Bankugintza: publikoa? pribatua? Finantzazioa eta bere politizazioa

Real Progressives‏ @RealProgressUS abe. 15

(https://twitter.com/wbmosler/status/942108014726778880)

“The immediate question following the Seattle vote was who should Seattle bank with given other Wall Street…

Seattle Municipal Bank–A Future For US All

Good question, wrong answer. I prefer federal grants to municipalities and appropriate regulation.

Bill‏ @TxEx

Given that Seattle has no direct control over federal policy and these changes would be difficult at best, what are your thoughts on the public bank as an alternative solution?

Warren B. Mosler‏ @wbmosler

Both public and private banks are extremely dangerous animals.

Bill‏ @TxEx

Seems like a public bank though could operate with a limited scope in a non-profit manner in the public interest and be subject to local regulation, if setup properly, no?

Warren B. Mosler‏ @wbmosler

Even with all that it can go awry as many public banks have done historically, as there are strong incentives for lending to become politicized.

Bill‏ @TxEx

Replying to @wbmosler @RealProgressUS

Corruption and politics is a problem we can’t seem to escape anywhere. I guess, I am just wondering if there is an advantage to this over private for profit banks in the absence of ideal federal policy.

(Segida: https://twitter.com/wbmosler/status/942206083082412032)

Warren B. Mosler‏ @wbmosler

Replying to @TxEx @RealProgressUS

Like the Fed, World Bank, IMF etc? 😉

2017 abe. 16

Gogoratzekoa: Warren Mosler-ek bankugintzaz

Eurolandia: paradisu galdua?

Die Welt – L’Euro ha frenato anche la Germania

Stefano Solaro – dicembre 14, 2017

(http://vocidallestero.it/2017/12/14/die-welt-leuro-ha-frenato-anche-la-germania/)

https://pbs.twimg.com/card_img/941431869731729408/m4ihjogM?format=jpg&name=800x419

Il quotidiano tedesco Die Welt, vicino alle posizioni di Angela Merkel, dà spazio a sorpresa a uno studio di alcuni economisti della BCE che risulta altrettanto sorprendente, per via di un’analisi fortemente critica della moneta unica. Invece che far convergere le economie dei Paesi membri, l’Euro ne ha amplificato le divergenze, portando al crollo del reddito pro capite di nazioni che potevano contare su economie floride prima dell’aggancio valutario, prima tra tutte l’Italia. Nonostante, come prevedibile, la ricerca indichi tra le concause della crisi alcuni dei consueti mantra liberisti, si tratta della prima volta che un’istituzione come la BCE ammette ufficialmente le asimmetrie provocate dall’Unione monetaria.

di Anja Ettel, Holger Zschäpitz, 04/12/2017

Quando gli economisti della Banca centrale europea (BCE) elaborano delle ricerche su temi cardine dell’Unione, in genere sono gli stessi “guardiani della moneta” ad invitare i giornalisti alla discussione, prima ancora della pubblicazione ufficiale dei documenti.

Gli studi elaborati dai ricercatori della BCE sono talmente numerosi che, senza il necessario briefing con la stampa, la maggior parte rischierebbe di finire nel dimenticatoio dell’opinione pubblica senza colpo ferire.

Non sorprende quindi che anche la ricerca più recente, un’osservazione a lungo termine sulla “convergenza reale nella zona euro”, valesse una tavola rotonda. In fin dei conti, si tratta di una delle questioni più delicate dell’unione monetaria.

Nello specifico, si tratta di comprendere se l’Euro, sin dalla sua introduzione nel 1999, abbia effettivamente soddisfatto l’obiettivo che si era posto, ovvero quello di diventare il motore dell’integrazione economica dell’Europa, o se, al contrario, abbia ampliato il divario tra le economie degli Stati membri. Lo studio emerso dai ranghi degli economisti della BCE giunge a conclusioni poco lusinghiere. Anche a 18 anni dall’introduzione della moneta unica, persiste nell’area valutaria un forte divario nord-sud. Anzi, dalla crisi finanziaria del 2008 a oggi, la distanza tra i paesi dell’Eurozona è persino aumentata.

La Spagna non è riuscita a stare al passo

Secondo gli autori dello studio è sorprendente come l’Unione monetaria non abbia favorito l’avvicinamento delle economie dei primi 12 membri dell’Unione. “Contrariamente a quanto si sarebbe aspettato, l’introduzione dell’Euro non ha fatto da catalizzatore per una rapida convergenza”.

Ciò vale soprattutto per il sud della zona euro. A detta del rapporto, la Spagna, per esempio, in termini di sviluppo del reddito è rimasta indietro di 18 anni rispetto alla media UE. I segnali di crescita dei primi anni sarebbero stati totalmente annullati dalla crisi del debito.

Dall’avvento dell’Euro anche l’Italia è precipitata sempre di più. Lo Stato che affaccia sul mediterraneo, che, considerando il Pil pro capite, originariamente faceva parte dei Paesi ricchi, è franato nel frattempo nel gruppo delle nazioni più povere. Le conseguenze della crisi finanziaria degli anni 2008/2009 possono spiegare solo in parte questa crisi. A detta degli autori, i problemi del Belpaese, affetto da tempo da cronici problemi di crescita e debolezze strutturali, sono in parte “autoinflitti”.

