Txinaren burtsa eta ekonomia globala

Txinaren burtsa albiste izan da.

Elkarrizketa Randall Wray-rekin: CHINA’S STOCK MARKET TUMBLE AND THE OUTLOOK FOR THE GLOBAL ECONOMY1.

Galdera: Era errazean, nola eragiten dio Txinako moteltzeak euroguneari?

Erantzuna: Uste dut inpaktua puztua izan dela. Txina oraindik nahiko azkar hazten ari da. Haren kontsumitzaileek goranzko errentak gozatzen dituzte. Atzerrian fabrikatutako kalitate handiko ondasunak nahi dituzte -prestigiozko ondasunak, luxuzko ondasunak. Epe laburrean, euroguneak oraindik txinatar eskariaren hazkunde positiboak gozatuko ditu. Eragin handiagoa salgai esportatzaileetan (Errusia, Brasil) izan ahalko litzateke. Txina baliabide naturalen erabilera nola ekonomizatu ikasten ari da, hazkunde jasangarriranzko mugitzeko bere ahaleginean.

Hala ere, epe luzean, euroguneak arazo handiei aurre egin behar die – batzuk bere egiteari dagozkionak, eta beste batzuk erbesteko lanpostuen mugimenduari dagozkionak. Txinak lanpostu batzuk lortuko ditu, baina Ekialdeko Europak eta Asiako Hego-Ekialdeak gehiago lortuko dute. Eta robotak izango dira irabazlerik handienak, manufakturak roboten aldera jotzen duen heinean. Txinak Europak baino lanpostu gehiago galduko du – hau fenomeno globala da. Nahiko erraza da afera konpontzea gobernuak sorturiko ordezko lanpostuen bidez – neurri handi batean zerbitzu publikoetan eta azpiegitura inbertsioetan, baina gobernuek ez dute hori egingo beraiek ‘dirurik gabe geldituko direlako’ beldurragatik.

Azkenik, ulertu behar da burtsa merkatuek ez dutela islatzen jarduera ekonomikoa, ezta jarduera ekonomikoetako inpaktua ere. Espekulazio basatiko eremuak dira, besterik ez. AEBn akzioetarako bataz besteko jabetza epea urte bete baino gutxiagora erori da – 1929an baino baxuagora, burtsa merkatuaren hondamena baino lehenago. Txinako burtsa esteroidezko espekulazioak elikatzen du. Txinako klase ertaineko familia-etxe askok esku-diru estra dute eta aberatsak azkar izatea nahi dute; hori da behar ez duten dirua. Galdu dezakete beren bizimoduetan inpaktu handirik gabe. Noski orain ero daude gobernuak, dirudienez, ezin duelako ezer egin jaitsiera gelditzeko – baina ez du eragin handirik izango beraien gastuetan,

G: Burtsa merkatuek lurralde negatiboetara irristatzen segitzen dutela ikusiz, uste duzu aferak Fed-en kudeaketa monetario txarrari dagozkiola ala Txinak beste batzuei egindako kalteari, yuan debaluazioa dela eta?

E: Burtsa merkatu bat espekulazio pasioak gidatzen duenean, edozerk sortarazi ditzake salmentak. Bai, moneta debaluazioa (zeinaren ondotik esportazio salmentetan presioak etorri ziren) txinparta izan zitekeen. Baina edozein albistek edo zurrumurruk salmenta hasi ahalko zukeen. Kontuan hartu AEBko burtsa merkatua, era berean, espekulazioak gidatzen duela, gehi korporazio akzioen berrerosketa oso altuek (akzio opzioko exekutibo balioa elikatzeko). Beraz, horri ere, erraz buelta eman dakioke.

G: Prestatuta al dago eurogunea beste krisi baterako?

E: Ez. Euroguneak frogatu du ezgai dela krisiari erantzuteko. Esan dezakegun gauza positibo bakarra da euroguneko batzuk azkenean konturatu direla euroguneak, egitaratura dagoen bezala, ezin diola krisiari erantzun. Greziar arazoa daukagula dirudien bitartean, izatez euroguneko arazo daukagu. Herrialdez herrialde erasoei aurre egingo diegu, harik eta azkenean zentroak -Alemaniak- ezin eutsi. Euroa diseinatu zen porrot egiteko; ez da sistema jasangarria – eta sistema ez-jasangarriak azkenean kolapsatzen dira.

G: Zentzu horretan, zer esan euroguneko quantitative easing (QE) delako programaz?

E: Hertsiki definitutako QE programa batek eurogunean eragin eskasa izango du, Japonian (20 urteetan) eduki zuen moduan, eta AEBn oraintsuago, ezer ere ez. Baldin eta EBZk erosten badu zor subirano nahigabetua – zeinak benetan sostengu fiskala ezkutatzen duen – eragin positiboa izan dezake. Hori EBZ-ren DNAren aurka doa – eta jadanik EBZk (eta Troikako beste kideek) egina izan da, soilik gogoz kontra eta erantsitako kateekin (austeritatea). Funtsean, QE honetan datza, alegia, banku sistematik irabazitako aktiboak kentzean eta interes baxuagoko irabazitako aktiboak ordezkatzean. Zergatik lagunduko du horrek ezer? Ez du. Soilik baldin eta QE ordaintze ezari aurre egiten dioten aktibo kaskarrak erosten fokatzen bada, orduan zerbait on egin ahalko luke – eta on gehiago egingo luke gobernu zorra merkatuetatik kenduz.

G: Oro har, zer espero dezakezu eurogunerako, Gabonetarako?

E: Ahaztu Santa Claus – bera ez dator. Politika triunfoko erabaki guztiak oraintxe daude, eta ‘irabazleen’ (bereziki Alemania) politikak agintzen du austeritate gehiago behartuz galtzaile guztien gainean (kide guztien lau bosten). Horrek ez du ongi bukatu. Azkenik Alemania ere arrastatuko du – haren merkatuek behaztopa egiten duen heinean. Ez dago inongo biderik Alemaniako langileek irabaz dezaketen fondoranzko azken lasterketa – Ekialde eta Ekialde Urrunaren aurka. Gertatuko al da hori guztia Gabonetarako? Segur aski ez. Espero daiteke eurogunetik hazkunde etsipengarri gehiago eta su basati gehiago, zeintzuek gogoz kontrako babesa piztuko duten, eskatutako austeritate gehiagorekin.

G: Zer esan AEBko ekonomiaz? Zein izango da inpaktua AEBko susperraldian?

E: AEB azken baliabideko kontsumitzailea da. AEBko hazkunde motelagoak (zeina jadanik bistakoa den) gauzak okerrago ekiten ditu gainontzeko mundurako. Beraz, esan dezagun alderantziz: AEBk dardaraz segitzen badu, etorkizun globala okerragoa da. AEBk, nahi badu, suspertzen segitu ahal du, eta horrek gainontzeko mundua lagundu ahalko luke. Susperraldi sendoa aukeratuko du? Ez dut uste. Austeritate gaixotasuna Washington ere hartu du.

