking Service and the National Loans Fund (table 3, step 3).
Table 3. Accounting Transactions Involved When the Exchequer Pyramid is “Swept” at the Conclusion of Daily Business to Consolidate Cash Balances Held at the Bank of England
The Consolidated Fund is balanced according to the process laid down by law (National Loans Act 1968, s 18), which results in the balance of the Consolidated Fund Account at the Bank being transferred to the National Loans Fund Account at the Bank. This has the effect of zeroing the Consolidated Fund Account’s balance that has accumulated from the day’s spending and taxing activities (table 3, step 4).
Spending and revenue are both anchored to the Consolidated Fund Account at the Bank of England but proceed during each day via separate accounts at the Bank—the Government Banking Service accounts in the case of payments, and HM Revenue and Customs’ accounts in the case of tax revenues. These accounts are only reconciled at the end of each day (National Audit Office 2009, Appendix Four, 11),16 and the Consolidated Fund Account can therefore only ever achieve a positive balance by receiving a net transfer over its initial zero starting position at the end of each day. It follows that any expenditure from the Consolidated Fund occurs when the Consolidated Fund has a nil or negative balance, and there is never a situation whereby a deposit of tax revenue furnishes a balance that is subsequently used for spending. In this sense, all spending arises as new money advanced as credit and not from taxation or “borrowing.”
With all public deposit accounts zeroed, the resulting balance on the National Loans Fund account is the UK Government’s net cash balance for that day, called the “Net Exchequer Position.” For the case described in table 3, where there is a deficit at the end of the day, the National Loans Fund has a permanent facility at the Bank of England known as the “Ways and Means account” to formalize its debt to the Bank. This facility is often viewed as an overdraft and was the normal method of Cash Management throughout the twentieth century.
HM Treasury also has access to another “Ways and Means” account, known as “Ways and Means (II),” which serves as an overdraft facility with the banking system. This facility is a liability of the Debt Management Account and arose as part of the Cash Management system introduced after the Debt Management Office was established in 1998.
The original Ways and Means account, linked to the National Loans Fund, was frozen around the turn of the century due to it conflicting with the UK Government’s desire to align with the European Union’s Maastricht Treaty (Articles 104 and 109e (3), the UK Protocol (Paragraph 11) and Council Regulation 3603/93) which prohibits direct monetary financing of governments by the central bank. But this would reduce the “discretion as to the timing of market borrowing by central government” (Debt Management Office 1998, §39, p. 15). The solution was to come up with a commercial overdraft linked to the Debt Management Account, but using a syndicate structure.
there may then be very occasional instances when the Exchequer’s credit balance is exhausted in the overnight ‘sweep’ of its accounts at the Bank. In order to be Maastricht compliant (if the UK were to join Stage 3), the Bank of England cannot lend overnight to make up the shortfall. As an alternative, a standby overdraft facility will be established in favour of the DMA with a syndicate of the core settlement banks. Any use of this facility by the DMO would be remunerated (at a rate to be agreed).” (Debt Management Office 1998, §43, p. 16)
This syndicate structure, known as SEDTA (Special End of Day Transfer Arrangement), was abandoned in May 2006 following the introduction of the Bank of England’s new monetary framework (Debt Management Office 2006, 50). It was quietly replaced by a second Ways and Means Account at the Bank.17
The net operational effect of using either of the Ways and Means accounts is identical: HM Treasury ends up with an overdraft at the Bank of England charged at Bank rate. The difference is that the original Ways and Means Account is an asset of the Issue Department of the Bank and transfers to the National Loans Fund, whereas the Ways and Means (II) Account is an asset of the Banking Department and transfers to the Debt Management Account.18
HM Treasury’s preferred policy approach is to clear the Net Exchequer Position using daily transfers between the Debt Management Account’s account at the Bank of England19 and the National Loans Fund account. Only when this leaves the Debt Management Account’s account at the Bank overdrawn is a transfer from HM Treasury’s Ways and Means (II) account at the Bank automatically made.20 The original Ways and Means account is still available but tends to be used only during crises. The most recent example was in April 2020 during the COVID-19 crisis when HM Treasury announced it may use the Ways and Means account.21 This reminder, that sales of interest-bearing government securities are a discretionary policy choice rather than a funding requirement, caused money market rates to settle, and the facility remained unused.
Debt Management and the Purpose of Government Debt Issuance
The Full Funding Rule, Cash Management, and Supporting Monetary Policy
Even though the institutional framework described in the whole of the Government Spending section above makes it clear that spending is not linked to bond issuance, the annual UK Debt Management report (Debt Management Office 2023a, 10) states that:
An overarching requirement of debt management policy is that the government fully finances its projected financing requirement each year through the sale of debt. This is known as the ‘full funding rule.’ The government therefore issues sufficient wholesale and retail debt instruments, through gilts, Treasury bills (for debt financing purposes) and NS&I products, to enable it to meet its projected financing requirement in full.
The rationale for the full funding rule is, first, that “the government believes that the principles of transparency and predictability are best met by the full funding of its financing requirement”; and second, that, “to avoid the perception that financial transactions of the public sector could affect monetary conditions, consistent with the institutional separation between monetary policy and debt management policy.” Furthermore, the overall debt management objective is “to minimize, over the long term, the costs of meeting the government’s financing needs, taking into account risk, while ensuring that debt management policy is consistent with the aims of monetary policy” (HM Treasury 2023, 10; Debt Management Office 2023a, 8).
The impact of spending and debt management on monetary policy merits further exploration. The daily accounting cycle described in the Consolidation of Balances subsection above results in a net positive or negative monetary balance being held in the National Loans Fund account, known as the Net Exchequer Position. Under the current policy, the Debt Management Office conducts “cash management” to eliminate this position, by trading in a “range of selected instruments with cash management counterparties”22 within the banking sector. The rationale is that, by accounting identity, the Net Exchequer Position also represents a measure of the impact of the government’s financial flows on the banking sector. Specifically, an end-of-day positive balance on the National Loans Fund account indicates that money has been drawn out of the banking sector overall, whereas an end-of-day negative balance indicates that money has been added to the banking sector.
Under the “corridor” reserve management system, which was in operation when the Debt Management Office was established, the impact of the Net Exchequer Position on the banking sector would risk influencing the policy-targeted short-term interest rate in the inter-bank market and undermining the Bank’s monetary policy objectives. Despite a change in the monetary policy regime, HM Treasury still aims to accumulate no cash balances or debt on its accounts at the Bank of England by the end of each day, as these would reflect an equal and opposite impact on the banking sector. The Debt Management Office’s remit remains, therefore, to drain any reserves which have been added to the banking system on days of net spending, or to return reserves which have been removed from the banking sector on days of net revenue. The Debt Management Office receives cash flow predictions throughout the day. These predictions guide its cash management trading activities with the banking sector as it looks to offset the predicted liquidity impact of the Net Exchequer Position and zero the National Loans Fund account.
The Cash Management process is summarized in tables 4 and 5 (and see also figure A 3 in the Appendix). Table 4 describes the more common deficit Net Exchequer Position, with describing the surplus position. The first step in table 4 describes the transactions required to furnish the Debt Management Account with the assets it needs to undertake its trading activity on behalf of the National Loans Fund. A large quantity of gilts is created for use within the Debt Management Account as short-term collateral.23 The Debt Management Account starts each day with a positive balance in its account at the Bank of England, and the Cash Management policy objective is to preserve that balance over a weekly period via the Debt Management Office’s market activities. This target balance is adjusted from time to time in agreement with the Bank of England, and any change is handled within the weekly turnover without explicit offsetting market activity by the Bank, given the current surplus liquidity environment within the banking system. 24
Table 4. Accounting Transactions Involved with the “Cash Management” of a Net Daily Exchequer Deficit Position
Table 5. Accounting Transactions Involved with the “Cash Management” of a Net Daily Exchequer Surplus Position
To clear the deficit position in table 4, the Debt Management Account sells a quantity of short collateral to a counterparty, along with a contract to purchase equivalent short collateral in the future, a repurchase agreement or “repo” (table 4, step 3). Recording these contracts in full shows that the counterparty borrows short collateral from the Debt Management Account at the same time as the Debt Management Account borrows sterling from the counterparty. Short collateral is transferred from the Debt Management Account to the counterparty, and an amount is transferred from the reserve account of the counterparty at the Bank of England to the Debt Management Account’s account at the Bank. At this point, the Debt Management Account’s account at the Bank of England is above target. Once trading has concluded for the day, the Net Exchequer Position is cleared by a transfer of this excess amount from the Debt Management Account’s account to the National Loans Fund account (Table 4, step 4).
Table 5 shows the corresponding surplus scenario and works similarly, but with the cash and short collateral moving in the opposite directions. In many cases, this can represent the settlement of the repo contract put in place by a previous repo. The Debt Management Account opens with the repo from table 4 still in effect, and with a surplus position to clear by settlement of the repo part of the contract. The counterparty returns equivalent short collateral to the Debt Management Account, and an amount is transferred from the Debt Management Account’s account at the Bank of England to the reserve account of the counterparty (table 5, step 3). This leaves the Debt Management Account’s cash balance below target until trading for the day is complete. At that point, the surplus balance in the National Loans Fund account at the Bank of England is transferred, clearing the Net Exchequer Position (table 5, step 4).
