Lan bermea: zer egingo du jendeak?

Neil Wilson-en The Job Guarantee: What Will People Do?1

The answer to the perennial question


(i) Zer ote da lan bermea? Prozesu bat da2

(ii) Merkatu balioa daukaten lanpostuak sortzeko da sektore pribatua3

(iii) Balio soziala daukaten lanpostuak sortzeko sortzeko mekanismoa da lan bermea4

(iv) Bi merkatu leku desberdin5

(v) Balioa soziala versus merkatu balioa: ondorioa enplegu osoa6

(The Job Markets Visualised )

(vi) Nola funtzionatzen duen balio sozialeko merkatu batek7

(vii) Behar diren zerbitzu publikoez, lan bermea eta sektore pribatua8

(viii) Lan bermea eta baliabide publikoak9

(ix) Zergapetzea eta lan bermea10


(1) Lan bermea eta balioa soziala: lanpostua jendearentzat, ez jendea lanposturako11

(2) Lan berme eta sektore pribatuaren arteko ‘lehiakortasuna’12

(3) Lan bermea enplegu merkatuaren egonkortasunerako mekanismoa da , enplegu osoa eta prezio egonkorrak edukiz13


Neil Wilson said…

” They’ll also make a plea to the public that they’re trying to make a living, and that the public works component is unfair competition.”

I didn’t mention that bit because the article was getting too long and I didn’t want to get bogged down in detail.

The Social Value part of the Job Guarantee avoids competition with the private sector. There has to be a mechanism where a market value firm can request the Job Guarantee backs out of an area.

I’d see that as working along the lines of a manifesto. If a local government has been elected saying they want pot hole filling to be a social activity, then the Job Guarantee can enter that area and eliminate any market value firm. Which it will do since the labour is subsidised on the Job Guarantee, but not in the private sector.

It’s all down to what the society believes is the best way to get things done. Social value does everything in Cuba and next to nothing in the United States.

May 22, 2017

Neil Wilson said…

“They’ll also make a plea to the public that they’re trying to make a living”

Social entrepreneurs are paid. They are paid a wage, usually in a non-profit organisation. We have a form of incorporation in the UK called a ‘Community Interest Company’ – which exists to benefit the community rather than enrich private shareholders.

May 22, 2017

2 Ingelesez: “If you’ve come here looking for a list, I’m afraid you’re going to be disappointed. The Job Guarantee isn’t a list of things to do, because, unsurprisingly, the people who designed it weren’t fans of central planning.

Instead we’ll go through the Job Guarantee in detail and explain that it is a process, not a destination. We’ll explain what it does and why it is there — using a slightly different viewpoint from normal.”

3 Ingelesez: “The private sector is a mechanism for creating jobs of market value. It is a dynamic system that enables and supports job creation. Hopefully the right sort of jobs in the right locations, if your policy settings are good.

Nobody has any idea what jobs the private sector will create or not create because that is left to the market entrepreneurs to decide based upon the forces they respond to. Nobody asks for a list of what jobs the private sector is doing this week, and you couldn’t provide an exhaustive list anyway. All you can provide are examples, but nobody expects those examples to fit every individual worker’s circumstances. Not everybody wants to be a scaffolder.

4 Ingelesez: “The Job Guarantee is a mechanism for creating jobs of social value. It is a dynamic system that enables and supports the creation of jobs that provide public service to others and that others consider to be of public service.

Nobody has any idea what jobs the Job Guarantee will create or not create because that is left to the Social Entrepreneurs to decide based upon the forces they respond to. Nobody should ask for a list of what jobs the Job Guarantee is doing this week, and you couldn’t provide an exhaustive list anyway. All you can provide are examples, but nobody should expect those examples to fit every individual worker’s circumstances. Not everybody wants to be a pot hole repairer.”

5 Ingelesez: “So now we have two market places. One where market value is primarily what matters and one where social value is primarily what matters.

The private sector is excluded from the social value marketplace because we want it to operate and optimise the market value marketplace via innovation, automation and investment. Similarly those utilising the social value marketplace are excluded from the market value marketplace by virtue of the fixed living wage paid by the Job Guarantee and because they have to place everybody that turns up.

6 Ingelesez: “Workers move between the two different marketplaces based entirely upon competitive force between them. If the private sector is offering a great deal and people are persuaded by that offering they will move to the market value marketplace. If the Job Guarantee is providing great social opportunities that others consider of huge value or, more likely, the private sector is having a sulk or doesn’t want people like you, then you will work under the Job Guarantee.

In this way the two systems are held in eternal tension across the nation — social-value vs. market-value vying for labour resources. In every location the balance is different. The result is full employment — everybody doing something of value and earning a living income, wherever they choose to live and whatever the differing views of social-value are at the time — anchored at stable prices due to that competitive tension between the markets.”

7 Ingelesez: “How a social value market works

Whereas market-value markets are determined by price and quality, social value markets are determined by public opinion. The Social Entrepreneurs creating the work for people have to be sensitive to changes in public opinion. A scheme to help people look after their own children in their own home may not be acceptable to the wider working population. Or it may be embraced with gusto because the culture of the country venerates children. Things may change over time. Assisted manufacturing employment for people with disabilities is a great idea in one decade and a patronising anachronism in another. Schemes to help immigrants to improve their local language skills may be frowned upon and then suddenly become very important due to social changes. Social Entrepreneurs are flexible enough to catch those changes and start delivering new social value as soon as the opportunity arises. They will sell the benefits of what they are doing to retain the public opinion they need to continue.”

8 Ingelesez: “But what about needed public services?

But surely anything that is worth doing is worth doing permanently in the public sector?

It’s a viewpoint, but it misses the operational reality of what ‘permanently’ means in a free society. (I’m presuming here that readers are not in favour of indenture and slavery).

There is no material difference between a ‘permanent’ public sector job at the living wage and a Job Guarantee public sector job at the living wage. Whether either gets filled, or stays filled, depends upon the current alternative offers available in the private sector.

The issue has nothing to do with the Job Guarantee, but a private sector that is running at a level that is taking resources away from public service.”

9 Ingelesez: “Once you have a Job Guarantee in place you are operating at full employment. If the resources you want for the public good aren’t in the Social Value market you have to redistribute them away from the Market Value market by government action.

If you want to pay public sector workers higher than the Job Guarantee wage you have to set up the redistribution mechanisms to make that happen. And that means getting the democratic votes necessary to allow you to take stuff from one person so you can give it to another.

For example, public opinion in the UK supports paying NHS nurses at a rate above minimum wage. There is strong public support for the social value of the work they do. This comes from a combination of first hand experience by the public, campaigning by their union and professional bodies, and political activity. There is therefore tacit permission for government to redistribute resources in favour of higher wages for NHS nurses.”

