Alemania eta EB, berriz

Bill Mitchell-en Der schwarzen Null continues to haunt Europe


(i) Alemania ez da aldatu, ez aldatuko1

(ii) Wolfgang Schäuble2

(iii Egonkortasun mekanismo europarra3

(iv) Dokumentuaren ezaugarriak eta Wolfgang Schäuble: kontrola eta diziplina4

(v) Olaf Scholz5

(vi) Emmanuel Macron eta François Hollande6

(vii) Brexit, EB eta Alemania7

(vii) Ondorio batzuk8

(ix) Frantziako erantzuna9


(a) So it is on to the European Council summit in Brussels at the end of June for more talk. The Germans will wax lyrical about the importance of Europe to them and how Germany is a European citizen bar none.

(b) But they will not concede ground on the things that matter.

(c) And as the French economy minister said – “without reform the euro area won’t survive”.

(d) And that doesn’t mean making a few changes around the edge.

(e) Germany has to give up control and allow a full fiscal union to develop. That is the scale of the reforms that are required.

(f) It won’t agree to do that.

(g) Nor, for that matter will France.

(h) That has been clear for decades and is why Europe is in the state (mess) it is in.

(i) The clock is ticking!


Ezkerra eta Brexit

Ahantz Europako erreforma

Ingelesez: “Last Tuesday (May 15, 2018), the new German Finance Minister Olaf Scholz stood up in the German Bundestag and delivered his first fiscal policy presentation. Not only was “der schwarzen Null” (Black Zero) sustained but in his address, the new German Finance Minister made it clear that Germany would not entertain any expansion of the EU fiscal capacity (thus rejecting Emmanuel Macron’s proposals) and wanted to delay other ‘reforms’ that Germany had previously suggested they would support (beefing up the Single Resolution Fund and the creation of the European Monetary Union). For those Europhile progressives who have been hanging their hat on the hope that the takeover of the German Finance Ministry by the SPD would be the deal breaker that the Scholz’s presentation was nothing short of a disaster. He reiterated Germany would not be shifting in any major way and that Member States just had to buckle down and follow Germany’s fiscal example – surpluses as far as the eye can see. None of this was a surprise to me. It has been clear for some time that Scholz is just a continuation of Schäuble. Indeed some pointed statements from Bundestag politicians next day in their responses suggested just that.

I wrote about why the elevation of Olaf Scholz will be a disaster for European reform in this blog post – Forget European reform – the Germans have anyway (April 23, 2018).

His Bundestag speech (May 15, 2018) just confirmed that assessment.”

Ingelesez: “On May 16, 2018, when the Bundestag President, Wolfgang Schäuble handed the floor to the spokesperson for Die Linke, Gesine Lötzsch to respond to the German fiscal statement that Finance Minister Olaf Scholz had delivered the day before, she opened by saying that Olaf Scholtz’s fiscal statement ran contrary to the “title of the coalition agreement” – “Ein neuer Aufbruch für Europa – Eine neue Dynamik für Deutschland – Ein neuer Zusammenhalt für unser Land” (“A new departure for Europe – A new dynamic for Germany – A new coheson for our country”.

She said that (Bundestag Protokoll, Wednesday, May 16, 2018, page 2898):

none of this is true in this budget. This is not only a disgrace for Olaf Scholz, but above all is fatal for our citizens. They continue to promote the black zero. I wonder why the SPD really wanted to take over the Ministry of Finance if it only wanted to continue the policy of Wolfgang Schäuble.

The black zero is the famous “schwarzen Null” or balanced fiscal state which Schäuble obsessed about.

In a similar vein, Leader of the Alliance ’90/The Greens, Katrin Göring-Eckardt asked Andrea Nahles (Leader of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the new German Parliament) (Bundestag Protokoll, Wednesday, May 16, 2018, page 2995):

Erst einmal habe ich mich gefragt: Warum haben Sie eigentlich 13 Stunden, glaube ich, um das Finanzressort verhandelt, damit am Schluss Wolfgang Schäuble Olaf Scholz heißt? Sonst ändert sich eigentlich nichts.

Which also asks why did the SPD bother trying to get hold of the Finance job when all that has happened is that Wolfgang Schäuble has morphed into Olaf Scholtz.

The day before, Olaf Scholz stood to the applause of the CDU/CSU and SPD members after former Finance Minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, now President of the Bundestag, invited Scholz to present the “Haushaltsgesetz 2018” (Federal Budget Act, 2018).

What followed was an almost final ‘nail in the coffin’ for any plans that the Europhile progressives might entertain to achieve meaningful reforms of the Eurozone.

But first some background.

Ingelesez: “The European Stability Mechanism

After an ad hoc approach to Member State insolvency in the early years of the GFC under the guise of the two programs – European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) – and the – European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), the European Commission established the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which was established as an intergovernmental agreement on September 27, 2012.

I emphasised its status as an Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism – because it means the status of the ESM is not currently integrated into European Union law.

The ESM is an intergovernmental institution based in Luxembourg with the EMU Finance Ministers becoming the Board of Governors.

The ESMs role was to provide:

a permanent solution for a problem that arose early in the sovereign debt crisis: the lack of a backstop for euro area countries no longer able to tap the markets.

That is, it was established as a means of helping Member States unable to fund themselves.

It was an explicit recognition that the EMU nations use a foreign currency and can easily find themselves unable to raise sufficient amounts of that currency in bond markets to cover their fiscal deficits.

The ESM has “its own capital of €80 billion” provided by the Eurozone Member States, which cannot be loaned out. Its purpose it to provide financial markets with the confidence that the ESM is widely supported within the Eurozone.

In addition, it raises funds on financial markets which it then loans out under strict (neoliberal) conditionality to Member States in trouble.

Of the six tools available to it the ESM has used just two – loans to Ireland, Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus and some indirect bank recapitalisation in Spain.

The ESM thus currently provides a bailout mechanism, albeit one that enforces the austerity bias. Its purpose is to “keep the euro together” rather than provide any progressive policy space.

On December 6, 2017, the European Commission released its – Further Steps towards completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union – (the ‘Roadmap’) which offered two ‘concrete’ proposals:

1. “A proposal to establish a European Monetary Fund”.

2. “A proposal to integrate the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance into the EU legal framework”.

I say ‘concrete’ because these were the only two proposals that have any sense of an action plan attached to them.

This document was really just a follow up on the – Five Presidents’ Report: Completing Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (June 22, 2015).

That meant that the European Commission intended that these two developments would constitute its major ‘reform’ agenda for the EMU.

Which at the time indicated that very little meaningful reform was going to be countenanced.

The agenda set out was really about tidying up the developments noted above that were introduced on a sort-of piecemeal basis during the crisis and consolidating them under European Commission control and Treaty law.

It doesn’t mean that will be administered as the term “law” is taken to mean. As we know, the European Commission and related institutions such as the European Central Bank, regularly and systematically break the Treaty laws for political gain.

But the proposal was about further centralising control in the technocracy and taking away discretion from the Member States.

