Mandanga: sasi-ziaboga ala kezko pantaila hutsa?

Hona hemen kazetari batek Ibarretxeren sasi-ziaboga esplikatu nahi duelarik: Juan Jose Ibarretxe.  Independentzia komeni litzatekeela esateraino (in Bidaide subiranistak | Berria.eus).

Hori guztia (eta agian gehiago) kazetari horrek irensteko prest badago, haren kontua da. Irensteko ‘eskubidea’ dauka, noski: ‘derecho a decidir!‘, argi eta garbi.

Apo eta suge horiek irensteko prest ez gaudenok, aldiz, zuzen, inongo ziabogarik gabe, nazioartean onartuta dagoen autodeterminazio eskubidea aplikatu nahi dugu.

Gaia oso argia da:

20 independentzia referendum azken 43 urteetan

Autodeterminazio eskubidea: zertan datzan

Autodeterminazio eskubideaz lau hitz

Brexit eta autodeterminazioa

AEBn batzuek badakite autodeterminazioa (self-determination) zer den

Erdia gehi bat

Autodeterminazioa = Demokrazia

RUI: zipriztinak

Euskal Herria: 25 urte galduta

Ideia argiak eta kontzeptu kaxkarrak

RUI (ideia argiak) (11)

Autodeterminazio eskubidea eta Konfederazioa

Autodeterminazioa ala ‘alter-determinazioa’?

Autodeterminazio eskubideaz Europan

Irudiak (Mandangaz eta Adz)

Autodeterminazioa eztabaidagai Bruselan

Autodeterminazioa eztabaidagai Bruselan (gehigarri berezia)

ICEC-ren albisteak: Venice adierazpena

eta

Autodeterminazio referendum bat beti da legala

Nahiko ote?

Katalunia: referendumaren paktua, zer den eta zer ez den

 Jordi Graupera@JordiGraupera1

El manifest del referèndum pactat de nou renuncia al dret a l’autodeterminació i entra en el fals debat legalista: https://pactepelreferendum.cat/pdf/manifest-ca.pdf …

2017 ots. 22

MANIFEST PACTE NACIONAL PEL REFERÈNDUM2

… Entre els drets essencials i inalienables de les societats democràtiques, es reconeix el de decidir el seu futur polític. I és aquest dret el que sustenta la demanda d’una majoria de ciutadanes i ciutadans de Catalunya, que volen materialitzar-lo mitjançant un referèndum.

Posem de manifest que la voluntat d’expressió de les catalanes i dels catalans mitjançant un referèndum és majoritària i transversal; i congruent amb la determinació cívica, pacífica i democràtica que han expressat les multitudinàries mobilitzacions de la societat organitzada a favor del seu dret a decidir. (…)”

Jordi Graupera@JordiGraupera

És un manifest que desemboca en eleccions autonòmiques, que es fixa en el que no “es pot fer” i que manté el vocabulari buit de contingut:

Jordi Graupera@JordiGraupera

No és el dret a decidir és el Dret a l’Autodeterminació. Auto. Determinació. Deixeu de posar el pes sobre els espanyols. És immoral.

Jordi Graupera@JordiGraupera

@JordiColomines Serveix per marejar la perdiu i fer creure la gent que es treballa per una cosa quan s’obre el camp per una altra.

Alegia, alde batetik mandanga, aka ‘derecho a decidir’, eta bestetik autodeterminazioa.

Bi bide desberdin, bi proiektu ezberdin, bi kontzeptu antagoniko, malgré Ibarretxe eta euskal progre guztiak.

Mandanga delakoak helburu zehatza dauka: “Serveix per marejar la perdiu i fer creure la gent que es treballa per una cosa quan s’obre el camp per una altra.”

Gogoratu ondoko link hau: J. J. Ibarretxe eta A. Mas jaunak

Aurrera joan ahal izateko, ICEC-koek (International Commission of European Citizens – Working together for democracy and Self-Determination, icec.ngo) oso argi daukate zer nahi duten:

Hortaz, gure esku dago, zer?: Gure Esku Dago: zer?


