Richard Murphy: Zergatik DTM? Warren Mosler-ekiko eztabaida (2)

Sarrera gisa, ikus Richard Murphy: Zergatik DTM? Warren Mosler-ekiko eztabaida

Segida:

Iruzkinak eta galderak.

(…)

Stone Elworthy says:

February 24 2018 at 8:21 pm

I was struck by Warren’s answer to
R: what about countries who cannot borrow in their own currencies, as many cannot?

W: Example

I was thinking that I was being naive in thinking that pretty much any country can borrow in its own currency since Iceland does despite only having <400000 people and Botswana has started to despite being a third world country. Surely there must be a hitch though.

If Warren (and me I guess) are correct, then doesn’t that imply that all countries that currently borrow in currencies that aren’t their own could potentially reap the benefits of transitioning to borrowing only in their own local currency? That could be a permanent and dramatic solution to the problem that got Jubilee 2000 so much support a couple of decades ago. Just imagine if countries such as Haiti were not burdened by catastrophic USD-denominated government debts. Ann Pettifor was at the helm of Jubilee 2000. She is now an MMT economist (that is what Simon Wren-Lewis described her as anyway). Could there be a campaign a bit like Jubilee 2000 but with the aim of re-denominating the debts of poor countries into their own local currencies? If that were to create prosperous trading partners then doing that might even be the easiest way for rich countries to improve the rich countries’ economies. Imagine if every country like Haiti had an economy like that of say Singapore (as an example of another small tropical island).

(…)

Charles Adams says:

February 24 2018 at 8:21 pm

And it seems people dislike inflation more than they dislike unemployment?”

Or may be people that are employed do not suffer enough if others are unemployed?

Is there is a tyranny of the majority (or perhaps an elite minority) happening here?

warren mosler says:

February 24 2018 at 11:31 pm

Stone,
Yes, and not to forget close analysis shows states with their own currency necessarily spend first and then do what’s called borrowing. Again, the funds to pay taxes or buy state bonds come only from the state, all of which means that, operationally, there isn’t a borrowing imperative for spending.

Charles,
Yes, I tend to agree with the tyranny of the majority narrative.

best

warren

(…)

Stephen Ferguson says:

February 25 2018 at 9:31 am

A socialist government would…provide public spending for every worthy cause. Trade union pressure…continuous wage increases”

MMT doesn’t equate to ‘spend, spend, spend’. Quite the contrary. It tells us that the limit to spending is the available real resources priced in £s.

Please see this great little 6 minute ‘MMT Basics’ cartoon… https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDL4c8fMODk

PS One other thing to keep in mind. There is no ‘normal’ gov. spending vs ‘printing press’ spending. There is ONLY the latter, which is used for ALL gov. spending. Every single last penny.

Richard Murphy says:

February 25 2018 at 9:56 am

Agreed

warren mosler says:

February 25 2018 at 10:35 am

A few things.

1. Either you believe in representative government with an informed electorate or you don’t.

2. Studies have failed to show that inflation per se slows real growth. It does have (serious) distributional issues which can be addressed in ways apart from fighting inflation, which does slow real growth.

3. What we call inflation- a continuous increase in the price level- are better thought of as one time events that require continuous application of policy to sustain the inflation. That is, inflation isn’t something that, once begun, automatically spirals out of control as many narratives suggest.

(…)

Richard Murphy: Zergatik DTM? Warren Mosler-ekiko eztabaida | Heterodoxia, diru teoria modernoa eta finantza ingeniaritza says:

February 25 2018 at 6:01 am

[…] Why MMT? A discussion with Warren Mosler […]

James says:

February 25 2018 at 7:01 am

The thing I always find hard to explain when trying to convince people of MMT goes back to money created by private banks. Yes they do so under licence, but in practice they do create a fair amount of money out of thin air in a way that is hard to reconcile with the notion that “only governments create money”.
This relates to the “self-made man/woman” trope: I have a brilliant idea for a unique product and start a business with a loan from the bank. I use that loan to invest in equipment, employees, marketing etc. and my innovative new product enjoys huge success. I pay back the loan but in the meantime have created employment for thousands of people in the company and down the supply chain, all of whom are having a multiplier effect on their local communities. The people buying the product are using money they have earned – maybe by working for other businesses funded by bank loans. That’s suddenly a lot of new money sloshing around that is outside government control. The self-made person says “what do you mean my tax is simply paying back money originally created by government? I created this by myself.”
Any neat rebuttals most welcome.

Stone Elworthy says:

February 25 2018 at 8:18 am

James, I thought it was the case that the private sector can use private sector credit to coordinate its activity just as you describe and on top of that the government can use the “outside money” system to pay for stuff with no revenue constraint for the government. The two things can go along in parallel and the government is not making the likes of your “self made man” pay except in the sense the government competes for labour and other real resources. The tax that your “self made man” is paying is just channeling money back to the government that came to his customers from some government spending at some point (assuming the government isn’t running a fiscal surplus).

-no doubt my take will be corrected by people more knowledgeable.

Richard Murphy says:

February 25 2018 at 10:10 am

You have pretty much got it

Nothing in MMT says the private sector should not operate

I can see no way it requires that private banks stop creating money. It does require their regulation when doing so.

warren mosler says:

February 25 2018 at 10:45 am

Yes, commercial bank loans (any bank purchases in fact) create commercial bank deposits (liabilities), just as central bank purchases (think of loans as purchased assets) create central bank liabilities (actual cash and the various types of central bank deposits). And central bank deposits are the source of tax payment, while commercial bank deposits are the source of the private commercial bank loan repayments as you discussed.

So I suggest the now educated ‘self made person’ will understand this?

Warren

(…)

(Segituko du)

Richard Murphy: Zergatik DTM? Warren Mosler-ekiko eztabaida

Why MMT? A discussion with Warren Mosler

A few weeks ago I mentioned on the blog that Warren Mosler had agreed to answer some questions on Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), of which school of thought he is one of the founders. Well over 200 questions came in as a result.

I tried to summarise these and have sent some to Warren now (the delay is all down to me: work has been rather more pressing this year than I anticipated when launching the invitation). This first Q & A is meant to be an overview of MMT. I am playing the role of sceptical enquirer: the questions I ask have to be viewed in that light. Warren has given short answers but has suggested he is open to answering responses.