In other words, it constitutes the anathema of democratic reform and will increase the democratic ‘deficit’, that has become apparent with Europe over the last decades.

In fact, the ‘Roadmap’ proposed only one substantial change – the proposal to establish the European Monetary Fund.

That proposal is clearly about further centralising control of European matters within the European Commission.

That is the intent of converting an ‘intergovernmental agreement’ into EU law.

Ingelesez: “The document set out time schedule to operationalise the proposal:

1. Euro Summit (December 15, 2017) – while this meeting was dominated by Brexit considerations, the Summit did discuss “the future of the economic and monetary union (EMU) and banking union”.

The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk released a – Letter – ahead of the Summit, which “outlined a number of ideas on which there is a broad convergence” among the Council members.

These were listed as:

  • putting into operation a common backstop for the Single Resolution Fund, possibly in the form of a credit line from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM);

  • further developing the ESM, possibly to become a so-called European Monetary Fund

  • further developing the Ecofin Council Roadmap of June 2016 on completing the banking union, including the gradual introduction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme

Note the ‘slippage’ in terminology – the proposal to create a European Monetary Fund, by the time the Summit arrived (one year after the ‘Road Map’ was released) was now being expressed as a “possibility”.

2. European Council (June 28-29, 2018).

3. European Council (March 21-22, 2019).

4. Sibiu Meeting (May 9, 2019) – Under the revolving Presidency of the Council of the EU, Romania will host this meeting which is expected to finalise the introduction of the European Monetary Fund.

Notwithstanding the uncertainty, the plan has some clear aspirations:

1. Integrate the ESM into the European Union Treaty – to give the European Commission more control. No reforms here.

2. A desire to kill the Troika – that is, keep the IMF out of any future bailouts in Europe.

3. Create a funding source for the – Single Resolution Fund – to buttress the “orderly resolution of failing banks with minimal costs to taxpayers and to the real economy” – nothing much new in that.

I considered the proposal in more detail in this blog post – The latest scam from the European Commission – the ‘roadmap’ – Part 2 (December 20, 2017).

The European Monetary Fund proposal clearly already reflected Germany’s aversion to any intra-Eurozone transfers. It states that its operations would be “fiscally neutral”, which means there would be no permanent intra-Member State transfers, which are common in functioning federations (such as Australia, Canada etc).

This had Wolfgang Schäuble written all over it as I outlined in this blog post (October 16, 2017) – Wolfgang Schäuble is gone but his disastrous legacy will continue.

That blog post analysed Schäuble’s parting 3-page offering as German Finance Minister – Non-paper for paving the way towards a Stability Union – which argued that “there is little willingness” among Member States to move towards a true federation.

The creation of the European Monetary Fund (EMF), which would just extend the existing European Stability Mechanism, “to provide temporary financial support under strict reform conditionality”, was as far as he was prepared to go.

The operational significance was that under this vision, the EMF would entrench the practice of pro-cyclical fiscal policy (cutting public net spending when non-government spending is declining), which is the anathema of sound fiscal practice.

Wolfgang Schäuble’s non-paper told us exactly why the Eurozone will never become a functioning federation.

Further, Schäuble outlined the German requirement that the ESM would become a monitoring institutions over Member State policies and be allowed to discipline nations that were seen to be in violation of the Stability and Growth Pact.

In other words, technocrats working within the ESM would be empowered to delve into Member State finances and impose conditionality where it thought the State was likely to (or was) violating the fiscal rules (Fiscal Compact).”

5 Ingelesez: “Enter Olaf Scholz’s first fiscal statement – May 15, 2018

Scholz told the Bundestag that (translating in paraphrase form from the German):

1. “The debate about the correct management of government debt and financial markets has dominated European policy over recent years. Taxpayers should never again have to bail out the mistakes of banks through state budgets.”

2. “Europe is the most important national concern for Germany. A strong Europe is of primary interest to Germany.”

3. “As the most populous country with a strongly performing, export-oriented economy in the middle of the continent, we are dependent on a successful European Union. Everything that happens in Europe is important to us, and everything we do in Germany or what we do not do has an impact on our European partners. With this responsibility, we have to be smart and reasonable.”

4. “But the challenges for Europe are getting bigger … wars nearby, millions of people displaced … terrorism … the rise of nationalism … climate change … the list of challenges is long.”

5. “The problem is not that Europe is too dominant, rather it is that the EU seems to be too weak … the big politicial issue is about the sovereignty of Europe, as the French President Macron correctly notes.”

6. “Macron is correct in saying that confidence in Europe is not gained through back room collusion but by making it clear what we are doing.”

Ingelesez: “So all these statements are of the motherhood variety. The nuance is that the way Germany appear to be handling France under Macron is a little different to the way they short-changed François Hollande directly after he was elected on a ‘reform agenda’.

During his election campaign, Hollande had criticised Germany’s obsession with austerity, but when he made his trip to Germany, he was attacked for not proposing a major neoliberal reform agenda in France.

As a result of the delicate structure of the current GroKo in Germany, they have to treat their disdain over Macron’s European ambitions a little less directly.

Ingelesez: “After making all the usual ‘Germany loves Europe’ type messages, Scholz went on articulate what he thought should happen at the European level.

7. “There are very concrete steps to be taken in the area of ​​Economic and Monetary Union and the regulation of banks. The one thing we will do now is to expand the European Stability Mechanism. We (as the government) have stated that we want to develop it further towards a European Monetary Fund. This is important for the future stability of the euro area. Perhaps the ESM may also be the anchorage for the last hedge behind the single European bank resolution mechanism, to be introduced by 2024 at the latest.”

8. “This mechanism avoids taxpayers having to bailout a bank in trouble”.

9. “This should be done in two steps – first, shape the new ESM, and then, embody this new ESM into EU law”. (the AfD members were recorded as laughing at this stage).

10 “the decision of Great Britain to leave the European Union is unfortunate. We do not yet know what withdrawal means for us in the EU. However, it is clear that if the exit is sealed and completed, we will lose a net contributor to the EU budget. We have stated in the coalition agreement that Germany is ready to spend more on the EU budget after Brexit”.

11. How much more? “I have the impression that we can also make a difference with 1 percent of the economic output of the world’s largest trading bloc.”

Even with the paraphrased German translation, it is pretty easy to pick up the further uncertainty that Scholz was intending to introduce into the upcoming European Council meeting on June 28-29, 2018 in Brussels and beyond.

Remember that Wolfgang Schäuble had already indicated Germany would accept the incorporation of the ESM within EU law under the strict conditions noted above.

Let me emphasise Scholz’ intent, starting in reverse order of the issues he discussed above.

First, how much more? Well clearly Scholz recognises that while Britain will no longer be contributing billions to the EU fiscal capacity, he agreed that Germany would be “ready to spend more”.

But don’t be seduced by that promise. The 1 per cent of GDP should be the focus.

On January 8, 2018, the European Commission issued a discussion paper – A new, modern Multiannual Financial Framework for a European Union that delivers efficiently on its priorities post-2020 – which aimed to condition the upcoming EU ‘budget’ considerations in the context of Brexit.