La ricchezza del Paese diminuisce

È importante sottolineare come lo studio in questione sia un saggio tecnico elaborato da alcuni economisti della BCE insieme a un autore originario della Slovacchia. Il documento non riflette necessariamente l’opinione della Banca Centrale Europea. È comunque degno di nota il fatto che l’organo comunitario pubblichi in modo così prominente un’analisi decisamente critica nei confronti dell’Euro.

Tuttavia, il saggio non facilita per nulla suoi lettori: molte delle formulazioni rimangono piuttosto vaghe, e gli stessi grafici non riflettono dei risultati immediatamente chiari, ma mostrano delle conclusioni frammentate rispetto alla convergenza nell’unione monetaria. Pertanto, i non-economisti sono costretti a ricomporre gli esiti della ricerca come se si trovassero alle prese con un puzzle.

I numeri sono allarmanti. Prima dell’inizio dell’euro il reddito pro capite italiano era il 122% della media europea. Diciotto anni dopo la ricchezza è solo al 96%. Al contrario, la Spagna è migliorata di dieci punti, dal 93% al 103%, tuttavia, questo aumento è dovuto principalmente a un boom immobiliare che non ha avuto vita lunga.

I numeri della convergenza delle economie europee sfatano un altro mito. Pare che la Germania, infatti, non sia affatto il grande vincitore dell’Euro, come si sente ripetutamente affermare. Soprattutto nei primi anni dell’Unione monetaria, la ricchezza tedesca era in calo rispetto all’intera UE. Nel 1998, il PIL pro capite era pari al 125% della media e alla fine del 2016 solo il 123%.

La Germania è al di sotto del proprio potenziale

Quanto siano davvero pronunciate le differenze tra i vari Paesi è mostrato nella quinta parte dello studio. Un grafico a barre confronta l’ipotetico sviluppo della prosperità nell’area dell’euro con quello reale. Tra i grandi vincitori ci sono prima di tutto l’Irlanda e gli Stati baltici. La Germania si piazza nelle posizioni centrali, risultando in lieve perdita. I maggiori perdenti risultano Grecia, Portogallo, Italia e Cipro.

Nonostante tutto, gli economisti non arrivano al punto di incolpare l’euro di questo disastro. Secondo gli autori, molti Paesi hanno perso la propria competitività globale molto prima dell’adesione alla moneta unica. In effetti i risultati suggeriscono che i Paesi a cui l’euro ha portato benefici sono, in particolare, quelli che hanno rispettato ampiamente le regole, come gli Stati baltici, la Slovacchia e i Paesi Bassi.

A crollare sono stati invece i Paesi che hanno aderito all’Euro ma che hanno in seguito infranto le regole per via di una “cultura della svalutazione” della propria moneta maturata nel corso di decenni. L’Irlanda, al contrario, ha beneficiato della sua posizione di Paese a bassa tassazione, una tattica che non pochi esperti considerano ingiusta.

Bankugintzaz hiru hitz (eta3)

Hasierarako, ikus Bankugintzaz hiru hitz (1) eta Bankugintzaz hiru hitz (2)

Segida:

Greziako desatreaz

(a) Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (1)

(b) Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (2)

(c) Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (eta 3)

Bukaera aldera…

Patetikoak izatetik haratago1. uste dut pixka bat ikasi beharko genukeela erridikuluan ez erortzeko. Kasu, Nafarroan bertako neokarlistek2 eraiki nahi duten banku ‘publikoa’ (sic)…


Bankugintzaz hiru hitz (2)

Hasierarako, ikus Bankugintzaz hiru hitz (1)

Segida:

Bankugintza: bankuen nazionalizazioaz

Both public and private banks  are very dangerous animals

(Warren Mosler)

Bankuak eta beraien nazionalizazioaz

E-posten trukaketa: (gorriz, Warren Mosler-ena)

Nork: . <josebafelix@outlook.es>
Bidaltze-data: asteartea, 2017(e)ko azaroaren 14a 08:07
Nori: Warren Mosler
Gaia: Doubt

Hi Warren.

Here a doubt I have been dealing with for some time: Banks and their nazionalization

(…)

 Nork: Warren Mosler <>
Bidaltze-data: asteazkena, 2017(e)ko azaroaren 15a 01:01
Nori: .
Gaia: Re: Doubt

On Mon, Nov 13, 2017 at 9:07 PM, . <josebafelix@outlook.es> wrote:

Hi Warren.Here a doubt I have been dealing with for some time: Banks and their nazionalizationBill Mitchell is in favor of nationalization:

Nationalising the banks | Bill Mitchell

The case for re-nationalisation – Part 2

Banking

Re-nationalising the banking system would eliminate the largely unresolvable tension that exists in the current system where banks occupy a special protected place and are not really allowed to fail by dint of government support (implicit or otherwise) yet at the same time behave just like risk-taking entrepreneurial firms, paying exorbitant executive salaries and skewing their operations to the interests of their shareholders.

except they do fail as defined  by the owners losing all their equity

 The tension between the public nature of banking and the intrinsic social role they play and the greedy pursuit of private profit –

That’s where regulation and  supervision comes in,  as per my proposals. 

 or the privatisation of profit and the socialisation of loss – is palpable and unsustainable.

Socialization of loss only after shareholders have lost  everything.