It is important to note that trading takes place concurrently with spending and tax collection, and any variation between the daily start and end balance of the Debt Management Account’s account at the Bank of England is largely rectified over its target weekly balancing period.25 This process clearly shows that gilts are not sold before spending; instead, short repo contracts are issued daily by the Debt Management Office to offset the liquidity impact of fiscal activities on the money market.26 These contracts represent bi-directional borrowing of two different types of money, or a “swap” as it is more commonly known. They are supplied from a pre-positioned pool of short collateral that the Debt Management Office can expand or contract on demand.
The notion that security issuance is ultimately motivated by monetary policy, rather than funding expenditure, is consistent with official procedures prior to the establishment of the Debt Management Office, as indicated by a Parliamentary Select Committee report which explained that “[a]lthough Treasury bills are a government debt instrument, the Bank’s monetary considerations determine the level of the weekly tender” (House of Commons, 2000, paragraph 38). It also aligns with studies described in the Mechanics section above, which emphasize the role of public debt issuance in offsetting the increase in reserves created by government (money-creating) expenditure to support the central bank in achieving its targeted interest rate (Bell 2000; Tymoigne 2014).
However, this motivation is no longer applicable in the UK case because in 2009 the Bank of England switched its monetary policy regime from a corridor system to a supply-dominated “floor” system following the Monetary Policy Committee’s decision to purchase assets through the creation of reserves, commonly known as “Quantitative Easing” (QE) (Clews and Salmon 2010). In such a “floor” system, there are excess reserves in the interbank market, which pushes the interbank lending rate down to the level paid by the Bank of England on the commercial banks’ holdings of reserves. This policy rate functions as a floor for the market rate, since it would be unprofitable to lend reserves at a lower rate. The price floor renders the actual quantity of reserves in the inter-bank market largely irrelevant to the achievement of the short-term interest rate target and, as such, any necessary operational link between quantities of debt issued and the net balance of HM Treasury’s spending and taxation flows is broken.
The Safe Store of Value and Collateral Function of Public Debt
Given the provisions in legislation that anchor the other Central Funds and the Debt Management Account to the Consolidated Fund, all UK government debt instruments are claims on the Consolidated Fund. Such debt instruments are held and circulated within the economy, exhibiting the money-like properties of a safe store of value based on the supreme creditworthiness that is inherent in financial claims on the State.
Some claims on the Central Funds are non-negotiable and are therefore specifically useful as a secure store of value. For example, National Savings & Investments is an Executive Agency of HM Treasury, which offers personal savings facilities to households and offers a highly secure way for individual savers to deposit money with the National Loans Fund. Furthermore, HM Treasury holds an “unquantifiable” contingent liability to the Financial Services Compensation Scheme for the provision of commercial bank deposit insurance (HM Treasury 2021, 379). This associates bank deposits up to a value of £85,000 per person with a claim on the National Loans Fund.
Gilts and Treasury bills are negotiable, fixed-term financial instruments. They comprise different maturities and are used extensively as collateral in the Sterling Monetary Framework to gain short-term access to central bank money. In the UK and beyond, negotiable, fixed-term government securities are at the heart of repo markets, which have grown increasingly important in financial systems over the past few decades. These securities serve as high-quality collateral for various types of non-bank financial intermediaries as part of the general trend towards “market-based-finance” or “shadow-banking” (Gabor 2016; Gabor and Ban 2016; Dutta 2020).
However, recent bank failures in the United States have demonstrated that negotiable, fixed-term government securities are subject to interest rate risk. Central banks’ decision to rapidly increase short-term rates and put upward pressure on longer-term rates by selling their stock of securities, known as “Quantitative Tightening” (QT), in an attempt to bring down high inflation, resulted in capital losses on negotiable securities held by financial institutions. In the case of some mid-sized banks in the United States, this led to runs on their deposits, many of which were uninsured.
In the UK, sudden changes in interest rate expectations among financial market participants in response to the Liz Truss government’s “mini-budget” in 2022 led to rising gilt yields. The Bank of England had to step in to provide emergency liquidity to support certain pension funds exposed to these market shifts. If the Bank of England had not intervened, a “self-reinforcing spiral” of falling gilt values would have severely jeopardized financial stability (Cunliffe 2022).
The latter episode has been presented as evidence that there are solvency risks relating to UK Government budget deficits. However, we would argue that it merely reveals that there is interest rate risk for holders of negotiable fixed-term government securities, not solvency risk for the Government. Furthermore, the crisis could likely have been avoided had HM Treasury and the Bank coordinated more effectively. The “gilt crisis” can be attributed more to regulatory issues than the Truss government’s budget, as it resulted from certain pension funds using risky hedging instruments that could strain liquidity when interest rate volatility rises (House of Commons2023). The Bank has now taken steps to provide a “lender of last resort” function to non-banks to ensure this type of event does not happen again.27
These episodes demonstrate the financial stability risks associated with the issuance of negotiable, fixed-term securities and suggest a need for improved fiscal-monetary policy coordination (see the Central Bank Independence subsection below), widening central banks’ regulatory perimeters to include non-bank financial intermediaries and potentially a general reconsideration of macroeconomic stabilization policy. However, while there are sound reasons for considering changing the composition of the UK Government’s aggregate liabilities away from negotiable, fixed-term instruments, there seems to be less of a case for adopting policies aiming to reduce the level of public debt per se. The reduction or elimination of aggregate government liabilities would have detrimental implications for private sector exchange and financial stability, though these consequences are rarely referenced by proponents of public debt reduction.
Constraints on Government Spending
Given the analyses presented in the Government Spending and Debt Management sections, what conclusions can be drawn concerning the constraints commonly portrayed as limiting the UK Government’s (and other governments’) financial activities? These include liquidity risk and market risk (or bond market discipline). First, regarding the sequencing of public financing and liquidity risk, the analysis in the Government Spending section shows there is no requirement for the provisioning of money balances through taxation and external “borrowing” activities to occur before government spending can be undertaken. As such, there are no circumstances whereby the UK Government has “insufficient money” for expenditure requirements or is at risk of “running out of money.” Indeed, one of HM Treasury’s fundamental organizing principles is for the accumulation of cash balances to be minimized. Instead, all spending arises via the creation of new monetary assets, and this process is independent of tax and securities dealing activities. The conclusion, which HM Treasury acknowledges, is that there is no aspect of the UK Government’s banking arrangements that can prevent government expenditure from being realized once it has been authorized by Parliament.28
Another commonly perceived constraint is default risk. HM Treasury is required by law to make payments of principal and interest on any “borrowing” it undertakes. Such payments are permanently authorized by Parliament as standing services under the National Loans Act 1968.Footnote29 Thus, default on national debt repayments, for example, those associated with maturing gilts and Treasury bills, or National Savings withdrawals, can only occur with an express or implied repeal by Parliament of the relevant legislation. Neither HM Treasury nor the Bank of England has any discretion in this matter. From this perspective, government securities already function somewhat analogously to time deposits, representing an interest-earning, secure alternative to other forms of money for a fixed or discretionary duration before reverting seamlessly to sterling (Mosler 2010, 108).
Equally, sales of negotiable, fixed-term securities, required to meet end-of-day “offsetting” objectives, pose little challenge to HM Treasury. It is often claimed that the Government is beholden to a hostile investor market, “bond market vigilantes,” which may refuse to purchase the government’s securities or otherwise demand punitive terms. However, the Bank of England (1964) explained half a century ago that the banking sector will reflexively purchase, by the end of each day, any securities that need to be sold to satisfy policy requirements. That is because banks are already holding excess central bank reserves that have been injected into the banking system during the day by virtue of HM Treasury’s net spending. The quantity of the balances added during the day exactly matches the Debt Management Office’s offsetting remit, by definition, and the banks will reflexively switch these excess balances for something of the same creditworthiness, but which receives a higher rate of return, with bond yields being higher than the interest received on the holding such reserves. In the current floor system, commercial banks are collectively compelled to hold excess reserves, which further establishes a “seller’s market” for gilts and Treasury bills.
The Debt Management Office is not, therefore, faced with a market holding scarce funds that seeks to bid up the prices charged to HM Treasury. Instead, as the monopoly issuer of sterling safe assets, the Debt Management Office needs only to offer terms that are, at worst, infinitesimally better than those earned on the excess central bank reserves that the banks already hold (Fullwiler 2020, 20). As such, short-term rates on government securities converge to the Bank of England’s policy rate, rather than being determined by market forces in the hypothetical market for loanable funds, which underpins neoclassical economic theory (Akram and Li 2020; Storm 2020). Given the role of government securities in the functioning of monetary policy (including QE and QT), interest payments on government debt can be conceived simply as an expression of the policy interest rate targeted by the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee. Sales of government securities are not at the discretion of markets, because the demand for gilts by primary dealers in auctions is generated as a routine feature of the functioning of HM Treasury, Government Banking Service, and the Sterling Monetary Framework.