10 Ingelesez: “The usual approach is to implement some form of taxation (other methods are available). The true function of taxation is to release resources for the public use. However, taxation is a messy weapon. It carpet bombs the economy by creating an artificial depression in activity, which means it almost certainly won’t release just the people you are after exactly where you need them. If you want pull nurses from private sector activity and use tax to release them, you’ll likely release other people from the private sector as a form of collateral damage. Not everybody from the release will be reabsorbed serving the new public purpose. (I’m presuming readers don’t believe in the fiction of 100% human fungibility)

With a Job Guarantee, that isn’t as much of an issue, because anybody inadvertently released alongside the people you want for ‘permanent’ public sector work will be able to get work in the Social Value sector via the Job Guarantee— easily and without having to change location.

Another added benefit: The Job Guarantee makes taxation work more effectively.

11 Ingelesez: “The confusion over the Job Guarantee comes from people failing to see it as just another mechanism for providing jobs to people. One that is based around Social Value — the needs of others and the views of others as to what is appropriate activity. One that matches Jobs to People, rather than people to jobs, with a fully elastic supply over time and location. One that fulfills the social contract of fairness inherent in primate societies, especially ours.”

12 Ingelesez: “Take an imaginary default position where everybody would work for the Job Guarantee on the living wage and everything would be done within it. Then visualise pulling people away from that default position using the private sector market-value mechanism and the traditional public sector ‘tax and spend’ mechanism to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the economy according to the shared values of the society it serves. You can see the other sectors as in competition with the Job Guarantee to deliver more overall value to its citizens, and if they fail returning workers to the Job Guarantee.”

13 Ingelesez: “The Job Guarantee default employment mechanism is as central and vital to the stability of the job market as the Central Bank default lending mechanism is to the stability of the lending market. If you want full employment and stable prices, there is no alternative.”

Katalunia 1936-37

Bernat Ferrer-en Catalunya va tenir l’oportunitat de ser independent el 1936-371

París, Londres, el Vaticà, la Roma feixista i la Lisboa salazarista donaven per feta la secessió

L’historiador Arnau Gonzàlez i Vilalta analitza la correspondència dels cònsols que van viure la Guerra Civil a Barcelona, en què donaven la independència “per descomptada”

“No es va produir una resposta catalana a les expectatives internacionals”, explica

(Aquesta notícia es va publicar originalment el 12/02/2015 i, per tant, la informació que hi apareix fa referència a la data especificada.)

Informe diplomàtic de l’almirall italià Ildebrano Goiran fruit de la seva conversa amb l’almirall francès Emmanuel Ollive, que advocava obertament per l’ocupació francesa de Catalunya. Document conservat a l’Ufficio Storico Marina Militare Italiana. Foto: A.G.V.

Hi va haver un moment en els inicis de la Guerra Civil espanyola en què les principals potències donaven per descomptat que Catalunya s’independitzaria unilateralment d’Espanya, i que la comunitat internacional hi hauria de reaccionar d’alguna manera. I no s’ho pensaven perquè sí. Els seus cònsols a Barcelona -i els seus militars atracats al port- així els transmetien la informació, els seus ambaixadors d’arreu del món així ho asseguraven. I així ho demostra l’historiador Arnau Gonzàlez i Vilalta al colossal estudi Amb ulls estrangers. Quan Catalunya preocupava a Europa. Diplomàcia i premsa internacional durant la Guerra Civil (Editorial Base), acabat de sortir del forn.

Es pot proclamar un Estat independent de Catalunya, que probablement prendria la forma d’Estat soviètic”, alertava el cònsol britànic a Barcelona, Norman King, al seu homòleg francès a finals del 1937. Un temor que l’ambaixador de la Itàlia feixista davant del Vaticà també atribuïa al Papa Pius XI: “El Pontífex s’ha expressat amb menys seguretat en allò que fa referència a Catalunya. Sembla, ha afegit, que el govern de Moscou pretén instaurar, a Catalunya, un Estat bolxevic model, fet que, si és complís -és el Papa el que parla- constituiria a la llarga un perill més enllà que per a Espanya, per a França i, en general, per a tot l’Occident europeu.”

En una altra línia de pensament, l’almirall francès Emmanuel Ollive advocava obertament per l’ocupació internacional de Catalunya i la seva segregació d’Espanya, fet que creia que facilitaria la pacificació de la península i el final del conflicte, en una conversa mantinguda amb el seu col·lega italià Ildebrano Goiran l’11 de setembre de 1936. A París mateix, l’ambaixador italià havia alertat Roma en una línia similar, a finals d’agost del 1936: “És de preveure l’eventualitat que els catalans, pràcticament separats de la resta d’Espanya, no dubtin a proclamar l’Estat separat, recorrent a l’ajuda francesa, que el comte Welczek pensa que no seria negada ni en homes ni en armes, ni en diners. Les conseqüències d’una eventualitat tal serien molt serioses, també en relació amb les Balears.”

Encara en una tercera línia de pensament, més neutra quant a les implicacions exteriors, el cònsol portuguès escrivia: “El Govern de la Generalitat, preveient la possibilitat d’una derrota del govern central, treballa activament per, quan arribi aquell dia, proclamar la independència, esdevenint aquesta regió una república independent.”

I és que Gonzàlez i Vilalta ha dut a terme una tasca titànica, de més de cinc anys de durada, de consulta dels arxius diplomàtics i militars italians, francesos, portuguesos, belgues, vaticans, argentins, nord-americans, de la Creu Roja Internacional, bascos, espanyols i catalans per disseccionar tota la correspondència que els cònsols de França, Itàlia, Portugal i Bèlgica es van intercanviar amb els seus respectius governs, així com les anàlisis que van fer sobre el tema tot d’ambaixadors d’aquests països escampats per les principals capitals del món.

Catalunya “no s’atreví a prendre decisions agosarades”

Un llibre de més de 500 pàgines i gairebé 1.500 cites precises per exposar, i demostrar, la tesi que Catalunya va estar a punt de ser un actor internacional de primer nivell durant el 1936 i el 1937. “De fet, fins a principis de 1937, el gruix de la diplomàcia mundial creia en la immediata separació catalana. Una Catalunya independent protegida per França”, analitza. I apunta: “La premsa i la diplomàcia internacional li concediren una mena de passaport extra que li permetia aparèixer a les travesses de la geopolítica europea.” I, tenint clar que, “com passa amb els individus, els països són si algú més els reconeix com a tals”, Gonzàlez i Vilalta defensa que el reconeixement internacional -total o parcial- d’algun tipus d’Estat català sí que hauria estat possible.

