Randall Wray-k 2010ean behin betiko eman zion erantzuna defiziten aferari[1].
Wray-ren dioenez, gobernu gastuak beharrezkoak dira gaur egungo krisia bukatzeko, alegia, defizitak beharrezkoak dira.
Azken bolada honetan, gogoratu 2010ean gaudela, histeria hedatu da aurrekontu defizit ez-jasangarrien izuaren gisa, ekonomia susperraldi osotik oso urrun dagoenean.
Defizit usoa den Paul Krugman ere, zeina orain pizgarri gehiagoren alde dagoen, larritzen ari da etorkizuneko ‘egiturazko defizitez’. Argudioa honelakoa da: orain ez badugu behar aurrekontua orekatzea, ekonomia suspertuko denean ‘etxe fiskala’ ordenan eduki behar dugu.
Hala ere, badago aukera bat MMTkoek, alegia DTMkoek, proposatzen duten bezala, moneta jaulkitzen duen gobernu subiranoa eta moneta erabiltzaileak direnak (familiak, enpresak eta gobernu ez-subiranoak) ez-berdinketa[2] azpimarratuz.
DTMkoek diotenez, ‘jasangarritasun fiskala’ edo ‘solbentzia’ ez dagokio gobernu subirano bati (zeina ezin baita behartu beraren monetan izendaturiko zorraren gaineko nahigabeko ordaintze ezean). Horrelako gobernuak gastatzen du banku kontuak kreditatuz edo paper moneta jaulkiz. Ezin du inoiz banku kontuak kreditatzeko erabiltzen duen tekla-sakatzerik gabe geratu, eta berak papera eta tinta aurki dezakeen heinean, paper moneta jaulki dezake. Baieztapen horiek erabat ez dira eztabaidagarriak, erabat. Hori ez da politika proposamen, bat moneta jaulkitzen duten gobernu subiranoen gastu prozesuaren deskribapen hutsa baizik.
Zenbait kritika bitxi egin dira[3].
Kritikarik arraroena “DTMkoen iritziz, defizitak ez direla garrantzitsuak” dioena da.
Kasu, Paul Krugman-ek honela dio[4], Jamie Galbraith-en lantxo bat aipatuz[5]:
“But here’s the thing: there’s a school of thought which says that deficits are never a problem, as long as a country can issue its own currency.”
R. Wray-k dioenez, gauzarik bitxiena da Krugman-ek ez dituela inoiz Galbraith-en puntuak ukitu, alegia, insolbentzia, porrota edo interes tasa handiak arazorik gabekoak direla gobernu subirano baterako. Okerragoa, Krugman-ek ez du inongo ahalegin egiten bere baieztapena (MMT-ers “say that deficits are never a problem”)justifikatzeko.
Wray-ren hitzez, “MMT-ers NEVER have said any such thing.”
Honela segitzen du Wray-k:
Gure aldarrikapena da gobernu subirano bat ezin dela behartu nahigabeko ordaintze ezean. Ez dugu inoiz esan moneta subiranoak inflaziotik libre direla. Ez dugu inoiz aldarrikatu truke tasa flotatzaile sistema batean monetak libre direla truke tasen fluktuazioetatik. Beti esan dugu gobernua ahalegintzen baldin bada bere gastua enplegu osoa baino haratago areagotzea, hori inflaziogilea izan daitekeela. Halaber, aipatu ditugu bideak non gobernuak inflazioa sor dezakeen, enplegu osoa lortu baino lehenago ere. Beti truke tasa flotatzaileen alde egon gara -non truke tasek ongi ‘flotatzen’ duten-. Nahiz eta aurrekontu defiziten eta truke tasa depreziazioaren arteko erlazio sinplea baztertu, onartu dugu moneta depreziazioa ekonomia suspertzeko gobernu politika erabiltzearen ondorio posiblea dela.
Wray-k segitzen du Zorra/BPGren ratioari dagokion beste sasi argudio bat kritikatuz[6], bi erantzun emanez: a) sasi-argudioaren eszenatokia onartuz[7], eta b) eszenatoki hori ez onartuz[8].
Eta baldin eta gobernuak enplegu osoko muga gainditu nahi badu, gehiago gastatuz eta prezioak hiperinflaziorantz eramanez, Krugman-en ‘inflazio infinitu’ko eszenatokia[9]?
Wray-k arazo horri ere aurre egiten dio[10], Jamie Galbraith-ren aita, John Kenneth Galbraith, the nation’s chief inflation fighter aipatuz.
Beraz, yes, deficits do matter, but not for solvency.
Stephanie Kelton-ek berriki erantzun duenez[11],
“Investment News: Are MMT theorists saying deficits don’t matter?
