Palestina: erresilientzia (6)

Resilience: the capacity to withstand or to recover quickly from difficulties; toughness.

Arnaud Bertrand@RnaudBertrand

mai. 30

Gazaz : “Le bilan aujourd’hui est équivalent à la frappe nucléaire de Hiroshima” @guillaume_ancel, ancien officier, dans #RTLBonsoir !

Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1796219367639716331

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@tobararbulu # mmt@tobararbulu

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2023 urr. 3

Brilliant!!! The best video

@0rf

Watch Matt Orfalea Bitch Slap Those Who Said The Ukraine Invasion

Was “Not About NATO”

The biggest threat in the world is NATO.

NATO exists to solve the problems created by NATO’s existence.

NATO is a military alliance that feeds on war. To justify its existence,

NATO constantly needs an external enemies and conflicts.

NATO DISBAND!

Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1709146534074302648

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Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1496500526476931076

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Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1495131072664907782

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2022 abu. 12

Can anyone tell me what is bad about this?

Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1558128789040893954

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Ignorance, the root and stem of all evil @ivan_8848

2022 abu. 24

This person trusted the West. And that NATO would not expand eastward. Does it make him a bad person? No, but an unfit politician.

Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1562214671196774400

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Ignorance, the root and stem of all evil@ivan_8848

2022 ira. 16

EXPANSION NATO

Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1570656996483010560

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Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1796691416695132180

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Syrian Girl @Partisangirl

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Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1796529376961458603

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Megatron@Megatron_ron

Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1796675104924909599

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Matt Wallace@MattWallace888

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Bideoa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dRGcacRHHy0

The prominent Palestinian activist Ahed Tamimi was among the 30 prisoners released on Wednesday.

The 22-year-old rose to prominence in 2017 when she slapped an Israeli soldier who raided her village in the Occupied West Bank. At the time, she was sentenced to eight months in prison. Tamimi was arrested again earlier this month on suspicion of inciting violence. To talk more about this, Dena

Takruri is from AJ+. She’s written a book with Ahed Tamimi called “They Called Me a Lioness: A Palestinian Girl’s Fight For Freedom”.

Transkripzioa:

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Gabe@GabeZZOZZ

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Bideoa: https://x.com/i/status/1796848417412419771

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UNRWA@UNRWA

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Bideoa:https://x.com/i/status/1796875630191010034

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mai. 31

My prediction: Israel will reject what @JoeBiden described as an Israeli proposal. Israel negotiates with itself and then rejects its own offers to itself.

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‘New Era of Struggle’: Thousands Convene to Strategize Future of Palestine Movement

After eight months of Israel’s genocide, where does the movement for Palestine go next?

That was precisely the question taken up by the People’s Conference for Palestine in Detroit.

Bideoa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2YjaGzn2G5Q

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Palestine solidarity organizers are planning a major mobilization at the White House on June 8th to protest the US-Israel invasion of Rafah. Netanyahu has plowed through Biden’s declared red line against a ground invasion of Rafah, and the global outrage after the Al-Mawasi tent massacre has moved millions into the streets for more protest. Yara Shoufani of the Palestinian Youth Movement joins the show to discuss why thousands of people will descend on Washington, D.C. wearing all red to form “the people’s red line” to demand an end to the genocide in Gaza.

Bideoa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NX3qF0l6qDs

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Hamas: How Israel created its own nemesis w/Paola Caridi | The Chris Hedges Report

Egun honetan estreinatu zen: 2024(e)ko mar. 29(a) The Chris Hedges Report

Hamas, like all resistance groups, from the African National Congress to The Irish Republic Army, are as demonized as they are misunderstood. Hamas is a religious, nationalist political movement. It is not, despite what Israel and Washington say, a terrorist organization—although, like most resistance groups (including the Jewish militias that created the state of Israel), it has used terrorism as a tactic. Because those on the outside do not understand what went into making Hamas—the steady drip of humiliation, violence, and impoverishment that define Israel’s Occupation of the Palestinians—Hamas and its ideology appears incomprehensible. But from the Palestinian perspective, Israel has left the Palestinians with no other choice. Journalist and historian Paola Caridi, author of “Hamas: From Resistance to Regime,” joins The Chris Hedges Report to discuss the roots and nature of Hamas, and what we miss when we unthinkingly cast Hamas as nothing more than a terrorist organization.