Però, “per a sorpresa dels diplomàtics i periodistes europeus d’aquell moment”, tot plegat no va passar mai de ser una hipòtesi. “Catalunya independent? Evidentment, dirien els cònsols o ambaixadors”, defensa l’autor. “De fet, la pregunta pertinent que semblava pampalluguejar amb llums de neó gegants davant dels ulls dels observadors estrangers era: per què no s’independitza Catalunya?”

Però el propi historiador dóna també la resposta a l’enigma tot citant una frase del periodista soviètic Ilya Ehrenburg ja de 1931: “Els nacionalistes catalans s’acontenten amb poca cosa.” Segons Gonzàlez i Vilalta, “a Barcelona ningú no s’atreví a prendre decisions agosarades que forcessin Europa a definir una posició específica. A obligar París a defensar-la, Londres a trencar el silenci, Roma o Berlín a insistir a Franco perquè deixés Catalunya a la seva sort o l’ataqués frontalment. En definitiva, no es va produir una resposta catalana a les expectatives internacionals en què la independència es donava per descomptada“.

Evacuacions, “atrocitats” i caos

Més enllà d’analitzar la dimensió nacional dels informes consulars, el llibre també és un complet recull de les tasques realitzades pels cònsols per evacuar de territori català la major quantitat de civils possibles, detallant tant històries personals -com la del cardenal Vidal i Barraquer, autoritzada per la Itàlia feixista per mantenir bones relacions amb el Vaticà- com oferint llistats globals. Així mateix, també s’explica com els cònsols narraven als seus respectius governs les “atrocitats” anarquistes, el descontrol governamental dels primers dies, les tensions FAI-ERC-PSUC…, entre multitud d’altres temes.

L’ambaixador de la Itàlia feixista davant del Vaticà atribuïa al Papa Pius XI una gran preocupació per l’Estat català bolxevic. Document conservat a l’Archivio Storico Ministero Affari Esteri. Foto: A.G.V.

Detall de l’informe de l’almirall italià Ildebrano Goiran sobre l’Estat català apadrinat per França. Foto: A.G.V.

Ea 2017an lortuko duten!

DTM eta Komunikabideak

Sara Holland‏ @sarahollando5521

Government spending funds taxation. #LabourManifesto #VoteLabour Follow MMT – reality economics

Kathryn Cannon‏ @katiecannon2

Replying to @sarahollando552 @DeficitOwls

Ondorioa: kontuz komunikabideekin!


Neil Wilson‏ @neilwilson2

OH: There are only two types of people who can be consistently wrong on everything and still keep their jobs: economists and journalists.

2017 mai. 21



CUP: nazioarteko konferentzia

Conferència Internacional

(i) Sobirania Popular i Autodeterminació. Canvi polític a la regió Euro-Mediterrània (I)

(ii) Sobirania Popular i Autodeterminació. Canvi polític a la regió Euro-Mediterrània (II)

Eta Euskal Herriko ordezkariz?

(a) Sortu alderdiko ordezkaria: maila intelektualean eta teorikoan ná de ná gehi, noski, mandanga.

(b) Izango ote dira inoiz gai autodeterminazioaz ezer ulertzeko (Katalan batzuk Orion)?

(c) Dudatan nago (Euskal Herria: 25 urte galduta).

(d) Zoritzarrez, urte gehiago metatzen ari zaizkie jadanik galdutako 25 urte horiei.

(e) Noiz arte?

DTM-ko lehen nazioarteko konferentzia

2017 MMT Conference1

Announcing the First International Conference of Modern Monetary Theory 

Economics for a New Progressive Era

Kansas City

Thur–Sun, September 21–24, 2017

Stephanie Kelton
Scott Fullwiler
Randall Wray

With Support From:

Robert Skidelsky and Morton Sosland

UMKC Economics Club

Journal of Post Keynesian Economics

Featured Speakers Include:

Warren Mosler, Robert Skidelsky, Jamie Galbraith, Jan Kregel, and Randall Wray

✼ ✼ ✼

Modern Monetary Theory has transformed the economics discipline. Its influence extends beyond economics, reaching deep into the fields of law, history, finance, banking, public policy, and philosophy. Join the world’s leading MMT practitioners, and explore the cutting edge of modern economic thinking.

Call for Papers. Submissions are welcome on any aspect of Modern Monetary Theory, such as: fiscal policy, economic development, employment policy, framing and marketing of MMT, taxation, inflation and reforming the financial system. Please send your individual abstract (200 words max) or panel submission with a short description before June 15 to

We look forward to seeing you there!

Warren Mosler eta DTM (3)

(1) Inbertsioak aurrezkia sortzen du, ez alderantziz

Investment Creates Saving, NOT The Other Way Around


Warren Mosler, one of the founder of Modern Money Theory, discussing the relationship between savings and investment. The commonly-held belief is that savings fuels investment. For instance, the bank takes in your money and loans it out to other people, therefore it’s necessary for people to save in order to have investment in the economy. This is actually completely wrong. It not only is incorrect on the mechanics of banking, it isn’t paying attention to the rest of the balance sheets.

Investment (in monetary terms) is better defined as the act of creating assets. This does not require any savings in advance. For instance, if I decide I would like to build a factory, then I can create bonds (investment). These bonds, my IOUs, aren’t widely accepted for payment, so I can sell them to you in exchange for cash, which is widely accepted. Notice what happened: the act of my creating and selling a bond didn’t reduce your savings, it just changed their form (from cash to bonds). Meanwhile, I have savings that I didn’t have before (the cash) which I can then swap for other assets (like factory equipment.) The investment created the savings.

People think that if we encourage more savings, there’ll be more funds for investment. This is wrong. In part because banks don’t lend out your money. Banks lend by creating their own IOUs, which are widely accepted for payment. For instance, if I would like to take a loan to buy factory equipment, I will sell my IOU to the bank, who will purchase it with their own IOU by *simply crediting my account* with funds out of thin air. (See more about that here:…)

(And furthermore, the rate at which individuals save their income actually in no way affects the total amount of deposits that banks hold. This is because if you’re not saving your money, then you’re buying something, which means you’re transferring your dollars to somebody else’s account. So they stay in the banking system. Buying stuff does not reduce the amount of savings in the economy, just shifts it around. )

Read Mosler’s book “The Seven Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy” for free online:…

(2) DTMk dioena politika ekonomikoaz

What Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) Tells Us About Economic Policy


(3) Banku erreformei buruzko eztabaida

Discussion of Bank Reforms


Warren Mosler, on with Steve Grumbine at Real Progressives, discussing reforms of banking. In order to reform banks, we have to first decide what banks are for and what they should and shouldn’t do.