Hori termino tekniko altuetan esateko: guztiok gaude erabat izorratuta.


1 Ikus Interview of L. Randall Wray by Dasha Chernyshova, Moscow reporter for the Sputnik News Agency: http://neweconomicperspectives.org/2015/08/chinas-stock-market-tumble-and-the-outlook-for-the-global-economy.html.

W. Mosler-en eta bion arteko e-posten trukaketa (Update/Eguneratzea)

Ikus W. Mosler-en eta bion arteko e-posten trukaketa1

Segida:

From: josebafelix@outlook.es
To: warren.mosler@gmail.com
Subject: FW: ME-MMT (DTM, italieraz) (Update)
Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2015 13:50:31 +0200

Dear Warren,

Similar situation as the one described before… (see below)2

Catalonian people are really scared to know new things about new currency, deficits and etc.

They have a problem, big problem, with the Spanish state.

So they ‘need help’ from Europe, at the political level.

An important event will take place next September 27th:

http://english.vilaweb.cat/noticies/raul-romeva-europe-and-the-world-are-watching-us-while-the-spanish-government-threatens/

http://english.vilaweb.cat/noticies/we-are-acting-in-legitimate-defence-against-systematic-attacks-on-self-rule-says-catalan-president/

http://english.vilaweb.cat/noticies/catalan-new-coalition-ready-to-declare-unilateral-independence-from-spain/

http://english.vilaweb.cat/noticies/oriol-amat-catalan-independence-under-eu-tutelage-is-a-feasible-option/

And so on and so forth: look at http://english.vilaweb.cat/

I have written to different Catalonian people, sending them the emails you sent me.

Not even a single answer!!! Not even for courtesy.

ooooooooooooooooo

As to the Basque Country, the situation is even worse…

People are engaged with the coming Spanish elections in December.

No way to discuss about economics, the euro, austerity…

Basque people are in favor of Syriza (!?)

I sent some different people twice the news that you will be in Catalonia this coming September.

No answer at all.

Discouraging!

All the best.

joseba

oooooooooooooooo

Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2015 09:47:38 -0400
Subject: Re: FW: ME-MMT (DTM, italieraz) (Update)
From: warren.mosler@gmail.com
To: josebafelix@outlook.es

Thanks for trying and doing the best you can!

from my Elophone 7000

2 Ikus 1. oharra.

Bakoitzari berea (omen da zuzenbidea)

(i) Bluff-ik handiena: Greziak merezi ez zuena

Albistea: Varoufakis to launch pan-European anti-austerity movement and political party1

Iruzkina: Pena handia. Askoz hobe izango litzateke mundu osorako mugimendua eta alderdi politikoa! Animo eta aurrera!

Agian hurrengoan izango da.

(ii) Syriza: bere buruaz beste egin zuena

Albistea: SYRIZA is slipping. New poll shows only a 3.5 point lead over rival pro-EU party New Democracy2

Iruzkina: Pena handia. From ‘anti-austerity’ guy to ‘love that austerity’ guy.

Agian hurrengoan hobetuko du egoera ‘tipo’ [Tsipras] horrek!

(iii) Herri Batasuna: Grexit ekarri ahalko lukeena

Albistea: Introducing Popular Unity3

Iruzkina: Pena handia. Grexit, berriz ere, mahai gainean4.

Agian Syriza eraberritu batek Grezia eurogunean sartuko du, betiko! Ea, bada!

(iv) Traidoreak: lehengo lagun minak

Albistea: Members of Syriza’s Central Committee Defecting to Popular Unity5

Iruzkina: Pena handia. Ez dute ikusten Infernuaren eta Paradisuaren artean dagoen leizea6.

Agian laster konturatuko dira, Dante irakurriz.

(v) Grexit, berriz: desastrerik desastreena, omen

Albistea: What Would Happen to the Eurozone if Greece Leaves?7

Iruzkina: Pena handia. Euskal Herriko progre, ekonomialari, politikari, intelektual eta kazetari guztiak negarrez…. Desastre totala, erabateko hondamendia, omen…

Agian hurrengoan, behingoz, negar egiteari utziko diote! Egin dezagun otoitz!


4 Ingelesez: “As the recent disaster had abundantly demonstrated, these goals cannot be realized without exiting the eurozone and breaking with the whole set of policies institutionalized by the European Union.

6 Ingelesez: “… 53 out of 201 members of Syriza’s Central Committee not only resigned their posts but defected to Popular Unity in the last 24-48 hours.

Monetaristentzat…

Bill Mitchell-en artikulua: US Federal Reserve should not increase interest rates1.

Artikuluan ukitutako punturik garrantzitsuenak:

(a) Korronte nagusiko ekonomialariek egindako aurreikuspenak hitz hutsalak izan dira, besterik ez2

(b) Ekonomialari guzti horiek ez dute ulertzen banku zentralaren eta merkataritza bankuen arteko dinamika3

(c) Kontua da kontserbadore haiek, hain leloak izanik, ez dutela ulertzeko gaitasunik ere ez, eta segitzen dutela errepikatzen txorakeria berberak4

(d) Gaur egun AEBko ekonomia suspertze motel batean murgiltzen da5

(e) Askoz hobea izango litzateke interes tasak ia zero mailari eustea eta Altxor Publikoarekin erreserba sistema federal osoa aldatzea6

(f) Gaurko inflazioaren egoeraren erroak monetarismoan dautza7

Beraz, justifikatzen ote du inflazio dinamikak interes tasa altxatzea?

(g) Inflazio tasaz hitz bi

  1. Dokumentu honetan, What is inflation and how does the Federal Reserve evaluate changes in the rate of inflation?, ikusten dira Fed-en neurriak inflazioa ebaluatzeko8
  2. Inflazioa AEBn, oso baxua9
  3. Quantitative easing (QE) delakoa10

(h) QE delakoaren ‘mirariak’11

(Gogoratu blog honetan QE dela eta esandakoa12.)

(i) Langabezia tasa13, oraindik altua14

(j) DTM eta interes tasak

  1. Zero interes tasa15
  2. Politika monetarioa erreminta kaxkarra16
  3. Politika fiskala erreminta boteretsua17
  4. Defizitaren tamaina18
  5. Defizita eta erreserbak19
  6. Enplegu osoa eta helburu ‘naturala’20: a zero rate is ‘natural’.
  7. Banku zentrala eta interes tasa positiboak21

Gehigarria22 (Bloomberg artikulua):

All 15 central banks of the 34 countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development that raised interest rates since the 2008 financial crisis ended up cutting again.

Beraz, zertan ari dira Kataluniako ekonomialari monetaristak eta neoliberalak?

Utziko dute kataluniarrek ekonomialari horien esku Kataluniako balediko Errepublika independentea eratzea?

Eta, bide batez, zertan ari dira Euskal Herriko ekonomialari ortodoxoak, alegia, monetaristak eta neoliberalak direnak, zeintzuk mozorroz agertzen baitira ‘progreen’ aureolaz? ‘Ezkerraren’ aureolaz ere?