Nor are govt. net losses all that large, best I can recall.  In  fact, 

many of the ‘bailouts’ resulted in profits for the govt. after 2008  

 Socialisation the profits and loss and steering the activities of banks 100 per cent towards the advancement of public purpose would go a long way towards eliminating the worst features of the banking system which culminated in the global financial crisis.

And introduce its own set of problems- politicization  of lending, as most europeans are painfully aware of after decades of large state owned banks. 

 The nationalisation of banks would mean that a key social institution is serving only one master – the public rather than compromising its public charter to line the coffers of their private owners.

More specifically,  they tend to be biased towards serving those with political power. 

When we consider the essential progressive reforms to the financial system in a later blog, a starting point will be to return banks to being banks rather than gambling casinos.

True, again, it’s about regulation and supervision

 Part of that process, should be the re-nationalisation of the banking sector

Both public and private banks  are very dangerous animals… 

Also in his latest book, Reclaiming the State, pp. 257 ff.It seems to me that you are not in favor of that measure…

as above.

The legislature can advance funds as desired, public banks or no  public  banks.

That is, the tool for the desired outcomes is already in place.

Warren Mosler, on with Steve Grumbine at Real Progressives, discussing reforms of banking. In order to reform banks, we have to first decide what banks are for and what they should and shouldn’t do. The first purpose of banking is to have a stable payment system. This is infrastructure that undergirds the economy, so that individuals or corporations can make payments. Decades and centuries of experience show that banks on their own cannot create a stable payment system, and instead have a tendency towards bank runs, panics, and financial crises. This is the argument for deposit insurance. With deposit insurance, the government protects bank customers from their bank. It ensures that even in the event of bank failure, customers can still withdraw or transfer their accounts, stabilizing the payment system. Furthermore, centralized payment clearing at a central bank (where the central bank (like the Fed) makes payments between banks) is necessary to ensure that $1 in every bank will actually be equal to $1. Once there is deposit insurance and central banking, the banking system becomes dangerous. This is because they have government guarantees behind their actions, so they cannot fail. It’s like letting a gambler loose in a casino, then saying “you get to keep all of your winnings and the government will pay for all of your losses.” It encourages extreme risk-taking. This therefore demands full banking regulation, to ensure that banks aren’t taking advantage of government protection. The next task of banking is lending. There are many purposes to lending, with probably the most important being the capital development of the economy. So, entrepreneurs and businesses can take out loans in order to finance investment in new technology, jobs, factories, etc. This kind of financing activity is a major contributor to the improvement of quality of life. One question here is, should banks do this? The private sector is capable of lending even without banks doing it. This is what the bond market does, and what private companies can do to finance their customers’ purchases (think auto loans from a car company). However, there are 3 key differences between bank lending and other private sector lending. First, because banks are lending their own IOUs rather than lending from a pre-existing pile of cash, this means that lending for the capital development of the economy is not limited by any quantity of saving. Second, because banks are backed up by government guarantees, they don’t have to lend based on the value of the assets, but can lend based on the ability of the borrower to pay. And third, because banking is heavily regulated by government, it is an opportunity for public policy to shape the development of the economy, by encouraging banks to lend for things that serve public purpose, and discouraging (or banning) lending for things that don’t. Since banks are already functionally public-private-partnerships, should we just nationalize banks and make them all into public institutions? Mosler argues that we should not. The reason is because public banks are subject to political pressures and can make huge losses, therefore public banks are highly susceptible to corruption. With the public-private model, Mosler asserts, the banks have incentive to lend based on risk, not based on political favors.

Those were not my actual words.  I don’t argue specifically against public banks, but I do  point out the  shortcomings

which never seem to be part of the analysis of those who advocate for them.

I have read some texts of yours where you have the same position (of course!!) about nationalizing the banks, i.e., Not to nationalize them.Is this OK?

As above, thanks!

Best!

Warren 

Any more arguments?
Thanks a lot.
Best.
Joseba
Warren Mosler

Valance Company, Inc.

5000 Southgate 

Christiansted, USVI  00820

oooooooooooo

Nork: . <josebafelix@outlook.es>
Bidaltze-data: asteazkena, 2017(e)ko azaroaren 15a 02:14
Nori: Warren Mosler
Gaia: ER: Doubt

Thank you very much!!!!

Best.

joseba

oooooooooooo

Nork: Warren Mosler <>
Bidaltze-data: asteazkena, 2017(e)ko azaroaren 15a 02:16
Nori: .
Gaia: Re: ER: Doubt

always glad to help!

On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 3:14 PM, . <josebafelix@outlook.es> wrote:

oooooooooooooo

Bankugintzaz hiru hitz (1)

Joserra Etxebarriari UEU-k egingo dion omenaldia dela eta, aspaldiko lanetan egon naiz murgilduta eta lanon hainbat oharretan azaldu dena, eta lantxo batzuetan zeharka bada ere agertu dena, orain zuzen azaldu nahi dut.

Zergatia? Ondoan azalduko dena mundu zabalean, mundu osoan jende gutxi, oso gutxi da gai ulertzeko… Eta, hala ere, euskaldunok UEUko bloga dela medio aukera izan dugu aparteko eztabaida sakona segitu ahal izateko.

Hona hemen hiru hitzak: (i) nazioarteko ekonomia eta ‘inperialismoaz’1; (ii) bankugintza: bankuen  `nazionalizazioaz’2, eta (iii) Greziako desastreaz3.