Bideoa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79-43bBUGsU

Transkripzioa:

0:19

Hamas, like all resistance groups, from the African National Congress to the Irish Republican

0:40

Army, is demonized and misunderstood. Hamas is not, despite what Israel and Washington say, a terrorist organization, although, like

0:51

most resistance groups, including the Jewish militias that created the state of Israel, it has used terrorism as a tactic.

1:00

Hamas is a religious, nationalist, political movement. It does not hold the Palestinians in Gaza hostage.

1:06

It has broad, popular support among Palestinians, largely because of the failure of the Palestine

1:12

Liberation Organization, or PLO, to deliver the promises made by Israel in the Oslo Accords.

1:20

But it also has popular support because of its dogged resistance to the Israeli attack

1:26

on Gaza. Indeed, since the Israeli attacks it has become lionized throughout the Muslim world.

1:33

The ferocity of the Israeli violence against Hamas, including the routine assassination

1:39

and imprisonment of its leadership, has failed to dismantle the organization.

1:44

To outsiders, the intransigence of Hamas — In its 1988 charter called for Israel’s destruction,

1:53

carried out suicide bombings in Israeli cities, as well as firing rockets into Israel, along

2:00

with the incursion that left some 1,200 Israelis dead — Is dismissed by Israel and Washington

2:08

as evidence of the group’s fanaticism. Because those on the outside do not understand what went into making Hamas, the steady drip

2:18

of humiliation, violence, and impoverishment that define Israel’s occupation of the Palestinians,

2:25

Hamas and its ideology is certified as incomprehensible. But from the Palestinian perspective, Israel has left the Palestinians with no other choice.

2:36

The secular Palestinian Authority, which nominally governs the occupied West Bank, has devolved

2:43

into little more than a hated colonial police force. It has failed to blunt Israel’s slow-motion ethnic cleansing.

2:52

Israel has steadily dispossessed more and more Palestinians from their homes and land

2:57

in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, seizing water resources. It uses indiscriminate violence to quell dissent.

3:04

In short, by shutting the door to any peaceful resolution to the conflict, Israel created

3:11

its own nemesis, the mirror image of an intransigent and brutal apartheid state.

3:17

Joining me to discuss the Palestinian resistance group, Hamas, is journalist and historian

3:23

Paola Caridi, author of Hamas: From Resistance to Regime.

3:29

Let’s talk about the origins of Hamas. It comes out of the Muslim Brotherhood.

3:34

You should explain what the Muslim Brotherhood was, and a little historical perspective because

3:41

until 1967, Gaza in particular — And Hamas is a Gaza-based organization — Was controlled

3:53

by Egypt. Hamas is the political branch of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, so I put two terms in

4:03

our discussion: Hamas and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood.

4:08

The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, as the Muslim Brotherhood movements in the region, was and is a social religious organization very deeply inside the refugee camps in Gaza.

4:29

And it is for a reason. Gaza was — I have to say was and not is — Home to hundreds of thousands of Palestinians kicked

4:46

out of their houses in Jaffa, Ashdod, and Ashkelon, and they had to create again a world,

4:57

their world, their community. The Muslim Brotherhood was one of the organizations that spread inside the refugee camps in Gaza,

5:09

but not only in Gaza. It’s true Gaza is the stronghold of Hamas but Hamas and the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood

5:17

is not only inside Gaza and is not only inside the West Bank, but is among the Palestinians

5:27

abroad, out of Israel and Palestine.

5:33

Hamas was born out of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, after a long discussion, as the

5:44

political branch of a social-religious organization.

5:53

And as many of the leaders and the activists said to me, not all the Muslim Brothers were

6:05

Hamas, but all the Hamas people are from the Muslim Brotherhood.

6:12

This is saying many things also about the Islamist movement and the fact that the Hamas

6:21

movement was and is a very nationalist one.