R: What is MMT?

W: A description of monetary systems.

R: What does MMT say money is?

W: Today’s currencies like the $, yen, euro, etc. are simply tax credits- the thing needed to pay taxes.

R: But it’s now widely though that banks make our money?

W: Bank loans create bank deposits, under charter, regulation, and supervision of the govt.

R: Can we trust them to do that?

W: Only to the extent you trust govt. regulation and supervision.

R: What, then  is the role of central bankers?

W: Setting the policy rates.

R: And what is the role government come to that? And how do we stop there being too much money?

W: Depends on the definition of ‘money’.  I suspect it’s more about too much spending? That can be addressed by cutting govt. spending or cutting private sector spending by various means including govt. spending cuts, tax increases, increased lending standards, etc. etc.

R: If tax is to stop inflation why do we get so worked up about it and what it does?

W: Tax increases will reduce aggregate demand and inflation to the extent the inflation is being caused by excess demand. If that’s not the cause- and it generally isn’t- there are other tools for addressing price increases from those other sources. And it seems people dislike inflation more than they dislike unemployment?

R: It’s widely thought that  interest rates are meant to be used  stop inflation? What does interest do if tax stops inflation? Is there a good rate of inflation?

W: Not that I know of.  There can be a good economy in the context of both low and high rates of inflation.

R: What does full employment really mean?

W: For me the best we can do is offer a transition job to anyone willing and able to work to both promote the transition from unemployment to private  sector employment, and to act as a more effective buffer stock for the price level than unemployment. At that point we are continuously at a form of full employment.

R: What is the Jobs Guarantee?

W: Another name for the above described transition job.

R: Isn’t that the same as `Universal Basic Income?

W: No, with the transition job you have to at least ‘sell your time’ to get paid.

R: But  isn’t that just a money hand out?

W: As above. The value of the currency is a function of what you have  to do to get it from the govt.  It’s a simple case of  monopoly pricing.

R: Surely what you’re really saying is we’re just going to pile debt on debt at cost to future generations?

W: The public debt is the amount spent by the government .that has not yet been used to pay taxes, and remains outstanding until used to pay taxes in the form of cash, reserves, and  securities. Treasury securities are nothing more than time deposits of the currency at the central bank.

R: If we don’t need debt do we need money markets?

W: Not for public debt or interbank lending.

R: But aren’t you ignoring the international dimension here?

W: No.

R: You say we don’t need debt but we need the rest of the world. Won’t they just trash our currency instead?

W: What does that mean? Exports are real costs, imports real benefits. Real wealth is about optimizing  real terms of trade.  Currency fluctuations per se don’t alter real wealth.

R: I’m still not convinced. What about the Weimar Republic, Zimbabwe and even Venezuela. Money printing didn’t work so well there, did it?

W: There problems varied. Weimar was about deficit spending for war reparations of approximately 5% of GDP per month and a massive loss of productive capacity. Zimbabwe lost it’s productive capacity, kept govt. spending as before, and the banking system was an open channel for corruption.

R: And what happens to countries that don’t have their own currencies? What does MMT say about them?

W: They are disadvantaged.

R: what about countries who cannot borrow in their own currencies, as many cannot?

W: Example?

R: Given all this, is MMT just some special case with no real use or does it really change the way we should think about the world of economics?

W: It’s the general case and will change how you think only if you don’t already understand  MMT.

R: Convince me: what would a world where the economy was managed as MMT suggests look like? Could I spot the difference, and how?

W: A form of continuous full employment is the likely outcome of understanding the monetary system.

Iruzkinak:

(…)

  1. Jane Ordley says: February 24 2018 at 2:19 pm Would also be informative to have some specificity on the kinds of taxes that would be used to control inflation.
  1. warren mosler says: February 24 2018 at 5:20 pm Hi,
    The currency is a simple public monopoly, as the funds needed to pay taxes (ultimately) come only from the state. Therefore the state is ‘price setter’. Therefore the ‘price level’ is necessarily a function of prices paid by the state when it spends, or collateral demanded when it lends.
    What call ‘inflation’ has come from a variety of sources, such as a foreign monopolist hiking the price of oil, which then gets passed through to most other prices, or currency depreciation- which itself can been due to a variety of factors, including corruption via the banking system- resulting in higher costs of imports and higher prices paid for exports which get passed through to most other prices, etc. In the old days the headline distinction was between those types of ‘cost push inflation’ vs ‘demand pull inflation’. And currently there seems to be a fear that wages are a source of cost push inflation driving the Fed towards higher rates. As a point of logic, however, if the state doesn’t pay the higher prices and doesn’t thereby redefine the value of its currency downward by paying more of it for the same thing, forces come to bear that in general ‘deflate prices’ back what the state is willing to pay.
    The reason for this brings us back to the beginning- the economy needs the states funds to pay its taxes. If the state refuses to pay the higher prices state spending falls leaving the economy without the funds needed to pay taxes, a deflationary condition that can only be reconciled by lowering prices until the state makes its purchases. And I’m not saying this would be ‘good policy’ but only using this example to make the point about the source of the price level.

    Also note that only MMT includes this understanding of the source of the price level.

    This is also written up in my (very short) book- The 7 Deadly Innocent Frauds of Economic Policy which is free online.

    Hope this helps!
    Warren

Gehigarria: ikus, halaber Warren Mosler-ek Richard Murphy-ri DTMz

Beste mandangazale bat (zenbatgarrena?)

«Borondate kolektibo berri bat eraiki behar dugu»

Lehen, aspaldi ez dela, autodeterminazio-eskubidea, behin eta berriz. Orain mandanga, aspertu arte elkarrizketa soil batean!

Nora doa Euskal Herria horrelako ‘estrategekin’ (sic) [Sortuko Orientazio Estrategikorako arduraduna]?

Mon dieu!

Gogoratzekoa: Newspeak (eguneratua)

Hortaz, hona hemen irtenbide ‘estrategiko bakarra: Sei (6) urrats XXI mendean independentista izateko

Zehazki,

(i) Autodeterminazio-eskubidea (AD) martxan jartzea

ADz gogoratu ondoko hau: Autodeterminazio eskubidea: Alfred de Zayas

AD eskubide unibertsala da, eta edozein estatutako ‘lege’ desberdinen gainetik dago, ZAYAS-ek oso argi dioenez: Elkarrizketa De Zayas-i.