Hiru eremuetan ezkerrak, edozein delarik hori, kale egin du, ez du ezer ulertu eta proposatu duena barregarria izanda, penagarria eta lotsagarriaz gain.

Hiru espazioetan Warren Mosler izango dugu, gidari, nor besterik?

(Nazioarteko ekonomia eta ‘inperialismoaz’

Hi monetary analysis is generally confused due to what appears to be a lack of understanding/comprehension of monetary operations

(Warren Mosler-ek niri bidalitako e-posta, 2014)

(a) Michael Hudson-i egindako elkarrizketa eta kritika

Berriki hauxe esan du Michael Hudson-ek elkarrizketa batean4:

Greg McInerney: You’ve written extensively about the US and it’s funny, the US might be the first Empire that’s really never been called as much by the people living there. How has the US managed to obfuscate the fact that it’s the biggest global superpower to most of its citizens?

Prof. Hudson: People don’t understand the balance of payments and the nature of the monetary system. They don’t understand that the dollar standard, internationally, means essentially that America’s balance-of-payments deficit – which is almost entirely military for many decades – is the basis of foreign central bank monetary reserves. So the world’s monetary reserves consist of loans to finance the American military surrounding of the rest of the world. People don’t look at what these central bank reserves end up being used for. When they hold US Treasury bills, what is the deficit resulting from? What is the balance of payments and the budget deficit resulting from? This kind of analysis, simply is not widely publicised there.”

Ezagutu nuen Hudson eta Mosler-en arteko e-posten trukaketa. Hona gaiari dagokionez, garrantzi handiko bat:

(Aspaldiko e-posta, 2010ekoa. Hudson-ek beltzez, Mosler-ek, gorriz.)

The system is asymmetrical, giving the US a free lunch as creator of international bank reserves in the form of Treasury IOUs.

The foreign country knows exactly what the terms and conditions are when it decides to facilitate the sale of real goods and services to the US in exchange for dollar balances at the Fed. 

So regarding the Second Question, this does indeed enable the U.S. military to spend abroad, with the dollars ending up in foreign central banks, to be recycled – to finance the domestic U.S. federal budget deficit”

Not at all.  When the US military spends it buys real goods and services from willing sellers at market prices.  It does this in most countries in the world, most of which do not have CB’s that continuously accumulate dollar balances to facilitate anything.  It spends the same way the rest of govt spends- by instructing the Fed to credit the account of the seller’s fed member bank (or correspondent).

Hortaz, honela idatzi nion Hudson-i :

It seems to me that the “America’s balance-of-payments deficit” …. does not “finance the American military surrounding of the rest of the world.”

Hudson-en erantzuna, berehalakoa:

I don’t see how you’re disagreeing with me, Joseba.

My model goes beyond the MMT model in dividing the economy into the FIRE sector vs the non-FIRE sector.

Ene erantzuna:

I agree with Mosler, or at least I try to agree with him.

I mean, despite the FIRE sector versus the non-FIRE sector, it seems to me that the point here is the working of the FED (and the Treasury).

In the enclosed document5:

============0

So what is Hudson talking about?  Do recycled dollars acquire a different nature by virtue of having been recycled?  So Europe and Asia–and for that matter, idiot politicians–may think that recycled dollars are financing our foreign adventures, but that is mistaken, correct? 

Correct, it’s mistaken.

===========0

Am I mistaken? Is Warren mistaken? On what?

Hudson-en erantzuna:

His [Mosler’s] perspective was the US financial system; mine was the global system and central bank activities to stabilize exchange rates.

Both perspectives are necessary. It depends on what question you’re asking.

Hor utzi nuen Hudson, jakinez afera ordainketen balantzeko defizita ulertzean datzala.

Aipatu bezala, Mosler-en eta Hudson-en artean eztabaida bat egon zen6. Link honetan7 dago irudikatua.

Baina link horretan azaltzen denaz haratago zen eztabaida. Segituan, beraz, eztabaida osoa dago.

(b) Warren Mosler eta Michael Hudson-en arteko eztabaida osoa

Hudson-ek behin baino gehiagotan azpimarratu duenez, AEB ez da inoiz euroaren aurka egon: EBko atzerritar trukeko erreserbak AEBk ikusi ditu bere Altxor Publikoari egindako mailegu gisa: beraren ustez, hortxe datza AEBrentzako bazka librearen giltza.

(Hudson-ek Superalismoa izeneko liburua 1972an idatzi zuen, 2003an edizio berria hitzaurrea, sarrera eta datu berriekin. Eta 2009ko martxoan, artikulu interesgarri bat plazaratu zuen, gai berberaz8.)

Eztabaida, edo zuzenketa hobeto esanda, Hudson-en Dollar Hegemony and the Rise of China artikuluaren inguruan da9.

Hudson-en iritziz, “orain AEBko Altxor Publikoak 4 x 1012 dolar zor dizkie atzerritar banku zentralei10.”

Mosler-ek dioenez, FEDren betebehar bakarra azaltzen da Altxor Publikoko bono horiek (4 x 1012) epemuga eguneratzen direnean, ordainkizun bilakatzen direnean. FEDk banku zentralaren bonoen kontua kargatu egiten du FEDren eta banku zentralaren erreserba-kontua abonatu egiten du FEDn. Ez dago beste ezer gehiagorik egiteko.