6:29

In the book you talk about the way future leaders of Hamas were educated, acculturated

6:40

by Egypt. I knew Abdel Aziz Rantisi, one of the co-founders of Hamas, as well as his wife.

6:48

I know you interviewed her, a very impressive woman in her own right, who was assassinated

6:55

by the Israelis at the very inception of this assault on Gaza.

7:03

Rantisi studied at the university in Alexandria; I think he was first in his class.

7:11

Let’s talk a little bit, quickly, about what the Muslim Brotherhood was.

7:16

With the rise of Nasser, this secular Pan-Arabist movement, the Muslim Brotherhood became a

7:25

target.

7:31

Tell us a little bit about the origins of the Muslim Brotherhood, what its perspective

7:36

was, and then I want to go into the birth of Hamas, which is tied directly to the first

7:43

Palestinian uprising or Intifada. Yes. The Muslim Brotherhood was born inside Egypt almost one century ago, so it’s not a movement

7:58

that was born 10 years ago, 20 years ago, or 40 years ago. But it has a century not only of history but of changes as socio-religious, and in the

8:18

case of Egypt, a political one. It is inside the so-called reformist Islamist movement, so it’s very different from the

8:32

Jihadi ones and from the Salafi ones. Very pragmatic, very inside the reality, very deep inside the society.

8:42

It’s not hyper-fundamentalist as the Salafi movements are, as the Jihadis are.

8:48

At a certain point of its history, the Muslim Brotherhood decided not to use any more violent

9:05

tools but to be inside, let’s say, a pacifist way of dealing with politics and the social

9:17

issues inside the Egyptian arena. Almost the same thing as in the Tunisian context.

9:30

It is different in Palestine because of the occupation.

9:36

It’s not an independent country, it’s a territory under occupation.

9:44

So the reaction inside the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, was to create a political branch

9:57

that would also use, along the years, terrorist means.

10:02

Let’s talk about the birth of Hamas which was a very politically pragmatic response

10:14

to the Palestinian uprising. Yes. It was a very pragmatic response in the First Intifada.

10:24

The birth of Hamas was in December 1987, so specifically the beginning of the First Intifada.

10:33

But we have to start a little bit before, in 1982, when the PLO was in crisis.

10:46

The crisis was in Beirut, not in Israel-Palestine, when the PLO had to leave Beirut and to go

10:57

into another exile — Let me interrupt you. For people who don’t know, the Israelis occupied Beirut, rather savagely bombed whole sections

11:09

of Beirut, and there was a deal cut that the Palestinians would be put on ships and sent

11:17

into exile to Tunis. I used to interview Arafat in Tunis along with Abu Jihad and others.

11:25

So that’s the crisis you’re referring to? Yes. And the reaction of the Islamist [foreign language 00:11:33], so the Muslim Brothers

11:35

and Hamas was not born in those days, but they were debating about a political branch.

11:48

Hamas was also a reaction on the politics that the PLO followed along the years.

11:57

They decided not to be involved inside the internal matters of the countries that hosted

12:05

them. It’s very clear that when the leadership of Hamas was in Damascus, they didn’t care about

12:14

the destiny of the Syrian Muslim Brothers. They wanted to be hosted by, but they didn’t want to deal with internal matters as the

12:27

PLO did, both in Jordan and after that in the Lebanese Civil War.

12:33

This was one of the decisions of the Islamists.

12:43

And after 1987, the birth of Hamas, and the decision of the PLO to recognize the state

12:51

of Israel, Hamas opposed this idea and was the opposition inside the Palestinian political

13:02

spectrum. Let’s talk about why they opposed it. They turned out to be right, of course.

13:09

Arafat and the PLO are allowed to return, but as Hamas predicted, the Palestinians were

13:19

betrayed. Explain the opposition of Hamas, their opposition, and what happened after the Oslo Agreement

13:31

was signed and the PLO leadership returned to Gaza and the West Bank. But one of the reasons is inside the [foreign language 00:13:40], the foundational charter

13:44

of Hamas, the destruction of Israel, or to say that the Palestine is not in the hands

13:52

of the people but it’s in the hands of God, and this is the Islamist part of Hamas.