Gehigarria:

Self-determination is legal under international law – it’s hypocritical to argue otherwise for Catalonia

(http://theconversation.com/self-determination-is-legal-under-international-law-its-hypocritical-to-argue-otherwise-for-catalonia-86558?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=twitterbutton)

(ii) Autodeterminazio-eskubidea Euskal Herrian

Gasteizko Parlamentuko aldarrikapena abiapuntutzat harturik (Mon dieu! Autodeterminazioa! (2014an!), segida:

Autodeterminazio eskubidea eta Konfederazioa

(iii) ADren erreferendum demokratiko baten bidez Independentzia lortzea

Estrategia garbi edukita, taktika desberdin batzuk erabil daitezke. Kasu, herri- eta herrialde-kontsultak egin ahal dira, nahi diren beste.

Baina autodeterminazio-eskubidearen aldeko erreferenduma bat eta bakarra izango da.

(iv) Euroa erabiliz, euroak gehi Mosler bonoak: ikus Katalunia: eta ekonomian, zer

Hortxe dauka Euskal Herriak, eurogunearen barruan egonez, irtenbide duin bat.

Eredu bat: Bulgaria eta euroa. Mosler bonoak

Bestela, badakizue, EHexit eta EFTA (European Free Trade Association, euskaraz Europako Merkataritza Libreko Erkidegoa), Islandia, Liechtenstein, Norvegia, Suitza eta agian laster Britainia Handia.

Hortaz, hona hemen azken aukera paregabea:

(v) Moneta propioa erabiliz, EHexit delakoan

Eurotik irtetea eta moneta propioa erabiltzen hastea: DTM lau eskematan (euroa eta lira) eta Ongi etorri euskoa!

Beharrezko baldintza: Diru Teoria Modernoaz jabetzea eta bera ongi eta egoki aplikatzea.

Eredua: Islandia: eredurik ereduena

(vi) Gehigarri gisa, DTMz

Warren Mosler: DTMzko zipriztin sendo batzuk

Warren Mosler-ek Richard Murphy-ri DTMz

Richard Murphy: Zergatik DTM? Warren Mosler-ekiko eztabaida

Prest al gaude?

Ala nekatuta gaude?

Ala baldintzak ez dira egokiak?

Ala erabat galduta gaude (PNV-ren atzetik)?

Ibarretxe jaunaren paradisu galdua

Hasierarako, ikus ondokoa:

Santurtzitik (Bizkaia) Santurcera (Puerto Rico)

Segida:

(Sorry, erdara batuan dago)

Luismi UHARTE

Un país en bancarrota y colonizado

(https://www.naiz.eus/eu/hemeroteca/gara/editions/2018-02-24/hemeroteca_articles/un-pais-en-bancarrota-y-colonizado)

Puerto Rico, el último país del continente americano de habla castellana pendiente de independizarse, se encuentra sumergido en una crisis económica descomunal, donde se combinan bancarrota, deuda impagable y una absoluta falta de soberanía económica.

El volumen de la deuda es de tal magnitud que «la deuda ya no es un problema político, es un problema matemático, y no sepuede pagar»

El presente análisis pretende desentrañar las razones históricas y contemporáneas de la catastrófica situación actual del país.

Coloniaje español y yanqui. La presente crisis no se puede entender sin tener en cuenta el legado de más de 500 años de colonialismo español y estadounidense, como nos señalan diferentes economistas del país. Los cuatro siglos de colonia española, hasta 1898, no van a culminar con la independencia, como sí sucedió en Cuba, ya que EEUU se apropiará del país e impondrá un modelo de latifundios de caña de azúcar por toda la isla. La devaluación forzada de la moneda portorriqueña (el peso) permitirá que latifundistas yanquis acaparen la mayoría de las tierras y se proletarice una gran masa de campesinos en condiciones de gran explotación, señala Iván Rodríguez, economista de la Universidad de Puerto Rico (UPR).

Entre finales de los años 30 y principios de los 40, EEUU sustituye el modelo agrícola-cañero por otro de corte industrial y militar. En primer lugar, en el marco de la II Guerra Mundial Roosevelt decide convertir a la isla en un territorio con fines militares. Se instalan bases y se construyen infraestructuras (carreteras, etc) al servicio de estas.

Paralelamente, se impulsa la industrialización bajo un modelo caracterizado por la atracción de empresas extranjeras, a las que se prometía exenciones fiscales, mano de obra barata y mínimos controles ambientales, según Marta Jiménez, economista de la UPR.

De cualquier manera, reconoce Rodríguez, la industrialización trajo aspectos positivos, ya que Puerto Rico pasó de ser un país empobrecido, donde las masas apenas trabajan seis meses al año en la caña, a un territorio industrial, con salarios más altos y mejores condiciones de vida. A esto hay que agregar la inversión en salud pública y educación y el inicio de los programas de asistencia social a los más pobres. Jiménez recuerda que el objetivo de EEUU era que Puerto Rico fuera «la vitrina del Caribe», un ejemplo para América Latina, una alternativa al «peligro comunista».

El político autóctono encargado de liderar este proceso fue Luis Muñoz Marín, gobernador durante 16 años (1948-1964) de la «neocolonia», oficialmente denominada desde 1952 «Estado Libre Asociado» (ELA). José Alameda, catedrático de Economía y consultor, recuerda que Muñoz Marín fue pionero en el endeudamiento del país y que incluso se jactaba de esto cuando repetía con sorna en sus discursos: «¿A qué se debe el progreso? ¡A qué se debe!».

Alameda indica que a fines de los sesenta se impulsa con fuerza un nuevo sector: la industria petroquímica. La importación de petróleo barato venezolano permite refinar el crudo en la isla y su posterior exportación a EEUU. El boom duró poco debido a la crisis de los 70 que disparó los precios, terminando así con la rentabilidad del sector.

