Galdera[1]: Beharrezko ote ditu DTM-k nazionalizazio mailaren bat (bankuena/korporazioena) eta erregulazio zehatza, ala bateragarria ote da nazionalizaziorik gaberekin eta erregulaziorako eskusartzerik gaberekin?
Erantzuna: Ikus banku sistemarako nire proposamenak[2], zeintzuek dramatikoki gutxitzen baitute erregulaziorako beharrik.
Ikus, dezagun, bada, Mosler-en banku-sistemarako proposamenak[3].
Banku operazioek eragina daukate Fed-ean eta Altxor Publikoan. Hori dela eta, AEBetako FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), Banku Zentrala (Fed) eta Altxor Publikoa aipatzen ditu Mosler-ek.
1. FDIC-rako proposamenak
Hona FDIC-z dioena[4]:
(i) FDIC-tik gordailu segurtasuneko kapitala ezabatzea. Kideak diren bankuekiko, Fed-eko fondo merkatuetan, Fed trukatzera zuzentzen den heinean, mugagabeko neurritan, fondo eskuragarrien aferak diskutigarriak dira[5].
(ii) Banku porrotetan galdutako fondoak eskuratzearren, bankuak ez zergapetzea. FDIC-ko fondo guztiak AEBetako Altxor Publikoak hornitu behar ditu[6].
(iii) FDIC-k bere eginkizuna betetzea Altxor Publikoaren inolako eskusartzerik gabe (FDIC-ko gastuen fondoak hornitzetik at). FDIC-ren eginkizuna banku insolbenteekin tratatzea da[7]. Izandako esperientzia oso kaskarra izan da[8], zeren politikariek ez baitute ulertzen bankugintzak nola funtzionatzen duen[9].
2. FED-erako proposamenak
Hona FED-z dioena[10]:
(a) Fed-ek maileguz eman behar die banku kideei[11], mugaturik gabeko kopuruetan[12]. Gaur egunean Fed-ek egiten duena erredundantea da[13].
(b) Horrela, bankuen arteko Fed-eko fondoen merkatua erabat deuseztatzen da[14].
(c) Fed-ek bankuak erabili behar ditu politika monetariorako eragile gisa[15].
(d) Zero interes tasako politika iraunkorra izan behar du[16].
(e) Fed-ek Altxor Publikoko tituluetan kreditu ordaintze ezeko asegurua eskainiko dio edozein erosleri bere banku sistemaren bidez[17].
3. Altxor Publikorako proposamenak
Hona Altxor Publikoaz dioena:
(I) Altxor Publikoko titulu guztien jaulkitzearekin bukatzea[18].
(II) Altxor Publikoak ezin ditu aktibo finantzarioak erosi[19].
4. Banku sistemarako proposamenak
Hona hemen proposamenak:
a) Bankuak publikoak eta pribatuak dira, kredituetan oinarritutako maileguak emateko.
b) Oinarri egonkor eta basiko eskarietan oinarritzen den mailegu emate hori sostengatuz, fondoen iturria ez dago merkatuaren menpe.
c) Hortaz, munduko banku sistema gehienek gobernuaren gordailu segurtasunen modu bat dute barnean. Baita banku zentral bat bere kide bankuei maileguz emateko.
Bankugintzaren xede publikoa ordainketa sistema bat hornitzea eta kreditu analisietan oinarritutako mailegua finantzatzea izanik, zenbait proposamen eta murrizketa gehigarri kontuan hartu behar dira:
d) Soilik mailegu hartzaileei zuzenki mailegu ematea permititu beharko litzaieke bankuei, eta mailegu horiek beren balantze orrietan gordetzea[20].
e) AEBetako bankuei dagokienez, LIBORetan kontratuak egitea ez litzaieke permititu beharko. LIBOR atzerritar herrialde batek jarritako interes tasa da, zeina AEBetako gobernuaren eskutik kanpo baitago[21].
f) Bankuei ez litzaieke permititu beharko inongo subsidiariorik edukitzea[22].
g) Bakuei ez litzaieke permititu beharko aktibo finantzarioak onartzea, maileguen berme gisa[23].
h) AEBetako bankuei ez litzaieke permititu beharko maileguz ematea lehorretik at[24].
i) Bankuei ez litzaieke permititu beharko kreditu ordaintze ezeko asegurua erostea (edo saltzea)[25].
j) Bankuei ez litzaieke permititu beharko jabeari dagokion merkataritzan edo eta, oinarrizko mailegu ematez kanpo, mozkina ateratzeko ekintzetan jardutea[26].
k) FDIC-ek onartutako kreditu modeloak erabili behar dira banku aktiboak aztertzerako[27].
5. Ondorioak
Hona hemen eskari agregatua sostengatzeko eta output eta enplegua eraberritzeko proposamenak:
(i) Nominaren zerga salbuespen bat, non Altxor Publikoak enplegatzaile eta enplegatuentzako kontribuzio guztia egiten duen[28].
(ii) Estatu gobernuei 150 x 109 $ errenta banatzea, per capita-ko oinarrian[29].