14:01

Then there is also a national nationalistic issue. What about the land of Palestine?

14:09

What about recognizing Palestinians? This goes deep inside the refugees’ case because Arafat, who was a refugee himself, put aside

14:27

the question of the refugees, and it’s not the case for Hamas.

14:35

Hamas was born inside the refugee camps. Hamas is inside not only the refugee camps and the OPT, the Occupied Palestine Territory,

14:44

but it’s outside. And this was not one of the core issues inside the agreement between the PLO and Israel.

14:59

Right. This is called the right of return. As you point out in the book, because a disproportionate number of the people in Gaza are refugees

15:10

or descended from refugees, and because Hamas’ base is probably found most predominantly

15:20

in Gaza — Although it’s very popular in the West Bank, especially after Israel embarked

15:28

on its genocide, but that was non-negotiable — The way the PLO could sidestep the issue,

15:38

that wasn’t something that Hamas was able to do, given its base of support.

15:45

Yes. And we see today, regarding the attack against UNRWA, is also the attack against the Palestinian

15:58

question in itself as the UNRWA owns the registry of the refugees and the descendants of the

16:07

refugees. So it’s really a core issue in the Palestinian question that — I say as analysts, journalists

16:16

also — We put aside for a long time and came up again in these weeks and months.

16:24

UNRWA is the UN organization that provides assistance to Palestinians; Not just food,

16:34

but schools. And in places like Gaza and in the diaspora, Israel accused the UN organization of UNRWA

16:47

of being infiltrated by Hamas. And this saw many countries including the US, the UK, and others, cut off their support

16:56

of UNRWA, which is only accelerating the starvation and the famine within Gaza.

17:03

And that has been accompanied by the blockage of humanitarian assistance all backed up in

17:10

the Sinai, in Egypt at the border, and the border crossing at Rafah. Yes.

17:16

And UNRWA is not only in Gaza. It helps almost six million people.

17:27

Hamas is born as a distinct organization with the First Intifada.

17:37

It’s in opposition to the PLO. Talk quickly about the collapse of credibility of the PLO as Israel does not follow through

17:50

on the promises made in the Oslo Agreement to create a separate state.

17:56

And then I want to talk about the elections that brought Hamas to power.

18:04

Hamas also represented the people inside the Palestinian Occupied Territory, and PLO was

18:12

in exile. The First Intifada was an intifada from the internal camp, not from the exile.

18:23

And then the PLO, in exile, jumped on the Intifada and the Oslo process started its

18:34

path. Hamas represented the part of the internal camp and this is a differentiation that we

18:43

have to underline.

18:49

The confrontation between Hamas and the PLO, especially Fatah and Arafat, was very strong

18:56

and very deep. It went very deep inside the history of the Palestinian politics and resistance along

19:06

the years. In those years, Hamas decided also to use terrorism.

19:15

It started in 1994 after the Hebron massacre, and was done by a settler, Baruch Goldstein.

19:24

Let’s stop there. That Hebron massacre, which I covered for The New York Times, was a turning point.

19:32

Let’s explain what happened and why it was a turning point, before we go on.

19:37

Baruch Goldstein was a settler from a settlement close to Hebron — Khalil for the Palestinians

19:46

— And he killed almost 30 people inside the mosque.

19:55

Inside the mosque. The Ibrahimi Mosque is the most important mosque in Palestine.

20:05

Then he was killed by the faithful people. They were praying during the Ramadan.

20:14

It was not only a shock, but for the city of Khalil/Hebron, that tragic moment is still

20:26

in the memory of the community.

20:34

The period of mourning for the Palestinians and Muslim people lasts 40 days.

20:43

After 40 days, there was the first suicide attack in Hadera, inside Israel, done by a

20:57

terrorist from the Qassam Brigade, the armed wing of Hamas.