EBZ ez litzateke bilakatuko agente fiskal

Bill Mitchell-en The ECB should not become a fiscal agent1

(i) Sarrera2

(ii) Mitchell-en ikuspuntua3

(iii) Eskutitza4

(iv) Frank Van Lerven5

(v) Mario Draghi-ren erantzuna6

(vi) Draghi eta ‘helikoptero dirua’7

(vii) ‘Helikoptero dirua’ eta Lisboako Akordioa8

(viii )Beste galdera bat EBZ-ri9

(ix) Draghi-ren erantzun berria10

(x) Jarduera monetarioa ala fiskala?11

(xi) QE for people, QE jendearentzat12

(xii) Jeremey Corbin eta PQE13

(xiii) QE for peple delakoaren iritzia14

(xiv) EBZ-ren eskutitzak dioena15

(xv) EBZ eta Akordioa16

(xvi) QE eta PQE17

(xvii) Quantitative easing (QE)18

(xviii) Bankugintza: mailegatzea19

(xix) QE eta ez-gobernuko sektoreko aktibo finantzarioen egoera20

(xx) PQE ez da QE21

(xxi) EBZ eta jarduera monetarioak eta fiskalak22

(xxii) EBZ-rako proposamena23

(xxiii) EBZ eta QE24

(xxiv) DTM, helikoptero jaurtiketa25

(xxv) Kezko pantaila eta Eurolandia26

(xxvi) EBZ eta hiritarrei egindako transferrak27

Ondorioak

(1) Nor izan behar da politika ekonomikoaren arduraduna?28

(2) Banku zentrala ezin da eragiketa fiskalen arduraduna izan29

(3) Hobeto Europako Batasun Monetarioko logika osoari desafio egitea30

Gogoratu ondoko linkak:

PQE (politika fiskala) eta QE (politika monetarioa)

Likidezia monetarioa(ren operazioak) eta politika fiskala(ren parte hartzea)

EBZ, Draghi, tasa negatiboak eta politika fiskala

Politika fiskalerako denbora

Politika monetarioa efektiboa izateko, batera lan egin behar du politika fiskalarekin

Ekonomialariek eta politikariek ez dute ikasi nahi

Inflazioa eta politika monetarioa


2 Ingelesez: “On November 29, 2016, Mario Draghi, the President of the ECB wrote to Mr Jonás Fernández, a Spanish European Parliament member in reply to a request for clarification from the Chairman of the EP’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON). The Letter discussed whether it would be legal under the Lisbon Treaty for the ECB to engage in direct monetary transfers to citizens bypassing the Member States and whether such a policy would be beneficial for economic growth. Several commentators have seized on the response from the ECB as saying that such a policy innovation would be both legal and beneficial.”

3 Ingelesez: “My view is that, in forming this conclusion, they have not fully understood the difference between a monetary and a fiscal operation. While I think the policy would produce positive results, in the sense that it would stimulate growth and employment and reduce unemployment, I also believe it would be illegal under the Treaty. Further, I don’t think it is a progressive position to argue that a group of unelected and unaccountable technocrats in the central bank should be in charge of economic policy. That should be the responsibility of the democratically-elected members of the government who are fully accountable every electoral cycle. The ECB should not become a fiscal agent. Rather, if the Eurozone elites cannot implement (which they cannot) a full federal treasury function then it should disband the monetary union in an orderly way.

4 Ingelesez: “The letter trail began on July 28, 2016, when Mr Jonás Fernández and Dutch MEP Paul Tang posed a question (Z-000081/2016) to the ECB – ECB-financed capital allocation for eurozone citizens – which required a written answer.

In that letter, Fernández and Tang explicitly asked the ECB to comment on statements made by Frank Van Lerven (a prominent Positive Money proponent and associated with QE for the People) that:

It would be more effective … if the money intended for each NCB [national central bank] to conduct QE [quantitative easing] were divided equally amongst all citizens. In effect, the money that would have been created through QE would be paid directly into people’s bank accounts and would put additional purchasing power directly into people’s pockets. This increased purchasing power should translate into increased consumer spending, which would lead to higher incomes, a rise in output of goods and services as well as reduce unemployment.

As an aside, I agree with the statement but more on that later.”

5 Ingelesez: “Frank Van Lerven was then quoted in the Letter as saying that such a move by “the ECB would not actually be breaking any EU laws”.

The MEPs wanted to know if the ECB agreed with the legal view that direct transfers to Eurozone citizens from the ECB would be consistent with the ECB’s Treaty obligations and whether the ECB thought that such a policy innovation would be beneficial to the real economy of the Eurozone.

6 Ingelesez: “Mario Draghi replied on September 19, 2016 – Letter from the ECB President to Mr Fernández and Mr Tang, MEPs, on monetary policy – where he said:

The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) … held that the ECB must act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by primary EU law, have a legitimate objective of monetary policy, and use its available instruments for the purpose of implementing that policy. Any monetary policy measures adopted must also be proportionate to the objective of that policy and observe the prohibition on monetary financing laid down in Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

So Chapter and Verse of the official Eurozone line about the ECB and the Treaties. No direct funding of Member State fiscal deficits.”

7 Ingelesez: “Draghi also noted that the proposal outlined in the MEP’s Letter referred to “helicopter money”, which he had addressed in an earlier letter – Letter from the ECB President to Fabio De Masi, MEP, on monetary policy – on April 18, 2016.

He referred Fernández and Tang to that response.

Fabio De Masi, a German MEP on the Left had posed the question (Z-000023/2016) to the ECB – Helicopter money/citizens’ dividend:

1. Is the ECB considering unconventional policy measures, such as ‘helicopter money’ or a citizens’ dividend, i.e. where the ECB would directly pay money to residents of eurozone Member States to stimulate private demand?

