Syriza lan bermearen alde

DTMkoek (Warren Mosler, Randall Wray, Bill Mitchell, Stephanie Kelton,…) bultzatu dute lan bermeko programa1.

Berri onak Greziatik:

Syrizakoek lan bermeko programa bat martxan jarri nahi dute2. Horretarako, DTM ezagutzen duen pertsona bat (emakume bat, Maddalen!) arduradun gisa dago: Rania Antonopoulos3.

Randall Wray-k dioenez,

…Senior Scholar Rania Antonopoulos is director of the Gender Equality and the Economy program at the Levy Institute, specializing in macro-micro linkages of gender and economics, international competition, and globalization; job guarantee policies and their macroeconomic and employment impacts; social protection and poverty reduction; and the implications of paid and unpaid work on poverty indicators. She was one of the founders of “Economists for Full Employment” and has been a long-time supporter of the job guarantee.”

Bien bitartean Greziako Finantza Ministro Yanis Vaurofakis pellokeriatan dabil, eten gabe. Izan ere, Euskal Herrian berriki argitaratutako elkarrizketetan deus gutxi esan du4, pellokerietatik at.

Warren Mosler-ek ere ez du ulertzen Varoufakis-ek dioena. Izan ere hona hemen Mosler-ek Greziaz5:

Regarding Greece, I have no idea how this translates into actual policy proposals:
Varoufakis said he had assured Dijsselbloem that Athens planned to implement reforms to make the economy more competitive and have balanced budgets but that it would not accept a “self-fed crisis” of deflation and non-viable debt.”

Aurrekontu balantze orekatuak Greziak dauzkan arazoei erantzuteko? Arren!

Wray-k, aldiz, argi dauka afera osoa. Hona zer dioen goian aipaturiko linkean, iruzkin batean, Aegean 1972 izenekoari erantzunez:

Lots of nonsense here. We need a balanced analysis. Germany did not repay its debts from WWI (the reparations were too large–just like Greek debts now). And then Germany murdered tens of millions of people in WWII and has never fully repaid its debts from that war. The US rebuilt Germany–with generous aid. Some say Germany still owes Greece perhaps up to $100 billion from WWII. All of that is from long before the EMU–debts Germany has never repaid. The EMU was designed to punish and impoverish the periphery. And you know nothing about the situation of the USA. Pure nonsense on that. The US federal govt is sovereign. There is no danger in its deficits. Germany is the rich nation. Let it first repay its WWII debts. Then we can start talking about Greek debt repayments or forgiveness or–maybe best–leaving the EMU.”

Noizko lan bermeko programa bat Euskal Herri osorako? Zertan gabiltza?


2 Ikus Randall Wray-k: Jobs for Greeks, http://www.economonitor.com/lrwray/2015/01/28/jobs-for-greeks.

5 Ikus Visa on consumer spending, GDP, Consumer sentiment, Greece update, Personal income, Employment costs: http://moslereconomics.com/2015/01/30/visa-on-consumer-spending-gdp-consumer-sentiment-greece-update-personal-income-employment-costs/.

Grezia: aspalditik ezaguna UEUko blogean (eta gehigarriak)

Blog honetan aspalditik aritu gara Greziaz.

Hona hemen sarrera batzuk:

2010ean.

Randall Wray: Greziaz haratago

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2010/04/05/greziaz-haratago/

Randall Wray eta Warren Mosler: Orain zer? Zein da hurrengoa?

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2010/12/14/orain-zer-zein-da-hurrengoa/

2011n.

Warren Mosler: Euroaren paradisua: zein irtengo da lehena?

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2011/01/02/euroaren-paradisua-zein-irtengo-da-lehena/

DTM. Diru Teoria Modernoa Irlandan: zorraren eta austeritatearen aurkako irtenbideak

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2011/06/11/diru-teoria-modernoa-dtm-irlandan-zorraren-eta-austeritatearen-aurkako-irtenbideak/

2012an.

Warren Mosler: Greziaz berriz

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/02/23/warren-mosler-greziaz-berriz/

Warren Mosler: Eurolandiako zor guztiarekin bukatzeko metodorik zuzenena

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/04/20/eurolandiako-zor-guztiarekin-bukatzeko-metodorik-zuzenena-1/

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/04/26/eurolandiako-zor-guztiarekin-bukatzeko-metodorik-zuzenena-2/

GEHIGARRIAK:

Mike Norman (2015): New Greek Finance Minister said, “Greece will neither want to leave the euro nor threaten to do so.”

http://mikenormaneconomics.blogspot.com.es/2015/01/new-greek-finance-minister-said-greece.html

Oh well, this thing’s going nowhere. It’s got the liberal disease of big talk, no action, written all over it.

The new Finance Minister is this guy, Yanis Varoufakis. He once said, “Greece will neither want to leave the euro nor threaten to do so.”

Done. Finished. Toast.

There is  no way that Tsipras and Syriza can deliver what they say they will deliver while in the euro. NO. WAY.