2 Ingelesez: “… all the predictions and scare campaigns that were being issued by mainstream economists and their conservative ‘think tank’ conduits about the impending disaster that would accompany the near zero interest rate regimes that the US Federal Reserve Bank had implemented it would make a great comedy sketch.”

3 Ingelesez: “There should be no surprise with the massive predictive failures of the mainstream economists in this regard. They clearly did not understand the underlying dynamics that govern the way the central bank interacts with the commercial banks.“

4 Ingelesez: “The problem is that these conservative forces are so dumb they don’t have adaptive learning mechanisms and so even in the fact of evidence contrary to their Groupthink they keep pumping out the same nonsense. The other problem is that they tend to be well funded by the right-wing establishment that they exhibit disproportionate influence on the public policy debate. That influence has turned to demands that the US Federal Reserve Bank (the central bank) increase interest rates and reverse its quantitative easing – apparently because hyperinflation is just around the corner. Nothing could be further from the truth.”

5 Ingelesez: “At present the US economy is some way into a very slow and relatively tepid recovery. But it has still some way to go and while interest rate changes have a relatively weak impact on overall growth any anti-growth noise is undesirable. It is also not justifiable given the central bank’s own logic.”

6 Ingelesez: “It would be better for humanity if it [the central bank] left rates at their current level (or adjusted the cash rate down to zero – that is, abandon the range between 0 and 0.25 per cent), called up the Treasury and told them they were seeking a merger and proceeded to scrap the entire federal reserve system.”

7 Ingelesez: “We came into this era of inflation targetting as a consequence of the Monetarist policy bias that central banks should ‘fight inflation first’, which was code for using unemployment as a policy tool rather than a policy target that it was during the full employment (non neo-liberal era).

8 Hona hemen ebaluaziorako urratsak: 1. To avoid month-to-month variability, it considers “average inflation over longer periods of time”. 2. It examines “the subcategories that make up a broad price index to help determine if a rise in inflation can be attributed to price changes that are likely to be temporary or unique events”. 3. It examines “a variety of ‘core’ inflation measures to help identify inflation trends. The most common type of core inflation measures excludes items that tend to go up and down in price dramatically or often, like food and energy items.”

This process is followed by central banks almost everywhere.

9 Ingelesez: “We learn that inflation in the US is very low at present (0.2 per cent per annum) but the underlying ‘core’ rate is a steady rate varying between about 1.6 and 1.8 per cent. It has been stable for the last three years at least.”

10 Ingelesez: “The three major rounds of QE in the US were dated as follows:

  • Quantitative Easing 1 (QE1, December 2008 to March 2010) – This was announced on November 25, 2008. The program was expanded on March 18, 2009 as described in this FOMC press release.

  • Quantitative Easing 2 (QE2, November 2010 to June 2011) – The FOMC announced on – On November 3, 2010 – that it “intends to purchase a further $600 billion of longer-term Treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011, a pace of about $75 billion per month.”

  • Quantitative easing 3 (QE3, September 2012 and expanded on December 2012 and terminated in October 2014) – The FOMC announced on – September 13, 2012 – that it “agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month”. This would continue “If the outlook for the labor market does not improve substantially”. This phase was expanded on – December 12, 2012 – such that the FOMC “will purchase longer-term Treasury securities … initially at a pace of $45 billion per month”. QE was terminated in the US in October 2014.2.”

11 Ingelesez: “It is hard to mount an argument that the QE episodes have increased inflationary expectations. The last phase (QE3) didn’t alter short- or long-run inflationary expectations one iota – they remain low and anchored despite the massive increase in the asset-side of the Federal Reserve balance sheet and the commensurate swelling of bank reserves.”

13 Ingelesez: “An unemployment rate of around 5 per cent was considered to be a ‘long-run’ policy target. We can disagree with that assessment (see The dreaded NAIRU is still about!) but within the Bank’s own logic, it is hard to argue that the ‘low’ unemployment rate has been breached from above.

The aggregate unemployment remains at 5.3 per cent (July 2015) and has been slowly falling for the best part of 18 months. Earlier in the recovery it fell quite quickly.

But if we dig deeper all isn’t that rosy in the US labour market.

14 Ingelesez: “…. broader indicators demonstrate that the US labour market has still not recovered its pre-GFC position. (…) Clearly, it has still not returned to its pre-GFC low of around 7.9 per cent which was recorded in December 2006. So any measure that seeks to slow growth down and undermine the relatively modest employment growth overall will impact disproportionately on the most disadvantaged workers in the labour market first.

15 Ingelesez: “… standard MMT principles, is that – The natural rate of interest is zero!

16 Ingelesez: “… Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) theorists consider monetary policy to be a poor tool for counter-stabilisation because it is indirect, blunt and relies on uncertain distributional behaviour.

17 Ingelesez: “MMT tells us that fiscal policy is powerful because it is direct and can create or destroy net financial assets in the non-government sector with certainty. It also does not rely on any distributional assumptions being made.

Further, MMT considers the desirable economic state to be full employment which means some irreducible low unemployment, zero hidden unemployment and zero underemployment.

18 Ingelesez: “MMT also tells us that deviations from full employment reflect failed fiscal policy settings – not a large enough fiscal deficit (other things equal).

The size of deficit has to be judged in terms of the desire of the non-government sector to save in the currency of issue. So if the deficit is inadequate and unemployment arises we know the net public spending has not fully covered the spending gap.”

19 Ingelesez: “We also know that fiscal deficits add to bank reserves and create system-wide reserve surpluses. The excess reserves then stimulate competition in the interbank market between banks who are seeking better returns than the support rate offered by the central bank. (…) It makes much better sense not to offer a support rate at all. In that situation, net public spending will drive the overnight interest rate to zero because the interbank competition cannot eliminate the system-wide surplus (all their transactions net to zero – no net financial assets are destroyed).”

20 Ingelesez: “So in pursuit of the policy goal of full employment, which we might consider to be a ‘natural’ goal for a collectively-minded society desiring high levels of well-being and inclusion, fiscal policy will have the side effect of driving short-term interest rates to zero.

It is in that sense that MMT concludes that a zero rate is ‘natural’.

21 Ingelesez: “If the central bank wants a positive short-term interest rate for whatever reason (MMT advocates against that) – then it has to either offer a return on excess reserves or drain them via bond sales.

The MMT preferred position is a zero interest rate with no government bond sales. In that environment, the government would then allow fiscal policy to make all the adjustments. It is much cleaner and effective that way.”

ANCk irailaren 8an ospatuko du Diada Bilbon

Orain da ordua…

… kasurako, honelako galdera zuzenak egiteko 18 hilabete (eta hiru aste) Kataluniako independentziarako izeneko solasaldian parte hartuko duten Martxelo Otamendi BERRIA egunkariko zuzendariari eta Vicent Partal Vilaweb.cat atariko zuzendariari:

  1. Zein moneta erabiliko luke Kataluniako  balediko1 Errepublika independente berriak? Eurogunean egotekotan, euroa noski. Eurogunetik kanpo geratzekotan, euroa? Moneta berri bat?