The paper said that this “is a time for Leaders to commit financially to the kind of Union they want” and that the Commission considered the next seven-year financial agreement “will be a litmus test for the European Union”.

It outlined a host of challenges facing Europe and concluded that if “the Union decides to do less, a smaller budget will suffice” but:

Europeans expect a strong Union able to face the challenges of the future and a budget that can deliver for them. Leaders must play their part in meeting these expectations.

Well, Scholz’s speech in the Bundestag last week clearly indicated that Germany was only going to support the “less” option,

Do the sums!

The nominal GDP for the EU (28) was 15,326,468 million euro.

1 per cent of that GDP would represent 153,264.68 million euro.

The EU buget for 2017 allocated:

The EU budget for 2017 sets the total level of commitments at €157.86 billion and of payments at € 134.49 billion” [1 bilioi amerikar = mila milioi europar].

Ingelesez: “Conclusion: Germany is proposing a smaller EU ‘budget’ going forward, which makes all his concilitory statements about Emmanuel Macron look pretty false, given the latter clearly wants to expand the EU allocation.

So Germany does not intend to support any changes that might create a federal fiscal capacity for Europe.

Second, the ‘Roadmap’ saw the European Monetary Fund as providing “the common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund as part of the Banking Union”.

The – Single Resolution Mechanism – was introduced on August 19, 2014 and provides a formal process through which failing banks can be either restructured or closed without requiring massive bailouts from the fiscal resources of specific Member States.

The Single Resolution Fund was the fiscal support to that process – in other words, it provides a fiscal indemnity to Member States facing bank failures.

Its operations began on January 1, 2016 and its fund was to be built up, over 8 years, to be in excess of one per cent of the deposits of all banks in the EU (noting that Britain and Sweden opted out).

Germany was a reluctant participant in the process and rejected the EU’s further plan to incorporate a EU-wide bank deposit insurance scheme, which the European Commission had considered to be the “third pillar” of the European banking union.

One might say, the most crucial pillar.

Germany considered that if such an insurance scheme was introduced it could use its funds to guarantee deposits of citizens across Europe. Germany already has its own deposit insurance scheme and resented having to provide funds to allow other Member State governments, who had not taken a decision to introduce their own scheme, to benefit.

Scholz’s speech indicates that he wanting to play for time in relation to the Single Resolution Fund and its incorporation into EU law.

As he said, Germany does not want the matter resolved until 2024, which by then, will mean Germany is in the next political cycle and no responsibility would be taken by the current government for decisions that might be made by a new German government.

Third and related, Scholz now wants to separate the ESM proposal – the move to create the European Monetary Fund and incorporate it into EU law into two steps (“zwei Schritten”), whereas the European Commission wanted the whole package to be done and dusted by May 2019.

According to Scholz, the first debate would concern the conditions under which the European Monetary Fund would be structured and operated.

The second debate would then concern whether the European Monetary Fund would transcend its current intergovernmental agreement status and become EU law, which would take it out of Germany’s direct control – given it can veto intergovernmental agreements.

There is no way those debates can be finalised by May 2019.

Ingelesez: “French response rather swift

The French response was articulated

On May 10, 2018, a few days before Olaf Scholz stood up in the Bundestag and effectively ruled out any serious reform in the Eurozone, French President Emmanuel Macron told an audience in Aachen (Germany) while he was receiving the Charlemagne Prize for European Unity, that (Source):

Germany can no longer remain attached to maintaining budget and trade surpluses, as they are always achieved at someone else’s expense.

Well they can and they will.

After Scholz’s devastating speech to the Bundestag, the French Minister of Economic Affairs Bruno Le Maire responded by saying that “The eurozone cannot withstand economic divergences among its member states … It is now or never”.

Well Olaf Scholz thinks ‘now’ is 2014!

Same old!

As an aside, the ‘Charlemagne Prize’ is very discriminating. Its past recipients include Martin Schulz, Herman Van Rompuy, Wolfgang Schäuble, Jean-Claude Trichet, Donald Tusk, Angela Merkel, and to cap it all off – The euro was awarded the Prize in 2002.

Given it is awarded for promoting European Unity, you would have to think that the famous quote by Groucho Marx – “Please accept my resignation. I don’t care to belong to any club that will have me as a member”.”

Stephanie Kelton (DTMkoa)

Ingeles soil eta apalean…

Stephanie Kelton Has The Biggest Idea In Washington


Once an outsider, her radical economic thinking won over Wall Street. Now she’s changing the Democratic Party.

By Zach Carter

Illustration: Damon Dahlen/HuffPost Photos: Getty

For most of her career, Stephanie Kelton was accustomed to being ridiculed. It started in grad school.

At Cambridge University in the late 1990s, she signed up for an economics course taught by Willem Buiter, who later became the chief economist at Citigroup. When she asked a question about money in a particular model, he turned, red-faced with fury, and unloaded on her. “If you are the type of person who thinks money is important,” she recalls him saying, “then you are probably the same type of person who enjoys sitting in your basement and beating yourself with a rubber hose.”

The words obviously left an impression. Kelton ― who is now 48 and has been teaching economics herself for more than 16 years ― repeats them, twice, to make sure they’re transcribed correctly. Buiter didn’t respond to a request for comment.

She’s been receiving (slightly) more polite versions of the same dressing down ever since. Conservatives have accused her of worshipping a “magic money tree,” and Paul Krugman dismissed her ideas in a 2011 New York Times column as a naive blueprint for hyperinflation that carried “a sort of eerie resemblance to John Galt’s speech in Atlas Shrugged ― a ruthless insult among her left-leaning friends.

Kelton’s core idea ― that the government can’t run out of money or go bankrupt, no matter how much it spends ― hasn’t really changed since the days when Buiter and Krugman were trashing her thinking. But it seems the world has. Today she is a full-fledged member of the American power elite, juggling television bookings with MSNBC’s Chris Hayes and Bloomberg TV’s Joe Wiesenthal, writing op-eds for The New York Times and being quoted in The Wall Street Journal.

Pod Save America and Financial Times want her on their podcasts. She’s got a book deal with Public Affairs, and Bloomberg View has signed her up as its newest columnist ― but she isn’t sure that gig is worth the time, given her packed speaking schedule. In May alone, she’s being flown to Las Vegas to debate a former International Monetary Fund chief economist before heading to Monaco to moderate a panel on artificial intelligence. After that, the House of Lords in London.

Everybody wants a piece of Kelton these days because a simple, radical idea she has been workshopping her entire career is the next big thing in Democratic Party politics. She calls it the job guarantee ― a federal program offering a decent job to every American who wants to work, in every county in the country, at any phase of the business cycle.

It’s a practical expression of her monetary thinking. To her, governments aren’t directly constrained by how much programs cost. The serious concern is inflation, and a job guarantee would revolutionize the way the United States manages the value of the dollar, forcing the Federal Reserve to stop creating unemployment when it wants to keep prices down.  