In summary, the institutional structures described in this article demonstrate that the UK Government is not exposed to the alleged risks of “running out of money,” defaulting on debt obligations, the sentiments of bond markets, or a need to reduce levels of government debt below those demanded by the economy. Instead, the functioning of the Central Funds, in particular the daily accounting cycle and trading activities, was developed with the maintenance of monetary policy in mind. Under the current “floor regime,” where there is excess liquidity in the market, the issuance of government debt instead serves mainly to support secure store-of-value and source-of-collateral functions for the private sector.
Central Bank Independence and Fiscal-Monetary Coordination
As noted in the Mechanics section above, there is currently lively debate about the relative independence of modern central banks vis-à-vis fiscal policy, a debate made more prescient in the light of the enormous fiscal expansions that accompanied the COVID-19 pandemic (Bartsch et al. 2020; Blanchard et al. 2020) and the high inflation that followed. In the UK, an official House of Lords Economic Affairs Select Committee investigation into Quantitative Easing examined accusations that the Bank of England had engaged in deficit financing (House of Lords 2021, 25–27). The report concluded that, “[w]e are concerned that scepticism of the bank’s stated reasons for QE grew significantly during the COVID-19 pandemic, when many market participants said that they believed the Bank of England had used QE primarily to finance the Government’s deficit spending” (House of Lords 2021, 59; see also Stubbington and Giles 2021). In contrast, as mentioned earlier, some post-Keynesian scholars argue against the neo-Chartalist “consolidated public sector balance sheet” hypothesis for allegedly neglecting the role of independent central banks in limiting spending (Lavoie 2013; Palley 2015).
Our analysis finds, however, that when applied to the UK case, these discussions lack grounding as they overlook, intentionally or otherwise, the institutional reality of the primacy of the Consolidated Fund and government debt securities in the monetary system. The Bank of England is never independent in the sense that it can refuse to facilitate public expenditure.e30 First, and most straightforwardly, HM Treasury requires the Bank of England to advance public deposits by virtue of the 1866 Act. Under its provisions, the Bank of England has no discretion over whether to extend credit (and accept the intra-governmental, non-negotiable counterpart debt asset, see table 1). It is thus not in a position to limit government spending, and, notably, this status was not changed by the Bank of England Act 1998, which granted operational authority for monetary policy to the Bank (Bank of England Act 1998, s10).
Although the intra-government accounting underpinning the spending process is complicated, it is not a complex system. The core insight of our analysis is that the UK Government spends by issuing sterling reserves, which are internally financed by claims on the Consolidated Fund by the Bank of England, and issues negotiable, fixed-term debt instruments subsequently. Before 2009, the main rationale behind debt issuance was to support monetary policy implementation under the corridor system and, afterwards, due solely (as far as the available evidence suggests) to convention. We therefore do not consider the “full funding rule” to impose any constraints on public spending that need to be “finessed,” as suggested by Pantelopoulos and Watts (2021), since the spending is financed automatically by a Bank of England claim on the Consolidated Fund.
Our findings thus support the argument that public financing operations can be significantly simplified in countries that require pre-funding of government spending accounts, without changing the economic impact. By removing non-binding constraints such as the full funding rule, public finance transparency reform would make clear that public financing derives from the State’s authority to define and issue money. Speculating as to why such a reform has not happened is beyond the scope of this article. However, we suspect the political impact of transparent government self-financing would be significant.
Second, Parliament is the only entity within the UK economy that can compel the payment of taxes. This privilege gives HM Government, uniquely, a guaranteed claim over domestic economic resources, making it the most creditworthy agent in the economy. This pre-eminent creditworthiness can be discerned from the systems and practices the UK Government employs to underpin the functionality of the monetary system. The Bank of England’s implementation of monetary policy, for example, relies on the supreme creditworthiness of Parliament. Almost the entirety of the Bank of England’s assets is represented by government securities or by private loans collateralized by these securities, and therefore, the banknotes and central bank reserves, collectively known as “base money,” are underpinned by liabilities of HM Treasury. Moreover, there are provisions in law to ensure that HM Treasury reflexively provides such securities to back the banknote issue31 and additional injections of capital or granting of indemnities to support the bank’s business more generally are also provided by HM Treasury (HM Treasury 2018; 2022).
Equally, HM Treasury stands ready to provide financial assistance to ensure economic stability in the event of commercial bank failure. Stabilization powers include the transfer of banking entities into public ownership and the provision of deposit insurance, both of which featured in the response to the Global Financial Crisis from 2008 (Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, part XV; Banking Act 2009). As the only entity within the economy that is in a position to extend such support, it is clear that the financial capacity of the UK Government surpasses that of the banking system, which creates the bank deposits that firms and households typically consider to be money. From this perspective, it is no mystery why the banking sector would be satisfied to receive claims on the Government, even without explicit compulsion. By requiring taxes to be settled in Bank of England liabilities, the government additionally creates demand reserves and notes, ensuring they function as sterling monetary assets.
Taxes thus do allow the UK Government to spend, but they do not mechanically enable it in the way that is usually implied by political discourse. Instead, the guaranteed claim over national resources, which the imposition of taxes provides, generates the creditworthiness that enables the UK Government to leverage the monetary system for its purposes, if it wishes to do so. This notion is enshrined in law with the provision that expenditure from the Consolidated Fund is charged “on the Exchequer account at the Bank of England (or on its growing balance),”32 thereby explicitly linking current spending to future tax revenue. This does not imply a mechanical 1:1 dependency between spending and taxation over a given period of time,e33 but rather that taxation bestows unsurpassed creditworthiness on the UK Government’s liabilities, making them valuable for the private sector to hold and net-save.
Taxes also play an important role in freeing up labor resources in the economy, and the physical capital or natural resources they would otherwise be using, which can subsequently support non-inflationary public spending. Thus, raising taxation on carbon-intensive forms of employment, for example, could free up capacity to support investment in renewable energy projects where similar skill sets and know-how may be needed to support the transition to a net-zero carbon economy.
The main constraint on fiscal policy in the UK is physical resource availability; spending in areas of the economy where resources are lacking with appropriate reallocation can result in inflationary dynamics. As the 2021–2022 inflation shock demonstrated, however, the causes of consumer price inflation can also have very little to do with government expenditure. Therefore, more administrative effort should be dedicated to analyzing the inflationary and deflationary impacts of spending (and taxation) in order to determine the need for offsetting adjustments. This focus on real-world effects and managing inflation should replace misplaced concerns about debt sustainability.
Overall, these insights support the neo-Chartalist description and understanding of modern public financing. HM Treasury spends via money creation and not from pre-existing funds, and it does so autonomously at the Bank of England, which is legally obliged to support expenditures sanctioned by Parliament. But while the existing neo-Chartalist position often emphasizes the need for central bank accommodation of government spending via actions in the money market that circumvent self-imposed constraints in the financing process (Tymoigne 2014; Pantelopoulos and Watts 2021), in the UK case there is a well-functioning system wherein the Government directly finances its expenditures without any need for accommodatory activity or finessing of self-imposed rules.
Conclusion
It is commonly claimed that the UK Government has no agency to create money and must instead obtain funding from taxpayers or lenders; expressed in the currently favored political parlance: “[t]here is no magic money tree.”34 In this article, we have shown that this theory does not accord with the institutional reality in the UK. The UK’s fiscal agent, HM Treasury, is fundamental to the sterling monetary system, including the creation and issuance of monetary instruments and guarantees that underpin the entire public-private monetary framework.
At the heart of the UK financial system is the Consolidated Fund. This fund provides the UK Government with sovereign credit that HM Treasury, with parliamentary authority, draws on, backed solely by the ability to raise taxes in the future. When spending occurs, Exchequer credits are allocated by the Government Banking Service to government departments and exchanged, on demand, at a fixed exchange rate onto the Bank of England’s balance sheet as sterling public deposits. This, in turn, allows government departments to spend into the private sector, creating additional sterling-denominated deposits in the commercial bank accounts of recipients. The process is legally mandated and cannot be challenged by the Bank of England, any other government department, or any private entity.
The primary economic function of government debt issuance, in the context of the “floor” reserve management system that the Bank of England currently employs, is to support the desire of the bank and non-bank financial sector to hold a secure store of value and a source of collateral. However, the Bank of England’s purchase of gilts withdraws the bonds back onto a public sector balance sheet and thus partly neutralizes this function. This inconsistency between the Debt Management Office and the Bank of England in terms of government debt dynamics suggests that the UK monetary system could be simplified. The current arrangements raise questions about the economic efficiency of these operations, given the involvement of financial intermediaries (the primary dealers, mainly commercial and investment banks), which profit from handling issuance transactions and market-making for the wider financial sector.
Whatever reforms do or do not take place, it should be made clear that the UK Government spends by issuing new money, destroys money when it taxes, and issues debt securities to provide a safe store of value and to affect interest rates in financial markets. Enhancing transparency in this way is necessary to improve public discourse and understanding of public finances. This could restore political accountability and strengthen the democratic scrutiny of macroeconomic policy.
There are no relevant financial or non-financial competing interests to report.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Andrew Berkeley
Andrew Berkeley is an associate at the Gower Institute for Modern Money Studies. Josh Ryan-Collins is Professor in Economics and Finance at the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (UCL IIPP), London. Richard Tye is an independent researcher and works in the aviation industry as a search and rescue helicopter pilot. Asker Voldsgaard is Director of the Center for Makrofinans based in Denmark and an Honorary Research Fellow at the UCL IIPP. Neil Wilson is an associate at the Gower Initiative for Modern Money Studies. The authors extend thanks to Eric Tymoigne, Michael Kumhof and three anonymous referees for comments on the paper and to participants at two seminars where the paper was presented: at the UCL IIPP on March 21, 2021, and at the Bank of England on June 15, 2022.