  1. Zein politika fiskal erabiliko da Kataluniako  balediko Errepublika independentean? Eurogunean egotekotan? Eurogunetik kanpo egotekotan, baina euroa erabiliz? Eurogunetik kanpo egotekotan eta moneta propioa usatuz, baldin eta proposamen hori aurreikusten bada?

  1. Zein politika zehatz erabiliko du Kataluniako  balediko Errepublika independenteak langabeziari aurre egiteko? Europan erabiltzen den monetarismo hutsa? Europan erabiltzen den politika neoliberal hutsa? Zein?

Nahiko eta sobera hasiera baterako…


1 ‘Baledi’ eta ‘balitz’ desberdintzen ditugu. ‘Baledi’ potentzialtasuna adierazteko. ‘Balitz’ irrealtasuna markatzeko.

Defizit publikoaz, berriz, hitz pare bat

Defizit publikoa da gaia. Gai teorikoa eta praktikoa. John Maynard Keynes eta Abba Lerner. Modern Money Theory, hots, Diru Teoria Modernoa eta defizit publikoa. Ondorioz: Britainia Handia, Eskozia, Katalunia, Euskal Herria, …

(1) Afera teorikoa

John Maynard Keynes eta Abba Lerner:

Gobernuek ez dituzte behar aberatsen aurrezkiak, ezta haien zergak ere!

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/08/19/gobernuek-ez-dituzte-behar-aberatsen-aurrezkiak-ezta-haien-zergak-ere/

Keynes, DTM eta defizit publikoa:

DTMren erroak ez dautza Keynes-engan

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/08/25/dtmren-erroak-ez-dautza-keynes-engan/

(2) Afera teoriko-praktikoa

DTM eta gastu publikoa:

a) Diru teoria modernoa, hasiberrientzat

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2011/08/04/diru-teoria-modernoa-hasiberrientzat/

b) Bill Mitchell Finantza Ministro(a)z ari

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/02/06/bill-mitchell-finantza-ministroaz/

c) Stephanie Kelton: defizitak eta superabitak

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/02/09/stephanie-kelton-defizitak-eta-superabitak/

(3) Britainia Handia eta defizit publikoa

Jeremy Corbyn eta defizit publikoa:

Defizit fiskala, berriz: Grezia eta Britainia Handia

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/08/16/defizit-fiskala-berriz-grezia-eta-britainia-handia/

(4) Ondorioak

(a) Katalunia:

Katalunia eta DTM

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/11/12/katalunia-eta-dtm/

Kataluniaren txanda (5) (monetarismoa, ortodoxia neoliberala eta abar)

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/08/10/kataluniaren-txanda-5/

(b) Euskal Herria?:

‘Puntua’

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/11/19/puntua/

Ikasiko ote dugu?

(Zabaldu arren)


DTMren erroak ez dautza Keynes-engan

Bill Mitchell-en artikulua: The roots of MMT do not lie in Keynes1

Ideia batzuk:

(i) Defizit fiskal orekatuak?2

(ii) Abba Lerner-ek defizitei buruz3

(iii) Keynes eta defizit publikoak4

(iv) ‘Urrezko araua’5

(iv) Mitchell-en jarrera6

(v) Britainia Handiari dagokionez7, “a continuous fiscal deficit is indicated

(vi) Gobernuei egindako gomendioa8

(vii) Zergen afera9

(viii) DTM10

(ix) OMF (Overt Monetary Financing) delakoa11

(x) Gehigarria12

Ondorioak:

  1. Progressives should abandon the notion that they attribute to Keynes that the fiscal balance should be zero on average over the course of the economic cycle.

  1. In this regard, the work of Abba Lerner in the 1940s on Functional Finance is much more seminal to the development of MMT than was Keynes’ offerings, which I believe a antithetical to the foundational blocks of MMT.

  1. Progressive narratives should aim to educate the public as to the need in normal times for continuous fiscal deficits. Then we would start getting somewhere.

Iruzkina13:

Warren Mosler says:

Tuesday, August 25, 2015 at 18:26

Totally agree!
Go Bill!


2 Ingelesez: “... the real sticking point against Keynes was his view that fiscal deficits should be balanced over the business cycle and that would allow governments to pay back debt incurred in the deficit years. That view has crippled progressive thought ever since and is antithetical to MMT. The debate also has resonance with the current leadership struggle within the British Labour Party about fiscal deficits and the claims by the ‘socialist’ candidate, Jeremy Corbyn that he will “balance the budget” when unemployment is low so as to avoid inflation. This view derives from the adoption by progressives of Keynes’ views, whether they know that or not. It is a mistaken view and retards progressive policy development.”

3 Ingelesez: “In his 1961 book article (page 139) – The Burden of Debt – the founder of Functional Finance Abba Lerner opened with the following parable:

But look,” the Rabbi’s wife remonstrated, “When one party to the dispute presented their case to you, you said ‘you are quite right’ and then when the other party presented their case you again said ‘you are quite right’, surely they cannot both be right?” To which the Rabbi answered, “My dear, you are quite right!”.”

4 Ingelesez: “In correspondence to Sir Richard Hopkins (July 20, 1942) – which is recorded in his Collected Works, Volume 27, Keynes wrote:

the ordinary Budget should be balances at all times. It is the capital Budget which should fluctuate with the demand for employment.

This is the precursor to the modern concept of the ‘golden rule’, which limits fiscal deficits to the rate of public investment in productive capital. The ‘golden rule’ essentially means that over some defined economic cycle (from the peak of activity to the next peak) the government deficit should match its capital (infrastructure) spending. All ‘recurrent’ spending (that is, spending which exhausts its benefits within the current year) should be ‘funded’ through current revenue (taxes and fines, etc.). The ‘golden rule’ is considered equitable across generations because the current taxpayers ‘pay’ for the public benefits they receive now, while the future generations have to pay for the benefits that the infrastructure delivers to them in the years to come. Thus, day to day spending that benefits the current taxpaying public should be covered by taxation revenue and capital infrastructure should be funded through debt. The fiscal balance would thus always be zero net of public investment spending. The ‘golden rule’ reflects the mainstream economics view that governments have to ‘fund’ their spending just like a household.”

5 Ingelesez: “So in Victorian times, the ‘golden rule’ was that in good times, the current ‘budget’ should deliver a surplus, which would then allow the government to repay the debt incurred in bad times, when it was running deficits. This reasoning then lef to the conclusion that balanced ‘budgets’ as a principle was dangerous and that ‘budgets’ should, rather, be balanced over an economic cycle.”

6 Ingelesez: “The point is that I depart from the view espoused by many Modern Monetary Theory (MMT) proponents who suggest that Keynes is one of the important precursor economists to the development of MMT. As I explained in this blog – Corbyn should stop saying he will eliminate the deficitthere is no foundation in the idea that fiscal balances should ever be balanced much less over the course of some discrete economic cycle (peak to trough to peak).