Politicians like the job guarantee for a simpler reason: Everybody gets a decent job. The idea is getting traction in the Senate. Bernie Sanders’ office is writing a bill that would create  such a program, with help from Elizabeth Warren’s office and support from Kirsten Gillibrand. Even supercentrist Cory Booker has signed off on a pilot version. The Center for American Progress, a leading Democratic think tank, is subtly trying to take credit for the concept (while watering it down).

The sudden respect for Kelton’s big idea isn’t the result of a public clamor for cutting-edge economic theory or an impromptu burst of self-reflection among Washington policymakers. It is instead a story about power and political legitimacy, about the way public officials use economists to block or advance social change and about how economists build credibility by circulating through the cocktail parties, expense-account dinners and conference rooms of high finance.

A onetime college dropout at California State University in Sacramento, Kelton has managed to earn the esteem of both Sanders and an oddball clique of multimillionaire Wall Street traders. Even in hindsight, her journey through this heady milieu seems improbable, almost impossible.

Money doesn’t grow on rich people.

Five years ago, Kelton had a teaching position at the University of Missouri at Kansas City that was partly financed by Warren Mosler, a Wall Street veteran who lives in the Virgin Islands to keep his tax bill down. His politics were flexible. He calls himself a progressive today, but he started pitching his economic ideas to Donald Rumsfeld in the steam room of a racquetball club in the early 1990s.

Mosler’s true passion is for proving smart people wrong, and his work at Bankers Trust in the 1970s instilled in him some unorthodox ideas about money. When people didn’t take those ideas seriously, he had an ax to grind.

So he started putting up funding for academic research at the Center for Full Employment and Price Stability in Kansas City and Bard College’s Levy Institute, hoping to flesh out his observations into a more formalized school of thought. The economists he helped support ― Kelton, L. Randall Wray, Pavlina Tcherneva, Scott Fullwiler, Mathew Forstater ― eventually called their ideas modern monetary theory, or MMT.

Modern monetary theorists believe that confusion around money has distracted economists from the real things that affect the economic health of society ― natural resources, technology, available labor. Money is a tool governments use to manage these variables and solve social problems. It is not a scarce resource that governments have to track down in order to pay for projects.

Mosler figured this out by making enormous amounts of money placing big bets on deeply indebted governments. “Insolvency is never an issue with nonconvertible currency and floating exchange rates,” he argued in a HuffPost blog.

Kelton’s version is simpler: “Money doesn’t grow on rich people.”

But influence does. And Mosler knew a lot of rich people from his days in high finance, including Maurice Samuels, who made millions for himself and Harvard University when he helped manage its endowment during the George W. Bush years. Samuels was MMT-friendly. He made a killing betting on the Italian lira in a Mosler-inspired trade in the 1990s, and in 2013, he talked another Wall Street alum, Andres Drobny, into hosting a dinner on MMT and suggested he invite Kelton to explain the doctrine.

Kelton didn’t come to MMT through glitzy banking connections. Her father served in the military, and she spent her childhood roaming between Illinois, California and North Carolina. She left Cal State in 1991 when the pay at a local furniture store seemed enough to fulfill her modest ambitions. When she went back to school a couple of years later, she became fascinated by ideas that mainstream economists had long since abandoned. After graduation, she traveled to Cambridge, England, to get her master’s at the temple of John Maynard Keynes.

Studying Keynesian economics was not a fast track to power and wealth in the 1990s. At the time, even top Democrats in Washington considered Keynes little more than a curiosity from the Great Depression. The hot topics in the field were innovation, creative destruction and a future in which information technology rendered the political problems of the 20th century obsolete.

Over the years, Kelton grew accustomed to working among professional outsiders ― liberal bloggers, obscure economists and nerdy political activists. Even today, with the book deal and a house in New York on Long Island’s North Shore with a private kayak dock, there’s still more than a little wide-eyed Midwesterner to her personality. Her favorite spot in Stony Brook ― she teaches at the Center for the Study of Inequalities, Social Justice and Policy at the State University of New York campus there ― is a kitschy diner called Crazy Beans with red-glitter vinyl upholstery.

When Drobny reached out to her, Kelton agreed to stop by the 21 Club in Manhattan to talk about MMT, expecting a small event with a few friends.

Instead, I show up and there are dozens of people, and they wanted me to talk for two hours,” said Kelton. “I had no speaking notes, nothing.”

The 21 Club is not Crazy Beans. Frequented by presidents, CEOs and celebrities from Ernest Hemingway to Jay-Z, its private dining menu features $180 sea bass and four-figure wine bottles. Drobny’s firm bills itself as a macroeconomic research outfit, but it’s more like an expensive, exclusive club for very rich, very eccentric intellectuals, including Peter Thiel — people who own private islands and financial gurus who leave jobs at Goldman Sachs because the money isn’t good enough.

After a few deep breaths, Kelton started her talk. It was a hit. “One guy wanted to take her to Congress,” Drobny recalled. Another wrote a note to all of Drobny’s clients saying Kelton could revolutionize the way the Fed managed the economy and wanted to start popularizing a new economic metric called the Kelton curve. Her inbox was flooded with follow-up questions, including a note from BNP Paribas chief economist Julia Coronado requesting a private briefing.

If you listen to Kelton long enough, you notice that she never refers to “bankers” or “Wall Street” with the derisive tone common among her political allies. She talks instead about “the financial community.” She’s perfectly aware of how far to the right the politics of Big Finance skew, but she views it more like a peculiar subculture than a dark underworld. After all, Wall Street took her under its wing before Democrats took her seriously.

The financial community ― if you can be persuasive with an unconventional argument, they don’t care about it being unconventional,” she said. “They want to be right.” There’s real money on the line, and fresh ideas can provide a competitive advantage.

In Washington, by contrast, being right rarely matters. Politicians don’t generally turn to economists for new insight into how the world works. Economists instead serve as a kind of credibility shield ― experts who can be trotted out to assure the public that there are very complex and sophisticated reasons political leaders should be doing the things they do. A big part of any Washington economics job is providing a sense of scientific certainty to political judgments that are, by their very nature, uncertain. This is true for big policy changes as well as straightforward tasks like projecting growth rates and government revenue.

The job, in other words, is to back up your team. Getting a policy decision wrong isn’t such a big deal, as long as everyone else on the team blows the same call. The Democratic Party today, for instance, generally regards the bank deregulation it pursued during Bill Clinton’s presidency as a mistake ― but plenty of economists who advocated it ended up with important jobs in Barack Obama’s administration.

As a result, politically relevant economists fetishize orthodoxy. Nobody with political experience really welcomes a new idea that explains why previous economic policies were wrong. And if Kelton’s MMT doctrine is right, then the way nearly every politician talks about government debt, deficits and even money itself is mostly wrong.

The basic idea is that the government can’t run out of money,” Kelton said. “It creates money just by spending.”