The first purpose of banking is to have a stable payment system. This is infrastructure that undergirds the economy, so that individuals or corporations can make payments. Decades and centuries of experience show that banks on their own cannot create a stable payment system, and instead have a tendency towards bank runs, panics, and financial crises. This is the argument for deposit insurance.

With deposit insurance, the government protects bank customers from their bank. It ensures that even in the event of bank failure, customers can still withdraw or transfer their accounts, stabilizing the payment system. Furthermore, centralized payment clearing at a central bank (where the central bank (like the Fed) makes payments between banks) is necessary to ensure that $1 in every bank will actually be equal to $1.

Once there is deposit insurance and central banking, the banking system becomes dangerous. This is because they have government guarantees behind their actions, so they cannot fail. It’s like letting a gambler loose in a casino, then saying “you get to keep all of your winnings and the government will pay for all of your losses.” It encourages extreme risk-taking. This therefore demands full banking regulation, to ensure that banks aren’t taking advantage of government protection.

The next task of banking is lending. There are many purposes to lending, with probably the most important being the capital development of the economy. So, entrepreneurs and businesses can take out loans in order to finance investment in new technology, jobs, factories, etc. This kind of financing activity is a major contributor to the improvement of quality of life.

One question here is, should banks do this? The private sector is capable of lending even without banks doing it. This is what the bond market does, and what private companies can do to finance their customers’ purchases (think auto loans from a car company).

However, there are 3 key differences between bank lending and other private sector lending. First, because banks are lending their own IOUs rather than lending from a pre-existing pile of cash, this means that lending for the capital development of the economy is not limited by any quantity of saving. Second, because banks are backed up by government guarantees, they don’t have to lend based on the value of the assets, but can lend based on the ability of the borrower to pay. And third, because banking is heavily regulated by government, it is an opportunity for public policy to shape the development of the economy, by encouraging banks to lend for things that serve public purpose, and discouraging (or banning) lending for things that don’t.

Since banks are already functionally public-private-partnerships, should we just nationalize banks and make them all into public institutions? Mosler argues that we should not. The reason is because public banks are subject to political pressures and can make huge losses, therefore public banks are highly susceptible to corruption. With the public-private model, Mosler asserts, the banks have incentive to lend based on risk, not based on political favors.

(4) Baliabideen esleipenaz

Discussion of Progressive Resource Allocation


Warren Mosler, on with Steve Grumbine of Real Progressives, discussing some issues that intersect progressive policies and fiat currencies.

Pavlina Tcherneva eta lan bermea (job guarantee)



  1. THE JOB GUARANTEE: WHAT, WHY, HOW (short video, 14min): 


  1. Reorienting Fiscal Policy: A Bottom Up Approach {pdf}
  2. Full Employment: the Road Not Taken {pdf}
  3. What is MMT and Why is the Job Guarantee Crucial to the Project


  1. Alternative Fiscal Policies: Why the Job Guarantee is Superior
  2. (NYTimes) Keep Unemployment From Mushrooming With Preventative Policies
  3. If ARRA was designed as a Job Guarantee, it would have created 20million living wage jobs
  4. The Job Guarantee is Not Workfare 


  1. Beyond Full Employment: What Argentina’s Plan Jefes Can Teach Us about the Employer of Last Resort {pdf} Summary of the features of JG/ELR, the Argentina program which the government modeled after our ELR proposal, How it behaved as a JG/ELR
  2. Poverty, Joblessness and the Job Guarantee
  3. Women Want Jobs, Not Handouts (HuffPo)


  1. Completing the Roosevelt Revolution: Why the Time for a Job Guarantee has come {pdf}
  2. The Social Enterprise Model for a Job Guarantee in the United States {pdf}
  3. Full Employment through Social Entrepreneurship: The Nonprofit Model for Implementing a Job Guarantee


  1. The Job Guarantee: Delivering the Benefits that Basic Income Only Promises”,
  2. 16 Reasons Matt Yglesias is Wrong about the Job Guarantee vs. Basic Income
  3. Guaranteed Income? How about Guaranteed Jobs (10min video)
  4. Income for All: Two Visions for a New Economy (video/panel discussion)

(for more on JG vs UBI, see research and media links)




  1. (NYTimes) Benefits of Economic Expansions Increasingly going tot the Top
  2. Reorienting Fiscal Policy: A Bottom Up Approach


Euroguneko susperraldiaz hitz bi

Juan Laborda-ren La superioridad aplastante del principio de demanda efectiva1

Espainiako eta euroguneko ekonomiaz, espainieraz, Bill Mitchell-en ‘laguntzaz’2

Después de 8 años de crisis [9 urte, jf t-a], la economía de la eurozona aún se encuentra en un estado muy frágil, mientras el bienestar de los trabajadores sigue destrozado por un desempleo persistente y por los recortes de austeridad.

No estamos en ningún proceso de recuperación sostenible, ni de la economía española, ni de la economía europea, ni de la economía estadounidense. Nos vuelven a engañar. La inmensa mayoría de la población simplemente sobrevive. La vulnerabilidad es extrema; los procesos de inestabilidad, crecientes. Los problemas de fondo, persistentes. El factor trabajo se ha visto sometido a otra vuelta de tuerca: menores salarios, mayor inseguridad jurídica, deuda excesiva, en definitiva, más pobreza. La inversión productiva del sector privado ni está ni se le espera –por obra y gracia de la financiarización extrema de las economías-. Y el sector público, ¡haciendo dejadez de su responsabilidad! La combinación final, explosiva.

El economista postkeynesiano William Mitchell, en uno de sus últimos blogs, “Eurozone recovery is much weaker than the headline figures might suggest” nos habla de ello. Hace referencia a un término utilizado de manera gregaria por la mayoría de los economistas: la “velocidad de escape”. Tiene dos acepciones. Por un lado, la tasa de crecimiento que la economía tiene que lograr para “escapar” de una recesión y reanudar su tasa de crecimiento sostenida a largo plazo. La otra implicación del término es política: una vez alcanzada la “velocidad de escape”, las medidas de apoyo de la política económica deberían ser retiradas.

Según Mitchell este análisis es simplista. Tras una crisis sistémica de naturaleza financiera siempre se reduce la tasa de crecimiento potencial, de manera que los gobiernos deben utilizar todas las palancas de política económica a su disposición para acabar con la recesión. En segundo lugar, la mayoría de los economistas, imbuidos por la teoría neoclásica dominante, consideran que la vuelta a la normalidad significa una política monetaria neutral, es decir, los tipos de interés deben ser aquellos que estabilizan la inflación; y una posición fiscal equilibrada o con superávits. Vuelven a errar de nuevo en el diagnóstico, y ya van demasiadas veces.