21:06

I will differentiate between the armed wing, in that moment, and the military wing, right

21:12

now in these days and months. It was the beginning of a tragic era of suicide attacks inside the buses, inside coffee shops,

21:28

against civilians, inside Israel. But not just the Qassam Brigades; The armed wing of Hamas did suicide attacks, and it

21:43

has to be underlined. It finished when Hamas, the Islamic Jihad, and all the Palestinian factions signed an

21:59

agreement in Cairo, in March 2005, suspending the suicide attacks and the terrorist attacks.

22:08

And paving the way for the political elections of 2006 and the presidential elections of

22:18

Abu Mazen as the new president of the Palestinian authority.

22:24

These elections are important because they’re heavily monitored by the international community.

22:30

Hamas runs its slate of candidates. It’s certified as a free and fair election.

22:37

This is 2006. And then what happens? If I may add, not only was it heavily monitored by the international community, it was supported

22:52

by the international community, and even Israel gave the permit to the Palestinians in Jerusalem

23:00

to vote for those elections. Nobody asked Hamas to recognize Israel before participating in the elections.

23:10

This is an important point because in an ambiguous way, Hamas recognized the Palestinian authority

23:21

in participating in the elections for the parliament of the Palestinian authority.

23:27

This was a big change inside Hamas, voted by the majority of the activists, and the

23:36

people of Hamas internally voted.

23:42

After that, the problem was Hamas won the elections.

23:49

The international community, Israel, and even Hamas thought that it could gain many votes

24:00

to be a stronger opposition inside the parliament, but none of the actors or Hamas expected for

24:11

Hamas to win the elections. It was a big success.

24:17

This changed the attitude of Hamas, Fatah, and the international community.

24:26

It means that the international community and Israel decided a factual embargo against

24:35

the government run by Hamas. After a few months, there was a split inside the Palestinian political arena and Hamas

24:48

did a coup in Gaza in June 2007.

24:54

Fatah and the PA controlled — We know that they didn’t control that much — The West

25:03

Bank. After that, Israel decided to seal the Gaza Strip and detach the Gaza Strip from the Palestinian

25:16

Occupied Territory. The split of the unity of the territory is the core issue nowadays because since the

25:31

beginning, since 2007, this division between West Bank and Gaza was the death of an idea

25:41

of a State of Palestine. This was supported by Bibi Netanyahu, who saw this split as furthering his own aims

25:51

to prevent a Palestinian state. Indeed, I remember, I was there in Gaza when Hamas first emerged.

26:02

And while it’s probably not correct to say that in any way — As you point out in your

26:07

book, Hamas is a creation of Israel as some have charged — But the Israelis who were

26:16

still inside Gaza at the time would carry out far harsher forms of repression against

26:22

Fatah or the PLO than they would carry out in the beginning against the Hamas figures,

26:29

because they mistakenly saw these divisions within the Palestinian leadership as advantageous.

26:36

Can you talk about that? Yes, it’s true.

26:42

Many are saying these months that Hamas was a creation of Israel.

26:52

It’s not right for both parties, for Israel, and for Hamas. Hamas is deep inside the Palestinian society and Israel was very repressive against Hamas,

27:11

especially after 1989, even 1988, 1989, 1992, and 1994 when there were waves of repression

27:25

by leaders and activists of Hamas. And then it started the tragic era of the assassinations, the extrajudicial killings

27:41

of the leaders of Hamas. The result was not a result Israel expected.

27:48

If you think about 2004, it was a very important year.

27:55

Israel killed Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in March 2004.

28:03

A month later, Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi.

28:10

These were the co-founders of Hamas. The co-founders, yes. A year and a half after Hamas won the elections.

28:19

The extrajudicial killings, they didn’t have the result of cutting the head off the snake

28:26

therefore killing the snake.

28:32

What Netanyahu did the most recent years was to detach Gaza from the West Bank and try

28:49

to over-cross the Palestinians as protagonists of a negotiation.

29:03

Gaza is an open-air prison.

29:08

The PA was very weak inside the West Bank. So what was the solution, according to Netanyahu?