Hudson: “Banku zentral gehienek beren truke tasak baxu edukitzen dituzte beren dolar sarrerak birziklatuz AEBko Altxor Publikoko IOUak erosteko.”

Mosler: Erosten dituztenak AEBko finantza-aktiboak dira, Altxor Publikoko bonoak bezala, eta haiengatik ordaintzen dute beren moneta propioan.

Hudson: “Birziklatze horrek ahalbidetzen dio AEBri bere atzerriko gastu militarra eta bere barneko aurrekontu defizita finantzatzeko 1950etik. Hortaz, Europak eta Asiak beren atzerritar truke mozkinak erabili dituzte polo bakarra den AEBko base militarrak finantzatzeko…”

Mosler: AEBko dolar-gastua ez dute sarrerek mugatzen. Banku zentralek AEBko dolarrak erosten dituzte beren esportazio-industriak babesteko, beren makroekonomien kaltetan.

Mosler-en iritziz, AEBko 4 x 1012 dolarreko kanpo zorra dolarretan da izendatua, ez atzerriko monetan. Hortaz, ez dago inolako arazorik ordaintzeko (alderantziz, atzerriko monetan izendatua izan balitz, AEBk arazoak izango zituzkeen).

Are gehiago, dolarren atzerritar birziklatzeak AEBko Altxor Publikoko bonoetan ez dauka inongo zerikusirik AEBk bere inperialismoa finantzatzeko, zeren AEBk nahi duen beste moneta kopuru jaulki baitezake. Izan ere, AEBko gobernu-gastu guztia “banku kontuetan zenbakiak markatuz” lortzen da, aspaldian ez dena Bernanke-k argitu zuen moduan11.

Beraz, Hudson-ek ez dauka arrazoirik, birziklaturiko dolarrek ez baitituzte AEBko atzerriko abenturak finantzatzen.

Ordainketa-balantzaren kontuei dagokienez, hona hemen bien arteko elkarrizketa osoa12:

Mosler: Banku zentralek badakite beti daukatela aukera beren dolarrak gastatzeko merkatu-prezioan. Badakite AEBko gobernuak ez daukala inolako betebeharrik arlo horretan.

Hudson: Baldin eta atzerritarrek ez badituzte beren dolarrak birziklatzen AEBko tituluak (edo AEBko esportazioak edo AEBko konpainiak, zeintzuk AEBko gobernuak oztopatzen dituzten) erosiz, orduan beraien monetak altxatuko dira.

Mosler: Kausatze prozesua pixka bat desberdina da. Hasten da AEBri ondasun edo zerbitzu bat saltzearekin, atzerritar konpainia dolarretan ordaindua izanik. Ordainketa hori kreditu bat da AEBko banku-kontu bati dagokiona, beraien izenean, zuzenki edo zeharka. Normalean, konpainia horrek gero dolar horiek salduko lituzke bere moneta propioak lortzearren, moneta propioren obligazio lokalak betetzeko. Haren saldo-orria normalki moneta propioan dago, non atzerritar monetaren jabetzak espekulatiboak kontsideratuko bailirateke. Dolar horien salmentak moneta propioaren altxatzea kausatzen du. Baldin eta banku zentralak ez badu nahi bere moneta propioa altxatzea, berak erosiko ditu dolarrak eta beraiek eduki bere FEDko kontuan.

Hortaz, atzerritar bankuek dolarrak erosten dituzte beren truke tasak baxu edukitzeko. Haiek uste dute hori beharrezkoa dela beren esportatzaileak lehiakorrak izateko, eta beraz, beren esportazio-sektorean langabezia alboratzeko.

AEBko kanpo-inbertsioa “kapital kanpo-irteera” egon daiteke truke tasak flotatzaileak izan ala ez.

Hudson: AEBko ekonomiak ordainketa-balantzaren defizita daukanean, hori neurtua da definitua da atzerritar Altxor Publikoko jabetzaren pilaketaren modura.

Mosler: Ez da izan behar dena Altxor Publikoko jabetza. Dolarretan izendaturiko finantza-aktiboak izan daitezke, edo AEBko barne gobernu-agentzien tituluak edo dolarretan izendaturiko korporazio-obligazioak.

Hudson: Pilaketa horrek adierazten ditu nazioarteko transakzioak, sektore pribatuaren bidez kitatu ez diren transakzioak eta atzerritar truke merkatuan kitatu ez direnak.

Mosler: Normalki atzerritar banku zentralak bere Altxor Publikoko tituluak AEBko Altxor Publikotik erosten ditu dolarren bidez, zeintzuk merkatuan jadanik erosi baititu. Ez ditu egiten atzerritar transakzioak AEBko Altxor Publikoarekin. Atzerritar banku zentralek ez dituzte AEBko Altxor Publikoko tituluak moneta propioan.

Hudson: Esportatzaileek, aktibo-saltzaileek eta beste dolar edukitzaileek beren dolarrak iraultzen dituzte beren merkataritza-bankuetara moneta propiorako.

Mosler: Ez dituzte irauli, moneta propioa erosten dute merkatu-tasetan.

Hudson: Gero banku horiek dolar ordainketa horiek iraultzen dituzte banku zentralera moneta propiorako.

Mosler: Berriz, ez irauli, baizik eta dolarrak saldu banku zentralari merkatu prezioetan, banku zentralak dolarrak erostea erabakitzen duenean.

Hudson: Orduan banku zentralak arazo bat dauka dolar txeke horiekin.