Este planteamiento, asumido por la mayoría de economistas, y trasmitido por los voceros mediáticos, suele ignorar la referencia a situaciones en las que persisten déficits externos y / o aquellas en las que el sector privado doméstico mantiene niveles récord de deuda. Y esa es la situación actual. Si el sector no gubernamental desea ahorrar en general, entonces para que el crecimiento se sostenga debe haber un déficit fiscal en curso, cualquiera que sea la magnitud que se requiera para satisfacer el deseo del sector no gubernamental. Como recalca Mitchell, “esto no es ninguna opinión, es una identidad contable, un hecho”.

Vayamos a los datos

Muchos economistas, organismos multilaterales, informes de Bancos Centrales y de Bancos de Inversión, bajo el paradigma neoclásico, sugieren que el crecimiento de la zona del euro ha superado la “velocidad de escape”. Como consecuencia, el BCE pronto tendrá que empezar a aumentar los tipos de interés, y los gobiernos tendrán que reforzar aún más una política fiscal equilibrada para evitar una ruptura salarial y una espiral inflacionaria. Pero Mitchell desmonta los argumentos con datos.

(The following graph shows the evolution of unemployment rates in selected Eurozone Member States since January 2005 up until March 2017)

(From this perspective, no normality has been restored in the Eurozone as a bloc)

Primero, la tasa de desempleo en la zona del euro sigue estando en el 9,5% (alrededor de un 30% por encima del nivel de marzo de 2008, el punto más bajo del último ciclo). La Francia de Emmanuel Macron soporta una tasa de desempleo del 10,1% (un 40,3% por encima del nivel de marzo de 2008); Italia un 11,7% (82% por encima), Grecia 23,5% (186% por encima), España 18,2% (91% por encima), Austria 5,9% (43% por encima), Irlanda 6,4% (23% por encima), los Países Bajos el 5,1% (41% por encima), y así sucesivamente. Desde esta perspectiva, no se ha restaurado la normalidad en la zona euro como bloque.

(The next graph shows the path of real GDP in the Euro19 Member States from March 1995 to December 2016 (indexed to 100 at the March-quarter 2008 – the peak before the GFC).)

(So the rate of growth is still well below the pre-crisis level and the output gap is massive.)

En segundo lugar, el empleo que se está creando en Europa es temporal, parcial y precario. El informe de Eurostat “Temporary Employment in the EU”, publicado el 2 de mayo de 2017, afirma que “26,4 millones de empleados de 15 a 64 años en la Unión Europea tenían un contrato temporal en 2016”. Esto equivale al 14,2% del total de empleados. En países como Portugal (22,3%), España (26,1%) y Francia (15,6%), los empleos temporales están creciendo rápidamente. Pero no solo eso, los datos anuales de Eurostat muestran que entre 2008 y 2016, mientras los empleos temporales han registrado una caída neta de más de 553.000 (disminución del 2,8%), los puestos de trabajo a tiempo completo han caído en más de 5.322.800 empleos (caída del 4,5%). Por el contrario, aumentaron los empleos a tiempo parcial en algo más 3.862.800 empleos netos entre 2008 y 2016 (un aumento del 14,3%). La suma de todo ello nos da que el empleo total disminuyó en la zona euro en su conjunto en 1.458.000 personas, pero además es cada día más precario.

(The following graph shows the evolution of total and full-time work in the Eurozone between 2000 and 2016 (indexed to 100 at 2008).)

(The pre-crisis growth period was very different to the current recovery.)

El crecimiento del trabajo a tiempo parcial en la Eurozona y la caída del empleo a tiempo completo implican que el crecimiento económico está inclinado hacia trabajos de peor calidad. Bank of America ha elaborado una serie histórica de la “tasa básica de empleo”, es decir, excluyendo contratos parciales y temporales del empleo total. La casi totalidad del rebote de la tasa de empleo global desde 2013 se atribuye a empleos de “baja calidad”. Por eso no hay recuperación sostenida. Ésta solo vendrá de un repunte de la demanda interna. Con el sesgo de austeridad en el gasto del gobierno, ello significa que los ingresos domésticos privados tendrán que crecer mucho más rápido de lo que actualmente lo están haciendo y ello requiere un crecimiento de los salarios mucho más fuerte.

(The growth of part-time work in the Eurozone and the fall in full-time employment is the motivation for the Bank of America’s study.)

(So while the total employment rate is nearly back to where it was prior to the pre-GFC peak, the core rate is several percentage points below its peak.)

En definitiva, después de 8 años de crisis, la economía de la eurozona aún se encuentra en un estado muy frágil, mientras el bienestar de los trabajadores sigue destrozado por un desempleo persistente y por los recortes de austeridad –fiscal y salarial-. De nuevo, y ya van muchas, la enésima superioridad del principio de demanda efectiva.

Ekonomia Monetario Moderno baten kudeaketaz

Neil Wilson-en Running a Modern Money Economy1

Putting it all together, alegia, dena batera ezarriz…

(a) DTM deskripzio operazionala da2

DTM operazionala izanik, hainbat proposamen politiko egin daitezke.

(b) Lanpostuak eta lan bermea3

(c) Ekonomiaren funtzionamendua4

(d) Lan bermea eta Barne Produktu Gordina5

(e) Sektore pribatua eta lan bermea: kapitalismoa versus jobism delakoa6

(f) Lehiakortasuna eta erregulazioa. Enpleguaren segurtasuna eta lan bermea7

(g) Bankuak eta Warren Mosler-en proposamenak8

(h) Bankuen gaineko neurriak9

(j) Aktibo aldekoaren erregulazioa eta pasibo aldekoarena merke izatea10

(k) Gobernua, DTM, lan bermea eta helburu publikoa. Sistema pribatua eta kapitalismoa11

(l) Politikariak, banku zentraleko bankariak eta ekonomialariak12

(m) Mikal Kalecki-ren hitzak, 1946an13

(n) DTMren politikak, bankariak, industriako ‘kapitainak’ eta lan bermea14


(i) DTM operazionala da15

(ii) Aukera desberdinak

This reveals new political choices. There is an alternative.

(iii) Politika monetarioa16

(iv) Bankugintza eta Mosler17

(v) Lan bermea18

(vi) Negozioak, enpresak19

(vii) Ekonomia automatikoki gidatua20

(viii) Kapitalismoa eta onura publikoa21

(ix) Gobernua eta berak erosten duena22

(x) Estatu subiranoa eta bere moneta propioa23

(xi) Neoliberalak24

(xii) Etorkizuna: estatu independenteak, haien artean kooperatuz

The future is independent states of people operating democratically in co-operation with each other, not world government by an aristocracy of the arrogant liberal elite in thrall to bankers

2 Ingelesez: “MMT is a description of the existing monetary system and its interaction with the production mechanisms. It takes a unique viewpoint that highlights opportunities that remain out of sight to traditional methods.