29:17

To call some Arab states to normalize the situation in the region, without the Palestinians;

29:25

No Palestinians at the negotiating table. This is not the way to reach a viable solution, peace, respect, and dignity, and the result

29:42

is what we see now. We should be clear that Sisi overthrew a Muslim Brotherhood government.

29:51

There’s been terrible repression against the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

30:01

The Egyptian government has a deep hostility, not only to the Muslim Brotherhood, but to Hamas as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood and has been working quite closely with Israel.

30:17

As we speak, it’s building an alternative open-air prison for what we assume will be

30:24

Palestinians pushed out of Gaza.

30:29

But we should talk a little bit about the regional response to the rise of Hamas within

30:36

the Arab world. Then I want to talk about October 7 and what has happened since.

30:42

The reaction in the Arab region was different according to the periods we are talking about.

30:54

The leadership of Hamas moved itself from one place to another according to the support

31:01

it received — From the Kuwait to Jordan to Syria — And after the Arab revolutions and

31:15

the counter-revolutions to Turkey, to Qatar.

31:23

After the Egyptian revolution, Mousa Abu Marzook, one of the leaders of Hamas, moved to Cairo

31:33

for a period of time. But it was a short period because of the coup of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Cairo and the annihilation

31:48

of the Egyptian revolution, of the Thawrat.

31:54

The Arab region has different relations with Hamas: In a way, pragmatic andstrongly opposed

32:09

to Hamas. But it depends on which period of time we are talking about.

32:17

Egypt, the patron and the mediator in all the issues regarding the Palestinian arena,

32:28

is pro-Fatah and against Hamas, but it’s also a pragmatic actor.

32:35

We see nowadays how pragmatic it is on the negotiation on the ceasefire, the release

32:43

of the hostages, and for the Palestinian prisoners inside the Israeli jails; but regarding the

32:51

reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, it’s a process like all the processes in the Middle

33:04

East: Lasting years and years and years without a result.

33:09

Let’s talk about October 7. How did you read about what happened on October 7?

33:14

This is a very tough and difficult question. It’s my headache, as I suppose it’s the headache of many among us.

33:25

It underlines a division between Hamas inside Gaza and Hamas outside Gaza.

33:38

The balance of power inside Hamas moved, changed a lot, in these years when Gaza was an open-air

33:51

prison administered and controlled by Hamas. When I say Hamas, I say especially the part of Hamas inside Gaza.

34:02

Many of the leaders moved from Gaza to safe havens abroad and the personality of Yahya

34:14

Sinwar was gaining power along the years since his release in 2011.

34:25

Okay, let me stop you there. In the book you have a fascinating dissection of the power structure within Hamas, including

34:35

its decentralization of authority — Which is why Israel’s not been able to decapitate

34:41

it — But there’s also a stark division between the political branch and the internal security

34:48

branch. So, before you go on, explain how that works.

34:54

Hamas is a political movement with a very strong structure, but a decentralized one,

35:01

in four constituencies. The four constituencies are very strange when seen from a European or a Western perspective.

35:15

They are the territory — So there is the constituency of Hamas in Gaza, in the West

35:22

Bank, abroad — The refugee camps, the diaspora, but there is also constituency inside the

35:31

prison. When we think about prisons, we don’t think about political activity inside the prison.

35:39

But in the case of the Palestinian prisoners, they continue to be political actors inside

35:46

the prison, and this was the case of Hamas.

35:56

Along the years, and especially in the most recent years, there is another shadow constituency

36:03

which is the military one. I say the military one because there was and there is an armed wing of Hamas, the Qassam

36:13

Brigades. And since the beginning, there was an armed wing; From 2007, until now, Hamas started

36:30

to be the power inside Gaza — The power, the administration, and also the armed force,

36:40

the Qassam Brigade; I assume they became the military wing.

36:46

There was a militarization of the armed wing and this means that it gained a very strong

36:58

political influence in defining the political structure.

37:06

Who will win in the internal elections of Hamas? That was the case in the last internal elections and the figure of Yahya Sinwar emerging as

37:21

the leader of Hamas — Not of all Hamas, but at least of Hamas in Gaza.