Mosler: Ez dago inolako arazorik. Dolarrak bankuaren FEDko kontutik banku zentralaren FEDko kontura doaz.

Banku zentralak zuritzen ditu dolarrak FEDrekin, balantze moduan. Gero FEDri zuzentzen dio Altxor Publikoko bonoak edo Fannie Mae-renak edo edozein erosteko.

Hudson: Baina gobernuak dolar horiek bere Diru Funts Subiranoan ezartzen baditu…

Mosler: … Dolarrak banku zentralaren FEDko kontutik Funts Subiranoak bere dolar balantzetarako erabiltzen duen banku kideko FEDko kontura joango lirateke…

Hudson: …eta ahalegintzen bada AEBko aktibo komenigarri bat (…) orduan AEBk esaten dio, “ez, zuk soilik AEBko Altxor Publikoko IOU delakoak eros ditzakezu”. Politika hori 1970eko hamarkadaren hasieran hasi zen OPECeko (Lurralde Petrolio Esportatzaileen Erakundea, LPEE) prezioen altxatzearekin. Oso esplizitua zen, denbora hartan Etxe Zurian esan zidaten moduan.

Mosler: Badaude aktibo mugatu batzuk segurtasun nazionala dela kausa, baina, orokorki Funtsak eros dezake nahi duena.

Izan ere, banku zentralek dolarrak erosten dituzte beren esportazio industriak babesteko, eta hori egiten dute beren makroekonomien konturako. Transakzio horiek egitean, atzerritar herrialdeak ongi ezagutzen du zer nolako terminoetan eta baldintzetan arituko den, berak ondasun errealak eta zerbitzuak AEBri saltzen dizkionean, FEDko dolar balantzaren trukean.

Ondorioa garbi dago:

Atzerritar banku zentralen dolarrak ez dira birziklatzen AEBko aurrekontu federalaren defizita finantzatzeko, Hudson-ek uste duen moduan. Kasu, AEBko sektore militarrak gastatzen duenean ondasun errealak eta zerbitzuak erosten dizkie saltzaileei merkatu-prezioetan. Munduko herrialde askotan gauzatzen dira eragiketa horiek eta herrialde gehienek ez dituzte Banku Zentralen metaturiko dolar-balantzak. Sektore militarrak gastatzen du gainontzeko gobernu-sektoreek egiten duten antzera – FEDri esanez saltzailearen FEDko kide bankuko (edo dagokioneko) kontua kreditatzea.

Egia esan, atzerritar sektoreak dolar aktibo finantzarioak metatzeko desioak ahalbidetzen du gobernu-defizita handiagoa izatea, baina ‘inflazioa’ sorrarazi gabe.

Paul Krugman Nobel saridunak ez du ulertzen prozesu hori13.

Esportazioak kostu errealak izanik eta inportazioak onura errealak, AEBk aparteko abantailak lortzen ditu merkataritza defizitetik. Hori dela-eta, gainontzeko herrialdeek AEBri esportatzen dizkiotenean, hori egiten dute beren makroekonomien konturako.

Hortxe dago desberdintasuna: AEBren defizita AEBrentzako onuragarria den bitartean, gainontzeko herrialdeen esportazioa herrialde horien kalterako da.


5 Hudson-ek 2010ean niri bidalitako e-posta sorta bat: aipatutako zatian, Mosler-ek, gorriz, erantzuten die berari egindako zenbait galderari.

6 Ikus aurreko oharra: aipaturiko 2010eko e-posta sorta.

10 Hona hemen, ingelesez, galderak (beltzez) Hudson-en testua (urdinez) eta Mosler-en erantzunak (gorriz):

In a recent article [Dollar Hegemony and the Rise of China], Michael Hudson wrote the following “The US Treasury owes $4 trillion to foreign central banks, foreign central banks have $4 trillion on deposit at the fed in securities accounts but there is no foreseeable way in which it can make good this foreign debt,

what does ‘make good’ mean?

the fed’s only obligation is when those tsy secs mature it debits the cb’s securities account at the fed and credits the cb’s reserve account at the fed.

given its chronic structural deficit of foreign military spending, import dependency and capital outflows.

‘capital outflows’ applies to fixed exchange rate regimes, not our floating exchange rate and non convertible currency regime

That is why so many countries are treating the dollar like a “hot potato” and trying to avoid holding them. And holding euros or British sterling does not provide a better alternative.

That implies inflation which isn’t the case either?

Most central banks today hold down their exchange rates by recycling their dollar inflows to buy US Treasury IOUs.

What they do is buy $US financial assets, like tsy secs, and pay for them with their local currency.

This recycling enables the United States to finance its overseas military spending and also its domestic budget deficit (largely military in character) since the 1950s. So Europe and Asia have used their foreign exchange earnings to finance a unipolar US buildup of military bases to surround them.”

US spending of dollars is not revenue constrained. The CB’s buy $US to support their export industries at the expense of their macro economies.

If I understand MMT correctly, this doesn’t entirely make sense. First question: is the US foreign debt of 4 trillion [1012] dollar denominated or foreign currency denominated.

dollar

If the former, there is no problem of payment, right?

right

If the latter, we do have a problem.

right

Second question, foreign recycling of dollars to US T-Bonds should have absolutely nothing to do with US ability to finance its imperialism, since it can issue all the currency it wishes to, (however unintelligently), right?

right, all us govt spending is by ‘marking up numbers in bank accounts’ as bernanke reported.