(iii) Lan egin nahi duen eta gai den edozeini Gobernu federalaren enplegu osoko 8$/h-ko fondoa hornitzea[30].
Azken hiru proposamenek, Fed-erako, Altxor Publikorako, FDIC-rako eta banku sistemarako goian proposatutako neurriekin batera, AEBetako ekonomia azkar eraberrituko dute hazkunde positiborako, enplegu osorako eta nahi den xede publikoa bultzatuko duen banku sistema bat ezarri, zeinak erregulazio gutxiago behar duen eta gaur egungo antolamendu instituzionalei dagokien arrisku sistemikoa murrizten duen bitartean.
[1] Ikus https://docs.google.com/document/d/1FrF4rVICAdx9unhsIgfnPdpBGqVp_VAfYMXCqxdkWso/edit?pli=1.
[3] Proposamenak AEBetarako dira, baina, noski, beste edozein herrialde subiranori aplika dakizkioke. Eurolandiari dagokionez, ikus https://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/10/09/mosler-ek-italian-laster-emango-duen-hitzaldiaz/
[4] Mosler-k FDIC-z:
“Proposals for the FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation)
I have three proposals for the FDIC.”
[5] “The first is to remove the $250,000 cap on deposit insurance. The public purpose behind the cap is to help small banks attract deposits, under the theory that if there were no cap large depositors would gravitate towards the larger banks. However, once the Fed is directed to trade in the fed funds markets with all member banks, in unlimited size, the issue of available funding is moot.”
[6] “The second is to not tax banks in order to recover funds lost on bank failures. The FDIC should be entirely funded by the US Treasury. Taxes on solvent banks should not be on the basis of the funding needs of the FDIC. Taxes on banks have ramifications that can either serve or conflict with the larger public purposes presumably served by government participation in the banking system. These include sustaining the payments system and lending based on credit analysis. Any tax on banks should be judged entirely by how that tax serves or doesn’t serve public purpose.”
[7] “My third proposal for the FDIC is to do its job without any assistance by Treasury (apart from funding any FDIC expenditures). The FDIC is charged with taking over any bank it deems insolvent, and then either selling that bank, selling the bank’s assets, reorganizing the bank, or any other similar action that serves the public purpose government participation in the banking system.”
[8] “The TARP program was at least partially established to allow the US Treasury to buy equity in specific banks to keep them from being declared insolvent by the FDIC, and to allow them to continue to have sufficient capital to continue to lend. What the TARP did, however, was reveal the total failure of both the Bush and Obama administrations to comprehend the essence of the workings of the banking system.”
[9] “Once a bank incurs losses in excess of its private capital, further losses are covered by the FDIC, an arm of the US government. If the Treasury ‘injects capital’ into a bank, all that happens is that once losses exceed the same amount of private capital, the US Treasury, also an arm of the US government is next in line for any losses to the extent of its capital contribution, with the FDIC covering any losses beyond that. So what is changed by Treasury purchases of bank equity? After the private capital is lost, the losses are taken by the US Treasury instead of the FDIC, which also gets its funding from the US Treasury. It makes no difference for the US government and the ‘taxpayers’ whether the Treasury covers the loss indirectly when funding the FDIC, or directly after ‘injecting capital’ into a bank. All that was needed to accomplish the same end as the TARP program- to allow banks to continue to function and acquire FDIC insured deposits- was for the FDIC to directly reduce the private capital requirements. Instead, and as direct evidence of a costly ignorance of the dynamics of the banking model, both the Obama and Bush administrations burned through substantial quantities of political capital to get the legislative authority to allow the Treasury to buy equity positions in dozens of private banks. And, to make matters worse, it was all accounted for as additional federal deficit spending. While this would not matter if Congress and the administrations understood the monetary system, the fact is they don’t, and so the TARP has therefore restricted their inclination to make further fiscal adjustments to restore employment and output. Ironically, the overly tight fiscal policy continues to contribute to the rising delinquency and default rate for bank loans, which continues to impede the desired growth of bank capital.”
[10] Textua ingelesez: “The fed should lend unsecured to member banks, and in unlimited quantities at its target fed funds rate, by simply trading in the fed funds market. There is no reason to do otherwise.”
[11] Banku kideei, ingelesez: “Currently the Fed will only loan to its banks on a fully collateralized basis. However, this is both redundant and disruptive. The Fed demanding collateral when it lends is redundant because all bank assets are already fully regulated by Federal regulators. It is the job of the regulators to make sure that all FDIC insured deposits are ‘safe’ and ‘taxpayer money’ is not at risk from losses that exceed the available private capital. Therefore, the FDIC has already determined that funds loaned by the Fed to a bank can only be invested in ‘legal’ assets and that the bank is adequately capitalized as required by law. There is no room for funding from the Fed to be ‘misused’ as banks already can obtain virtually unlimited funding by FDIC insured deposits. The only difference between banks funding with FDIC insured deposits and funding directly from the Fed might be the interest rate the bank may have to pay, however it’s the further purpose of the Fed’s monetary policy to target the fed funds rate.”