Boom farmacéutico. Esto obliga a buscar nuevos nichos de negocio, que van a ser ahora la electrónica y sobre todo las farmacéuticas. De cualquier manera, los principios del modelo siguen siendo los mismos: atracción de empresas con exenciones contributivas. El Gobierno estadounidense aprueba la Sección 936 del Código de Rentas Internas, que en síntesis era una medida fiscal para facilitar la implantación de sus empresas farmacéuticas, y, paralelamente, para promover el negocio bancario. Alameda recuerda que a Puerto Rico le llamaron «la capital mundial de las farmacéuticas». Jiménez señala que la ley permitía que las empresas depositaran sus ganancias en bancos portorriqueños durante diez años y luego poder repatriarlas sin pagar impuestos. En este contexto de fuerte liquidez financiera, los bancos comenzaron a realizar grandes préstamos al sector inmobiliario y a la ciudadanía en general, por lo que en poco tiempo la deuda acumulada fue notable. Se promovió vivir a crédito, otorgando incluso deducciones fiscales a todo aquel que comprara bajo esta modalidad.

Rodríguez puntualiza que era un sector que no generaba un gran volumen de empleo, por lo que los programas de asistencia social tuvieron que ampliarse. Es la época en la que se inicia la alternancia entre los dos partidos dominantes al servicio de la colonia, el Partido Popular Democrático (PPD) fundado por el citado Muñoz Marín, y el Partido Nuevo Progresista (PNP) de orientación claramente anexionista. Tantos unos como otros, fueron creando cada vez más agencias estatales para premiar el clientelismo creciente.

Desde finales de los ochenta y, sobre todo, en los noventa se impulsan las medidas neoliberales más drásticas. Alejandro Torres, abogado y profesor de derecho laboral de la UPR, señala que en primera instancia se crea el «Consejo estratégico de Planificación» con el fin expreso de privatizar un buen número de empresas públicas. Posteriormente, a lo largo de la última década del siglo se desmantela paulatinamente la «legislación de protección laboral». A su vez, se suprimen también las leyes de protección de los pequeños negocios locales.

Es la etapa de la llegada masiva de las grandes superficies comerciales estadounidenses y la desaparición progresiva del comercio autóctono, recuerda Jiménez. De nuevo, la condición colonial de Puerto Rico se evidenció en la denuncia del gigante farmacéutico Walgreens, que llevó al Tribunal Federal de EEUU su «derecho» al libre comercio y ganó la batalla. En poco tiempo, indica Rodríguez, la mitad de las farmacias locales del país desaparecieron.

El colofón de todo esto fue la privatización del sistema de salud (que había sido público, a diferencia del estadounidense). Para la población más empobrecida se inventó una tarjeta de salud para que pudieran acceder a las clínicas privadas. Esto aumentó el gasto sanitario de manera desproporcional y hoy día la gobernación tiene una importante deuda con este sector lucrativo, alerta Rodríguez.

De la 936 a la crisis de la deuda. En 1996, el partido anexionista PNP propone a Clinton que suprima la Sección 936, creyendo así que facilitaría a medio plazo la conversión de Puerto Rico en un nuevo estado de la Unión. Se aprueba un desmontaje progresivo durante una década (1996-2006).

Lo que ocurre a partir de 2006, según Alameda, es que tras el fin de las ventajas impositivas, un buen número de empresas se van, incrementándose el desempleo. A esto hay que agregarle una deuda creciente, por lo que se inicia una etapa de grave recesión.

Ante la crisis fiscal, el Departamento de Hacienda creó el IVU (Impuestos sobre Ventas y Uso), un impuesto al consumo para recaudar dinero de manera desesperada. Sin embargo, el incremento de la deuda continuó hasta terminar estallando. Todos los investigadores consultados coinciden en que se emitió deuda de manera inconstitucional. Alameda recuerda que la Constitución portorriqueña no permite emitir deuda por encima de «un 15% de los recaudos de Hacienda», pero los gobernantes no lo cumplieron. De hecho, crearon una «corporación virtual» llamada COFINA para seguir emitiendo deuda por otra vía. Lo más preocupante, agrega el catedrático, es que la deuda anterior se utilizaba para inversiones, para «mover la economía», mientras que la nueva «se usa para pagar salarios», por lo que no genera más riqueza y su monto se dispara.

Parte de la deuda está relacionada, según Rodríguez, con obra pública que terminó costando mucho más de lo presupuestado. El caso del tren urbano de la capital del país, San Juan, es paradigmático, ya que finalmente el gasto se triplicó. Además, Jiménez denuncia que encima se rescató a la banca y a las empresas constructoras. Todo esto ha llevado a que la deuda sea similar al 100% del PIB. De hecho es muy superior, afirma Rodríguez, ya que a esta hay que agregarle la deuda generada en los planes de pensiones, cifrada en unos 50.000 millones de dólares. El volumen es de tal magnitud, que como sentencia Alameda, «la deuda no es un problema político, es un problema matemático, y no se puede pagar».

¿Estado Libre Asociado? Frente a la bancarrota del país, a mediados de 2016 el Congreso de EEUU aprueba la ley PROMESA (Puerto Rico Oversight Management and Economic Stability Act). La consecuencia más dramática en términos de soberanía, según Torres, es que dicha norma impone una Junta de Control Fiscal que tiene poderes económicos por encima de la Gobernación y el Parlamento portorriqueño. El objetivo fundamental de dicha Junta será priorizar el pago de la deuda a los acreedores.

Alameda precisa que la Junta de Control Fiscal está compuesta por siete miembros de los partidos demócrata y republicano, nombrados por el Congreso estadounidense. Es la instancia máxima para administrar el presupuesto nacional de Puerto Rico y la que ha impuesto recortes para garantizar el pago de la deuda: la reducción de un 10% del salario de los empleados públicos, la supresión de la paga de fin de año y el recorte de las pensiones. En síntesis, la Junta es «la agencia de cobro de los acreedores y si nos tienen que reventar para garantizarles el pago, nos reventarán», afirma categórico Torres.

El carácter colonial de la relación entre Washington y la isla caribeña se muestra por tanto ahora sin filtros. Frente a la actual bancarrota nacional, Alameda indica que «no tenemos ley de quiebra porque somos colonia; hicimos una ley de quiebra local pero fue impugnada por los bonistas en la Corte Federal» y finalmente suspendida.

Paralelamente, la represión antisindical se ha incrementado sustancialmente en la última década, ya que para frenar huelgas obreras amenazan reiteradamente a los sindicatos con quitarles la «certificación» (su estatus legal), denuncia Luis Pedraza, dirigente sindical. Actualmente, hay muchos convenios laborales suspendidos y un incremento de la precariedad laboral, apunta Pedraza.