2. Are such measures in accordance with the ECB’s mandate (regardless of whether or not they are currently being considered)?

3. Would such measures provide a sufficient economic boost to push inflation rates towards the ECB’s target?

So, the later question in November 2016 from Fernández and Tang was essentially asking the same thing, hence Draghi’s deference to his earlier response.

In his Letter to De Masi, Draghi wrote that the current policy suite adopted by the ECB was “working” and added that:

Helicopter money means different things to different people, but all these schemes are fraught with complexities from accounting, operational, and legal perspectives, especially as regards compatibility with Article 123 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.“

8 Ingelesez: “In other words, Draghi considers that helicopter money (whatever it is) would violate Article 123 of the Lisbon Treaty (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), which says:

1. Overdraft facilities or any other type of credit facility with the European Central Bank or with the central banks of the Member States (hereinafter referred to as ‘national central banks’) in favour of Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of Member States shall be prohibited, as shall the purchase directly from them by the European Central Bank or national central banks of debt instruments.

2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply to publicly owned credit institutions which, in the context of the supply of reserves by central banks, shall be given the same treatment by national central banks and the European Central Bank as private credit institutions.”

9 Ingelesez: “Apparently, not satisfied with that answer, Mr Jonás Fernández pushed ahead. On November 15, 2016, he posed a further question (Z-000107/2016) to the ECB (Extending the LTRO programme to households) which required a written answer.

He sought to clarify what Mario Draghi had meant in his April Letter to Fabio De Masi about helicopter money.

Explicitly, Fernández asked:

Since Article 123(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) forbids lending to EU and Member State bodies and public sector companies, it is clear that direct lending to Eurozone households through the LTRO programme, for example, is not within the scope of this prohibition, since private citizens cannot, with all certainty, be considered in any way public entities.

Can the ECB President therefore explain what the ‘legal complexity’ of the said monetary policy option is in connection with Article 123(1) of the TFEU?

10 Ingelesez: “Draghi’s response (November 29, 2016) – Letter from the ECB President to Mr Fernández, MEP, on monetary policy – noted that:

1. “helicopter money as an instrument of monetary policy has never been discussed by the Governing Council.”

2. He once again referred Fernández to his reply to Fabio De Masi (as above).

3. On the legal issue (compatibility with the Treaty, he wrote:

While the governments of euro area countries would not be the direct recipients of a cash transfer involved in such a scheme, legal complexities could still arise if the scheme could be seen as the ECB financing an obligation of the public sector vis-à-vis third parties, as this would also violate the prohibition of monetary financing. In order to determine what constitutes a form of financing of the public sector’s obligations vis-à-vis third parties, an assessment has to be made of whether the task concerned is a central bank or a government task, i.e. a task falling within the responsibility of the Member State institutions mentioned in Article 123 of the Treaty.

Draghi finished by claiming that “the transmission of our monetary policy measures is proving to be very effective” and that there was no need for additional measures, such as “helicopter money”.

11 Ingelesez: “So the legalities come down to an assessment of whether a direct transfer of ECB funds to Eurozone citizens was a monetary operation or a fiscal operation. If it was deemed to be the former then it would be legal under Article 123. If the latter, then clearly not.

12 Ingelesez: “The QE for People group waded in claiming this interchange as some sort of victory.

On December 3, 2016 they wrote a blog – ECB confirms ‘helicopter money’ is legally feasible under conditions – where they cite Draghi’s November 29, 2016 Letter (above) as evidence that the ECB could hand out money directly to citizens of the Eurozone under Article 123.

QE for People is a group that considers the current QE program of the ECB to be “an ineffective and unfair response to the financial crisis” (Source).

Instead, they “propose an alternative form of QE which would make sure money is spent into the real economy and benefits those that need it the most. We call this concept ‘Quantitative Easing for People’.”

13 Ingelesez: “The same terminology came up when Jeremy Corbyn was campaigning to take over leadership of the British Labour Party. At the time, I wrote this blog about the proposal – PQE is sound economics but is not in the QE family.

Other blogs of relevance:

1. OMF – paranoia for many but a solution for all.

2. ECB should start funding government infrastructure and cash handouts.

3. Helicopter money is a fiscal operation and is not inherently inflationary.

4. Keep the helicopters on their pads and just spend.

5. Quantitative easing 101.

My opinion hasn’t changed since I wrote those blogs.

14 Ingelesez: “The QE for People think the ECB Letter means that “helicopter money must be framed as a monetary policy tool if it is to be legally implemented in the Eurozone” – that is, a “central bank task” (relating to monetary policy).

The spokesperson for QE for People wrote:

This clearly is the core question, but in fact the letter shows that the ECB already knows the answer: if a helicopter money programme is independently designed, decided and implemented by the ECB for the purpose of price stability, then clearly it is a monetary policy task.

I disagree.

15 Ingelesez: “The ECB letter does not say that helicopter money is legal under the Treaty. What it says is that the matter would come down to “whether the task is concerned is a central bank or a government task”.