Keynes’ views in this context were relatively conservative and mistaken.

1. Issuing debt to match fiscal deficits does not reduce the inflation risk of the initial spending, whether that spending be government or non-government.

It just swaps one financial asset – a saving balance (deposit) for a government bond. Moreover, the latter carries an income flow which is likely to be larger than the former.

2. There is no reason to believe that continuous fiscal deficits will be inflationary. Extending Keynes’ own logic, deficits are required when non-government spending is insufficient to generate sales that would justify firms fully employing all available labour.

As long as firms can continue to respond to nominal demand growth through increased output growth, there is no major likelihood of an inflation breakout.

In other words, a deficit could easily be a ‘steady-state’ policy position to support full employment when the other sectoral balances (external and private domestic) were in particular states.”

7 Ingelesez: “For a nation such as Britain, we note the following:

1. A fairly sizeable external deficit which drains domestic spending in net terms (more cash flows out via imports than flows in via exports) and is not going to go away anytime soon and is not a problem anyway, given it means the British people enjoy advantageous real terms of trade (foreigners are willing to send them real goods and services in exchange for bits of paper – financial assets).

2. The private domestic sector is already highly indebted and cannot be expected to sustain even higher debt levels.

3. There is considerable idle capacity – unemployment, underemployment etc.

In this context, a continuous fiscal deficit is indicated.

8 Ingelesez: “Governments should not follow fiscal rules like a ‘balanced budget rule over the cycle’. Rather, they should be guided by evaluations which show the impact of different fiscal policy parameters on the well-being of the population. If there is a need for the private domestic sector to have less purchasing power,then a tax increase is indicated. Not to generate revenue for the government but to reduce purchasing capacity of households and firms.”

9 Ingelesez: “The tax increase is serving a specific function – to deprive the private domestic sector of purchasing power, presumably, because the government wants extra real resource space available to pursue its own socio-economic mandate and/or exports are booming. It needs to create the extra resource space because if the taxes weren’t increased there would be incompatible claims on those real resources from all the claimants (households, firms, government, foreigners) which would result in inflation.”

10 Ingelesez: “… no rule can be devised to automatically ensure that these functional decisions will be made effectively. It is the art of the policy maker that rules rather than a rule driving the policy. Keynes did not take into account the sectoral balances. MMT makes them a central part of the macroeconomic evaluation and policy development framework. Understanding them in an accounting sense is only the first step. The art is to understand what drives these balances and how they interact. So a ‘balanced budget over the cycle’ rule would mean the private domestic sector has a deficit equivalent to the external deficit on average over the same cycle. Why is that desirable? It implies that the private domestic sector will be accumulating ever-increasing debt levels, which eventually will become unsustainable. MMT focuses on the private debt dynamics and considers the public debt dynamics to be passe. It goes further and recommends that governments break the nexus between debt-issuance and fiscal deficits.

11 Ingelesez: “In this sense, governments should use Overt Monetary Financing rather than going through the pretence that they are being funded by private bond holders. The bond sales are made possible by past deficits, which generate net financial assets for the non-government sector. Further, they are just an example of corporate welfare, which is totally unnecessary. There is some progressive argument that the debt helps pension/superannuation funds provide safe returns to workers in retirement. My solution would be to national superannuation funds, eliminating the managerial fee grab of workers’ savings, and using the government’s currency-issuing capacity to fund workers’ retirements. That is pure MMT but very non-Keynes.”

12 Ingelesez: “… you might also like to reflect on David Colander’s article in the Journal of Economic Literature (December 1984) – Was Keynes a Keynesian or a Lernerian? – which mounts the argument that Keynes shifted ground in the 1940s and considered Lerner’s Functional Finance to be a sound framework.

Puerto Rico zorretan

Puerto Rico: informazioa1

Free Associated State of Puerto Rico United States territory bat da.

Moneta: dolarra

Zenbait datu ekonomiko:

(a) Biztanleak: 3,6 milioi

(b) Zorra: 72.000 milioi dolar inguru

Zorra dela eta, albiste batzuk:

(1) Puerto Rico Has No Easy Path Out of Debt Crisis

http://www.wsj.com/articles/puerto-rico-has-no-easy-path-out-of-debt-crisis-1435526355?mod=e2tw

(2) Global Debt Time Bomb Ticks – Puerto Rico Is Next

http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2015-07-01/global-debt-time-bomb-ticks-%E2%80%93-puerto-rico-next

(3) The Origins of the Puerto Rican Debt Crisis

https://www.jacobinmag.com/2015/08/puerto-rico-debt-crisis-imf/

Hona hemen, besteak beste, zenbait zehaztasun:

(i) 2008ko krisia dela eta, enpresa txiki eta ertaineko kreditua murriztu da, horrelako asko bukatu dira ixten

(ii) BPG dramatikoki erori da, bataz beste %2 urtero azken zortzi urteetan

(iii) Langabezia handitu da, 270.000 lanpostu eliminatu dira

(iv) Puerto Rico-ko per capita-ko errenta AEBko estaturik txiroenaren -Mississipi- ia erdia da

(v) Langabezia %12,6, AEBko estatuetan langabeziaren tasarik altuena daukan West Virginian % 7,4 den bitartean

(vi) 2009an aukeratutako New Progressive Party izenekoak gobernua eratzerakoan egokitzeko politika neoliberalak erabili zituen2

(vii) Austeritatearen ondorioz, lehen aipatutako datu ekonomikoak azaldu ziren3

(viii) Gainera, Puerto Rico lotuta dago AEBko ekonomiari4, eta BPGren zati bat AEBri joaten da5

(ix) Zor publikoaren murrizketen ondorioak6

(x) Diru laguntza estatu federaletik7

(xi) Aldaketa politikan8

(xii) Zorraren gaineko eztabaidak9

(xiii) Zorra eta Nazioarteko Moneta Fondoa: lehen proposamena10

(xiv) Bigarren proposamena11

(xv) Azken neurriak12

Puerto Rico-ko ekonomiaren zenbait berezitasun:

(a) Alokairuek ez dute parekatzen lehiakortasuna

(b) Mozkin guztiak ez dira inbertituak bertan

(c) Ondorio sozial latzak

(d) Alderdi politikoen politika ekonomiko neoliberalak

(e) Sektore publikoarekiko erasoak

Hori guztia konpondu nahiz, kritika eta proposamenak egin dira.

  1. Paul Krugman-en kritika eta proposamena13

  2. Krugman-en kritikari egindako kritika14

Puerto Rico-n dauden aferei irtenbideak emateko, beste neurri batzuk dira beharrezko.