When people talk about government profligacy bankrupting their grandchildren or triggering a cataclysmic debt crisis, Kelton argues, they’re conflating the experience of a typical family, which has to get money from somewhere outside the household to meet expenses, with that of a sovereign government, which creates money as part of its basic operation.

In one of her most important academic papers, published in 2000, Kelton maintains that government doesn’t actually finance its activity by levying taxes or issuing bonds. Instead, it creates money by spending it into existence. If a government wants to build a road, it calls some contractors and puts money in their bank accounts to pay for it. Where does this money come from? The same place all money comes from: thin air.

This means, among other things, that the government can always pay for whatever it wants ― housing, health care, tanks, whatever. But it doesn’t mean governments can just spend infinite amounts without any consequences, she emphasized. Eventually inflation becomes an issue when the amount of money in circulation gets ahead of the productive capacity of the workforce.

But even inflation doesn’t impose a hard limit on policy options. The Federal Reserve can raise interest rates to deal with it, Congress can raise taxes to pull money out of circulation or even impose price controls. All those have their drawbacks, but depending on circumstances, any of them might be preferable to reducing government spending. It all depends on what a society needs. Those needs, Kelton thinks, should be the primary focus of study ― not the immediate impact on the federal budget deficit, a metric that dominates policy discourse in Washington.

The left-wing appeal of these ideas is obvious. With inflation stubbornly low over the past 35 years, Kelton’s work suggests Democrats have plenty of fiscal room to not only protect Social Security and Medicare but also expand them and propose ambitious new programs. But MMT is also attractive to certain elements of the superrich. Because if we don’t have to worry so much about how much these programs cost, then there is no pressing need to raise taxes in order to pay for them.

After the 21 Club dinner, Drobny invited Kelton to a small, select conference he was hosting in Santa Monica, California, where she met Larry Summers, a Clinton treasury secretary and Obama economic adviser, who asked her to send him the best 40 pages of material on MMT available. By October 2013, Kelton was on stage explaining MMT at Columbia University alongside Nobel laureate and former Clinton adviser Joseph Stiglitz. Charles Schwab wanted her to present at its Impact conference the next month. The month after that, she spoke at Harvard.

Her career had changed tracks. She wasn’t just a clever economist with some quirky ideas anymore. Her credibility with Wall Street began to register as academic clout.

Kelton never refers to ‘bankers’ or ‘Wall Street’ with the derisive tone common among her political allies.

The great irony of Kelton’s career is that her breakthrough with the financial elite created her breakthrough with the American left. In the fall of 2014, she got a call from Sanders. He was taking over as the ranking minority member of the Senate budget committee and needed a chief economist.

We wanted somebody who could walk into a room with establishment economists and tell them that they were wrong,” said Warren Gunnels, Sanders’ policy director.

That was essentially what Kelton did every time she addressed Wall Streeters about MMT. “I never speak to audiences that are already on board,” she said. “It always feels like going into the lion’s den. But then they love it.”

There are thousands of left-wing economists. But it’s hard for the economically inexpert to distinguish brilliant creativity from quackery. Kelton’s social credentials with Wall Street helped her stand out.

And Sanders liked the ambition of her policy vision. Perhaps more important, he liked the way she talked about Franklin D. Roosevelt. When Sanders asked her what he should do on the budget committee, she said he should pick up FDR’s unfinished agenda from 1944 ― an economic bill of rights. The top item on that agenda was a good job for everyone, guaranteed.

Sanders hired her as the minority’s chief economist on the budget committee, and when he started his presidential run, she agreed to serve as an adviser to the campaign.

Like most politicians, Sanders doesn’t get his economic ideas from studying economic theory. They’re an extension of his moral intuitions, according to several former staffers. He’s much more interested in Pope Francis than in Thomas Piketty. Sanders likes FDR because he spoke clearly and forcefully about economic justice as a moral and political right, and Sanders likes Kelton because she can communicate not just about inflation but also about rights and justice.

When she teaches at Stony Brook, she supplements the chart-and-graph drudgery of economic analysis with current events and a strong dose of history. This year she’s going over the Freedom Budget proposed by A. Philip Randolph, a civil rights leader who organized the 1963 March on Washington. The Freedom Budget ― first presented in 1966 ― is an “almost perfect document,” Kelton says after class. She particularly likes that its author doesn’t force the government to choose between providing a job as a civil right, and providing other priorities, like funding the military.

The jobs pay for themselves,” she says, by creating new socially productive stuff that makes its way into the economy. What matters isn’t the deficit but whether these new work hours can generate something useful.

Kelton thinks it’s obvious that there’s plenty of room for more work today. Poverty and unemployment are tricks played on the economy by money ― there are no material or productive barriers to eliminating either one.

But it’s hard for many to believe that achieving such ambitious goals wouldn’t come with some other searing social price. While she got Sanders’ attention talking about economic rights and social justice, he balked at the implications of her broader theory. He had been pounding Republicans on the deficit for years and didn’t want to give it up. He had voted against the expensive Iraq War, the George W. Bush administration’s Big Pharma–friendly Medicare prescription drug benefit and the Bush tax cuts, arguing they were too expensive and diverted resources from programs that would genuinely help the middle class. While Kelton the radical theorist wanted Sanders to shrug off deficits, Sanders the politician wanted to pay for his plan by taxing the rich.

Gunnels said Sanders “does believe that the wealthy and large corporations need to pay their fair share in taxes and we can use that to rebuild our crumbling infrastructure and Medicare and tuition for all Americans.” And Kelton and Sanders discussed their theoretical differences before she was hired. “He wanted to make sure that Stephanie understood that ― that when she came on she was working to advance the agenda of Sen. Sanders,” said Gunnels.

For all its ambition, Sanders’ agenda wasn’t very creative. It just expanded the scope of existing programs that liberals already liked. The minimum wage would be higher. Tuition at public universities would be not just reduced, but free. Medicare would be available to everyone, with better coverage. Kelton didn’t have a problem with any of it, but almost nothing distinctive about her economic thinking ended up in the platform.

She thought her boss was walking into a trap by insisting that higher taxes on the rich and economic growth could pay for everything he wanted to do. She was right. When the campaign enlisted University of Massachusetts at Amherst economist Gerald Friedman to calculate the cost of Sanders’ platform, Friedman relied on overly optimistic assumptions in his modeling. Economists aligned with rival Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton pounced, accusing the Sanders operation of fiscal irresponsibility and economic illiteracy. Sanders staffers still wince at the memory. The numbers shouldn’t have mattered, but they didn’t add up.

To project some intellectual legitimacy for the campaign, Kelton corralled economists into signing letters in support of individual Sanders policies. She got over 200 signatures from people backing a $15 minimum wage and 170 endorsing his plan to break up the banks. This was not an easy task, since nearly every economist with political experience expected Sanders to lose and most saw little reason to get themselves on Clinton’s bad side a few months before she secured the Democratic nomination. Even Friedman endorsed Clinton.