That is, whether it is a monetary policy action or a fiscal action.

It is all very well to claim that because it is the central bank doing something, that that means it is a monetary policy action.

16 Ingelesez: “The ECB has been getting around the Treaty for years (since May 2010 when it instituted the Securities Market Program) by claiming that its massive bond purchase program in the secondary markets was to facilitate its liquidity management operations.

First, the scale of the bond buying exceeded any reasonable estimate of open market operation requirements by a considerable margin.

Second, the ECB was paying (through its standing facilities) interest on the excess reserves anyway, thereby avoiding the need to maintain its (low) interest rate target with bond sales. So it was creating the excess reserves through bond purchases and then paying income on those reserves – the latter being a fiscal action.

The QE program that the ECB embarked on in 2010 was clearly a fiscal action designed to keep bond investors happy and buying debt from troubled governments (for example, Italy) in the primary market to avoid a Member State becoming insolvent. The investors knew they would be able to quickly off load the debt at a profit in the secondary market courtesy of the ECB’s QE program.

The fact that the European Commission (and Council) turned a blind eye to it just tells us that the elites in Europe will do anything to defend their position.

So the ECB can clearly engage in fiscal actions, given the flawed way in which the monetary union was designed and implemented. It has been playing the role of federal fiscal agency for several years now.

As I wrote in the blog cited above (PQE is sound economics but is not in the QE family), it is highly misleading to conflate the current practice of quantitative easing, where the central bank swaps bank reserves for financial assets such as government and corporate bonds (purchased in the secondary market) with the proposal known as helicopter money.”

17 Ingelesez: “While it sounds rather cute to call QE the policy for the banksters and elites and QE for the people (PQE), the two concepts are not akin.

Why is that?

PQE involves the central bank, which is one part of the consolidated government sector, the other being the treasury, using the currency-issuing capacity of the government to facilitate the purchase of real goods and services to build productive infrastructure or, alternatively, to provide direct transfers to citizens.

I think that PQE is an excellent strategy for any currency-issuing government to introduce. It exploits the currency-issuing capacity of the government directly and uses it to increase the potential of the economy to improve well-being.

But, the policy proposal should never have been called PQE because it is not similar at all to Quantitative Easing and the false analogy only opens the proposal to further, unwarranted criticism.

So the language is all wrong because the underlying economics is not fully articulated.

PQE is really just deficit spending without issuing debt whether it be on infrastructure or something else.”

18 Ingelesez: “First, Quantitative Easing (QE) is a monetary operation that can be distilled down to being asset swap – bank reserves for a government bond.

Under QE, the central banks bids up the price of government bonds in the secondary markets, which forces yields (interest rates) down, given the inverse relationship between the effective yield and the price of the bond in fixed coupon assets.

Therefore, the only way it can impact positively on aggregate spending is if the lower interest rates it brings in the maturity range of the bond being bought stimulates borrowing and spending.

The problem is that borrowing is a function of aggregate spending itself (and expectations of where demand is heading) and if unemployment is persisting at high levels and governments are imposing harsh net spending cuts, the sentiment that might lead to increased borrowing is absent – lower interest rates notwithstanding.

QE is based on a false premise – that the banks need reserves before they can lend and that quantitative easing provides those reserves.

Mainstream macroeconomics create the illusion that a bank is an institution that accepts deposits to build up reserves and then on-lends them at a margin to make money. The conceptualisation suggests that if it doesn’t have adequate reserves then it cannot lend. So the presupposition is that by adding to bank reserves, quantitative easing will help lending.

19 Ingelesez: “This is clearly an incorrect depiction of how banks operate in the real world. Bank lending is not ‘reserve constrained’. Banks lend to any credit worthy customer they can find and then worry about their reserve positions afterwards.

If they are short of reserves (their reserve accounts have to be in positive balance each day and in some countries central banks require certain ratios to be maintained) then they borrow from each other in the interbank market or, ultimately, they will borrow from the central bank through the so-called discount window. They are reluctant to use the latter facility because it carries a penalty (higher interest cost).

The point is that building bank reserves will not increase the bank’s capacity to lend. Loans create deposits which generate reserves.

Please read the following blog – Building bank reserves will not expand credit – for further discussion.

Bank lending is never constrained by a lack of reserves.”

20 Ingelesez: “Second, QE does not change the net financial asset position of the non-government sector. This is a crucial point. It is an asset swap. The non-government sector just rearranges is wealth portfoliomore cash, less bonds. No net change.

That is the essence of a – monetary policy operation – which alters the liquidity in the economy. It does it by portfolio swaps and in doing so influences the interest rates and the term structure.”

21 Ingelesez: “Third, PQE is not QE because it is a fiscal operation – as is any so-called ‘helicopter drop’. What does that mean?

PQE (like a helicopter drop) would increase the net financial assets in the non-government sector because it would increase national income (via spending on infrastructure).

That is the hallmark of a fiscal operation.”