Irtenbiderako zenbait zipriztin moslertar:

a) Zorrari buruzko iritzi orokorraz: Paul Krugman eta Warren Mosler, zorrari buruz15

b) Twitterrak:

Warren B. Mosler@edwardnh eka. 29

Puerto Rico Has No Easy Path Out of Debt Crisis – WSJ http://ow.ly/OUxbB 

Warren B. Mosler@wbmosler eka. 29

@edwardnh correction, they don’t know the path out…

c) Irtenbideak, Mosler-i jarraituz:

Mosler-en proposamena AEBetarako

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2013/02/14/mosler-en-proposamenak-aebetarako/

Mosler bonoak Greziarako (edo Puerto Rico-rako)

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2011/10/07/europar-batasuneko-eta-ebko-estatu-desberdinetako-bonoak-mosler-bonoak/

eta

Greziako irteeraz (Grexit delakoaz), zenbait iritzi (edo Puerto Ricexit)

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/07/24/greziako-irteeraz-grexit-delakoaz-zenbait-iritzi/


2 Besteak beste, honelakoak: “…the firing of 30,000 public employees, tax reform favorable to the rich, increases in tuition fees for higher public education, the privatization of public assets, deregulation of business permits, and the like.”

3 Ingelesez: “Unsurprisingly, these policies did not have the desired effect. In the first place, it is theoretically and practically known that an economy experiencing a downturn will probably not experience growth if government spending is reduced. Puerto Rico’s own economic history attests to the importance of the public sector and government spending in fostering economic growth.”

4 Ingelesez: “The economic model of “industrialization by invitation” that for decades has characterized industrial policy in Puerto Rico has been sustained by a high number of subsidies and tax exemptions whose purpose is to attract foreign (mainly American) capital. This tax and corporate haven arrangement, with no accountability in the case of private failure, has further accentuated the fragility and dependence of the economy.

5 Ingelesez: “… a substantial amount of wealth created in the island is extracted and not reinvested — $35 billion in manufacturing profits, or approximately a third of GNP, are repatriated back to the United States.” (Amerikar bilio bat: 1.000 milioi)

6 Ingelesez: “The cuts in public spending, best exemplified by the mass termination of public employees in 2009, have had a negative multiplier effect on the economy because they’ve failed to spur an increase in private sector investment and employment.

To cover the shortfall, the New Progressive Party issued around $17 billion in debt over its tenure, or 22 percent of GNP. In other words, more than a fifth of the country’s total debt burden was comprised of bonds and lines of credit opened by the public sector to contain an economic freefall effectively created by the same government.

7 Ingelesez; “It is also important to point out that, apart from the debt, this government had access to $6 billion dollars (8.6 percent of GNP) courtesy of the Obama administration’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and to liquidity injected into the local banking sector to prevent its decapitalization. The most conservative estimates calculate that around $25 billion was funneled into the Puerto Rican economy, meaning outright austerity would have had even more dire consequences.

8 Ingelesez: “In 2013, the New Progressive Party was voted out and replaced by the Popular Democratic Party, a purportedly center-left formation that had promised to stop laying off public employees. (…) Despite its tepid program, the new administration’s arrival prompted immediate credit downgrades from Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch; the shutting off of access to primary debt markets for the Puerto Rican government; and a fall in the value of the country’s bonds in secondary markets. To make matters worse, many of the government bonds contained “acceleration clauses,” which meant that the minute the Puerto Rican government failed to make a payment on time, it owed the debt in full. Since it was shut out of credit markets, it couldn’t refinance the debt by issuing new bonds. When its debt servicing payments doubled, the government responded by slashing public spending. Soon after, it increased the tax on oil and hiked the sales tax, burdens that have contributed to soaring costs of living.”

9 Ingelesez: “In the meantime, debates have sprung up about whether the debt should be restructured or paid back under the original conditions agreed upon with creditors. Proposals from new political parties and law projects emerged out of these debates, providing the government with some ammunition to declare a moratorium on the payment of the debt, to audit it, and to renegotiate it. But of all the proposals, only one became law — the right to declare local bankruptcy.”

10 Ingelesez: “After multiple failed attempts at renegotiating and restructuring the debt via legal and institutional mechanisms that require a specialized third party, the Puerto Rican government commissioned a study from advisers associated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Published at the end of June, the report proposed a raft of supply-side measures: reducing production costs (mainly labor costs), reforming the tax code with more weight on real-estate property and indirect taxes (direct taxes would be eliminated), and cutting the budget of the Puerto Rican government’s General Fund. Current debates about the study have focused on the fact that the majority of the proposals to reduce production costs — decreasing the minimum wage, weakening labor protection laws, exempting the country from cabotage laws — are at odds with federal laws prohibiting their supersession by an institution like the IMF.

11 Ingelesez: “Shortly after, mutual and hedge-fund bondholders commissioned a second study, appealing to the “expertise” of economists who have also worked for the IMF. The authors concluded that the debt was payable without concessions to bondholders, in clear contrast to the first report. The report’s analysis was clearly a reaction to the statement of the statement on June 28 by Puerto Rico’s governor that the island’s “debts are not payable,” a statement that has recently materialized with the inability of the government to meet an August 3 deadline for a full $58 million bond payment.”

12 Ingelesez: “This, and other potential future defaults, will probably accelerate the implementation of what both commissioned studies suggested: more doses of austerity (closing of schools, firing of teachers, reduction of the minimum wage, etc.) to pay off the debt.

13 Ingelesez: “Paul Krugman recently wrote that thanks to the safety net provided by the federal system and “big government,” Puerto Rico’s case “is one of bad times that fall well short of utter disaster.” Like a good philanthropist, our Nobel laureate seems to want Puerto Ricans to be thankful for what they have received, given that they have not ended up like Greece.“ Ikus America’s Un-Greek Tragedies in Puerto Rico and Appalachia: www.nytimes.com/2015/08/03/opinion/paul-krugman-americas-un-greek-tragedies-in-puerto-rico-and-appalachia.html?ref=opinion.

14 Ingelesez: “This myopic take, however well-intentioned, abstracts from the historical processes of political and economic control and wealth extraction by the United States over its colony of 117 years, processes that to this day shape the downward spiral in which a decomposing Puerto Rican society finds itself.” Ikus On the Puerto Rican Debt Crisis: A Reply to Krugman: http://newpol.org/content/puerto-rican-debt-crisis-reply-krugman.

1100 sarrera UEUko blogean

2009tik 2014.10.08 arte: 10.791 + 1.115 + 1604 = 13.510 bisita izan ditu blogak

Jakin behar duguna:

Zenbat bisita egon dira 700. sarreratik 800. sarrerara?

eta

Zenbat bisita egon dira 800. sarreratik 900. sarrerara?

eta

Zenbat bisita egon dira 900. sarreratik 1000. sarrerara?

Baita zenbat bisita egon dira 1000. sarreratik 1100. sarrerara ere?

Gogoratzekoa:

1100. sarrera hauxe da: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/08/23/paul-krugman-eta-warren-mosler-zorrari-buruz/

1000. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/05/30/me-mmt-dtm-italieraz-13/

900. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/03/24/deutsche-bank-eta-w-mosler/

800. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/01/12/europak-plazebo-bat-eztabaidatzen-duen-bitartean/

700. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/10/08/dtm-eta-eurogunea-berriz/

(Falta zaizkigun datuak jakingo ditugu UEUko Zuriñe lanera itzuliko denean.)