Josh Ryan-Collins
Andrew Berkeley is an associate at the Gower Institute for Modern Money Studies. Josh Ryan-Collins is Professor in Economics and Finance at the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (UCL IIPP), London. Richard Tye is an independent researcher and works in the aviation industry as a search and rescue helicopter pilot. Asker Voldsgaard is Director of the Center for Makrofinans based in Denmark and an Honorary Research Fellow at the UCL IIPP. Neil Wilson is an associate at the Gower Initiative for Modern Money Studies. The authors extend thanks to Eric Tymoigne, Michael Kumhof and three anonymous referees for comments on the paper and to participants at two seminars where the paper was presented: at the UCL IIPP on March 21, 2021, and at the Bank of England on June 15, 2022.
Richard Tye
Andrew Berkeley is an associate at the Gower Institute for Modern Money Studies. Josh Ryan-Collins is Professor in Economics and Finance at the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (UCL IIPP), London. Richard Tye is an independent researcher and works in the aviation industry as a search and rescue helicopter pilot. Asker Voldsgaard is Director of the Center for Makrofinans based in Denmark and an Honorary Research Fellow at the UCL IIPP. Neil Wilson is an associate at the Gower Initiative for Modern Money Studies. The authors extend thanks to Eric Tymoigne, Michael Kumhof and three anonymous referees for comments on the paper and to participants at two seminars where the paper was presented: at the UCL IIPP on March 21, 2021, and at the Bank of England on June 15, 2022.
Asker Voldsgaard
Andrew Berkeley is an associate at the Gower Institute for Modern Money Studies. Josh Ryan-Collins is Professor in Economics and Finance at the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (UCL IIPP), London. Richard Tye is an independent researcher and works in the aviation industry as a search and rescue helicopter pilot. Asker Voldsgaard is Director of the Center for Makrofinans based in Denmark and an Honorary Research Fellow at the UCL IIPP. Neil Wilson is an associate at the Gower Initiative for Modern Money Studies. The authors extend thanks to Eric Tymoigne, Michael Kumhof and three anonymous referees for comments on the paper and to participants at two seminars where the paper was presented: at the UCL IIPP on March 21, 2021, and at the Bank of England on June 15, 2022.
Neil Wilson
Andrew Berkeley is an associate at the Gower Institute for Modern Money Studies. Josh Ryan-Collins is Professor in Economics and Finance at the UCL Institute for Innovation and Public Purpose (UCL IIPP), London. Richard Tye is an independent researcher and works in the aviation industry as a search and rescue helicopter pilot. Asker Voldsgaard is Director of the Center for Makrofinans based in Denmark and an Honorary Research Fellow at the UCL IIPP. Neil Wilson is an associate at the Gower Initiative for Modern Money Studies. The authors extend thanks to Eric Tymoigne, Michael Kumhof and three anonymous referees for comments on the paper and to participants at two seminars where the paper was presented: at the UCL IIPP on March 21, 2021, and at the Bank of England on June 15, 2022.
1 The UK system was described in several publications through the early- and mid-twentieth century (Philippovich 1911; Higgs 1914; Young 1915; Brittain 1959; Bank of England 1963; 1964; 1966; 1982; Ulph 1985) but no detailed synthesis has appeared since, despite significant institutional changes. These include reform of the gilt market, Bank of England independence, the establishment of the Debt Management Office and Government Banking Service and monetary policy evolution in the form of interest rate targeting and the payment of interest on central bank reserves.
2 Although many of the Freedom of Information requests were successful, some were refused under various exemptions within the legislation. Among the authorities contacted, including the Bank of England, the Debt Management Office and HMRC, HM Treasury was the greatest user of exemptions. Full correspondence is available on request.
3 For a discussion of the UK’s Quantitative Easing design, operation and impact see Joyce et al. 2011.
4 From the Government Spending section onwards, the use of the term “Government” within this article refers to this consolidated view. The UK fiscal authority is HM Treasury, and the monetary authority is the Bank of England, and we refer to these separately when describing the institutional detail. The Bank of England is a wholly owned subsidiary of HM Treasury and subject to its direction and control under the Bank of England Acts.
5 See also Tymoigne and Wray (2015) and Cesarotto (2016) for further details on this debate.
6 These include the loans of the Public Works Loan Board and the IMF Quota Subscription as well as Gilts and Treasury bills.
7 In particular, the Debt Management Account and the National Loans Fund both have several asset and liability accounts with each other.
8 The UK’s financial year runs April to March.
9 Elaborately entitled “The Account of His Majesty’s Exchequer.”
10 The BACS level 3 (Government Grade) payment clearing and settlement protocol directly substitutes a Government Banking Service public deposit account for the commercial partner’s reserve account as the pertinent settlement account for transactions. This is via a three-legged transaction: there is a source account, a destination account and a nostro account. The public deposit account is used as the nostro. This makes the GBS source account (managed by the commercial partner) a memorandum account on the public deposit control account used as the nostro.
11 This account, among others, was operated by The Office of HM Paymaster General for around 170 years before responsibility was transferred to the newly established Government Banking Service (Transfer of Functions Order 2006).
12 “The Bank of England’s mission is to promote the good of the people of the United Kingdom by maintaining monetary and financial stability. The Bank’s operations in the sterling money markets — known as the Sterling Monetary Framework (SMF) — serve that mission.” (Bank of England 2015, 3)
13 Throughout the early nineteenth century, the UK Exchequer was organized around a quarterly accounting cycle within which Bank advances were made to support spending and reconciled with tax receipts only at each quarter-end (House of Commons 1857). “Deficiency Bills” were issued to the Bank as security for net advances carried over into subsequent quarters. In 1857, a report from the Parliamentary Select Committee on Public Monies recommended ending the practice of issuing Deficiency Bills to the Bank of England and the practice of simply recording deficiencies as “book debts” was adopted from 1866 (Tye 2023). The quarterly accounting framework was abolished in 1954 (Finance Act 1954, s 34 [3]).
14 Reply to Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request, Ref: FOI2021/10608. by HMRC to author Richard Tye. May 24, 2021. Available at www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/755814/response/1796633/attach/html/3/210524%20FOI%20reply%20Richard%20Tye%20FOI%202021%2010608.pdf.html.
15 “Government bank accounts at the Bank of England are linked together in a system known as the Exchequer Pyramid … At the end of each working day, any public funds in the Exchequer Pyramid at the Bank of England are swept up to the National Loans Fund, which itself is swept into the Debt Management Account.” (National Audit Office Citation2009, Appendix Four)
16 Reply to Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request, Ref: FOI2021/10608. by HMRC to author Richard Tye., May 24 2021. Available at www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/755814/response/1796633/attach/html/3/210524%20FOI%20reply%20Richard%20Tye%20FOI%202021%2010608.pdf.html.
17 “The DMA is held at the Bank of England and a positive end-of-day balance must be maintained at all times; it cannot be overdrawn. Automatic transfers from the government Ways and Means (II) account at the Bank of England would offset any negative end-of-day balances, though it is an objective to minimize such transfers” (Debt Management Office Citation2024, 35). A version of this wording first appeared in the annual review in 2008 (Debt Management Office Citation2008, 30-31)
18 “Reply to Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request, Ref: CAS-66626-W5N6Z7” by Bank of England to author Neil Wilson. October 26, 2023, available at www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/1035674/response/2454686/attach/html/2/Response%20to%20Neil%20Wilson.pdf.html.
19 The Debt Management Account is a fund and holds operational accounts at various institutions. Hence the tortuous terminology.
20 The last time this happened was December 13, 2021 to the tune of £3.9million (Debt Management Office 2022, 32).
21 “As well as temporarily smoothing government cash flows, the W&M facility supports market function by minimizing the immediate impact of raising additional funding in gilt and sterling money markets” (HM Treasury 2020).
22 “The DMO may transact in repo/reverse repo transactions in gilts, European government bonds and/or corporate bonds, Treasury bills, certificates of deposit, commercial paper and short-term debt with counterparties for maturities of up to one year and enter into transactions in gilts (including strips) within 18 months of maturity” (Debt Management Office 2021, 7).
23 “During the year, £63,309 million (nominal) gilts (2022: none) were created by the National Loans Fund and sold to the DMA for use as collateral in its cash management operations” (Debt Management Office 2023b, 118). They are “sold” only in the sense that the liability of the Debt Management Account to the National Loans Fund is increased.
24 “Under the monetary policy framework in place prior to Quantitative Easing (referred to as ‘reserves averaging’), the Bank of England […] took into account a number of external variables when determining the amount of liquidity offered in its weekly open market operations. This would have included the target set on the Debt Management Account […] Similarly, under reserves averaging, deviations from the target would also have been factored into the next calculation of liquidity to be offered to the market.” “Reply to Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request, Ref: CAS-24437-J7C6Z9.” by the Bank of England to author Andrew Berkeley. September 17 2020 available at: https://drive.google.com/file/d/1xutR5zeLnH2KpRSYdZvvy_tZ6oPM57jW/view.