La válvula de escape, como lo ha sido de manera recurrente desde el inicio de la colonia, es la emigración hacia EEUU, recuerda Rodríguez. Torres estima que entre 350.000 y 400.000 compatriotas se han visto obligados a emigrar. Para un país de poco más de tres millones y medio de habitantes esa es una cifra alarmante.

La reflexión que nos transmite la vicepresidenta del Partido Independentista Portorriqueño (PIP), Lourdes Santiago, es muy clarificadora: «La deuda es un gran problema pero el mayor problema es que el país no tiene un proyecto de desarrollo, y no lo tendrá bajo la colonia».

Irtenbiderako ikus, besteak beste, ondokoak:

Puerto Rico zorretan

Puerto Rico: irtenbiderako bideaz hitz bi

Puerto Rico: mandangaren banderadunaren paradisua?

Ikus, azken linkean ondoko lanak:

(i) Bernie Sanders to unveil a $146 billion1Marshall Plan’ for Puerto Rico2

(ii) Puerto Rico eta lan bermea
The policy experiment that might just save Puerto Rico

Jeff Spross3

Zorra eta Mosler bonoak4

Mosler Bonds are designed to be sufficiently attractive to private investors and ensure the funding of government at very low rates of interest. They’re identical to existing municipal bonds, with one exception. The “default clause” in the bond indenture is replaced by the following statement: “In the event of non payment, principal and interest, which continues to accrue, [the bond] can be used for the payment of taxes to the government.”

In the event of non-payment, investors are not dependent on payments from the government for debt repayment—instead, they’re compensated by reductions of tax payments. Mosler Bonds function as interest-bearing government tax credits. The elimination of default risk dramatically lowers interest rates. They can be used to immediately fund payments of interest and principal on existing debt. Banks and other investors will compete for Mosler Bonds, thereby driving down the interest rate for Bulgaria. The government can issue Mosler Bonds at low rates of interest and fund its public corporations at the same yield. Mosler Bonds are not a substitute for monetary sovereignty, but they’re the smartest funding scheme for currency user governments.

Azken irtenbidea:

  1. Autodeterminazio-eskubidea martxan jartzea

  2. Erreferendum baten bidez Independentzia lortzea

  3. Dolarretik irtetea eta moneta propioa erabiltzen hastea

  4. DTM aplikatzea

Prest al daude Puerto Ricokoak?


Amerikar bilioi bat = mila milioi europar.

 

Zerga-paradisuak itxi behar dira, …

… baina ez zuk uste dituzun arrazoiengatik

Thomas Fazi eta William Mitchell-en Tax havens must be closed, but not for the reasons you think

(https://www.greeneuropeanjournal.eu/tax-havens-must-be-closed-but-not-for-the-reasons-you-think/)

It is commonly believed that tackling tax evasion/avoidance is crucial to the viability of the welfare state and to the sustainability of public finances in Europe. A correct understanding of economics, however, tells a different story.

(i) Ez ote dago dirurik?1

(ii) Mitoak: zergak eta zorra (Richard Murphy tartean)2

(iii) Gobernua ez da familia bat3

(iv) Moneta berriak, gobernua, zergak, diru sormena airetik4

(iv) Behar al dugu aberatsen dirua?5

(v) Euroguneko herrialdeak6

(vi) Inflazioa? Defizit fiskala, Gobernu-gastua eta ekonomiaren egoera7

(vii) Zerga-paradisuak itxi behar dira8

(viii) Aurrerakoien jarrera eta politikariak9

Ondorioak. Zergen helburuak:

(a) Zerga-oinarriaren gaineko kontrola: Gaining a greater control over the tax base would also allow governments to tax high incomes and wealth more efficiently – not with the aim of ‘raising more money’ but of creating a more equitable society.

(b) Moneta jaulkitzaileko gobernuak: This underscores how, for currency-issuing governments, taxation is first and foremost a way to redistribute economic (and therefore political) power between classes, as well as a means to alter the allocation of resources away, for example by encouraging or discouraging certain industries and/or products (think taxes on alcohol or carbon taxes). To conclude: there are very good reasons for closing down tax havens. Financing government spending, however, is not one of them.

(c) Eurogunea kasu berezia da. Gogoratu Eurogunea, Federaziorik eza eta EBZ

Testu-oharrak:

[1] William Mitchell and Warren Mosler, ‘The Imperative of Fiscal Policy for Full Employment’, Australian Journal of Labour Economics, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2002), p. 255.

[2] Interestingly, in 1948, none other than Milton Friedman argued not only that government deficits should sometimes be financed with fiat money, but that they should always be financed in that fashion, on the basis that such a system would provide a surer foundation for a low-inflation regime. More recently, a similar policy has been advocated even by Adair Turner, the former chair of the British Financial Services Authority.

[3] The list also includes a host of other European countries, dependencies or overseas territories: Ireland, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark, Portugal (Madeira), Spain, Malta, Hungary, Liechtenstein, Latvia, Monaco, San Marino, Gibraltar, Andorra, the Turks and Caicos Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, Montserrat and Anguilla.

Bill Mitchell-en gehigarria:

I have written about this issue previously (among other blog posts on the topic):

1. What matters about the Paradise Papers (November 13, 2017)

2. Solving tax avoidance will not cure the Eurozone of stagnation (December 15, 2014).

3. Off-shore tax havens – be sure we define the issues correctly (July 23, 2012)

Gehigarria:

Richard Murphy dela eta,ikus Warren Mosler-ek Richard Murphy-ri DTMz


Ingelesez: “Money does not grow on trees – or does it?

Following the recent disclosure of the so-called Paradise Papers – millions of leaked documents revealing the complex schemes used by the world’s wealthiest individuals and corporations, ranging from the Queen of England to Facebook, to avoid paying taxes – the English-speaking Twittersphere was flooded with messages along the lines of ‘we’ve found the magic money tree, it is in Bermuda!’ (or some other tax haven related to the leak). This was a reference to a controversial statement by British Prime Minister Theresa May a few months earlier on BBC’s Leaders Question Time, when she told a nurse who hadn’t had a pay rise for eight years that “there is no magic money tree” – a variation on the classic ‘there is no money’ argument used since the financial crisis to justify austerity.