22 Ingelesez: “In deciding whether the ECB would contravene Article 123, the matter would be decided on understanding the intrinsic differences between a monetary operation and a fiscal operation, not whether the central bank was involved or not, or not whether it was acting independently or not.

The flawed structure of governmental institutions (treasuries and central banks) in the Eurozone mean that the distinction between these operations is even more important given the centrality of the ECB in the EMU and the absence of any federal treasury function.”

23 Ingelesez: “It is clear that the proposal for the ECB to directly hand out euros to Eurozone citizens (a policy that has merit) would be a fiscal operation, which would normally, if the structures were sound, be done through a government agency, even though the central bank would be involved as the government’s bank.

The spending (direct transfers) would boost the bank deposits of the recipients (the citizens), which increases their net financial assets or net worth.

Their banks would then have more reserves and matching liabilities (the citizen deposits).”

24 Ingelesez: “Under QE, the central bank buys a bond in exchange for a bank deposit. The Assets of the bond holder would be unchanged but altered in composition (more cash less bonds). For the bank of the bond holder, deposits rise (liabilities) as do assets (reserve balances).

The essential difference is in terms of the impact on the net wealth of the non-government sector. QE leaves that position unchanged, whereas PQE increase net wealth via the net spending effects.”

25 Ingelesez: “From the perspective of Modern Monetary Theory (MMT), a helicopter drop is equivalent to an increase in the fiscal deficit in the sense that new financial assets are created and the net worth of the non-government sector increases.

It occurs when the government uses its currency-issuing capacity (linking treasury spending to central bank operations) without matching its deficit spending with debt-issues to the non-government sector.

So the central bank adds some numbers to the treasury’s bank account to match its spending plans and in return may be given treasury bonds to an equivalent value.

Instead of selling debt to the private sector, the treasury simply sells it to the central bank, which then creates new funds in return.”

26 Ingelesez: “This accounting smokescreen is, of course, unnecessary. The central bank doesn’t need the offsetting asset (government debt) given that it creates the currency ‘out of thin air’. So the swapping of public debt for account credits is just an accounting convention.

In the Eurozone case, the matter would become even more simple because there is no federal treasury although the meaning of the term ‘fiscal deficit’ becomes blurred.”

27 Ingelesez: “The ECB would in effect be deficit spending if it started to hand out direct transfers to citizens. It wouldn’t be accounted for in that way, but in terms of meaning and intent, that is the nature of the helicopter transfer, because it injects new net financial assets into the non-government sector and directly stimulates aggregate spending.

That is why:

1. I would not start an organisation called QE for People and have as my main policy – helicopter drops (or OMF).

2. I think the Court of Justice of the European Union would see through the bluster and understand the difference between a monetary operation and a fiscal operation and declare the proposal as being consistent with the latter.

3. The whole design of the Eurozone is dysfunctional and explains why the bloc is in such a parlous state some 9 years after the GFC started to manifest.”

28 Ingelesez: “The discussion also raises questions of who who should be in charge of economic policy the democratically-elected members of the government who are fully accountable every electoral cycle or a group of unelected and unaccountable technocrats in the central bank.”

29 Ingelesez: “Clearly, proposing that the central bank take over fiscal operations because the Member State governments are constrained by ridiculous fiscal rules doesn’t appear to be a very progressive position to take.

30 Ingelesez: “It would be better to challenge the whole logic of the EMU than to give further fiscal capacities to the unelected ECB board.

Autodeterminazio eskubidea Kataluniarentzat

Enric Vila@enricvd1

Més gent que diu coses normals sobre l’autodeterminació amb la lengua del imperio.

2017 ots. 16

Gehigarriak:

Alfred-Maurice de Zayas – Wikipedia

Lasting peace entails the exercise of self-determination by all peoples .

My report on the right to self-determination to the UN General Assembly

Eta mandanga2 Euzkadirentzat!


Joxe Elorrieta-k subiranotasunaz

Badakigu independentzia (politikoa) zer den. Ez dakigu, zehatz-mehatz zer ote den ‘subiranotasuna’.

Badakigu, halaber, hitzak polisemikoak direla. Hitz baten azpian ez dago ezer, edo nahi bada, hamaika esanahi desberdin.

Agian Elorrietak afera argituko liguke…

«Hay que recaracterizar el soberanismo, innovando sin complejos y sin vértigo1»

… reaparece en la escena pública con su libro “Una mirada sindical contracorriente”. Una propuesta inusual e interesante. Un libro con el que no hará amigos. «Ya me lo dijo, ya, un viejo amigo de fatigas de nuestra ejecutiva histórica al que se lo pasé», reconoce en tono alto, con cierto humor socarrón.