Bloga 2006an hasi zen.

Hasierako sarrera (2006.11.04): http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2006/11/04/heterodoxia-ekonomikoaren-bloga/

Ez dakigu zenbat bisita egon diren hasieratik (2006tik) 2009ra.

Beti cum mica salis hartu behar dira datuok, noski.

Segituko dugu lanean…

Zuen iruzkinen zain, mila esker.

Ez adiorik.

joseba

Paul Krugman eta Warren Mosler, zorrari buruz

Oso noizean behin ingelesezko sarrera bat jarri behar dugu blog honetan. Zergatiak? Alde batetik erabilitako ingelesa erraza delako, plain English edo. Bestetik, gaia oso garrantzitsua delako, zorra; eta eztabaida funtsezko delako, eta badaezpada ere, zehaztasunak ez galtzeko edo. Gainera, kasu honetan Nobel saridun bat, P. Krugman, dugu alde batean eta W. Molser bestean.

Krugman kolore beltzez.

Mosler kolore urdinez.

(Euskarazko egokitzapena kolore moreaz.)

(Gozatu eta ikas!)

Krugman on debt

http://moslereconomics.com/2015/08/22/krugman-on-debt/

Debt Is Good

By Paul Krugman

Aug 21 (NYT) — Rand Paul said something funny the other day. No, really — although of course it wasn’t intentional. On his Twitter account he decried the irresponsibility of American fiscal policy, declaring, “The last time the United States was debt free was 1835.”


Which consequently was followed by the worst depression in US history.

(Eta jarraian AEBko historian depresiorik txarrena egon zen.)

Wags quickly noted that the U.S. economy has, on the whole, done pretty well these past 180 years, suggesting that having the government owe the private sector money might not be all that bad a thing. The British government, by the way, has been in debt for more than three centuries, an era spanning the Industrial Revolution, victory over Napoleon, and more.

But is the point simply that public debt isn’t as bad as legend has it? Or can government debt actually be a good thing?

Believe it or not, many economists argue that the economy needs a sufficient amount of debt out there to function well.


Yes, to offset desires to not spend income (save) when private sector borrowing to spend isn’t sufficient, as evidenced by unemployment.

(Bai, desioak konpentsatzeko errenta ez gastatzearren (aurreztu) sektore pribatuaren maileguz hartzea gastatzeko nahikoa ez denean, eta horren froga langabezia izanik.)

And how much is sufficient? Maybe more than we currently have. That is, there’s a reasonable argument to be made that part of what ails the world economy right now is that governments aren’t deep enough in debt.


Yes, it’s called unemployment, which is the evidence that deficit spending is insufficient to offset desires to not spend income. Something economists have known by identity for at least 300 years

(Bai, langabezia deitzen da, eta horren froga defizit gastua ez dela nahikoa desioak konpentsatzeko, errenta ez gastatzearren. Zerbait ekonomialariek identitate gisa ezagutu dutena gutxienez 300 urtetan.)

I know that may sound crazy. After all, we’ve spent much of the past five or six years in a state of fiscal panic, with all the Very Serious People declaring that we must slash deficits and reduce debt now now now or we’ll turn into Greece, Greece I tell you.

But the power of the deficit scolds was always a triumph of ideology over evidence, and a growing number of genuinely serious people — most recently Narayana Kocherlakota, the departing president of the Minneapolis Fed — are making the case that we need more, not less, government debt.

Why?


This is the right answer- because the US public debt, for example, is nothing more than the dollars spent by the govt that haven’t yet been used to pay taxes. Those dollars constitute the net financial dollar assets of the global economy (net nominal savings), as actual cash, or dollar balances in bank accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank called reserve accounts and securities accounts. Functionally, it is not wrong to call these dollars the ‘monetary base’. And a growing economy that generates increasing quantities of unspent income likewise needs an increasing quantity of spending that exceeds income- private or public- for a growing output to get sold.

(Hau da erantzun zuzena – zeren eta AEBko zor publikoa, kasurako, gobernuak gastatutako  eta oraindik zergak ordaintzeko erabili izan ez diren dolarrak besterik ez baitira. Dolar horiek ekonomia globalaren finantza aktibo netoak (aurrezki nominal netoak) osatzen dituzte, benetako esku-diru gisa, edo Erreserba Federaleko banku-kontuetan eta titulu kontuetan dolar balantze moduan. Funtzionalki, ez dago gaizki dolar horiek ‘oinarri monetarioa’ deitzea. Eta gero eta handiago den ekonomia batek, gero eta handiagoko ez gastatutako errenta-kopurua sortzen duenak era berean errenta -pribatua edo publikoa- gainditzen duen gero eta gastu handiagoa behar du, handituz doan outputa saldu ahal izateko.)

One answer is that issuing debt is a way to pay for useful things, and we should do more of that when the price is right.


Wrong answer. It’s never about ‘when the price is right’. It is always a political question regarding resource allocation between the public sector and private sector

(Erantzun okerra. Ez da inoiz ‘prezioa noiz den zuzen’ari buruz. Sektore publikoaren eta sektore pribatuaren arteko baliabideen esleitzeari buruzko kontu politikoa da beti.)

The United States suffers from obvious deficiencies in roads, rails, water systems and more; meanwhile, the federal government can borrow at historically low interest rates.


Wrong answer. Yes, there is a serious infrastructure deficiency. The right question, however, is whether the US has the available resources and whether it wants to allocate them for that purpose.

(Erantzun okerra. Bai, badago azpiegituraren gabezia larria. Galdera zuzena, ordea, hauxe da: AEBk baliabideak ote dituen eta horiek helburu horretarako esleitu nahi dituen ala ez.)

So this is a very good time to be borrowing and investing in the future, and a very bad time for what has actually happened: an unprecedented decline in public construction spending adjusted for population growth and inflation.


I agree it’s a good time to fund infrastructure investment, due to said deficiencies.

However, whether or not it’s a good time to increase deficit spending is a function of how much slack is in the economy, as evidenced by the unemployment rates, participation rates, etc. And not by infrastructure needs.

And my read based on that criteria is that it’s a good time for proactive fiscal expansion.

Nor in any case is deciding whether or not to increase deficit spending rightly about whether or not to increase borrowing per se for a government that, under close examination, from inception necessarily spends or lends first, and then borrows. As Fed insiders say, ‘you can’t do a reserve drain without first doing a reserve add.’

(Ados nago, une egokia da azpiegituraren inbertsio finantzatzeko, aipatutako gabeziak direla eta.

Hala ere, defizit gastua handitzeko momentu egokia den ala ez, ekonomiaren zenbat moteltasun dagoenaren funtzioa da, eta horren froga gisa langabezia tasak, parte-hartze tasak eta abar dira. Eta ez azpiegituraren beharrak.

Irizpide horretan oinarrituta, nire irakurketa da tenore ona dela aurreranzko hedapen fiskalerako.