May’s comment provoked strong criticisms. Most of these were directed at the Tories’ blatant hypocrisy: i.e., the fact that they were denying wage increases to public sector workers and cutting back on social welfare while giving away billions in tax cuts to high-income-earners and corporations. In this sense, May’s ‘there is no money’ claim was rightly seen by many as an obvious denial of reality: the government was simply refusing to take the money from those who have it. Denying nurses a pay rise was therefore a political choice. Few people, however, challenged the basic premise of May’s statement: that money does not grow on trees.”

2 Ingelesez: “The reason is, quite simply, that most people share this view. It is one of many deeply-rooted myths about how modern monetary systems operate, which relates to the wider belief that governments, like households, are financially constrained and have to ‘fund’ their expenses through taxes or debt. The pervasiveness of this economic misconception is testified by the reaction to the Paradise Papers scandal – and more generally by how the debate about tax havens is framed, especially on the left. Progressives tend to couch the argument about the offshoring of wealth first and foremost in terms of its impact on the domestic tax base (the tax or revenue loss) – and therefore on the budget balance – of ‘source’ countries. A few years back, for example, Richard Murphy, director of Tax Research UK, estimated that tax evasion and tax avoidance together ‘cost’ EU Member States around 1 trillion [1 britainiar trilioi = 1 europar bilioi] euros a year in lost revenues, equal to around 105 per cent of total healthcare spending.

The implication of such analyses is obvious: if only governments could find a way of tackling tax evasion/avoidance and could get their hands on some of that offshore cash, they could afford to spend more – on nurses, for example – and bring their fiscal deficits and public debt under control. As the progressive Twittersphere proclaimed: tax havens are the magic money tree. In his report, Murphy even went as far as writing that ‘tax evasion and tax avoidance undermine the viability of the economies of Europe and have without doubt helped create the … debt crisis that threatens the well-being of hundreds of millions of people across Europe for years to come’ – thus establishing a causal link between offshoring, the European debt crisis, and the related economic and social crisis.”

Ingelesez: “The idea that the savings and tax receipts of the rich are crucial to the viability of the welfare state, and to the ‘sustainability’ of public finances more generally, is a corollary of the aforementioned ‘household budget’ analogy: This idea – peddled by politicians and the media on a constant basis – holds that governments face the same financial constraints as households. As individuals and households, we are painfully aware that we have to earn income before we can spend. Sure, we may borrow to temporarily spend more than we earn, run down savings, or sell assets, but eventually we will have to sacrifice spending to pay back our debts. We intuitively understand that we cannot indefinitely live beyond our means. We have to ‘finance’ every penny we spend and we can quite literally ‘run out of money’. However, the idea that governments face similar limitations is false at the most elemental level.”

Ingelesez: Modern currencies are often called fiat currencies – from the Latin word fiat (‘it shall be’) – because their value is not underpinned by a government promise to redeem them for precious metal. Their value is proclaimed by faith: the government merely announces that a coin is worth, let’s say, a half dollar without holding a reserve of precious metal equal in value to a half dollar. A consequence of the fiat system is that governments that issue their own currencies no longer have to ‘fund’ their spending. Technically, they don’t need to raise money through taxes before they can spend, neither do they need to offset deficits that may arise by issuing debt to the private sector. They can simply create the necessary money ‘out of thin air’. Moreover, flexible exchange rates mean that governments no longer have to constrain their expenditures to meet the central bank requirements to sustain a fixed parity against a foreign currency. This, of course, does not apply to countries that are part of the European Monetary Union – a point we will return to.

In short, currency-issuing governments such as those of Australia, Britain, Japan and the US ,[edo Norvegia. Islandia…¡ , can never ‘run out of money’ or become insolvent. They face no solvency constraint precisely because they face no revenue constraint. These governments always have an unlimited capacity to spend in their own currencies: that is, they can purchase whatever they like, as long as there are goods and services for sale in the currency they issue. This includes the capacity to purchase all idle labour (or to offer a raise to those that are already employed in the public sector). In other words, the magic money tree does exist, but it’s located much closer to home than we think: in each country’s central bank, not on some faraway tropical island.

Ingelesez: “Do we need the rich’s money?

Once we understand how modern currency-issuing states operate, we can also appreciate that the widespread belief that tackling offshoring is necessary to allow governments to provide high-quality services, public infrastructure, and jobs is largely unfounded. “Every pound avoided in tax by the super-rich is a pound desperately needed by our National Health Service, our schools and our caring services” declared the British shadow chancellor John McDonnell in the wake of the Paradise Papers leak. Indeed, in the USA “we find that when tax payments are made to the government in actual cash, the Federal Reserve generally burns the ‘money’. If it really needed the money per se surely it would not destroy it”.[1] Ultimately, this is a dangerous and misguided narrative for progressives to engage in. Not only because it fuels damaging myths about how the economy works, but also because it unwittingly provides governments with the perfect excuse not to meet their obligations to society, by legitimising the premise that this is largely predicated on their ability to tackle tax evasion/avoidance (giving them even more reason not to address the issue). It also elevates the rich and high-income earners to an indispensable status that is unwarranted. Progressives should come to terms with the fact that the incomes and taxes paid by the rich are largely irrelevant to the capacity of a currency-issuing government to provide first-class public services and infrastructure (though this does not in any way mean that taxes are not important, as well shall see).”

Ingelesez: “This does not apply to countries that are part of Eurozone, they effectively use a foreign currency (the euro). Much like a state government in, say, the US or Australia, Eurozone countries borrow in a currency which they don’t control (they can’t set interest rates nor can they roll over the debt with newly issued money and thus, unlike currency-issuing countries that issue debt in their own currency, they are subject to risk of default). As a recent European Central Bank (ECB) report reads “although the euro is a fiat currency, the fiscal authorities of the member states of the euro have given up the ability to issue non-defaultable debt”. Thus, the spending capacity of euro area countries is indeed largely reliant on tax revenues (and on the goodwill of the ECB) and their ability to issue debt to the private markets. This situation “is reminiscent of the situation of emerging economies that have to borrow in a foreign currency”, Paul De Grauwe noted a few years back.