From this viewpoint comes a number of suggested policy proposals. So how do those proposals help keep things running smoothly?

3 Ingelesez: “Jobs

We know how MMT helps an economy avoid a recession and pullback. After all, we’ve been talking about little else for the past ten years. You implement a Job Guarantee which injects additional spending into the economy where it is needed at precisely the right amount — all completely automatically.

The Job Guarantee is an advanced auto-stabiliser which implements ‘Spatial Keynesianism’. ‘Spatial Keynesianism’ is just a fancy way of saying that spending happens in the locations that need it. More in some areas and less in others depending upon the level of other activity at the time.”

4 Ingelesez: “So as the economy moves out of recession and into growth what do we need to do to stop overheating?

Well, firstly, you implement a Job Guarantee which injects additional spending into the economy where it is needed at precisely the right amount — all completely automatically.

Precisely the right amount” means that it is withdrawn progressively and spatially as private economic activity increases. People hired away from the Job Guarantee start being paid with private funds, not public funds, so you get a swap of spending power, rather than an increase.

Over the cycle people come on and off the Job Guarantee which grows and shrinks government spending automatically. All without any politicians or central bank ‘experts’ making any discretionary changes. The result looks something like this over the cycle.” (ikus Irudia)

5 Ingelesez: “The Job Guarantee job is just a job like any other. It generates GDP with labour that nobody else currently wants to use. The private sector no longer has to go into areas it doesn’t really belong, or want to go, in a misguided attempt to try and “create jobs”. It can be left to do its thing of eliminating jobs with innovation and automation via capital investment. That drives up productivity and leads to an increased standard of living for all.”

6 Neil Wilson-en asmaturiko hitza: jobism, job creation, aka, enplegua sortzen aritzea.

Ingelesez: “In fact, the private sector can be encouraged down the route. Controlling labour supply makes labour expensive which shifts the capital/labour ratio towards using more capital. You can ensure competition is intense because you’re no longer terrified about firms going bust or moving abroad; the Job Guarantee ensures there are always jobs in a locality that people can take. You don’t need the jobs of the private sector; they are a nice to have. This is the correct approach to take, because the private sector actually creates jobs as a side effect of its main task of destroying them with capital investment (hence capitalism, not jobism).”

7 Ingelesez: “Government can set policy to eliminate price adjusting firms — via a combination of regulatory action (a strengthened Competition Authority with power to break up cartels rapidly) and competitive action. The Post Keynesian view of a firm shows that quantity-adjusting, time shifting competitors will outcompete price adjusters at any given quality level. Nobody gives up market share willingly in a truly competitive market.

Intense competition, and regulatory authorities aiming their 12-bore at price adjusters who break cover, along with tough government purchasing tactics, force businesses to compete or fail. Failure moves workers from the private sector to the Job Guarantee, activates the auto-stabilisation mechanisms and avoids cascade contagion. Only the misallocated resources are purged.

With the Job Guarantee in place you can let firms go bust and can hold firms to a much higher competitive standard than if you are relying on private firms to ‘provide jobs’. Job security is provided by a liquid local job market backed by the Job Guarantee, not by propping up individual firms with state subsidies. Businesses can be treated as cattle, not pets. If we are to have capitalism, we should have it — raw in the teeth and brutal — but merely restrict its effects to the capitalists. Those that survive this Ninja Challenge will then have truly earned their spoils.

The Job Guarantee helps prevents an unsustainable boom by creating an environment where bad firms can fail early and fail often.

Movement between the private sector and Job Guarantee automatically stablises the fluctations in business activity.”

8 Ingelesez: “Banks

Alongside the Job Guarantee are the Mosler Mechanics for banks. These regulate the asset side of banks and prevent the banks creating another Minsky Moment.

The job of a bank is to promote the capital development of the economy. That is its public purpose; the job it is licensed to do. All other activities that conflicts with that purpose must be prevented.

For banking to be effective it must be boring — bowler hat boring. The job of a bank is to provide capital development loans to the economy based solely upon credit analysis. All other activities deflecting from that purpose are Ultra Vires.”

9 Aurrekoak hauxe esan nahi du, ingelesez: “That means:

  • Banks can only lend directly to borrowers for capital development purposes (i.e. business credit lines and household loans), and the banks keep those loans on their books until cleared.

  • Banks must operate on a single balance sheet. No hiving things off into ‘off balance sheet’ subsidiaries to try and hide them.

  • Banks cannot accept collateral. Collateral is a fixed charge over an asset as an insurance policy and aligns the incentives of banks with those possessing assets, not ideas. It stops banks being capital developers and turns them into pawn shops. That is the wrong alignment of incentives. We want loan officers with skin in the game. Their success should depend upon the success of the borrower. Banks should line up in insolvency with the other unsecured creditors (and importantly behind the remaining preferential creditors — employees).

  • Depositors are protected 100% at all amounts. A depositor in a commercial bank is holding nothing more than an outsourced central bank account. They are not investors in the bank and should never be treated as such.

  • Regulation is provided by the bank resolution agency, which is a public body funded entirely by government. There is no charge or levy to the banks for the operation.

  • The job of the bank resolution agency is to ensure the banks are properly capitalised given their loan book and declare them solvent. If they are not, they take the bank over and resolve it with any excess losses absorbed by government. This aligns the incentives of the regulator. If they get the solvency calculation wrong and the capital buffers exhaust, the regulator stands the cost.

  • The Central Bank provides unlimited, unsecured lending to regulated banks at zero interest rates. Collateral serves no purpose since the bank has been declared solvent (and therefore there is no reason for it to be illiquid), and collateralised Central Bank lending just shifts the losses to depositors who are protected 100% anyway.

  • Once you get rid of interbank collateral and funding requirements, you get rid of one of the final

    excuses for keeping Government Bonds. National Savings annuities for pensions (allowing retiring individuals to receive a secure lifetime income) would get rid of the final one. Transferable instruments that confer government welfare on the owners do not serve the public purpose. Government welfare receipt is a social decision, not a market driven one.”

10 Ingelesez: “As the asset side is heavily regulated, you want the liability side to be as cheap as possible. Unlimited central bank access ensures liquidity for depositors and allows lending-only banks to arise. It gets rid of the Interbank overnight market and replaces it with central bank overnight accounts. It puts the Central Bank ‘in the bank’ as a major investor — with open access to the commercial bank’s loan book via the work of the solvency regulator.