So what is Hudson talking about? Do recycled dollars acquire a different nature by virtue of having been recycled? So Europe and Asia–and for that matter, idiot politicians–may think that recycled dollars are financing our foreign adventures, but that is mistaken, correct?

correct, it’s mistaken.

As I understand it, foreigners recycle their dollars into US T-bonds, because they think it is advantageous to park the money in such savings accounts rather than invest them in other ways. They are not constrained to do so. Are their currencies really at risk if they do not do so?

they do it to lower the value of their currencies to hold down domestic wages to help exporters at the expense of the rest of their economies.

12 ikus 5. oharra. Hemen, ingelesezko bertsio osoa, Hudson-ek (beltzez), Mosler-ek (gorriz):

It’s always good to walk through the balance of payments accounts step by step, to reconcile what’s happening with domestic monetary theory. This helps avoid talking at cross purposes.
You’re right that “make good” on this debt means simply that the Fed will credit foreign holders of T-securities with an account at the Fed.

By “make good” I actually meant reciprocating by selling U.S. exports or ownership of U.S. real assets (like the oil refinery that CNOOC tried to buy).

CB’s know that they always have the option of spending their dollars at market prices. They know that the US Govt is under no obligation in that regard.

My point is quite different. If foreigners did NOT recycle their dollars by buying U.S. securities (or of course, by buying U.S. exports – which are not very competitive – or U.S. companies, which the U.S. Government blocks), THEN their currencies will rise.

Let’s trace this back as the causations are a bit different. It starts with a sale of a good or service to the US where the foreign company gets paid in dollars, which are a credit to a US bank account in their name, directly or indirectly.

Ordinarily, that company would then sell those dollars for its local currency to meet its local currency obligations, and its balance sheet is generally in its local currency as well, where foreign currency holdings might be considered speculative.

Selling those dollars causes its local currency to rise.

If the CB doesn’t want the local currency to rise it will buy the dollars and hold them in its Fed account.
So foreign central banks buy dollars in order to hold down their exchange rates.

right, as above.

They believe that this is necessary to keep their exporters competitive, and thereby avoid unemployment in their export sectors.

right, as above.

U.S. investment abroad – “capital outflow” – can exist regardless of whether exchange rates are floating or not.

Ok
When the US economy runs a balance-of-payments deficit, this is measured – indeed, defined – as the buildup of foreign Treasury holdings.

It doesn’t all have to be Treasury holdings. It can be any dollar denominated financial assets, including US govt. agency securities, or dollar denominated corporate obligations?

This buildup represents the international transactions that are NOT settled via private-sector transactions and the foreign-exchange market.

Generally the foreign CB buys its Treasury securities from the US Treasury with dollars it’s already purchased in the market. It does not do fx transactions with the US Treasury.

Foreign central banks do NOT buy U.S. Treasury securities with LOCAL currency.

right, as above.

Local exporters and asset-sellers and other dollar recipients turn over their dollar receipts to their commercial banks for domestic currency.

They don’t ‘turn them over’ but purchase local currency at market rates.

These banks then turn over these dollar payments to the central bank for domestic currency.

Again, not ‘turn over’ but sell dollars to the CB at market prices when the CB decides to buy dollars.
The central bank then has a problem of what to do with these dollar checks.

It’s not a problem. Dollars go from the bank’s fed account to the CB’s Fed account.
It clears them with the Fed, and has a balance. It then directs the Fed to buy Treasury bonds, or Fannie Maes or whatever.

right.
But if the government puts these dollars in its own Sovereign Currency Fund

They would go from the CB’s fed account to the fed account of the member bank the sovereign fund uses for its dollar balances.

and tries to buy a desirable US asset (not Rockefeller Center, on which the Japanese lost $1 billion), then the US says, “No, you can only buy US Treasury IOUs.” This policy began during the OPEC price rise in the early 1970s. It was quite explicit, as I was told at the White House at the time.

There are some restricted assets for national security considerations, but in general the fund can buy whatever it wants.

We agree that central banks buy these dollars to support their export industry. You believe that this is (by definition, I gather) “at the expense of their macro economies.” But this is their decision. Probably they believe that it is in their macroeconomic interest to keep their export industries competitive. (Otherwise, it is special interest pleading.)

agreed And I’d make the case it’s a special interest pleading.

The US doesn’t have a problem as long as it can keep the surplus dollars in its own securities or “pay” them off by establishing a Fed account for the T-bill seller.

As above, I don’t see a ‘problem’ in any case.

The problem is diplomatic: foreign countries get the short end of the stick. The system is asymmetrical, giving the US a free lunch as creator of international bank reserves in the form of Treasury IOUs.

The foreign country knows exactly what the terms and conditions are when it decides to facilitate the sale of real goods and services to the US in exchange for dollar balances at the Fed.

So regarding the Second Question, this does indeed enable the U.S. military to spend abroad, with the dollars ending up in foreign central banks, to be recycled – to finance the domestic U.S. federal budget deficit!

Not at all. When the US military spends it buys real goods and services from willing sellers at market prices. It does this in most countries in the world, most of which do not have CB’s that continuously accumulate dollar balances to facilitate anything. It spends the same way the rest of govt spends- by instructing the Fed to credit the account of the seller’s fed member bank (or correspondent).