(…)

Leyó con placer a nuevos autores, especialmente a David Harvey, un marxista heterodoxo del que destaca su visión del territorio. «A los abertzales siempre nos han atacado por ahí, que si el nuestro es un caso pequeño, que no da de sí, que los intereses de la clase obrera obligan a cambiar de escala, pero no, el único territorio que vale para la lucha es el que se ocupa, el que se agarra, y los cambios de escala hacia territorios más amplios hay que hacerlos con mucha prudencia y cuidando el territorio de partida».

(Alta, DTMkoek ez dira kezkatzen herrialdearen tamainaz2, bertan erabiltzen diren politika ekonomikoaz eta fiskalaz baizik.)

(…)

En su libro aborda el caso vasco con tres ideas clave: mayoría sindical fuerte desde la autonomía; soberanismo de izquierdas con liderazgo, y dialéctica entre espacios institucional, político y sindical.

(…)

«Hay cosas que no pasaron en los 90. Una, ETA se retira, un dato políticamente sustancial, despeja camino a una corriente muy potente en este país; dos, el PNV –y hay que agradecerle su sinceridad– entierra Lizarra-Garazi. Lo descataloga expresamente por frentista. Abraza una lógica neoestatutista, quiere vertebrar y estabilizar el Estado, sus aliados son el PP y el PSOE. Y luego está su deslizamiento neoliberal, teorizado hacia una posición proempresarial extrema. Urkullu dice: ‘los únicos que estamos en la realidad somos Confebask y nosotros’, en su concepción solo hay Administración, empresas y ciudadanos. ¡Eso es Margaret Thatcher! Y Confebask dice que hay que ilegalizar a ELA y LAB porque se meten en cosas que no son de sindicatos (fiscalidad, TAV…)».

(…)

… en su libro se pone la esquela a la idea monzoniana de Malzaga. (…) «…el último intento de llegar a Malzaga fue Lizarra-Garazi, pero no es un horizonte ya. El PNV lo ha dicho y lo está haciendo. Hay que recaracterizarlo todo y asumir que en una primera fase hay que hacer sin el PNV».

(…)

«No, no, a ver, a ver, no me gusta caer en la cosa de contra. Construyamos una alternativa, desde un diagnóstico común, recogiendo experiencias, recorridos, capacidades, hagamos el camino, sin vértigo. Aquí, en Euskal Herria, hay fuerzas organizadas, experiencia política y social suficiente para asumir el reto de recaracterizar, sin ningún complejo, el soberanismo vasco desde una perspectiva de izquierda. Hay que ir a una innovación estratégica y organizativa. Esa es la lectura».

(Alta, segitzen dugu jakin gabe zer den subiranotasun mota hori… Zergatik ez autodeterminazio eskubidea? Eta Independentziarako bidea?)

(…) no ve novedad organizativa, que sigue anclada en una concepción vanguardista y escorada hacia lo institucional, además de calificar la propuesta de Anoeta o el intento de Loiola como «error estratégico» por priorizar transversalidades con fuerzas estatales. (…)

«… tienen documentos en los que dicen que Sortu es su principal organización y referente, y que dinamiza el conjunto de la estrategia. Y que LAB y Ernai solo tienen capacidad propositiva y dinamizan sus tareas propias. Y ese formato, en este contexto de oportunidades, pues no. Yo critico eso».

(…)

(Alegia, betikoek betikoa egiten!)

«La lucha es un proceso largo, las derrotas están ahí y hay que saber gestionarlas»

«… la hegemonía neoliberal es mucha, mucha hegemonía. Y que en el mejor de los escenarios, con una estrategia común engrasada y a velocidad crucero, esas dos organizaciones seguirían a la defensiva, optimizarían recursos, obtendrían más victorias… Harían pedagogía, a veces ganarían y a veces perderían, pero por sí solas no le darían la vuelta a la tortilla. Y es que la lucha es proceso largo, las derrotas están ahí y hay que gestionarlas, entre otras cosas, manteniendo la moral de lucha».

Iritzi batzuk:

(i) Eta estrategian berriz okertzen bagara? Eta nazioartean onartuta dagoen autodeterminazio eskubidearen ordez, euskal progreekin eta Ibarretxe jaunarekin3 mandangaz aritzen bagara?

(ii) Elkarrizketa irakurri eta gero, segitzen dugu jakin barik zertan datzan Elorrietak aipatzen duen subiranotasun mota hori, aka, ‘soberanismo de izquierdas‘.

(iii) Hona hemen ezkerraz hitz batzuk, linkean4.


3 Ikus J. J. Ibarretxe eta A. Mas jaunak. Bertan mandangaz eta autodeterminazio eskubideaz irakur daiteke.

J. J. Ibarretxe eta A. Mas jaunak

Pere Cardús-en El camí d’Ibarretxe que Mas no va voler seguir1

La conferència de demà a Sant Sebastià ha revifat les comparacions entre els dos ex-presidents

“Més de mil vuit-cents assistents ompliran demà la sala gran del Kursaal de Sant Sebastià, al País Basc, per escoltar la conferència compartida per l’ex-president basc Juan José Ibarretxe i l’ex-president català Artur Mas. Parlaran del dret de decidir i del procés d’independència de Catalunya. L’acte és també el trencament del silenci d’Ibarretxe, que després de la seva caiguda va submergir-se en la vida acadèmica i s’allunyà del combat polític –començà a impartir classes sobre desenvolupament humà sostenible en universitats internacionals. La conferència és una iniciativa d’Agirre Lehendakaria Center –un think tank presidit per l’ex-president– i Gure Esku Dago –una plataforma pel dret de decidir.”