25 “The DMO will conduct market operations with a view to achieving, within a very small range, the weekly cumulative target balance for the DMA at the Bank of England” (Debt Management Office 2024, 34).
26 The “debt management” process, the auctioning of gilts, then becomes, functionally, a short to long refinancing procedure.
27 “Our end destination is clear—to build a new central bank backstop tool capable of lending directly to NBFIs against high quality assets to help tackle future episodes of severe dysfunction in core markets that threaten UK financial stability” (Bank of England 2023).
28 “The Government’s banking arrangements … ensure that all expenditure authorized by Parliament can be settled” “Reply to Freedom of Information Act 2000 Request, Ref: FOI2020/02182.” by HM Treasury to author Andrew Berkeley. February 27, 2020. Available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ebUnW3aUOLMpdWR7q9ewYHSSII2BRqiQ/view.
29 “The principal of and interest on any money borrowed under this section … shall be charged on and paid out of the National Loans Fund with recourse to the Consolidated Fund” (National Loans Act 1968, s 12 [4]).
30 Even the landmark monetary policy initiative of Quantitative Easing was initiated on instructions from HM Treasury (HM Treasury 2009; Darling to King 2009).
31 “If … the value of the assets then held in the [Issue] Department falls short of the total amount of the Bank of England notes then outstanding, the Treasury shall assume a liability to the said Department of an amount equal to the difference… . Any liability assumed … shall be charged on the National Loans Fund with recourse to the Consolidated Fund” (National Loans Act Citation1968, s 9, 3–4).
32 This wording is used in the Exchequer and Audit Departments Act 1866 in both s 13 (2) and s 15 (2).
33 The orthodox view that there is a government fiscal constraint is a misinterpretation of an accounting identity as an ex-ante system constraint rather than an ex-post balance sheet position. (Mitchell et al. 2019, §21.2, 333–335).
34 The term has been used by successive Conservative governments since David Cameron’s speech in 2013 featured in the opening quotation of the article; most recently by the then Prime Minister and Chancellor in an article for the Sunday Times (Johnson and Sunak 2022)
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Appendix
Supplementary Balance Sheet Representations of Spending, Taxation, and Borrowing Processes
Figure A1. Government Spending in a Graphical Balance Sheet Representation
Note: In order to make all balances balance assets and liabilities, one could add a negative net worth for the CF and a positive net worth for governmental departments (Dept.). These are left out for graphical clarity.
Figure A2. The Exchequer Sweep
Note: All balances reflect each entity’s position vis-à-vis the Bank of England. GBS: Government Banking Service. HMRC: His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. CF: Consolidated Fund. NLF: National Loans Fund.
Figure A3. Cash Management with Daily Fiscal Deficit and Surplus
Note: All balances reflect each entity’s position vis-à-vis the Bank of England. CF: Consolidated Fund. NLF: National Loans Fund. DMA: Debt Management Account controlled by the Debt Management Office (DMO).
oooooo
Bill Mitchell: Our sequel to Reclaiming the State in now in progress
(https://billmitchell.org/blog/?p=44390)
February 27, 2020
As parat of my recent European speaking engagements, I went to Rome on February 5, 2020 to speak at the Italian Senate on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) and the dysfunctional state of the European Union. The next day I had long discussions with one of my co-authors, Thomas Fazi, who I wrote – Reclaiming the State: A Progressive Vision of Sovereignty for a Post-Neoliberal World (Pluto Books, September 2017) with. We have been working on the sequel to that book for some time, and, in the process, have had to work through some difficult issues on which there has been some degree of difference in our viewpoints. While I was in Rome, Thomas and I also recorded a video of a conversation where we talk about our sequel. We provide that video here as well as a brief discussion outlining some of the major issues that the book will address.
Video
The conversation took place on February 8, 2020 in the Hotel Indigo, via Giulia, Rome.
We had been talking that afternoon about the sequel and trying to resolve differences we had regarding the emphasis, especially with regard to how to tackle the difficult identity issues.
In fact, we have been discussing these issues for some months as we tried to sort out the proposed chapter outline.
We have been able to come up with a way forward that one think will not be divisive within the progressive community.
But then, given past history, an ant can walk across a path and the Left will find something to argue about. The next book is proposed for release later this year1.
The video is the result of our lengthy discussions on various topics.
The video goes for about 37 minutes, was recorded on an iPhone XS Max, supported on a little tripod structure that we bought in a Trastevere street market for a few euros.
Some information about our proposed sequel
In Reclaiming the State and in my 2015 book – Eurozone Dystopia: Groupthink and Denial on a Grand Scale (published May 2015) – the issue of identity came up.
Towards the end of that book, I was evaluating the various options that the 19 Member States of the Eurozone had to get out of the dystopic neoliberal austerity machine that they had created when they went into the common currency and surrendered their own sovereignty.
One option was clearly to create a true Federal Europe, which was the only way the earlier processes that explored further economic integration (the 1970 Werner Report and the 1977 MacDougall Report).
The – Werner Report – for example, concluded that for EMU cohesion “transfers of responsibility from the national to the Community plane will be essential” (Werner Report, 1970, page 10).
Moreover, the (p.11):
… transfer to the Community level of the powers exercised hitherto by national authorities will go hand in hand with the transfer of a corresponding Parliamentary responsibility from the national plane to that of the Community. The centre of decision of economic policy will be politically responsible to a European Parliament.
In a similar vein, the – MacDougall Report concluded in relation to the need for a mechanism to cushion “short-term and cyclical fluctuations” (p.12) that:
… because the Community budget is so relatively very small there is no such mechanism in operation on any significant scale, as between member countries, and this is an important reason why in the present circumstances monetary union is impracticable.
The current design of the Eurozone determines that the Member State governments are not ‘sovereign’ in the sense that they are forced to use a foreign currency and must issue debt to private bond markets in that foreign currency to fund any fiscal deficits.
Their fiscal positions must then take the full brunt of any economic downturn because there is no ‘federal’ counter stabilisation function.
The EMU is a federation without the most important component.
The decision by the Delors Committee in 1989 to ignore these recommendations reflected two realities:
1. The neoliberal ideology had become dominant and they didn’t want a major fiscal role for government in the new system.
2. But, relevant here, the decision to leave fiscal policy responsibilities at the Member State level reflected the diverse cultural, historical and language differences across the 19 Member States.
In particular, Germany’s dominant position in the European economy allowed it to dictate terms and there was never going to be a system established where permanent fiscal transfers could be made between states, which in the European context would have meant transfers from Germany to the South (mainly).
There was simply no European ‘demos’, which could force the creation of a truly federal Europe.
Which led me to conclude that the option for Europe to create an effective federal system was not viable.
That led me to recommend various orders of exit starting from the politically impossible orderly dissolution of the currency sharing to different forms of unilateral exit.
But the point was that currency sovereignty is only legitimised if there is a demos that accepts that sovereignty and all that it implies (permanent asymmetric spatial transfers and the like).
In our 2017 book – Reclaiming the State: A Progressive Vision of Sovereignty for a Post-Neoliberal World (Pluto Books, September 2017), Thomas and I developed a progressive manifesto for reconfiguring the state (in concept) away from neoliberalism.
We had argued that neoliberalism was really a state-driven project rather than an abandonment of the nation state.
And as the agenda we outlined was based on the imperative for governments to have true currency sovereignty.
Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) outlines four requirements for sovereignty:
1. The government issues its own currency.
2. It floats it on international markets.
3. It creates no liabilities in any other currency.
4. Its central bank sets the interest rate.
So in Reclaiming the State, the progressive agenda relied on the government using its capacity as the currency issuer to pursue social, economic and ecological policies that advance the well-being for the people rather than being an agent for capital and overseeing and facilitating a process that systematically redistributes income and power away from workers to capital.
While we extended the ideas I had developed on culture and identity in Eurozone Dystopia, we didn’t fully develop the analysis.
Importantly, while MMT places currency sovereignty at the centre of the macroeconomic analysis, and we certainly made that a necessary condition for underpinning an effective progressive agenda, there has been much work from us on what determines the political legitimacy of the currency sovereign government.
Why are some currency arrangements unworkable (such as the EMU) and others effective (Australia)?
That is the first major question we seek to answer in the sequel.
And, clearly, it requires us to explore the delicate issues of identity and culture.
As is apparent in the video, Thomas and I are very aware of the way discussions of these sorts of issues can easily descend into one-line accusations of racism, xenophobia, homophobia, trans-phobia and all the rest of the nasty assertions that seem to appear regular on social media.
To some extent, there are elements that do not really want a debate about these issues but seek to close down the discussion.
We reject that strategy.
But, as the video shows, and as audiences who came to the GIMMS lectures in London and Manchester last week heard, I am also extremely cautious about entering discussions of these issues.
It is not that I am scared of the cancel culture characters.
Rather the issues are so nuanced that it is hard to make progress in a definitive manner.
So, Thomas and I will explore these issues using a dialogical narrative technique, where we can rehearse our individual differences on these topics and the conflicts within the literature to provide what I hope will be an intelligent and respectful portrayal of the divisions that exist.
We are searching for a ‘demos’!