But by 2016, Kelton had some impressive connections. When she noticed Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs criticizing Clinton’s foreign policy on cable news, she reached out to see if he could find other common ground with Sanders. It should not have been a natural fit. During the 1990s, Sachs was a proponent of shock-therapy neoliberal economics ― a swift transition from state-dominated economies to market-based pricing and delivery. It proved a disaster in Russia, where he was a top adviser to the government. He has since drifted leftward, but remains a card-carrying member of the D.C. establishment, a mainstay of MSNBC’s “Morning Joe” and superelite conferences like the Aspen Ideas Festival and the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland.

Sachs endorsed Sanders and invited him to a conference at the Vatican, where the senator got to meet one of his heroes, Pope Francis. In one of the oddest political unions of the past 30 years, Sanders returned the favor by writing the introduction to Sachs’ latest book. The Sachs connection boosted Sanders’ credibility in Washington, and the campaign relished getting him in front of the camera. Economics is as much about prestige as it is about math.

Kelton refuses to criticize Sanders or her time in his employ. She likes him, and she’s proud of her work for the campaign. But other staffers say she was obviously underutilized by the three white men at the top of the organization. The Sanders camp’s struggles with race and gender aren’t exactly breaking news, but in Kelton’s case, it’s hard to distinguish the campaign’s gender trouble from general incompetence or the sexism that pervades the economics profession.

Male economists dominate senior positions internationally and hold 86 percent of tenured jobs in academic doctoral programs, while the number of women entering graduate programs has flatlined at about 33 percent for nearly two decades. The pattern overflows into journalism: The people who cover economic policy for major news outlets tend to look like this. (Hi!) Power and expertise are heavily gendered ideas in America, and so economics, the most powerful form of modern expertise, is a heavily gendered discipline.

Economists don’t like to acknowledge this because it undermines the status of male economists ― who tend to hold more conservative views than their female colleagues ― and the intellectual primacy of the field. It’s a reminder that politics are ultimately governed by social relations, not financial abstractions. In 2005, Summers, the most prominent Democratic Party economist of this generation, gave a lecture downplaying sexism in academic sciences while positing that “issues of intrinsic aptitude” might account for the dearth of female science professors.

He quickly apologized amid a tremendous outcry. But econ is still a bro’s world. A study published last year analyzed the words that were most closely associated with women economists on the popular message board Economics Job Market Rumors. The results are gross: “hotter,” “lesbian,” “bb,” “sexism,” “tits,” “anal,” “marrying,” “feminazi,” “slut.”  

Kelton hasn’t been immune to this. She knows men don’t get lectured about rubber hoses, but she doesn’t volunteer complaints about the discipline in casual conversation. Her passion is for economic theory ― probably the most male-dominated sector of the field ― and she’d rather explain to Summers why he’s wrong about Keynes than why he’s wrong about women.

When pressed, she acknowledges the profession can be a minefield. Kelton teaches plenty of feminist economics in her courses, but early in her career, she avoided publishing research on policies that are obviously gendered, like child care and the pay gap.

It’s easy to get pigeonholed as a women’s economist,” she said. “I’m an economist.”

The basic idea is that the government can’t run out of money. It creates money just by spending.

Usually, being on the losing end of a lefty Democratic Party presidential run is a career blow. But Clinton’s loss to Donald Trump exploded the existing hierarchy of party experts. Her team of economists, which had expected to be running various government agencies, is instead plugging away at think tanks and universities just like the Sanders crew.

As a result, a new class of intellectuals is getting a shot at crafting the next slate of Democratic priorities, and Kelton is one of the most important economists in their ranks.

When she isn’t busy teaching or working out the economic effects of eliminating student debt, she gets invited to strategy sessions with Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.), and maintains a strong relationship with the Sanders team. She’s no longer working for his Senate office, but she’s a fellow at the new Sanders Institute, a think tank devoted to progressive policy ideas. In February she connected Sanders with Darrick Hamilton and Sandy Darity, two economists who specialize in the economics of racial inequality. Darity, who teaches at Duke in North Carolina, and Hamilton, who works at the New School in New York, had been putting together a proposal for one of Kelton’s favorite ideas: the job guarantee.

Kelton was already developing a similar proposal with MMT economists. But Hamilton and Darity’s work, which had a stronger focus on infrastructure than Kelton’s, intrigued Sanders, as did their more straightforward focus on economic and racial inequality. Both proposals envision the government’s hiring more than 10 million people who are currently sitting on the economic sidelines, though they differ in the way the program is administered and what kinds of jobs are offered.

After the call, Sanders announced that the job guarantee will be his next major policy initiative. Though the legislative details haven’t been announced, anybody in the job guarantee program would receive at least a $15-an-hour wage and health insurance. Just about everyone in Washington expects it to be the centerpiece of a 2020 Sanders presidential run.

Plenty of liberal economists are skeptical. Even if Kelton doesn’t like focusing on the cost of the plan, the price tag is big: Hamilton and Darrity’s version would run $543 billion a year, or about 3 percent of the U.S. economy, and Kelton’s would come in at about $378 billion a year for the first five years before rising modestly. It would reshuffle labor markets, automatically raising the minimum wage to $15 an hour, requiring significant corporate reorganizations and unpredictable price increases.

The logistics are also formidable: The federal government would need to coordinate with states, municipalities and nonprofits all over the country to get millions of people into new jobs and establish an effective bureaucracy to manage the enterprise through the ups and downs of the business cycle.

Kelton isn’t too worried. People are debating the idea seriously. Some lawmakers are thinking beyond the deficit and asking how much it would grow the economy (hundreds of billions of dollars a year), or improve productivity by developing and maintaining new skills. In April, freshman Rep. Ro Khanna (D-Calif.) called Kelton “one of the most thoughtful and creative economists of our generation,” saying her ideas had “moved the entire debate in Congress.”

It’s too early to know if she can move the country, as well. But nobody is screaming about rubber hoses. 

I believe employment should be a right,” she insists. “Values come first, technical details are next.”

[1 bilioi amerikar = mila milioi europar]

‘Ziklo berri’rako hiru kontzeptu sendo

(i) Hasieran, autodeterminazio-eskubidea izan zen:

Autodeterminazioa giza eskubideen funtsezko printzipio gisa

Gehigarria: Nazio Batuen Erakundea eta autodeterminazio-eskubidea

Ultrakrepidariak: askotxo eta nonahi

(ii) Geroago, dirua izan da. Non ote dago dirua?

Diruari buruzkoak, gogoratzekoak

(iii) Bukatzeko, independentzia izango da:

Sei (6) urrats XXI mendean independentista izateko

A. Otegi The Guardian egunkarian

A. Otegi-ren Eta’s armed struggle is no more. Now Spain must end its brutality


Thu 17 May 2018

The end of the Basque group does not mean the end of its struggle. It’s time an unrepentant state embraced democracy

On 2 May, the armed Basque organisation Eta issued a historic statement declaring a definitive end to its armed struggle, after six decades of political conflict. It was the last step of an internal process that had started years before, with crucial milestones along the way, including a statement whereby it recognised the suffering caused, accepted that it bore direct responsibility for years of violence, showed its respect to all affected – and expressed it was “truly sorry”.