Alegia, ‘subiranotasuna’ (sic) via mandanga2 eta independentzia via autodeterminazio eskubidea3.

Ez dakigu zer esango duen Mas-ek, baina badakigu ICEC-ek (International Commission of European Citizens – Working together for democracy and Self-Determination, icec.ngo) zer dioen:

ICEC

ICEC@ICECintl4

In Turkey TV our Catalan Spokesperson @anna_arque : https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=HbhSyLxayws …Democrats support Catalans determination to exercise Democracy

Segida:

“(…)

Pocs punts de comparació
És evident que no hi ha punts sòlids que permetin d’establir una identificació entre la trajectòria de Juan José Ibarretxe i la d’Artur Mas. L’ex-president de la Generalitat va tenir un mandat de poc més de cinc anys. Va convocar
una consulta sobre la independència a desgrat de la prohibició del TC. I va convocar eleccions per obtenir un mandat democràtic que fes possible d’obrir el camí de la independència sense esperar l’acord amb l’estat espanyol. Ibarretxe no va proposar en cap moment un trencament amb la legalitat espanyola ni un procés de desconnexió unilateral. Parlem de renúncia? D’error? D’estratègia? No sabem què hauria passat si hagués revalidat la presidència el 2009, però es va palesar que com més anava menys suport del seu partit tenia i que l’estat espanyol li havia impedit de disposar institucionalment de la majoria social que existia.

La marxa enrere del PNB
A més,
tampoc no és comparable l’estat en què va quedar l’independentisme després d’Ibarretxe i l’estat actual del procés d’independència català, un any després de la renúncia de Mas. Si al País Basc el PNB va fer una passa enrere i va tornar a les posicions més conservadores i autonomistes, a Catalunya el PDECat i ERC –al govern– amb la CUP –al parlament– s’han compromès a fer un referèndum d’independència digui què digui l’estat espanyol.

(…)”

Laburbilduz:

Euskal progreak, politikariak eta kazetariak Ibarretxerekin, mandangarekin, PNV-ren itzalean eta eskutik…, iparra galduta.

Katalanek, Mas-ekin edo gabe, aitzina joango dira, independentziaranzko bidean, autodeterminazioaren bitartez demokrazia praktikatuz.


Dirua: joko baten markazain bezala

Gogoratu ondoko link hauek:

Warren Mosler: bertsolaritza berria hitz gutxitan

AEB-ko Kongresua: dolarrerako ‘markagailuaren’ arduraduna

Segida:

money_trek@pio_trek_g1

@FixtheDebt 1) US spends with… keystrokes 2) Gov debt is our *asset* 3) balanced budgets cause depressions 4) taxes create demand for $

taxes create demand for $

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C46PAJzWQAEhqhO.jpg

2017 ots. 17

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C46PAKUUoAALbXq.jpg

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C46PAKVVcAUo_eH.jpg

https://pbs.twimg.com/media/C46PAJ2XAAAaOvU.jpg

Merkataritza bankuek dirua sortzen dute

Tiffany Hayden @haydentiff2

Banks have the money they need because they create it. Sorry to break the news to you. @InkAndEcon @ProfSteveKeen

The Mainstream is Wrong. Banks Create Money out of Nothing.3

Banks don’t intermediate loans, they originate loans

… banks aren’t doing what economics textbooks say they should do. But those textbooks are profoundly wrong about the actual functioning of banks, and until the economics profession gets its head around this and why it matters, then the economy will be stuck in the Great Malaise…

… The argument that banks merely intermediate between savers and investors leads the mainstream to a manifestly false conclusion: that the level of private debt today is too low, because too little private debt is being created right now. In reality, the level of private debt is way too high, and that’s why so little lending is occurring. (…)”

2017 ots. 14

Gogoratu ondokoak:

Dirua: transakzio bertikalak eta horizontalak (1)

Dirua: transakzio bertikalak eta horizontalak (2)

Dirua: transakzio bertikalak eta horizontalak (3)

Dirua: transakzio bertikalak eta horizontalak (eta 4)


Brexit, ezkerra eta Lexit

Directa@La_Directa

#OPINIÓ | El Brexit ha posat en l’ordre del dia de l’esquerra radical la necessitat de sortir de la UE. @antonisoy https://directa.cat/crisi-esquerra 

Antoni Soy-ren Crisi i esquerra1

La situació de l’economia mundial presenta molts problemes. El capitalisme financer sembla portar-nos cap a una nova crisi. Les economies dels països emergents estan estancades i fins i tot en recessió. L’economia dels EUA té un dinamisme molt modest i hi ha unes grans desigualtats. La política del “Quantitative Easing” (QE) (política monetària expansiva) ha arribat als seus límits i els bancs centrals comencen a prendre mesures no ortodoxes com els tipus d’interès negatius. Molts bancs es troben de nou en situació precària, especialment a Europa. L’economia europea, sobretot la de la Unió Econòmica i Monetària (UEM), està estancada i no té perspectives de creixement.