The other question that was left unanswered but touched on in – Reclaiming the State: A Progressive Vision of Sovereignty for a Post-Neoliberal World – was the question of internationalism.
Thomas and I are both committed progressives and have been deeply influenced by the aspirations to create a global working class resistance against capitalism.
But as one of the founders of MMT, I clearly consider national currency sovereignty to be essential.
I eschew the notion that an international currency is possible or even desirable, for reasons the first section of the new book (outlined above) establishes.
We also reject the notion that the European Union is to be supported as an expression of the international aspirations of workers.
The EU is a corporatist, neoliberal cabal where that ideology is embedded in the legal structure of the structure and is effectively incapable of reform.
The cosmopolitanism embedded in the EU, which many of the progressive Left hold out as a reason for supporting the arrangement and was behind their deep opposition, for example, to Brexit, ends at the Mediterranean!
We reject this limited application of cosmopolitanism.
The question therefore is this.
If we are committed to effective currency sovereignty, which usually means one nation-one currency, then how do we construct a meaningful progressive internationalism?
That is the second task we aim to pursue in the sequel.
We will develop a notion of ‘international solidarity’ with all peoples and then evaluate how that concept can be operationalised in a progressive manner.
And, again, entering the minefield we have to discuss population policy, migration, foreign aid and lots of related thorny issues.
Our view is that an open borders policy for a nation is impossible for a variety of reasons.
If we consider one of the foundational principles of MMT – that the constraints on a society (and hence government) are the real resources that are available for use at any point in time – then the idea of a population policy makes sense, without invoking any identity issues at all.
Real resources are typically fixed in space and/or fixed in ratio.
In the first case, at any point in time there is only so much housing available, so much public infrastructure, so much educational resources etc. They evolve slowly and although China built a hospital in 10 or so days that was atypical behaviour.
In the second case, while human resources clearly come with immigration, they are typically combined with other productive capital, which is less mobile and immediately available.
So a planned approach to population expansion is responsible.
But we are aware that wealthy nations have a responsibility to less well-off nations and the task is to devise ways of advancing that responsibility so that:
1. Global resources are more equitably shared.
2. Old colonial and post-colonial extraction mechanisms are terminated.
2, Multilateral agencies that are created do not destroy prosperity in weaker nations.
4. Foreign aid is generous and targetted to reduce the so-called ‘push factors’ that force people to seek migratory options.
5. Necessary migration (if that is the most equitable and effective option) is planned and scaled in a way to enhance solidarity within and across nations rather than promote division.
A big task.
But I think on these issues, Thomas and I are fairly close in our views.
We plan to have the sequel out later in 2020 and there will be a promotional tour probably in early 20212.
oooooo
1 Up to now, 2025/09/15 the book has not been published.
2 See the previous note.
oooo
Conversation with William Mitchell and Thomas Fazi, Rome, February 2020
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Cn8z9Ycknc)
In this video, Reclaiming the State authors discuss the scope of their sequel (due out later in 2020) and how they intend to deal with some of the issues involved.
Transkripzioa:
0:01
[Music]
0:37
down by the river and here’s Thomas party my co-author on reclaiming the
0:44
state and hey y’all you know and we’ve just been talking about our next project
0:50
and if there is going to be money because with all of these cohorts and
0:58
projects there’s always room for debate and we’re just working through all of
1:06
the issues there’s been a lot of attention on social media about some of these issues in recent weeks and months
1:13
and particularly the sort of identity issues that the that the left so
1:21
concentrates on at times and I think that these issues are so nuanced that
1:27
it’s very hard getting any clear noise out into into a debate you know as soon
1:35
as you talk about anything to do with the West Bank you’re accused of being an anti-semite and the issues are you know
1:44
the issues that we’ve been talking about today and we’ll talk about a bit today here together is that you know from a
1:52
strategic point of view I wonder whether they’re so nuanced whether we can
1:59
actually get anywhere focusing on those
2:04
sort of issues you know you know sort of progressive live debate but then I
2:11
understand your position that we shouldn’t be silenced by irrational
2:19
responses and and I accept that I mean my starting point is I’m I’m basically
2:26
politically correct and I guess the reason I’m I’ve accepted
2:33
that as being a reasonable discipline on dialogue is because I’m aware that it’s
2:42
very easy just to hurt people even if even if even if we might stand back in
2:51
some dispassionate way whatever that is and think well why would you be advised by something it doesn’t matter you know
2:58
that that’s not the point people do get hurt and see it could be very cautious in in what in and I think I think
3:05
society has evolved so we use language much better in these issues but but I do
3:11
accept your point that there’s this like I you know this I wrote about it a
3:18
couple of weeks ago about the cancel cancel culture or the call out culture and and I think that I think that
3:28
there’s that there’s evidence of you know messy inconsistency in that approach but I also think it’s sort of
3:35
anti education that my my period my my sense as an educator is that we should
3:42
be taking on these issues and addressing them you know you know scholarly fashion
3:50
and so what do you think about all of that well I mean I completely understand
3:56
your point I think it’s it’s a very thin
4:01
line between wanting to address controversial issues and risking to
4:08
seriously offend people I think that’s something that one should be aware of but I think there’s also very thin line
4:15
between political correctness and censorship and I think while I think
4:21
there are some there are some things that it’s correct to be politically
4:27
correct about because even if it imposes even quite rigid constraints on the
4:34
conversation in some context I think it’s been necessary to force
4:41
to evolve kind of you know force certain habits some people habits that might
4:48
have been offensive to a specific minorities or groups in society but I
4:54
think the mind has been shifted quite a bit in recent times and it’s been
5:00
shifting so much that the space for that the issues that have become taboo keep
5:07
growing and growing and growing which means that the space for debate has been narrowing and now in the narrowing down
5:14
so much to the point that the that you’ve got all these issues that that
5:20
are out there and that people are debating out in the streets people are debating in bars people debate in their
5:25
own homes for or against or just trying
5:31
to understand what these changes in society are about and those people that
5:37
have the capacity and the ability to approach these issues in a nuanced serious way so the world of academia at
5:45
the world research intellectual intellectual world more in general is
5:50
instead on the other hand terrified of touching these issues because you’ve got
5:57
these because you’ve got these people out that this year this year as Darryl
6:03
to police the debate it’s very interesting because you know I’m older
6:10
than you obviously and I was a generation that wanted to break down all
6:16
censorship in filming writing and you know I remember I remember when when I
6:23
was in my teenage years the big debate in Australia was where the D had four answers Lady Chatterley’s Lover but that
6:28
was banned and so you know I’m of the
6:34
generation that wanted to tell all of those restrictions down and and now
6:40
we’re seeing a sort of come back to that I mean in a way it was the it was the
6:45
conservative right in that 60s and in 70s that wanted to maintain censorship
6:52
and how’s the left and now the sort of the left self actions of the left part
6:57
of these parts a well I’d say so-called lived it’s just an interesting
7:06
transition how we were evolved where we struggled for freedom to express and and
7:12
now we’re restricting expression but I think as I said at the beginning I think
7:18
part of that restriction is that we’ve evolved in understanding you know I mean
7:24
those we’re also now much better to understand gender issues and issues
7:32
about sexuality and race and so we’re much more sensitive to to using language
7:40
and framing that that hurts and and it’s part of exclusion and those things and
7:49
anti solidarity so even though in the early 70s we were fighting for freedom
7:54
of everything mm-hmm I think it’s sensible that we’ve we’ve stepped back from that position somewhat and adopt
8:03
more care in our language because that’s an evolution of the way in which we think about issue is more deeply that
8:09
we’ve never did in in this in 60s or before that no no no I mean and I think
8:15
you know I mean the progress that has been done in in that you know in that area I think is important it should be
8:20
it should be offended so no one so it’s not about stepping back from what we achieved I think it’s about it’s about
8:30
having the ability to talk about how how sometimes the the the defense of certain
8:39
categories and society of learning minorities can can be brought so much to
8:44
the extreme where it becomes where where it simply becomes impossible to to talk
8:51
about how how some of these rapid changes in society might be you know my
8:58
cause you know my cause anxiety and my cause just confusion in a lot of people and I
9:06
think the not talking about this is not the right way to approach it
9:11
I think you know understanding how I think change is about you know I mean it’s it’s it’s a dynamic process you
9:17
know it’s about you know trying to introduce to introduce new awareness about new topics and a new and a new
9:24
consensus about topics and sometimes it’s about society having a hard time to to react to those changes and I think
9:31
sometimes that reaction is also you know it’s also rational and understandable
9:37
and I think it should be should be addressed but I think more in general I mean it’s um as I said a voice I think
9:44
it’s about upholding the right to talk about to talk you know to talk about
9:49
issues that are considered taboo because it’s so easy to remove the line in the
9:54
sand whereby you know it’s it’s easy for what I mean what may appear to be a
10:01
progressive narrative to turn into a you know very much pro-establishment narrative so for example if you take the
10:09
question of sovereignty which we’ve addressed a lot in in our book there are
10:15
factions of the left that they need you know they’re just talking about sovereignty is is making a nationalist
10:23
mr. argument and so and so I think this is a great example of how of how
10:29
dangerous this approach can be we’re even talking of an issue that should be fairly uncontroversial
10:34
even from our left standpoint which is the issue of you know the defense of sovereignty the pneumatic sovereignty
10:41
national sovereignty becomes a taboo you know that’s so when you know how the thought police to you know to show off
10:49
the conversation and to constantly shift over homeless and then then issues that
10:56
we would consider completely uncontroversial can become controversial yeah I think talking about that next to
11:06
to consider I mean we were talking earlier about – two concerns that I’ve
11:12
got in this issue and the first one is that there’s obviously one of the developers
11:19
of mmt which nm ticketing such you know
11:25
we now I think it’s not putting tickets on her selves to say that we’re now seen