Inongo kasutan afera ez da defizit gastua handitzea ala ez behar bezala mailegatzea handitzea ala ez per se, gobernu baterako, zeina, azterketa estuaren azpian, hasieratik nahitaez lehendabizi gastatu edo maileguz ematen duen eta gero maileguz hartu. Fed-ekoek diotenez, “ezin duzu erreserba drainatze bat egin lehenago erreserba gehigarri bat egin gabe.”)

Beyond that, those very low interest rates are telling us something about what markets want.


Wrong, they are telling is something about what level market participants think the fed will target the Fed funds rate over time.

(Oker, esaten dutena da merkatu parte-hartzaileek pentsatzen dutenari buruz, hots, Fed-ek Fed-eko fondoen tasa, denboran zehar, zein helburu maila lortuko denaz.)

I’ve already mentioned that having at least some government debt outstanding helps the economy function better. How so?


Right answer- deficit spending adds income and net financial assets to the economy to support sufficient spending to get the output sold.

(Erantzun zuzena- defizit gastuak errenta eta finantza aktibo netoak gehitzen dizkio ekonomiari, nahikoa gastu sostengatzeko, outputa saldua izatearren.)

The answer, according to M.I.T.’s Ricardo Caballero and others, is that the debt of stable, reliable governments provides “safe assets” that help investors manage risks, make transactions easier and avoid a destructive scramble for cash.


Wrong answer. Net govt spending provides in the first instance provides dollars (tax credits) in the form of dollar deposits in reserve accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank. Treasury securities are nothing more than alternative deposits in securities accounts at the Federal Reserve Bank for those dollars. Both are equally ‘safe’.

(Erantzun okerra. Gobernuaren gastu netoak lehendabizikoz dolarrak hornitzen ditu (zerga kredituak) dolar gordailuen forman, Erreserba Federaleko erreserba kontuetan. Altxor Publikoen tituluak Erreserba Federaleko tituluen kontuetan dolar horietako gordailu alternatiboak baino ez dira. Biak daude era berean ‘seguru’.)

Now, in principle the private sector can also create safe assets, such as deposits in banks that are universally perceived as sound. In the years before the 2008 financial crisis Wall Street claimed to have invented whole new classes of safe assets by slicing and dicing cash flows from subprime mortgages and other sources.

But all of that supposedly brilliant financial engineering turned out to be a con job: When the housing bubble burst, all that AAA-rated paper turned into sludge. So investors scurried back into the haven provided by the debt of the United States and a few other major economies. In the process they drove interest rates on that debt way down.


Rates went down in anticipation of future rate setting by the fed.

What investors did was reprice financial assets. Investors can’t change total financial assets. The total only changes with new issues and redemptions/maturities.

(Tasak behera joan ziren Fed-ek etorkizuneko tasa ezartzearen aldez aurretik.

Inbertsiogileek egin zutena finantza aktiboen prezio aldatzea zen. Inbertsiogileek ezin dituzte finantza aktibo totalak aldatu. Totala soilik ldatzen da jaulkipen berriekin eta kitapenekin/epemugekin.)

And those low interest rates, Mr. Kocherlakota declares, are a problem. When interest rates on government debt are very low even when the economy is strong, there’s not much room to cut them when the economy is weak, making it much harder to fight recessions.


True, but cutting rates doesn’t fight recessions. In fact low rates reduce interest income paid by govt to the economy, thereby weakening it.

(Egia da, baina tasa murrizketek ez dituzte atzeraldiei aurre egin. Izan ere, tasa baxuek gobernuak ekonomiari ordaindutako interes errenta murrizten dute, eta beraz, bera ahuldu.)

There may also be consequences for financial stability: Very low returns on safe assets may push investors into too much risk-taking — or for that matter encourage another round of destructive Wall Street hocus-pocus.


That would be evidenced by an increase in the issuance of higher risk securities, but there has been no evidence of that. In fact, it was $100 oil that at the margin drove the credit expansion that supported GDP growth, as evidenced by the collapse when prices fell.

(Hori frogatuko luke arrisku handiagoko tituluetan jaulkipen gehitze batek, baina ez da gertatu horrelako frogarik. Izatez, 100 dolarreko petrolioa izan zen, zeinak marjinatan kreditu hedapena gidatzen duen, BPGren hazkundea sostengatzen zuena, prezioak erori zirenean, gainbeherak frogatu zuen moduan.)

What can be done? Simply raising interest rates, as some financial types keep demanding (with an eye on their own bottom lines), would undermine our still-fragile recovery.


It would more likely very modestly strengthen it from the increase in the govt deficit due to the increased interest income paid by govt to the economy. However, I’d prefer a tax cut and/or spending increase to support GDP, rather than an interest rate increase. But that’s just me…

(Litekeenez oso apalki indartuko luke gobernuaren defizitaren gehitze batek, ekonomiari gobernuak ordaindutako interes errenta gehituak direla eta. Hala ere, zerga mozketa bat edo/eta gastuaren gehikuntza bat nahiago nuke BPG sustengatzeko, interes-tasa gehikuntza baino. Baina hori nire ustea da…)

What we need are policies that would permit higher rates in good times without causing a slump. And one such policy, Mr. Kocherlakota argues, would be targeting a higher level of debt.


Mr. K isn’t wrong, but again I’d rather just have a larger tax cut to get to the same point, but, again, that’s just me…

(K jauna ez dago oker, baina berriro ere nahiago nuke zerga mozketa handiago bat puntu berera iristeko, baina, berriz ere, hori nire iritzia da…)

In other words, the great debt panic that warped the U.S. political scene from 2010 to 2012, and still dominates economic discussion in Britain and the eurozone, was even more wrongheaded than those of us in the anti-austerity camp realized.


True, and this author…

(Egia da, eta egile hau…)

Not only were governments that listened to the fiscal scolds kicking the economy when it was down, prolonging the slump; not only were they slashing public investment at the very moment bond investors were practically pleading with them to spend more; they may have been setting us up for future crises.


True but for differing reasons. It’s never about investors pleading. It’s always about the public purpose behind the policies.

(Egia, baina arrazoi desberdinengatik. Ez da inoiz inbertitzaileen aitzakiaz. Politiken atzean dagoen helburu publikoari buruz da beti.)

And the ironic thing is that these foolish policies, and all the human suffering they created, were sold with appeals to prudence and fiscal responsibility.


The larger problem with this editorial is that the wrong reasons it gives for what’s largely the right policy are out of paradigm reasons that the opposition routinely shoots down and shouts down, easily convincing the electorate that they are correct and the ‘headline left’ is wrong.

Feel free to distribute-

(Editorial honekiko arazorik handiena da hein handi batean politika zuzenaren alde ematen dituen argudio okerrak oposizioak beti ukatzen dituen paradigma argudioetatik kanpo daudela, hautesleria erraz konbentzitzeko haiek zuzen direla eta ‘utzitako titulua’ okerra dela.

Sentitu aske banatzeko. )

Gehigarria:

Argazkia: Krugman Mosler-en liburuarekin1