Al mateix temps, avui, Europa és la del gran capital, dels grans bancs, de la sobirania alemanya. El triomf del gran capital ha suposat una pèrdua de sobirania -política, econòmica, monetària- dels països, especialment dels perifèrics, i sembla haver tancat qualsevol perspectiva de reforma.

En aquest context, l’esquerra europea hauria de proposar un programa ambiciós de recuperació econòmica i social: un veritable projecte alternatiu. Però, actualment, l’esquerra socialdemòcrata tradicional (que Frédéric Lordon ha anomenat la “Dreta Acomplexada”) és un clar suport del statu quo europeu (Unió Europea, euro), si bé manté algunes diferències menors en les polítiques econòmiques amb els partits conservadors europeus.

D’altra banda, entre l’esquerra de tradició marxista o/i llibertària ens trobem amb diversos grups relativament minoritaris, que poden tenir o no representació parlamentària a Europa i als seus respectius parlaments nacionals o regionals i que no tenen una posició homogènia respecte a la Unió Europea i a l’euro. Tanmateix, la pàgina web de l’Esquerra Unitària (GUE/NGL) al Parlament Europeu està encapçalada per un ambigu “Another Europe is possible” que, si més no, demostra les dificultats de fer concordar diferents posicionaments dels grups polítics dels diversos països.

Si es consideren el que en podríem dir els principals partits  a cada país –Die Linke a Alemanya, Front de Gauche a França, Podemos a España, Syriza a Grècia, SEL o Sinistra Italiana a Itàlia- sembla clar que els seus posicionaments oficials es correspondrien bastant amb el d’un europeisme del tipus “Una altra Europa és possible” -que a la pràctica no posa en qüestió el statu quo actual-, tot i que a la majoria d’ells hi ha unes tendències minoritàries que sí que posen en qüestió, en major o menor intensitat, l’euro i fins i tot la mateixa Unió Europea.

Només alguns partits minoritaris, extraparlamentaris o amb una reduïda representació parlamentària, a l’àmbit nacional o regional, i amb un marcat caràcter anticapitalista, posen en qüestió de manera radical l’euro i sovint també la mateixa Unió. Al mateix temps, després del desastre de Grècia, des de l’àmbit polític, acadèmic i d’alguns moviments socials sembla sorgir una mobilització per a “Un pla B per a Europa”, que de moment ja ha realitzat algunes reunions (París, Berlin i Madrid) però que no s’acaba de saber cap a on anirà. Ho resumia molt bé amb motiu de la reunió de Madrid, François Ralle: “parece que hoy en día la izquierda europea está partida entre los que han dejado de cazar dragones (Syriza), los que tienen miedo de enfrentarse en breve al dragón europeo y quieren ser prudentes (Podemos) y los del plan B que piensan saber cómo domar al dragón pero no tienen gran posibilidad de cruzarse con él, por lo menos en los próximos meses (la inmensa mayoría de las fuerzas rojas y verdes que no consiguen sumar y llegar al poder en ningún país del continente a pesar de la crisis)”.

Per això, alguns no ens cansem d’insistir en la ingenuïtat de l’esquerra europea que es pensa que és possible lluitar contra l’austeritat dintre de l’euro, i de repetir que el problema fonamental a Europa avui és el de la sobirania nacional, i popular, és a dir la democràcia; i això requereix sortir de l’euro i fins i tot, probablement, de la Unió europea.

I mentrestant s’ha produït la sortida de la Gran Bretanya de la Unió Europea (Brexit). I això ha posat, més que mai, en l’ordre del dia de l’esquerra radical la qüestió del Lexit, és a dir, la necessitat de plantejar nítidament des de l’esquerra la sortida de l’euro i de la Unió europea com a alternativa al caràcter depredador, antipopular i antidemocràtic del capitalisme europeu.


Xora

Filma: https://eu.wikipedia.org/wiki/Xora

Trailerra: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=d8wH-m-wBA8

EITBn: http://www.eitb.tv/eu/bideoa/zinez/5417/127823/xora/

Iritzia: Xora, bitxia, diferentea, http://www.argia.eus/blogak/mikel-asurmendi/2012/05/16/xora-bitxia-diferentea/

Peio Cachenaut: “Anitz dago ikasteko maite ez dugunaz”

Infozazpi irratia: http://info.info7.eus/2012/03/13/xora-filma/

Xora, fitxa: http://ganbara.eus/fitxa/?vid=46