The balance-of-payments deficit – military spending and all – finances the government’s domestic budget deficit (including tax cuts for the wealthy).

I say it this waythe desire to accumulate dollar financial assets by the foreign sector allows the govt deficit to be larger than otherwise without causing ‘inflation.’

The ability to deficit spend without causing inflation is a function of non govt savings desires, including those of the foreign sector.

So maybe foreign politicians and government officials are not so dumb after all in seeking an alternative international financial arrangement.

I can assure you that China would like to buy the same commanding heights of the US economy that US investors have bought abroad. They are not given this “choice.” Their choice is not really to buy US Treasuries rather than other securities (such as euro bonds plunging in dollar-price terms). It is whether to export and accept US dollars or whether to develop their own domestic market and block US and hence foreign buyouts of their own infrastructure, industry and commanding heights.

I agree that exports are real costs and imports real benefits, and that we benefit enormously from the trade deficit.
That’s why I say
it’s at the expense of their macro economies to net export to US.

Patetikoa, erabat!

Antoni Soy‏ @antonisoy

(https://twitter.com/antonisoy/status/940501095444512768)

SIMPLEMENT PATÈTIC!!! Iglesias fa una crida al PSC i a ERC a construir una ‘alternativa entre

progressistes’

Iglesias fa una crida al PSC i a ERC a construir una ‘alternativa entre progressistes’

El líder de Podem dóna suport a Xavier Domènech i critica l’independentisme perquè diu que ha ‘estafat’ els ciutadans

(https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/ampliacioiglesias-reivindica-una-alternativa-entre-progressistes-que-blindi-els-drets-socials-i-rebutgi-la-unilateralitat/)

2017 abe. 12

Mutatis mutandis:

Antoni (ekonomialaria, DTMren ingurukoa) —> joseba

PATÈTIC —> Patetikoa

Iglesias —> A. Otegi eta, oro har, EHBilduko ‘lider mandangazale‘ guztiak

Podem —> Podemos

PSC —> PNV

ERC —> EHBildu

Patetikoa, erabat, eta behin eta berriz aldarrikatua!

Utikan progre(sista) guztiak, hala Katalunian nola Granadan, sorry Euskal Herrian!

Autodeterminazioa, Independentzia eta Euskal Errepublika berria!

Gehigarri berezia:

Eta CUP?—>???

(Agian etorkizuneko euskal mugimendu independentista berria, eraikitzear dagoena eta orain faltan botatzen duguna… Beharbada orain dela 25 urte nahita lurperatu zutenekoaren antzekoa…)

Kripto-monetak

Warren B. Mosler‏ @wbmosler

(https://twitter.com/wbmosler/status/940534610395615232)

Wouldn’t surprise me to find out a central bank has been buying cryptos... 😉

2017 abe. 12

Jim‏ @jimyiapanis

Replying to @wbmosler

Why do you think they’d want to do so Warren?

Warren B. Mosler‏ @wbmosler

Speculation. 😉

Gogoratu ondokoak:

Bitcoin delakoaz hitz bi: zergak, ‘moneta’ lokalak, isunak…

Zergak, dolarrak eta bitcoinak

E-dirua, zergak, sasi-monetak eta… urre estandarra

Demokrazia Katalunian?

Carles Puigdemont ?‏ @KRLS

(https://twitter.com/KRLS/status/939584785667805184)

Ho vaig demanar fa dies i ara ho exigeixo: PP, PSC i Ciudadanos respectaran els resultats del #21D o engarjolaran sistemàticament a tothom fins que no quedin rivals polítics? De moment el model que practiquen i defensen és el de governar al marge dels resultats a les urnes

2017 abe. 9

Demokrazia?

Katalunian?

Gora Errepublika katalan independentea!

España, aparta de mi este cáliz (baita ekonomian ere!)

Sarrera gisa, ikus:

España: Aparta de mí este cáliz

eta

ESPAÑA, APARTA DE MÍ ESTE CÁLIZ (Cesar Vallejo)

Segida:

Zipriztin ekonomiko interesgarriak:

(i) Diru Teoria Modernoa (DTM) eta Red MMT España

(ii) Katalunia eta DTM: nazio arazoa tartean

(iii) Los independentistas son también responsables de la enorme crisis en Catalunya

Ez dago ezer egitekorik espainiar horiekin, ezta ekonomian ere.

Brusela eta Katalunia (edo Katalunia eta Brusela)

Egun onak… egun ederrak…

Hasierarako, ikus

Katalunia: autodeterminazio-erreferendumaren eguna

eta

Bartzelonan bizi nuenekoaren lekuko aparta

Segida:

Jordi Domingo‏ @JordiDomingoGM

(https://twitter.com/JordiDomingoGM/status/939149565944614917)

1/2 Avui, novament un gran dia ple d’emoció. El MHP de Catalunya @KRLS Carles Puigdemont ens ha rebut i li hem lliurat el projecte de

2017 abe. 8

Jordi Domingo‏ @JordiDomingoGM

Replying to @JordiDomingoGM @KRLS and

2/2 constitució elaborat, com a eina de debat i reflexió, per més de 3.500 persones. La República és a les mans de tots nosaltres. Persistim

Urriaren 1a gogoratuz…

Egun onak eta egun ederrak.

Zorionak Jordi eta segi aurrera, beti aitzina!