Ms. Kelton: Deficits do matter, but not in the way people think.”
Pavlina Tcherneva-k ere antzekoa idatzi du, AEBetako defizit datuak analizatuz[12].
[2] Ikus http://www.nextnewdeal.net/deficit-nine-myths-we-cant-afford eta http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2010/04/paul-samuelson-on-deficit-myths.html .
[3] Ingelesez: “…there are a number of misconceptions circulating that need to be addressed. Many (often of the Austrian persuasion) interpret this simple statement as a Leninist plot to destroy the nation’s currency by flying black helicopters dumping an infinite supply of bags of money all over the planet. This is usually accompanied by a diatribe on the evils of fiat money, with a call to return to “sound money” based on shiny yellow metal. Others suggest that we are instead proposing to ramp up the size of government, until it completes Obama’s plan to gobble up the whole economy. Almost all critiques eventually produce a lecture on the lessons to be learned from Weimar Germany and from Zimbabwe.”
[4] Ikus http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/i-would-do-anything-for-stimulus-but-i-wont-do-that-wonkish/?_r=0.
[5] Krugman-ek hauxe idazten du, Galbraith aipatuz: “Insolvency, bankruptcy, or even higher real interest rates are not among the actual risks.” Kritika gehiago hemen: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/17/more-on-deficit-limits/.
[6] Wray-k, ingelesez: “A favorite scenario used by the critics is the ever-rising budget deficit that causes the government debt-to-GDP ratio to rise continuously. As interest payments on the debt increase, government faces a vicious cycle of rising deficits, more debt, more interest paid, higher interest rates, and even higher deficits.”
[7] Wray-k, ingelesez: “First, OK, let us accept your premise. Will the government be able to make all payments (including interest paid on debt) as they come due? The answer is, of course, “yes — by crediting bank accounts”. Insolvency is not possible when one spends by a simple keystroke. The critic then quickly changes the subject: Weimar! Zimbabwe! You are a destroyer of the currency! Yes, but it was your scenario, not mine. And even in your worst case scenario, the government cannot be forced to default. Instead, Krugman argues “the government would decide that default was a better option than hyperinflation”. In other words, Krugman veers off into politics — government “decides” to default — because the economics does not give him the result he wants.”
[8] Wray-k ingelesez: “Second. Your scenario is highly implausible. As budget deficits rise, this increases income (government spending exceeds tax revenue, thus adds net income to the nongovernment sector) and wealth (nongovernment savings accumulated in the form of government debt) of the nongovernment sector. Eventually, this causes private spending and production to grow. As the economy heats up, tax revenue begins to grow faster than government spending or GDP. (In the US over the past two cycles, in the expansion phase federal tax revenue grew two to three times faster than GDP and government spending.) This reduces the government deficit (remember the Clinton boom and budget surpluses?). Even if the government spending is on interest (in Krugman’s model, the deficit is due to interest payments) that generates nongovernment income and spending. In other words, the cyclical upswing will automatically reduce the budget deficit. The scenario ignores the “automatic stabilizers” that cause the budget deficit to swing counter-cyclically.”
[9] Ingelesez: “Even though incomes and thus tax revenues rise, government spending always keeps one step ahead so that the deficit rises. This is Krugman’s “infinite inflation” scenario.“
[10] Wray-k ingelesez: “OK, we never claimed that a sovereign government will necessarily adopt good economic policy. The last time the US approached such a situation was in the over-full employment economy of WWII. Rather than bidding for resources against the private sector, the government adopted price controls, rationing, and patriotic savings. In that way, it kept inflation low, ran the budget deficit up to 25% of GDP, and stuffed banks and households full of safe sovereign debt. By the way, Jamie Galbraith’s father, John Kenneth Galbraith, was the nation’s chief inflation fighter. After the war, private spending power was unleashed, GDP grew relatively quickly, and government debt ratios came down (not because the debt was retired but because the denominator — GDP — grew more quickly than the numerator — debt). In other words, Galbraith, senior, used rational policy to avoid the Zimbabwean fate. I do not understand why Krugman prefers to believe that our policymakers would choose hyperinflation over more rational policy. If there is anything that policymakers of developed nations in the postwar period appear to hate, it is rapid inflation. In other words, the policy choice will not be between hyperinflation and default, but rather rational use of inflation-fighting policy should the need arise in order to prevent hyperinflation.”
Halaber, ikus Deficit hysteria redux: http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/ppb_111.pdf and Does Excessive Sovereign Debt Really Hurt Growth?: http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_603.pdf.
[12] Ikus There is always a counterpart to the government deficit somewhere in the private sector in the form of a surplus izeneko lantxoa: http://pavlina-tcherneva.net/2-key-charts.pdf.