[12] Mugaturik gabeko kopuruetan, ingelesez: “The Fed also tends to set quantity limits when it lends to its member banks, when there is every reason to instead lend in unlimited quantities. Bank lending is not reserve constrained, so constraining lending to the banks by quantity does not alter lending. What constraining reserves does is alter the fed funds rate, which is the rate banks pay for reserves as well as the Fed’s target rate. So the only way the Fed can fully stabilize the fed funds rate at its target rate is to simply offer to provide unlimited funds at that rate as well as offer to accept fed funds deposits at that same target rate. And with no monetary risk or adverse economic consequences for lending unlimited quantities at its target rate there is no reason not to do this.”
[13] Ingelesez: “Currently the Fed will only loan to its banks on a fully collateralized basis. However, this is both redundant and disruptive. The Fed demanding collateral when it lends is redundant because all bank assets are already fully regulated by Federal regulators. It is the job of the regulators to make sure that all FDIC insured deposits are ‘safe’ and ‘taxpayer money’ is not at risk from losses that exceed the available private capital. Therefore, the FDIC has already determined that funds loaned by the Fed to a bank can only be invested in ‘legal’ assets and that the bank is adequately capitalized as required by law. There is no room for funding from the Fed to be ‘misused’ as banks already can obtain virtually unlimited funding by FDIC insured deposits. The only difference between banks funding with FDIC insured deposits and funding directly from the Fed might be the interest rate the bank may have to pay, however it’s the further purpose of the Fed’s monetary policy to target the fed funds rate.”
[14] Ingelesez: “Another benefit of this policy would be to entirely eliminate the interbank fed funds market. There is no public purpose served by banks trading fed funds with each other when they can do it with the Fed, and transactions costs are reduced as well. And to eliminate the interbank markets entirely the Fed has the further option to provide funding with an entire term structure of rates to its banks to both target those rates and also eliminate the need for any interbank trading.”
[15] Ingelesez: “I would limit the Fed to using banks as agents for monetary policy. I would not pursue the policy of attempting to establish additional public/private partnerships for the purpose of buying various financial assets. Instead, if I agreed with the need to purchase those assets, I would enable the banking system to do this along the same lines proposed for the new public/private partnerships. That might take the form of allowing banks to put these ‘qualifying assets’ in a segregated account, where losses to bank capital would be limited to, for example, 10% of the investment in those accounts. This would have the same result as the recently proposed public/private partnerships but within the existing highly regulated and supervised banking system. Banks are the appropriate instrument of monetary policy for targeting the risk adjusted term structure of interest rates. Why go to the expense and risk of creating new public/private partnerships when there are already approximately 8,000 member banks already set up for that purpose?”
[16] Ingelesez. “I would make the current zero interest rate policy permanent. This minimizes cost pressures on output, including investment, and thereby helps to stabilize prices. It also minimizes rentier incomes, thereby encouraging higher labor force participation and increased real output. Additionally, because the non-government sectors are net savers of financial assets, this policy hurts savers more than it aids borrowers, so a fiscal adjustment such as a tax cut or spending increase would be appropriate to sustain output and employment.”
[17] Ingelesez: “I would instruct the Fed to offer credit default insurance on all Treasury securities through its banking system to any buyer. There is no default risk in US Treasury securities, but, if market participants do want to buy such credit default insurance, I would make it available through the Fed. This would keep the premiums and the perception of risk down to a level determined by the Fed. I would suggest they offer it freely at 5 basis points for any maturity.”
[18] Ingelesez: “I would cease all issuance of Treasury securities. Instead any deficit spending would accumulate as excess reserve balances at the Fed. No public purpose is served by the issuance of Treasury securities with a non-convertible currency and floating exchange rate policy. Issuing Treasury securities only serves to support the term structure of interest rates at higher levels than would be the case. And, as longer term rates are the realm of investment, higher term rates only serve to adversely distort the price structure of all goods and services.”
[19] Ingelesez: “I would not allow the Treasury to purchase financial assets. This should be done only by the Fed as has traditionally been the case. When the Treasury buys financial assets instead of the Fed all that changes is the reaction of the President, the Congress, the economists, and the media, as they misread the Treasury purchases of financial assets as federal ‘deficit spending’ that limits other fiscal options.”
[20] Ingelesez: “Banks should only be allowed to lend directly to borrowers and then service and keep those loans on their own balance sheets. There is no further public purpose served by selling loans or other financial assets to third parties, but there are substantial real costs to government regarding the regulation and supervision of those activities. And there are severe consequences for failure to adequately regulate and supervise those secondary market activities as well. For that reason (no public purpose and geometrically growing regulatory burdens with severe social costs in the case of regulatory and supervisory lapses), banks should be prohibited from engaging in any secondary market activity. The argument that these areas might be profitable for the banks is not a reason to extend government sponsored enterprises into those areas.”
[21] Ingelesez: “US banks should not be allowed to contract in LIBOR. LIBOR is an interest rate set in a foreign country (the UK) with a large, subjective component that is out of the hands of the US government. Part of the current crisis was the Federal Reserve