The Basque conflict was deeply violent, with hundreds of killings, thousands of tortured detainees, hundreds of prisoners. As spokesman for Bildu, the second-largest coalition of parties in the country, I recognise all victims and their equal suffering, with no exception. We as a political party have stated that we apologise if, by words or attitude, we have caused suffering to any victim of this conflict

I wish all this had never happened. I wish we had been able to resolve the conflict earlier. And I do not say that expecting any recognition or apology from the Spanish side for the suffering they inflicted on us. A long time ago I lost the hope of hearing even a word of acknowledgment for the brutal torture Spanish officers inflicted on more than 4,000 people over the years, including myself. There were shoot-to-kill policies, death squads, newspaper and media closures, political parties banned.

The Spanish authorities will not apologise because that would be to admit there was a deeply rooted political conflict. They prefer to talk of a criminal gang being defeated by the security forces, even though they know this story is not true.

Obviously Eta was weakened over recent years by Spanish and mainly French police operations, but the internal debates carried out by Eta, in which almost 3,000 people participated – more than 1,000 of them on active service – show they were not defeated.

There were other reasons for Eta to end. On the one hand, the vast majority of Basque people wanted peace; and on the other, the internal debate process recognised the need for a strategic overhaul and to move to an unarmed, peaceful political strategy to achieve our goal of self-determination. This debate, the development of which I took part in and for which I was sent back to prison, was the main reason Eta ended the armed campaign.

Yet the Spanish government was much more comfortable operating in an “anti-terrorist” scenario. It has always preferred the reason of force – where it feels strong – to the force of reason, where their weakness is clear to the eyes of the world. This was clearly proven in the case of Catalonia. Spain told us for years that, with no violence, everything would be possible. Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba used to repeat: “Bombs or votes.” Then when the Catalans went to vote peacefully and democratically, they found the response was police brutality. And there, just as in the Basque case, the Spanish government insists there is no political conflict.

This leads us to the real problem, which is not Catalonia or the Basque country, but Spain and its lack of capacity to deal with the national question, and its weak democratic history. (…)

(…) but the political conflict remains, as it does in Catalonia. The inability of the Spanish state to respond through dialogue, negotiation and compromise to the democratic aspirations of Catalan and Basque societies persists, and so does instability for Spain and for Europe.

Until this authoritarian Spain transforms itself into a truly democratic state, where the democratic aspirations of nations such as Catalonia or the Basque country can be addressed peacefully and politically – as has happened in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Canada – political conflict will remain in the heart of Europe.

Arnaldo Otegi is general coordinator of the Basque pro-independence progressive coalition, Euskal Herria Bildu

Autodeterminazioa giza eskubideen funtsezko printzipio gisa

Jornada: El dret a l’autodeterminació com a principi fonamental dels drets humans 


Jornada d’estudi, examen i anàlisi en la qual intervindran, entre d’altres, Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, expert independent de l’Organització de les Nacions Unides; Karl Albrecht Schachtschneider, professor de dret constitucional, internacional i europeu i activista polític del nou dret, i Ramon Cotarelo.


Lloc: Sala Prat de la Riba de l’Institut d’Estudis Catalans

Hora:9 h 

Organització: Col·lectiu Maspons i Anglasell, amb la col·laboració de la Societat Catalana d’Estudis Jurídics, el Cercle Català de Negocis i l’associació de juristes Drets


Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

De Zayas “El dret d’autodeterminació no neix els 60 ni està restringit a les colònies” “Sempre està en evolució, no és estàtic”

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

En base a resolucions Nacions Unides 2625 i 3314 “el principi d’integritat territorial és extern: Estat A no pot envair o annexar Estat B. Per tant no afecta al dret d’autodeterminació de Catalunya

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

El referèndum és un mètode d’expressar la democràcia. A Suïssa tenim consultes constants. A Espanya hi ha demofòbia, por al demos.

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

“És indispensable que el cas català s’internacionalitzi. Consell d’Europa i Comissió Europea s’haurien d’ocupar de la violació de drets humans a Catalunya”

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

La violació més greu no són les agressions de la policia l’1 octubre sinó la negació del dret a expressar-se (violació art 19 pacte drets civils i polítics ) i la negació del referèndum”

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

Aplicar el dret internacional a la carta com està fent la Comissió Europea li treu legitimitat”

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

L’autodeterminació és un dret ius cogens, preval sobre altres drets

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

“Ara s’està construint artificialment i amb absurditat un cas jurídic, per exemple amb l’acusació de malversació. El cas sencer ha de ser rebutjat perquè l’ús de fons públics hauria estat per fer un referèndum i el dret d’autodeterminació preval s/ altres drets

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

“La corrupció del llenguatge a Espanya és un problema. Un altre pb és la conversió del dret en una arma de repressió.”

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

L’actuació còmplice de la Comissió Europea està socavant els principis que fonamenten la Unió Europea”

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

El comportament de la premsa a Espanya és “bochornoso”. Mai he vist un hostigament com el que s’està fent a Quim Torra

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

Violació de drets fonamentals amb els presos poltícics que són utilitzats d’ostatges.”

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

Acaba amb una cita d’@AamerAnwar sobre l‘abús del mecanisme de l’euroordre i la manca imparcialitat justícia espanyola

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

DE Zayas proposa que es convidi a visitar Espanya altres relators de Nacions Unides com David Kay i García Sayan

Elisenda Paluzie‏ @epaluzie

The rule of law must evolve into de rule of justice

25 urte galduta: aurrera bolie!

(i) Autodeterminazio-eskubidea dela eta:

Euskal Herria: 25 urte galduta

Gutxienez, 25 urte galduta


Zer gertatu da 2012tik 2017ra? Zergatik?


Nazio Batuen Erakundea eta autodeterminazio-eskubidea

Ikus Ultrakrepidariak: askotxo eta nonahi

(ii) Estrategia armatua delakoaz:

Neure egia   

(…) garbi zegoen negoziazio zuzenen bidez konstituzioa aldarazteko, lurralde-batasuna lortzeko edo autodeterminazioa emateko aukera hutsaren hurrengoa zela, estrategia armatu hori utzi beharra zegoela, presoen askatasuna lortu (artean posible zen), eta mugimendu politiko gisa segitu helburu haien aldeko borrokan. (…)

Dena dela, erabakia beste bide batetik joan zen.(…) Palestinako Intifadarekin liluratuta, borroka berrindartzea proposatu zuela: komandoek beren ekintzekin ezin bazuten estatua makurtu, gazteek koktelak eta harriak jaurtiz aztoratu zezatela gizartea. Horra hor kale borrokaren hazia, hainbesteko mina ekarri zuena.(…) Oinazea zabalduz joan zen, baina etsaiaren erantzuna ere gero eta bortitzagoa bihurtu zen, eta hasierako helburuak, hurbildu ordez, gero eta urrunago.

Nire kalkulu pertsonalean, 25 urte alferrik galduta, gehi milaka kaltetu, alde guztietan. Edozein modutan, amaitu da.”