However, this is not because of some intrinsic economic law but because of a purely self-imposed constraint: Eurozone membership. Any serious discussion concerning the tackling of tax evasion/avoidance for fiscal reasons necessarily needs to be framed within a wider debate on the monetary union. Supporters of such a course of action should bear the onus of explaining why this is a better option for countries aiming to improve their public services rather than, say, regaining their monetary sovereignty and thus the capacity to spend irrespective of revenues. However, the taxes-do-not-fund-spending logic does apply to the Eurozone as a whole. The ECB, like any other central bank, does not face financial constraints of any sort, and could easily support the spending requirements of Eurozone countries – or of a yet-to-be-created ‘European treasury’ – by creating the necessary funds out of thin air (as it already does in the context of quantitative easing, to the tune of 30 billion euro per month). The obstacles to reforming the ECB’s role in relation to public spending are political, not technical, as discussed elsewhere. [Ikus Is The Left Finally Waking Up To Eurozone Realities?: https://www.socialeurope.eu/left-finally-waking-eurozone-realities#comment-3652256987]”

Ingelesez: “It is commonly believed that financing government spending through a fiscal deficit rather than through taxes is inherently inflationary – even more so if the deficit is financed directly by the central bank rather than by the private sector. In reality, fiscal deficits do not carry any intrinsic inflationary risk. Instead, it is government spending itself that carries such a risk, regardless of how such spending is financed – by raising taxes, issuing debt to the private sector, or issuing debt to the central bank. Indeed, all spending (private or public) is inflationary if it drives nominal aggregate spending faster than the real capacity of the economy to absorb it. In other words, the government taking money sitting idle under someone’s mattress and spending it in the economy carries exactly the same inflationary risk as the central bank creating that money out of thin air and giving it to the government to spend. What matters, from an inflationary perspective, is the government’s capacity to spend responsibly, without overheating the economy.

However, it is often overlooked that private spending is just as inflationary as (if not more inflationary than) government spending. The current system allows private banks to create (out of thin air, just like central banks) most of the digital money in circulation through loans, which create deposits and liquidity that can be spent. This freedom gives banks the power to engineer credit-driven booms at will, which in turn leads to soaring prices (especially in the housing market), as we saw in the run-up to the financial crisis.[2]

Ingelesez: “So should we close down tax havens? Yes!

Of course, none of means that the offshoring of wealth is not serious problem and shouldn’t be urgently addressed. There are very good reasons for tackling tax evasion/avoidance and closing down tax havens, and for collecting more taxes in general; however, these have little to do with the financing of public expenditure (with the possible exception of the Eurozone). They largely have to do with social justice, inequality and the distribution of political power. It is a well-established fact that today’s soaring levels of inequality – which have returned to levels of over a century ago – represent a grave economic and social problem. As acknowledged even by the International Monetary Fund (here and here), inequality hampers growth (“when the rich get richer, benefits do not trickle down”, one IMF study notes, consigning decades of trickle-down propaganda to the dustbin of history), exacerbates financial instability, erodes social cohesion, and leads to political polarisation. Even more importantly, various studies show that extreme inequality represents a threat to democracy itself. Allowing a small minority to amass obscene amounts of wealth leads them to wield disproportionate influence and power, and allows them to capture to legislative process and push through laws that further cement their power and influence. As Branko Milanovic writes, the “higher the inequality, the more likely we are to move away from democracy toward plutocracy”. Tax havens and offshoring, by facilitating the concentration of wealth, exacerbate the problem of inequality. For this reason they should be shut down.”

Ingelesez: “If that is the aim, however, progressives should be clear about the fact that this does not require some all-encompassing international agreement. This is just another smokescreen. A cursory glance at the world’s leading tax havens shows many lie within the direct legislative jurisdiction of nations such as the US and the UK (which themselves are tax havens). Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Guernsey, Jersey and, the Isle of Man – all major tax havens – are all British dependencies or overseas territories. Moreover, according to the Tax Justice Network, many of the world’s largest and most secretive tax havens – Switzerland, Luxembourg, Germany, the UK, Belgium, Austria, Cyprus – are located in Europe (and, with the exception of Switzerland, are part of the European Union).[3] The conclusion is obvious: if politicians were serious about the issue of tax evasion/avoidance and offshoring they could do something about it with a stroke of their legislative pens.

It is often argued that the EU, by establishing free capital mobility among its members, has forced countries to engage in tax competition with each other, since these have little choice but to lower their corporate tax rates if they want to attract foreign direct investment. This argument prompts the conclusion that the only viable solution to tax avoidance and declining corporate tax rates is to ‘harmonise’ tax rates across Europe. However, various studies (see here and here) have found a negligible relationship between foreign direct investment and low(er) corporate tax rates, finding a much more significant relationship to things like labour costs, skill levels, infrastructure quality, and political stability. This would appear to disprove the oft-heard claim that there is little individual countries can do to tackle tax avoidance.

Egia borobilak

El suïcidi d’Esquerra

Bernat Dedéu

(https://www.elnacional.cat/ca/opinio/bernat-dedeu-suicidi-esquerra_241119_102.html)

Per aquelles curiositats de la vida, els catalans estem processant a comptagotes la veritat sobre els preparatius de l’1-O i la no aplicació del referèndum gràcies a la (tan prevaricadora com tossuda) tasca del jutge Pablo Llarena, que no només ha resultat ser el braç polític de la repressió judicial amb què Rajoy, Sánchez i Rivera pretenen silenciar l’independentisme, sinó també un dels nostres grans informers. Dilluns passat, sense anar més lluny, Marta Rovira tornava a insistir en el fet que demanà a Carles Puigdemont que aturés la votació el migdia de l’1-O, tot just quan les imatges de la policia colpejant salvatgement la població començaven a viatjar a tots els grups de whatsapp del país. La cosa té certa gràcia, perquè fins ara i sotto voce, eren els piuladors clandestins d’Esquerra qui et contaven irats com fou el PDeCAT qui va pretendre tocar la corneta de la retirada el matí del referèndum no aplicat, per por que la violència augmentés radicalment durant el dia.