37:29

It meant also not a split but a distance between Hamas in Gaza and the leaderships abroad because

37:43

there are different sensibilities among the leaderships abroad.

37:51

Not only in Doha, there is a leadership also in Beirut. Okay, let’s talk about October 7 and your take on

38:05

what happened. Through the journalistic reports, only a few people in Gaza decided the October 7 attack

38:16

in Israel, by the Qassam Brigades and Al-Quds Brigades, is linked to the Islamic Jihad.

38:25

A lot of people went off of the fence on October 7.

38:33

What was the goal of October 7?

38:39

It was very clear in the document that Hamas published, some months after October 7.

38:54

That means they wanted to take hostages to do an exchange with the Palestinian prisoners

39:05

inside the Israeli prisons.

39:10

Thousands of Palestinians are inside Israeli prisons — Including women and children.

39:17

— Including women and children, in administrative detention.

39:23

Many of them, they are not part of the Palestinian factions, even.

39:29

So this was one of the goals of Yahya Sinwar, who spent a lot of years inside the Israeli

39:36

prisons. Jerusalem is also a core issue in October 7 because of what is happening on the Haram

39:48

al-Sharif; That means on the mosques esplanade or Temple Mount for the Jews.

39:56

Especially because of what the new Israeli government is doing in the last year, but

40:08

also in the last years.

40:14

Hamas in 2021 was clear on the fact that Jerusalem is the core issue of the Palestinian question.

40:27

He wanted to cross the fence of the open-air prison of Gaza using Jerusalem as a tool and

40:43

let the people understand that they were not in Gaza, they were out of Gaza, and they were

40:50

dealing with the whole Palestinian question.

40:55

This was another reason of October 7.

41:01

The third one is the West Bank. They wanted to say, we are not confined in Gaza, we are part of the Palestinian political

41:11

spectrum, and we want to cross and open the fence, open the open-air prison, and let the

41:20

people, our public, our consensus, understand that we are still there. I want to talk about Jerusalem, because I thought it was one of the most insightful

41:28

parts of your book, as being central to the identity of Palestinians and the resistance

41:35

movement. Can you explain why? Jerusalem is not just a religious symbol.

41:41

Jerusalem is more than this. It’s a national symbol, it’s a national icon, and not only for Hamas, not only for the Palestinians

41:54

of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, but also for the Palestinians inside Israel.

41:59

The Palestinians inside Israel are, two million, 20% of the Israeli population.

42:09

They and the other Palestinians see inside the diaspora, outside Israel-Palestine, Jerusalem

42:18

as the myth, as their identity, which is not a religious one.

42:26

We forget that there are the Palestinians with a Christian faith, and those Palestinians

42:37

are nationalistic as are the others, as are the Palestinian Muslims.

42:44

Jerusalem is that part of their identity that meets all together in a place like the Old

42:53

City. So thinking to possess Jerusalem from the Israeli side is breaking the last wall for

43:15

the Palestinians. They were not renounced to Jerusalem. It was very clear in 2021, when a peaceful protest that was going on in different parts

43:29

of Jerusalem. That means in the Old City, on the Haram al-Sharif al-Aqsa, in front of Damascus Gate, the secular

43:41

central part of the Arab sentiment, of the Palestinian sentiment.

43:48

In Sheikh Jarrah, for the people who know Jerusalem, very near the American Colony,

43:54

because there was the issue of the settlers who wanted to possess the most important parts

44:09

of the city in order for the city to be completely conquered, not only by the Israelis, but by

44:17

the Messianic settlement movement. Well, they’ve changed the geography of Jerusalem.

44:24

It doesn’t even physically look like the city that I first visited in 1988 because of the

44:31

Jewish settlers and the buildings they’ve erected and the evictions they’ve carried

44:36

out. Let’s close by talking about what’s happening now in Gaza.

44:43

The Netanyahu government says this is a war against Hamas. They claim that victory will be defined by the eradication of Hamas.