(iii) Bai, amaitu da:

Bukatu da, bukatu du, bukatu dute, amaitu dute, amaitu du, amaitu da, kito

(iv) Urte gehiago galduko ditugu?

Hona ortodoxiaren inguruan (existitzen ez den mandangaren inguruan, alegia) mugitzen den batek dioena, Ziklo aldaketak eta munduko zilborrak direla eta (

(…) Orain dela 60 urte bezala, mundu ikuskera bat dago ezbaian; askapenerako edozein estrategia pentsatzerako orduan naturaltzat hartzen dugun zorua dago krisian. Zoru horrek, prozesua, alderdi abertzaleen hitzarmenetatik pasatu behar dela diosku; edozer egin edo sortzen dugula ere, PNV “erakartzera” bideratu behar duela independentismoak bere bidea.

Sinistu (sic) nahi genuenaren kontra, eta azken zazpi urte hauetan ikusi duguna adibide, ETAren arma uzteak ez du PNV eta EHBilduren arteko elkarlan independentistarik erraztu. Neurri batean, independentismoak sinetsi egin du elkarlanerako arazoa ETA zela. Hau da, sinetsi nahi izan dugu, PNVk, prozesu independentistari ez ekitearen arrazoia, politikoa beharrean morala zela. Ez dugu ikusi gura, PNVk ez duela nahi, eta kito. Eta nahiko balu ere, artikulaziorako oinarria alderdiak izatea, XXI. mendeko Euskal Herrian ez dela ideia onegia. Indar metaketaz dugun kontzepzioak,  subjektu politikoak estatikotzat jotzen dituen XX. mendeko politika ulertzeko moduari erantzuten dio. Funtsean, independentismoaren artikulazioa ulertzeko dugun moduaren, hau da, gehiengoak sortzeko moduaren krisian murgildurik gabiltza.

Badira urte gehiegi alderdi abertzaleen batasunaren errelatoak porrot egin duela. Independentista berriak sortzeko baliorik ez izateaz gain, oinarri independentistak bide horretan esperantza handiegirik ez duenez, aktibaziorako ere ez du balio., Datozen egunetan, seguruenik PNVk Estatuko aurrekontuak aurrera ateratzen laguntzea, porrot horren enegarren konstatazioa izango da. Horrek, EH Bildu, estrategia sinesgarririk gabe uzten duela uste dut; Autogobernu Ponentzian PNVk erabakitzeko eskubidearen (sic) alde egin eta jarraian Estatuarekin konfrontatu.

Guzti honek, independentismoak gaur gaurkoz dituen galdera garrantzitsuenetakora garamatzala uste dut: artikulazio independentista alderdi abertzaleen arteko hitzarmenen bitartez egin ezin daitekeenez eta EH Bilduk “bakarrik” ezin dezakeenez independentismoa artikulatu, nondik jo beharko luke bide berriak? Eta bide berri horretan ze egiteko izan beharko luke EH Bilduk?. Prest gaude bide egokian jartzen gaituzten galdera hauen inguruan aritzeko? edo jarraituko dugu galdera zaharretatik, hau da, “nola erakarriko dugu PNV?” galderatik erantzun berriak etorriko zaizkigula pentsatuz?

Galdera berriek, ezinbestean, EH Bilduren funtzioaren eta izaeraren birplanteatze sakon batera eraman behar gaituzte.(…)

Esan bezala, mundu ikuskera bati erantzuten zion errelatoak ondoa jo du. (…)Sabin Etxea ez da munduko zilbor bakarra, ezta independentismoarentzat egokiena ere. Ziklo berriak zilbor berriak eskatzen ditu.”

Mon dieu!

‘Pentsalari’ horrek horrela idazten badu, … mon dieu!!!!

Hamaika ikusteko jaio gara!

Gogo eta gorputzaren zilbor-hesteak (Mikel Laboa)


Etorkizuneko eginkizuna: autodeterminazio-eskubidea

(i) Katalunian

La CUP a Torra: ‘El principal objectiu no és el diàleg amb l’estat sinó el dret a l’autodeterminació’

Vidal Aragonès també lamenta que es digui que la pilota està sobre la teulada de Madrid: ‘És el poble de Catalunya qui ara ha de fixar les normes i el terreny de joc’


2018 mai. 15

(ii) Euskal Herrian

Directa‏ @La_Directa


#PORTADA | ‘ETA, punt i a part’. Un cop desapareguda l’organització armada, es mantenen sobre la taula tres eixos de resolució del conflicte polític: víctimes i reconciliació, persones preses i dret d’autodeterminació. Avançament de continguts #DIRECTA454 …

2018 mai. 15

Kosovoz, berriz

@tobararbulu‏ @tobararbulu


Rajoy, únic dirigent de la UE que no anirà a la cimera dels Balcans perquè hi haurà Kossove

Eslovàquia, Romania, Grècia i Xipre tampoc no reconeixen el país balcànic com a estat des que va autoproclamar-se independent l’any 2008, però assistiran a la cimera


2018 mai. 15


Territorial integrity and self-determination: the approach of the International Court of Justice in the advisory opinon of Kosovo (

News from Nowhere (alegia, Granadatik)

(i) Urkullu, lehendakari absolutua?

Urkullu censura a Etchegaray en una entrevista a ‘Sud-Ouest’

(Ikus iruzkinak ere)


Militantes del PNV de Ipar Euskal Herria muestran su apoyo al «lehendakari Etchegaray»

(Ikus iruzkinak ere)

(ii) EH Bildu mandangazale totala:

Sarrera gisa, ikus EHBildu: alderdi mandangazalea!? eta Euskal Herriko faltsukeria batzuk (1) (segida)


EH Bildu buscará un nuevo apoyo parlamentario al derecho a decidir


EH Bildu ha registrado en el Parlamento de Gasteiz una proposición que declara que «Euskal Herria tiene legitimidad democrática para decidir su futuro, teniendo que ser el límite lo que la ciudadanía exprese y decida democráticamente», una afirmación suscrita en octubre del pasado año por este grupo junto a PNV y Elkarrekin Podemos.

EH Bildu ha registrado en el Parlamento de Gasteiz una proposición no de ley para que la Cámara autonómica declare que «Euskal Herria tiene legitimidad democrática para decidir su futuro, teniendo que ser el límite lo que la ciudadanía exprese y decida democráticamente». Se trata de una afirmación que el 17 de octubre de 2017 se recogió en un texto conjunto suscrito por el grupo independentista, junto a PNV y Elkarrekin Podemos, en relación a la cuestión catalana.

En el segundo punto del texto, presentado por Jasone Agirre, figura que el Parlamento «declara que se deben poner en valor y apoyar aquellas iniciativas para pasar de la reivindicación del derecho a decidir a su ejercicio». Esta afirmación fue presentada y aprobada conjuntamente por PNV y EH Bildu en las Juntas Generales de Gipuzkoa en marzo de 2017, y en diversos ayuntamientos en las semanas posteriores.