11:31
as a real challenger to the mainstream mm-hm and the scrutiny that were under
11:36
now is intense and the we’re up against
11:41
you know will as I said in the Italian Senate yesterday were in the midst of a
11:47
paradigm shift and that that’s bringing massive resistance from the dominant
11:52
paradigm and and they you know history philosophy of science tells us that when
11:59
paradigms that are generating they use all sorts of vicious tactics to defend
12:05
their position and so as a public figure and as an author and as a researcher I
12:13
clearly don’t want to the MMT agenda to
12:18
be blurred by other agendas as a way of
12:24
undermining what I see as the MMT agenda and the second thing I think is it
12:31
because these identity issues are so nuanced and so so they’re like a
12:36
minefield and you know that as well as I do absolutely that you’ve then got a
12:45
methought to talk about them as in a public intellectual mm-hmm because they bear they bear on our
12:52
primary research agenda your yours and and what we want to empower talk talk
13:00
about in our sequel to reclaiming this day but they’re so complicated and
13:07
nuanced I don’t think social media as the vehicle to to advance them in any
13:13
constructive way I mean the research I’ve done on Twitter is that Twitter is not good for having any debates at all
13:19
the Twitter is only really good for pointing people
13:24
in the direction of of coherent writing
13:31
and research and report absolutely and so I think that trying to have these
13:36
identity issues out on with limited character tweets is really opening the
13:43
door for for misunderstanding as that their misunderstandings and and then it
13:50
just evolves into inter destructive conflict where I think if you you know
13:57
like we’ve had a nice discussion this afternoon where we’ve been able to go
14:02
through a whole lot of issues because we’ve been able to speak at length and discuss them at length whereas if we
14:08
just hadn’t been tweeting back and forth with each other we’ll make the progress and and I think you know that that’s
14:15
been my concern that some of these issues have been luring mmt and also not
14:22
getting us anywhere because and Aspire don’t really get involved with debates
14:28
on twitter i get it i get character assassinated you’re good enough not to get more than anybody I get careful
14:34
fascinated almost every day on Twitter and I just don’t buy because it’s not it’s not it’s too nuanced these issues
14:40
and and it’s just so you know I think
14:45
that’s I know I mean I as for the first on us they think no I
14:51
think that’s going to be increasingly an issue to deal with about you know the the the line between the MMP framework
14:59
analysis and political consequences that people draw from that I think it’s
15:07
almost inevitable that the line gets gets blurred because as we’ve always
15:13
said you know a monkey is not prescriptive prescriptive in itself it’s a framework if you want understand
15:19
reality and then you can apply that framework in in different ways and the people that don’t understand that
15:25
framework and subscribe to they can have very different views [Music]
15:30
society look at the case in Japan you know I’ve been I’ve been giving some
15:36
discussions with the Liberal Democrats conservatives you know the ruling party
15:41
are concerned we have completely different ideas about I’m very lift ok economy from you yeah better day about
15:48
the Iranian clears absolutely and I think there’s no there’s no easy way around it I think you know you’re always
15:56
going to have people that are associated with I mean putting aside a core mmt
16:03
group I said you had you do have an increasingly wide array of characters of
16:10
people of public intellectuals and I guess to some extent that you can include myself in that category
16:16
especially in my home country elite that are associated with MMT although of course they don’t belong to the core the
16:24
founding group but in the public debate on associated with MMP and they will have their own right is and I think I
16:32
can understand as I call haven’t you found out why you would just some sex find out troubling that you have people
16:38
out there that are somewhat viewed as associated German tea that may be put forward of you now in my case might be
16:44
probably quite similar views this is why in the last week I swim to clarify that by by differentiating what I call the
16:52
MMT as macro from the MMT project exactly I think that’s very important to draw that
16:58
there’s a project is much broader it informs mmt and it draws on them empty
17:06
but it’s not nearly empty so I’m sort of sought to draw draw that line in the
17:11
saying we’re just to help people I
17:17
understand where they lie and I think to some extent what the effort that people
17:22
that see themselves as them as mmt advocates can do is themselves to try to separate the line and so you know if
17:29
once if you’re engaging on specific economic issues that relate to empty you
17:36
know that’s that’s okay when you’re dealing with extra economic issue more cultural issues identity politics
17:42
issues and so on you should make it clear I think you know who whoever’s
17:48
talking to make it clear that that doesn’t necessarily have anything to do with MIP yeah I depend on that we do a
17:55
lot of people have said we well if you have these views you’re not part of them empty now you know I’ve responded and
18:01
said that’s not correct and I thought getting back to what we’ve seen before I think there are you know factions within
18:08
just as their faction within the left that are trying to frame what are the acceptable boundaries of the bay
18:14
you also have factions within the M&T wider well but I think they’re trying to frame the boundaries of what is
18:20
acceptable talk within the within the so-called mmt community and I also see
18:26
dangers in that and people trying to claim the flag of you know the true the
18:32
true in them tears that’s what I’ve said that ruling them tears MMT the Trail of Tears okay mm please project the MMT
18:39
project can be whatever people want know whether I associate with their work or
18:45
not so it depends upon the values in bulb solutely but I can you know as I
18:51
wrote this week or last week anyways start the week but that I can’t be out
18:57
there policing absolutely what I don’t think you should what the energy project
19:02
is I’m very happy that there’s lots of great people doing in humanities in a
19:08
mall or doing little group drawing on our work and in a way you know not in a
19:13
way but they also provide context for the macroeconomics oh that’s terrific
19:18
and and long way around but at the same time I can’t police some you know let’s
19:26
be crude a right-winger coming up with an mmnt project to lock refugees up and explaining how it would
19:35
be easy to for the government to do that because there’d be no financial constraints you know that’s it so let’s
19:41
go it’s we’ve been talking about the book I thought we might die give-give the people watching this video
19:48
and an idea of what we what we’ve been thinking about in terms of their sequel
19:54
to reclaiming this day in a way it’s
20:00
taken us a little while to think through how we can expand that in in a
20:06
constructive way and I think we’ve sort of come up with a plan today we reckon
20:11
yeah yeah I think we found a good middle ground as bill was saying we do have some this is we’re talking to me you
20:20
don’t just say but are we having conversation yeah yes as you were saying
20:29
you know we do have disagreements about specific issues but more importantly about the emphasis and the space that
20:36
maybe should be given to specific to these issues in the book and now I’ve
20:42
we’ve agreed that you know we will try to touch upon most of the even some of
20:47
the more control of controversial issues but not to make it obviously the focus
20:53
of the book yeah yeah I think one of the things we left implicit in reclaiming
21:00
this day I touched on it in my 2015 book about the euro zone where I concluded
21:08
that the euro zone was unlikely to be
21:13
reformed because because it needed to be a true federal system and there were too
21:20
many historical and cultural issues across the 19 member states that would
21:26
preclude that development and but Anne in reclaiming state we touched on the
21:34
way in which the left had had really embraced and I talked about it in the Senate yesterday where the left had
21:41
become sort of caught up in what what a postmodern deconstruction and really
21:48
left the macro space uncontested and and where they did are people in that closed
21:54
space they sort of became they rendered to the nail improve the mainstream macro and so in reclaiming
22:01
state we we just left a lot of those issues implicit and concentrated on the
22:08
the concept of a state as a currency as sovereign and that disabused all of
22:15
these other notions that we were nationalists or you know ethno nationalists or something like that but
22:21
I think in this next project we have to tease out what it is that gives a
22:29
sovereign currency political and societal legitimacy now you know and mmt
22:35
we talk about it being driven by a tax liability but that or that begs the
22:42
question as to what’s lying underneath the acceptance is that liability I think
22:47
that’s I think that’s the context you call it the demos they were what
22:53
constitutes a demo and what one of the characteristics of that I think that’s where we can have a nuanced and
23:01
reasonable discussion about identity and you know what binds societies together
23:07
and so I think that that would that’s
23:12
going to be a great yarn for this book I think that’s I think that’s a very important issue as you know and it’s
23:17
it’s a very delicate issue because it bears upon that a whole lot of a matter
23:23
of set of issues you know which include you know borders to some extent
23:29
population policy even integration to some respect and I think and these are
23:36
all issues that relate to the wider issue of the demos you know what constitutes demos and what extent is
23:43
democracy only possible in a context in which people feel the day that or have a
23:52
degree of have a collective understanding of the of the world have a
23:58
you know collective understanding of history and there are also more basic elements you know common language obviously helps which is
24:05
what you don’t have him in the EU for example and that’s something we have touched upon in the previous book and I
24:12
think you know just not shying away from you know discussing and analyze you know
24:18
what guess what constitutes the body politic and I think you know it’s not I
24:25
think an important point in males that no none of us whatever claimed that the body politic is fixed in history or is
24:33
always based on you know biological elements and you know that’s that’s absurd and that’s what some people know
24:39
right claim that there are you know biological elements you know that there
24:44
are the rule of the demos and I think that was I would argue is mostly cultural I mean I’ve long argued in the
24:50
Australian context that a progressive government has had a population policy
24:56
and that’s now much more apparent the
25:02
logic of that because of climate issues I mean Australia is a very arid continent as you know you’ve been there
25:08
you’ve lived there and that we’re all clustered around the east coast or you
25:15
know around the coast because the inland stew in a speedo ball or does that love water and so we have to be really
25:22
careful as to a popular managing population growth and so I I don’t think
25:28
you know I see some progressives saying where you could have open borders and
25:34
when you actually push that issue with them they end up agreeing that it’s it
25:39
would be impractical impractical for hundreds of thousands of people to descend on a country overnight I think
25:46
it’s like there should be uniform you know once you start thinking about it any sensible person reaches the conclusion that it’s just not doable
25:52
yeah so you know I think in this book I’m hoping we can elaborate start with
25:58
this notion of international solidarity where that’s a that’s a left ambition in