All levies, liquidity ratios, reserve requirements and the like are eliminated. The cost of maintaining the collateral system is eliminated. The result is loans at a low price with the quantity restricted solely by credit quality. As an economy heats up, credit quality declines and loans become restricted — systemically preventing the Ponzi stages of finance that lead to a Minsky Moment.

Proscribed banks, forced to rely on credit analysis for profit, help prevent a boom by issuing less credit as project quality declines.

You get a natural and steady withdrawal of funding that is far more surgically targeted and responsive to local conditions, than the carpet bombing approach of interest rate adjustment.

This leaves the payment system, which should be as costless as cash and clear just as instantly to eliminate transaction frictions. Whether that should be publicly provided, or remain outsourced to the banks is an open question. Depositors are a cost to the bank and would effectively be a tax, but leaving them with the banks would give them an incentive to get the cost of clearing provision down. It may boil down to a political question that depends upon your view of the effectiveness of public and private provision. I’d lean towards an Open clearing system created by the state (or even states) and available to all on an open licence. We want one good clearing system like we have one good Linux.

Banks are currently too complicated, too large, too impersonal, too intertwined and systemically dangerous. They need to be simpler, smaller, more local and relationship oriented in scope. All of which are easy to achieve once you adopt the Mosler Mechanics for banking.

Once again, because there is a Job Guarantee and a government that will use fiscal policy, we don’t need the banks to provide endless credit, any more than we need private firms to provide endless jobs. Banks and firms can be maintained at their appropriate natural size and location as determined by the technological level of the economy and where people actually reside.

11 Ingelesez: “Government

MMT describes a currency as a simple public monopoly, and that monopoly rules apply to its use. Where a nation has its own currency, runs its own central bank, floats its currency on the currency markets and has no material state-owned debt in any other denomination, the government controlling the currency is in charge and sets the rules of the game.

Government can command any resources available for sale in its currency and can use its sovereign power to force those resources to be freed up so it can purchase them for the public good.

This is in sharp contrast to the neo-liberal viewpoint which is that government is just another organisation in the system that has to compete for resources by price. Business and banks always get first choice of resources and government has to make do with the scraps. They believe the bankers and businesses should be in charge and that the population are just factors of production to be shifted around, like ingots of steel, as business requires.

MMT shows there is a different approach. You can determine that business and banks are servants of the people. Government can take first choice of resources for the public purpose, then allow business and banks to work with what is left, before hoovering up any left over resources with a Job Guarantee.

The public wrap of the private system provides a containment vessel around the nuclear power of capitalism. We can draw its power without the boom. We can fuel it with public investment and improve the power output.

The focus of government action shifts from money to the actual things we need to buy for the public purpose. Smart people talk about government buying, not spending.

From this, government sets the policy for spending and taxation at a level that allows the Job Guarantee and other auto-stabilisation mechanisms (such as standby investment contracts) to function.

Government keeps the Job Guarantee anchor working by making discretionary policy tight enough to maintain a functional buffer.

Because Job Guarantee jobs are just living wage jobs you don’t need to get people ‘off the Job Guarantee and into work’. They are already in work doing things people see as useful and delivering valuable output. Therefore you can adjust policy more slowly based upon data from the Job Guarantee as to how liquid the buffer is in different parts of the country.”

12 Ingelesez: “Politicians are almost certainly useless at driving an economy. In fact the only people worse than politicians are central bankers and their lackey economists. Politicians are at least partially grounded in reality because they have to get elected.

Enhanced auto-stabilisation via the Job Guarantee and proscribed banking gets all these people out of the way. Discretionary policy is then decided by politicians in parliament once a year, and the day to day gyrations are handled automatically by the system.

Central bank civil servants can then go back to being anonymous operators, just like the ones operating social security, applying the rules they have been given and keeping out of the limelight. It’s time for the era of rock star Central Bank Governors, waving their expectations fairy wand, to end. There is no factual basis for their actions. If we turned up in a remote jungle and found a tribe managing their affairs in the way we do at present, we’d call them primitive and superstitious. The One Rate to Rule Them All is just as much of a fantasy tale as the One Ring.”

13 Ingelesez: “Kalecki (1946) §2 made a similar point:

It should be first stated that, although most economists are now agreed that full employment may be achieved by government spending, this was by no means the case even in the recent past. Among the opposers of this doctrine there were (and still are) prominent so-called ‘economic experts’ closely connected with banking and industry. This suggests that there is a political background in the opposition to the full employment doctrine, even though the arguments advanced are economic. That is not to say that people who advance them do not believe in their economics, poor though this is. But obstinate ignorance is usually a manifestation of underlying political motives.”

14 Ingelesez: “The policies MMT put forward reduces the political power of bankers and the ‘captains of industry’. Reducing the scope of bank lending creates spending space in an economy and reduces the need for general taxation. Limiting lending to useful activities is, in effect, a massive tax on the excesses of banking — all without touching a single tax rate.

Forcing the ‘captains of industry’ to undertake actual capitalism, where they have to invest heavily, in an environment of scarce labour resources, to gain a profit, is loathed by big business. As Kalecki (ibid.) points out:

The social function of the doctrine of ‘sound finance’ is to make the level of employment dependent on the state of confidence.

The Job Guarantee takes that power away from business and makes them the servant of the people once again.

The neo-liberal framing of the debate studiously avoids these views, but an MMT analysis brings them both into sharp relief.”

15 Ingelsez: “MMT is a description of how the current fiat monetary system operates. It takes a different viewpoint on the economic circulation that reveals insights hidden by other viewpoints (deliberately so in the case of neoliberalism).

16 Ingelesez: “Monetary policy stabilisation has been an utter failure leading to crippling levels of private debt and inequality. The idea that economic stabilisation is simply a matter of banking policy is Victorian zombie economics at its worst. The One Rate To Rule Them All belief can be rejected entirely, along with all the people that support it.

17 Ingelesez: “Banking can be returned to bowler hat boring. The job of a bank is to lend for capital development and not a lot else. The Mosler Mechanics for banking puts banks back in their box, and at the same time releases a huge amount of misallocated resources for other uses. Private debt is constrained and naturally limited by credit analysis. No more private debt fuelled booms.

18 Ingelesez: “Everybody can have a job in the location where they live with the help of the Job Guarantee. Business is moved from master to servant. Business must wander the nations looking for labour to serve it and compete hard to get any. Or it can engage in actual capitalism, and invest in advanced technology and techniques — eliminating jobs while driving forward productivity and our standard of living.”

19 Ingelesez: “We can treat businesses like cattle not pets. Those that don’t make the grade can fail to allow those that do to flourish.