El jutge Llarena s’ho deu passar pipa veient com els independentistes no només es desacrediten davant dels seus electors (admetent que ni havien pensat a aplicar el referèndum ni tenien cap mena de preparació efectiva per, si més no, intentar-ho; la qual cosa, dit sigui de pas, no és només una estratègia de defensa), sinó també admirant com els partits catalans juguen a un sálvese quien pueda on tothom afirma haver estat el primer a avisar el Molt Honorable 130 que el procés s’havia d’aturar per tornar-lo al cau tranquil i estèril de la legalitat espanyola. Així Marta Pascal, ai las, que declarant al Suprem semblava tan convençuda del seu marc legal com si ella mateixa hagués escrit l’article vuitè de la Constitució del 78: ni els estrafolaris jacobins de VOX, pobrets meus, van gosar demanar fiança per a la colíder convergent. Llarena, insisteixo, deu pregar perquè el judici s’eternitzi.

Esquerra creu ingènuament que només arribarà a regnar en el món de l’independentisme si modera el llenguatge dels seus líders i així guanya temps i aire amb la conegudíssima excusa d’eixamplar la base social del secessionisme. Però si continua per aquest camí, el partit republicà no només no serà hegemònic en termes electorals a Catalunya (on el predomini del moderantisme, les veritats a mitges i el sí-però-no el té apamadíssim el món convergent), sinó que acabarà espedaçat en lluites internes com així li ha passat al PDeCAT. En comptes d’escriure cartes sobre l’amor des d’Estremera, Junqueras faria bé de lluitar i fer tot el possible perquè el Parlament escollís el candidat que van votar els catalans i posar-se a disposició d’un nou govern Puigdemont, que és —ara per ara— l’única incomoditat que pot incomodar les marmòries estructures de poder espanyol.

Al seu torn, Rovira només podrà continuar essent una líder independentista amb credibilitat si reivindica com ella mateixa va estar en contra de suspendre la declaració d’independència i va enfrontar-se directament i forçuda a Junqueras quan el vicepresident es va posar de perfil quan el Govern renuncià a la unilateralitat. Fent-se la moderada i escudant-se novament en la violència de l’Estat, Rovira no només està justificant que l’independentisme reculi davant l’amenaça de força bruta espanyola (que és justament allò que els ciutadans no van fer l’1-O, mostrant un coratge que encara fa tremolar), sinó que deixa Esquerra exposada al suïcidi innecessari de convertir el seu partit en una cosa pujolista. Dit això, esperem que en les properes setmanes siguin els nostres polítics qui ens diguin la veritat: perquè tenir-la via un jutge espanyol fa una certa vergonya aliena.

Horrelako egia borobilak behar ditugu gure EH maitean.

Baina hemen dena da pazientzia, isilik egotea, nekatuta gaudela (sic), baldintzak ez direla egokiak (re-sic) (agian frankismopean baldintzak ‘hobeak’ ziren, edo eta Franco eta geroko urte luzeetako kondizioak,… nork daki!!!!).

Non dago pentsamendu kritikoa?

Are sinpleagoa: non dago pentsamendua? Ba ote dago pentsamendu politikorik?

Warren Mosler-i buruz

2011koa: MMT: A Doubly Retrospective Analysis

(in DTM: hasiera eta bilakaera)

2013koa:

Randall Wray-k Warren Mosler-i buruz

2016koa:

Randall Wray-k DTM-ren historia

Segida:

Stephanie Kelton-ek Mosler-i buruz:

Stephanie Kelton: Some History of Modern Money Theory

Professor Stephanie Kelton giving some history of Modern Monetary Theory, and particularly the story of Warren Mosler attempting to get economists to pay attention to his ideas.

Bideoa: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9MiCxVrZgk

Anna Gabriel: bide berriak irekitzen

(i) Joaquín Urias‏ @jpurias

(https://twitter.com/jpurias/status/965911676980727813)

Lo que hace Anna Gabriel es convertir una mera declaración judicial en un problema internacional. Ahora, si el juez Llarena quiere imputarla tendrá que esperar más de un año a que Suiza la extradite ?. Pedirá asilo y Suiza examinará las actuaciones contra el procès.

2018 ots. 20

(ii) Olivier Peter, un advocat per a Anna Gabriel coneixedor dels abusos de l’estat Espanyol

Aquest jove advocat suís s’ha especialitzat en la defensa del drets humans al Tribunal d’Estrasburg

(https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/olivier-peter-un-advocat-per-a-anna-gabriel-coneixedor-dels-abusos-de-lestat-espanyol/)

(iii) Dirigents socialistes suïssos donen suport a Anna Gabriel

El diputats Mathias Reynard i la regidora Amanda Gavilanes asseguren que cal defensar els drets de Gabriel

(https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/un-diputat-socialista-suis-dona-tot-el-suport-a-gabriel/)

(iv) La CUP opta per un torcebraç amb Espanya com a estratègia jurídica

La CUP explica que amb el cas d’Anna Gabriel, vol internacionalitzar el procés i desafiar jurídicament l’estat espanyol

(https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/la-cup-planteja-una-estrategia-juridica-de-torcebrac-amb-espanya/)

(v) Catalan politician Anna Gabriel defies court summons

Catalan pro-independence politician Anna Gabriel has said she will not go before a court in Madrid this week.

(http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43126789)

(vi) Les armes jurídiques que Anna Gabriel pot fer servir des de Suïssa contra Espanya

Suïssa denega les peticions d’extradició si són per delictes polítics, i autoritza peticions d’asil i de refugiat

(https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/les-armes-juridiques-que-anna-gabriel-pot-utilitzar-des-de-suissa-contra-espanya/)

(vii) Suïssa, un país sensible a les reivindicacions catalanes

L’exili d’Anna Gabriel a Ginebra ha tornat a posar Suïssa al taulell de joc del procés d’independència

(https://www.vilaweb.cat/noticies/suissa-un-pais-sensible-a-les-reivindicacions-catalanes/)

Zaldieroa

Autodeterminazio-eskubidearen aurkako errepresioa

Jornada‏ @DiariJornada

(https://twitter.com/DiariJornada/status/965871272394739712)

Dades sobre la repressió de l’Estat contra l’independentisme, en una setmana plena de citacions al Tribunal Suprem. Aquests dijous publiquem una entrevista a la directora de litigis d’@centre_IRIDIA, @Anais_Franquesa, i a l’advocat Eduardo Cáliz (@Edi_III) d’@AlertaSolidaria

2018 ots. 20