26:04
my view that’s been an historical progressive ambition and then then the
26:10
question is well how do you advance that to everybody’s best interest and that may
26:16
well be that you have immigration and that it’s done in a way in which there
26:23
can be employment opportunities and that it’s not seen by the existing working
26:29
workers as being undermining their potential for their families of that and
26:35
you have it in a growing economy supported by a currency sovereign state and in fully employed environment I mean
26:41
it’s quite historically it’s quite clear that tensions among you know we call
26:48
racial tensions they are very suppressed when there’s for employment and reduced reductions in
26:55
inequality and it may well be that international solidarity will in some
27:00
specific instances requires much more generous foreign aid and can technology
27:06
transfer and I think as we said earlier when we were mapping or said one of the
27:12
things that I’ve become really interested in well I’ve been interested a long time about this idea of the colonial extraction system as being sort
27:20
of a new progressive and so I think we can touch on we can analyze that and
27:25
this is you know we’ve both now had contact with Nodame going in West Africa
27:31
and done work for him and other no no and I think that the things that I’ve
27:39
learned from work I’ve done in South Africa and in Central Asia really has of
27:47
course you know I think this work to be done in there that expands reclaiming the state in turn in a really logical
27:55
one and I think but I mean I I think a fundamental point about which relates also the question of the
28:02
demons is that you do have societies can be very different cultures can be very
28:07
different and I think that diversity is great and I think so what mmt for example should be about is still provide
28:13
the means for each society to evolve in a more progressive manner according to
28:22
their own in their own way we’ve got also recognized that all societies are
28:28
interlinked the climate issues of evidence of that and also the fact that
28:35
you know one of the things I say when I’m talking about mmt is that the
28:40
currency sovereign government can bring all available productive resources into
28:48
use and therefore advanced material prosperity in that worry about
28:53
the sticking point is available resources so it can’t make a country
28:59
that hasn’t got very many resources poor rich and so I mean you know a natural
29:06
extension of reclaim the state and I think is that we talked about this earlier this idea of what does it mean
29:13
if you’re advocating currency sovereign states which we deal very strongly and reclaiming this day
29:20
what what what expression then does international solidarity have you know
29:25
what’s what formed says so a lot of progressives let’s talk we’re in Europe
29:30
you live in Europe think I think that the EU is an expression of international solidarity and therefore we should hang
29:37
on a reform at room whereas I think it’s an expression of the victory of neoliberalism and it should be torn
29:44
apart but I don’t abandoned for one moment the idea that we live in one
29:49
globe where we’ve got one climate and we’ve got we’re one people I’m a true
29:55
cosmopolitan type of person and even though I advocate currency borders and
30:03
the first bit teases out what what might determine feasible borders
30:09
I also became you know cross-border generosity and solidarity and equity and
30:16
I think that something aerbook and really build on yeah you know I think it
30:21
was always the confusion on the left you know of globalization and pre-trade you
30:27
know this idea that you know because we trade and you know it’s interconnect in the world evermore then there’s something intrinsically progressive I
30:36
sort of get confused by those who trade because the same free trade come often takes very exploitive
30:42
it’s been nice I face pride and I support failing trade not free track
30:48
I think of course I mean fair traders I think there’s a good there’s a lot there’s a lot to be said about a train
30:53
and that should be you know in basis of any trade you know should be done on fair conditions and social environmental
30:59
conditions but I think especially you know if we consider the extent to which trade the global trade contributes to
31:06
carbon emissions for example I think there also is a case for you know an ecological case to be made for a
31:13
reduction oh yeah trade I mean I think you know the old you know even case
31:18
themselves said you know I mean you know try to make you know like yeah whatever goods you can make it how should be made
31:23
at home and the finance should be national that was a crucial case that Keynes made and I think you know now
31:29
that might seem like an absurd argument to make nowadays but I mean I think from a purely ecological perspective that’s a
31:35
really important case to be made for the real localization of certain aspects of production I mean you’ve got these goods
31:42
be shipped all over the place you know often involving very exploitative conditions of labour of the environment
31:47
and definitely definitely the thing is that you know wealthy high-income
31:57
urbanites we’re probably in that category we benefit from the from trading systems
32:04
that exploit you know my profession has this idea that gains from trade you know
32:12
they you a country wouldn’t try it unless everyone gave you whereas we know from the colonial
32:20
extraction system that that that’s not true that the advanced countries have
32:26
really grown and prospered in a way that
32:38
here’s the way of saying it is that the way in which the advanced countries are
32:43
prospered is totally different to the way we were expecting me and that we’ve imposed them on that the poorer
32:50
countries and I think we need to discuss that in the book as part of the International Solidarity and what
32:57
internationalizing internationalization means for a left progressive because I
33:02
think there’s if there’s a lot of emotion about the first second and third internationals and you know I was young
33:09
I’ve suddenly international often and felt great about it but I think we need
33:14
to really nail that down in the context of currency sovereignty so yeah I think
33:22
the whole issue of internationalism is very interesting I think I mean the left as always let me go and people have to
33:28
always talk about international it’s an everyone sits and everyone’s that they sleep that word into every discussion
33:34
basically without often you know really thinking about the implications and how
33:41
difficult real internationalism actually is and in fact if you look at a history
33:46
of the left I mean it’s been most most
33:51
most changes have been achieved at the national level by you know individual individual countries and the masses of
33:59
the neutral countries taking power and implementing change in your own country and of course you’ve had important you
34:06
know levels of support between countries you know I think of the non-aligned
34:12
countries movement for example you have example in history of countries
34:18
collaborating but history also tells us that it’s very young that is very difficult I mean for for countries that
34:25
have different you know different cultures miles and so I think the dominant into
34:32
the nationalization and especially under capitalism has been these colonial or
34:38
postpone your extraction mechanisms I think it’s been a really unequal
34:44
relationships and no no no no I know but
34:50
then that is the way in which countries have oh yes absolutely that’s been the
34:56
most common formula so we’ve got to work out of why I mean you know I think this
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book can tease out arguments as to how the advanced world can maintain their
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material prosperity in the face of climate change but also in the face of
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sharing resources more equitably across the planet so that we’re not we’re not
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just extracting from other people’s and we’re sharing better and I think that
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you know that will be a really great extract line extrapolation yeah I mean I
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think that’s that’s the whole the relationship between the the national
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the local and the global level is that it’s in Clayton is incredibly interesting I think and I think it’s
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easy to overemphasize any of those levels so you’ve got people that say it’s all about you know neighborhood community action or literally or even
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people that focus on the individual level you know recycle your garbage and so on and then then you’ve got you know
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people to go to down to complete other end of the spectrum and say you know change can only be global and so you’ve
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got you know what I would call this a globalist faction even the of the environmental movement for example let’s
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say I was only possible if we have a global green you deal but realistically are you ever gonna have you know I mean
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essentially managed authority that you know that can implement the green you deal or an equivalent of that
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productivity level but that’s right he never gonna happen and so international collaboration is where you only leverage
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that which that can happen which which also means taking into account that you know
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countries will go over and and the volume in terms of consciousness all these problems at different paces
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and there’s only so much you that living only so much to either live in Italy and
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that you to live in Australia can can do about the pace at which other countries of world not on these issues that’s why
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I would say that it’s a very important you know to to focus on changing things at the national level all sometimes
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we’re providing a positive example to other countries and I think it’s I mean
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to say that either change is global or you know screwed is a dead end because you know I mean change is not
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going to happen simultaneously at all at the global level and that’s why I think that focusing on national level change
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is so important because you know I mean who’s to say you know how inspiring it can be this in one country actually
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implementing radical economic change and a radical ecological transition could provide a huge inspiration to other
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countries I think and I mean I said I’ve argued for a long time and that’s the
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role of the you in Europe to be to be just intergovernmental set up that can
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handle those big issues across countries rather than try to squeeze them to death
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through the currency unit okay so we’ve now better finish this
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book oh yeah and so stay tuned everybody and we’ve conquered long enough here in
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there Julia Julia Julia yeah and it’s a very public street and let’s do it yeah
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well you’ll hear more about it [Music]