20 Ingelesez: The gyrations of the economy can be stabilised automatically. We have no need for central bankers doing their Wizard of Oz routine. It’s a waste of money and borders on a superstitious ritual. The last ten years have proved that these experts are nothing of the sort, and it is time for them to find alternative employment. (Perhaps they can join Psychic Sally on tour…) Government can adjust fiscal policy with a long term view once a year in the budget, and leave the enhanced automatic stabilisers to handle the short term wiggles in the interim. We need to get people out of the stabilisation business and let fiscal policy and competitive mechanics handle it instead.

21 Ingelesez: “We can contain the nuclear power of capitalism and make it work for the public good. MMT shows that the government is in charge in its own domain, by virtue of its monopoly over the currency. Government can deploy the resources it requires for the public good, allow the private sector to work its wonders with what is left, and then utilise any remaining capacity with the Job Guarantee. This puts an advanced containment vessel around capitalism giving greater control and output than ever before.

22 Ingelesez: “Government can focus on what it buys and how it buys it. Once money is out of the picture we can get back to what economics is supposed to be about — the allocation of actual physical resources to tasks. If we want more nurses, where are they coming from? If we want buildings, who is going to build them and what with? What were the alternative uses? What are the opportunity costs? Just because government can command resources, doesn’t mean it should. Neo-liberalism likes to imply that market value and social value are the same. The MMT view shows they are very different beasts. Public provision has to be assessed politically on its social value and social costs.”

23 Ingelesez: “The sovereign state with its own currency is the world’s unit of independent governance — allowing a set of people to manage their affairs in the way they wish without compromising too much to any other set of people. If you believe that system is worth preserving and can work for the good of all then the MMT viewpoint gives you the tools to make it work well.”

24 Ingelesez: “The globalists and internationalists of both liberal and neo-liberal persuasion won’t like it. But they have failed us and their day is done.”

Draghi eta EBZ (Europako Banku Zentrala)

Artikulu zahar samarra (2016koa) baina oso interesgarria.

(Sorry, erdara batuan azaltzeagatik…)

Andres Vilena-ren Draghi, el hombre que pudo reinar… y que remó para casa 1

Mario Draghi, presidente del Banco Central Europeo (BCE), parecía haber nacido con el cometido de salvar al euro de las amenazas que se cernían sobre él desde el comienzo de la crisis. Cuando en julio de 2012 sorprendió a los denominados “mercados financieros” con su “whatever-it-takes” , la situación límite que atravesaban países como España pareció experimentar un giro de, por lo menos, cien grados.

Las palabras de Draghi no implicaban intervención alguna, pero sí la supusieron de facto: las expectativas llevaron a los especuladores a retirar las apuestas que mantenían contra la quiebra de los tesoros públicos de las naciones europeas periféricas, al descontar que el Banco Central las salvaría entrando con su bazuca en el mercado secundario de la deuda soberana. Se había creado un cortafuego contra los buitres, y las primas de riesgo mediterráneas no volvieron a ser lo que eran.  

Liquidez sin apenas frutos

El gobernador del BCE adoptó entonces una serie de decisiones de política monetaria que, en definitiva, facilitaban más liquidez a la banca privada, incrementaban el valor de sus activos financieros y reducían en general los tipos de interés de los préstamos. Se esperaba con esto una suerte de efecto de goteo, un trickle down, como se dijo en los años ochenta, pero aplicado al ámbito financiero: la barra libre de crédito fomentaría que los bancos tuvieran una mayor propensión a prestar a las empresas y a las familias, lo que reflotaría a medio plazo las economías nacionales por la vía del consumo, la inversión y con ello la demanda.

Pero estos intentos se quedaron ahí: la gran banca se contentó con acoger créditos baratos para después financiar onerosamente a los Estados mientras el rendimiento de la deuda pública representaba un negocio redondo: estas entidades tomaban prestado al 1% y después se hacían con bonos del Tesoro a cambio de un 5% o un 6% de intereses. Un dinero que, al menos, les serviría para sanear sus balances y, por fin, para dar lugar a la actividad del crédito a la economía real.

(Gogoratu ondoko eskemak:


Ni por esas: además, las economías domésticas, enormemente endeudadas, tampoco demandaban suficiente crédito. Llegó por entonces el concepto de “estancamiento secular”: el caballo, una vez arrastrado al abrevadero, no quería beber agua. Lo que todo este arsenal de medidas sí permitió fue aligerar el estrés financiero y mediático soportado por las haciendas nacionales que, como en el caso español, aprovecharon para gastar de manera más atrevida en víspera de las elecciones generales. Las cifras nominales de riqueza bruta se recuperaron, salvo en el caso griego y por los motivos conocidos. Pero la economía ha seguido durante este período en un estado anoréxico, famélico.

Un balance previsible  

El balance del gobierno de Draghi es decepcionante, pero también previsible, teniendo en cuenta la arquitectura institucional de la moneda única. Tampoco podía esperarse mucho de un antiguo directivo de Goldman Sachs bajo cuya gestión se asesoró al Gobierno conservador griego en el maquillaje de sus cifras de deuda y de déficit público. En definitiva y si se reflexiona sin los prejuicios propios de la tecnocracia más ideologizada, el gobernador del BCE ha llevado a cabo un continuo rescate de las finanzas, que han gozado de unas facilidades de crédito inusitadas a lo largo de un largo período de privaciones.

El último ejemplo de esta supeditación de los recursos públicos a los intereses privados es el anuncio de la compra de los denominados corporate bonds, o bonos de grandes empresas que adquieren, de esta manera, una financiación privilegiada por delante de las pymes, que apenas pueden acceder a estos. De esta manera, las multinacionales, principalmente las francesas y las alemanas, contarán con liquidez adicional para refinanciar sus créditos o para sanear sus balances. ¿Es que nadie protesta por esto en el Gobierno español ni en el Parlamento Europeo? ¿A qué se dedica la oposición progresista?

Una élite financiera fracasada

El BCE representa en estos momentos un refugio para una élite financiera fracasada y subvencionada. Otro too big to fail encubierto y cargado de riesgo moral. Además de mostrar una doble vara de medir entre países meridionales y septentrionales, lo que prueba la gestión del gobernador central es que, tras unas propuestas supuestamente técnicas y con base científica, la política monetaria está capturada por los intereses privados. A falta de una política fiscal común y expansiva, todavía impensable, la zona euro seguirá enferma. Hasta que, como apuntó más de una vez John Maynard Keynes, ocurra lo inesperado.

(Gogoratu Warren Mosler proposamenak: Warren Mosler-en proposamenak eta Independentziaren garaia politikan eta ekonomian)