44:53

What’s happening in Gaza, what’s happening to Hamas, and what does this portend for the

45:03

future? What I see is not the cancellation of Hamas, what I see is the complete cancellation of

45:11

Gaza. Which is a completely different portrayal of what is happening in Gaza.

45:21

The Israeli strategy changed along the weeks and months of this war on Gaza, and at a certain

45:31

point, it started to be a war with a very specific goal: The expulsion of the Palestinians

45:41

from Gaza. After that, we have to take care of the second front of this war, which is the West Bank

45:49

and what is going on in the West Bank in these months. It’s a tragic picture of what is happening there.

46:04

The expulsion of the Palestinians, what does it mean? It means a second Nakba.

46:10

It means also end of the idea of the two states, although the two states, we know they died

46:19

many, many years ago as a perspective. It is also the idea to finish the chapter of 1948.

46:32

It’s 1948, the core issue.

46:37

The Israeli government wants to arrive at this goal that means to finish the expulsion

46:50

of the Palestinians from Palestine. And the consequences, and what does it mean for Hamas?

46:58

Hamas is not just in Gaza. Saying the Israeli narrative, we will get rid of Hamas, is not the reality on the ground.

47:15

Hamas is not only in Gaza, Doha, and Beirut; It is a movement that is deep inside the Palestinian

47:25

society. We see in the videos coming from the West Bank that people are asking for the Qassam

47:34

Brigades to come and liberate the West Bank. It will not happen, of course.

47:40

We have to see the reality.

47:45

In one way Israel is cutting the grass under Hamas — Because I don’t think that the consensus

47:59

on Hamas is growing in Gaza, is lesser in Gaza and more in the West Bank — But we see

48:09

that Hamas is gaining ground outside Gaza. So what about the goal?

48:17

Does Netanyahu reach the goal in this way?

48:23

The opposite is going on and the reaction, not only of the Palestinians but of the Arab

48:33

street, will be more anti-Israeli sentiment.

48:41

And you’re traumatizing a whole new generation. I remember speaking to Rantisi and he told me the story of being a nine-year-old boy

48:52

in Khan Yunis, in 1956 when the Israelis occupied, and watching the Israeli forces lining men

49:00

and boys up against a wall, including his uncle, and killing them. That moment was a moment that radicalized him, because to him it exposed the intent

49:14

of the Israelis, which was the extermination of the Palestinian people.

49:19

How is this going to play out in the years ahead? I don’t know.

49:25

Because what I see from Jordan is that nobody’s saying anything, but you see in the face of

49:35

the people that it’s difficult to have this weight on their heart and their shoulders,

49:44

to see what they see. In the US, Europe, and Italy, people don’t see the images from Gaza.

49:56

The images from Gaza are unbearable to each of us, and especially to the Arab street.

50:05

They are really unbearable. I can’t bear the images of children who are dying from starvation.

50:15

I can’t bear the images of women who have problems with their menstrual cycle.

50:26

They don’t have sanitary pads. They don’t have anything — bread, flour, et cetera.

50:32

It’s unbearable, simply unbearable. And it’s not a humanitarian issue because a humanitarian issue means to cover the fact

50:41

that this is a political issue for all of us, not only for the Arab region. Great, thank you.

50:47

That was journalist and historian, Paola Caridi, author of Hamas: From Resistance to Regime.

50:55

I want to thank The Real News Network and its production team, Cameron Granadino, Adam Coley, David Hebden, and Kayla Rivara.

51:02

You can find me at chrishedges.substack.com.

oooooo

(Michael Hudson-en bidetik)

… the only way of stopping what’s happening in Gaza happening in the rest of the world is to create an alternative to the United Nations, an alternative to the World Bank, to the IMF, an alternative to all the organizations that the United States has controlled to turn the whole rest of the world into Gaza, …

oooooo

Warren Mosler, maisu eta gidari

“Any school of thought that is not ‘MMT consistent’ is inapplicable

with regards to any actual economy”

“DTM-rekin koherentea ez den edozein pentsamendu eskola

aplikaezina zaio gaur egungo edozein ekonomiari”

(Warren Mosler, 2013)

#LearnMMT