The sad thing is, this guy Varoufakis taught at University of Texas. That’s where MMTer and economic liberal, James K. Galbraith teaches. Too bad he didn’t learn a thing or two while he was there.

W. Mosler on Yanis Varoufakis (Minister of Finance in Greece, in 2015):

Back in 2011.

(Exit plan: Mosler/Pilkington: The IMF-ECB ‘Plan’ – Fig-Leaf upon Fig-Leaf:

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/11/moslerpilkington-the-imf-ecb-%E2%80%98plan%E2%80%99-%E2%80%93-fig-leaf-upon-fig-leaf.html)

Response to Varoufakis’ response to that plan:

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/12/moslerpilkington-response-to-yanis-varoufakis-regarding-our-eurozone-exit-plan.html

Lastly, we should note that, should a nation exit the Eurozone in the manner we have outlined, a worldwide deflationary collapse might actually work to their advantage. Why? Because with their new currency they could undertake an Argentinean-style jobs guarantee program which would maintain full employment domestically while real terms of trade shifted dramatically in their favour as worldwide prices fell. Or, to put it another way: peripheral countries like Ireland would no longer have to rely on export-oriented growth in a world plagued by massive deflationary contraction. Instead they could run fiscal deficits to maintain full employment and high living standards while having little concern for the potential devaluation of the new currency caused thereby because worldwide prices would be falling at the same time.”

W. Mosler on Y. Varoufakis (Back in 2012):

http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2012/11/modern-money-public-purpose-yanis-varoufakis-and-marshall-auerback-on-the-eurozone-crisis.html#comment-914312

Warren Mosler November 15, 2012

Yanis is confused on his monetary operations.

Bill Mitchell (2015): Conceding to Greece opens the door for France and Italy

http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=30048

I doubt that they will agree to a 50 per cent write-off in Greece’s debt because then the citizens of Spain, Italy and, even France, would line up for the same. Then it is game-over for the Eurozone. More likely, if Syriza sticks to its promises, then there will be an organised way to ease them out of the game. Greece will win either way.”

The history of the EMU to date has taught us that if Germany is unable to meet rules, then the rules will be altered. Otherwise, the rules will be used as a blunt weapon to devastate the employment base and living standards of weaker nations without the political clout of Germany.”

The suppression of real wages growth in Germany and the growth in the (very) low-wage ‘mini-jobs’ meant that Germany severely stifled domestic spending up to 2005. Schröder’s austerity policies forced harsh domestic restraint onto German workers, which meant that Germany could only grow through widening export surpluses.
(…)
The growth in employment in Germany in the lead up to the crisis was not due to a well-functioning monetary union.

Rather, it reflected its malfunctioning because it depended on widening trade imbalances – huge surpluses in Germany and some of its neighbours against widening deficits in the periphery, covered by unsustainable capital flows from the former to the latter.”

If Germany does give up on its austerity mania and fiscal deficits expand then all of the Eurozone will return to growth. Greece could resume growth tomorrow if the new government announces a large-scale public employment program. It is a lack of spending that is causing stagnation. The obsession with structural reforms is a side-issue. The recession was due to a collapse in spending not any shift in competitiveness.
It will be amazing if Germany agrees to write off half of Greek debt. We will see whether that happens
.”

Bill Mitchell (2012): Standby for the third Greek bailout

http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=18305

Baldin eta Greziari ahalbidetzen bazaio bere zorraren % 53,5, zergatik ez genuke espero Italiak, Espainiak, Irlandak, Portugalek eta gainontzeko herrialdeek gauza bera egitea? Zergatik ez diete eskatuko herrialde horien populazioek beren gobernuei antzeko akordioak lortzea, guztiak austeritate bide kaltegarri beretik ibiliz?”

Greziako hauteskundeak (zenbait proposamen eta gogoeta)

Hasteko, ikus Greziako hauteskundeak (orain gehitua eta hobetua!)1.

Hona hemen zenbait proposamen, gogoeta eta iruzkin.

Gogoratzekoa, eurogunetik irteteko proposamenak:

  1. Quebec eredutzat hartuta, Warren Mosler-ek: Nola irten eurogunetik? Proposamena2

  2. Warren Mosler-ek: Eurogunetik irteteko estrategia3

Aipatutako atalean subiranotasuna da afera eta ardatza. Argi dagoenez, DTM-koek moneta propioaren aldekoak dira. Horrela eta soilik horrela, erabiltzen den moneta da subiranoa eta bonoen arazoa desagertzen da, baita zorraren afera ere. Kasu honetan, Banku Zentralak moneta jaulkitzaileak dira eta ez moneta erabiltzaileak.

Hauteskunde eta geroko iruzkin batzuk:

a) Bill Mitchell-en Smart Austerity – its just the same dumb austerity4

Greek elections


The results in the Greek elections were very good. I have received a lot of E-mail criticising my skepticism about Syriza’s capacity to honour its title – radical coalition. The signs were that it was slipping towards the centre to assuage the voters. Time will tell.


The main problem is that has continually claimed it is pro-Euro. I cannot see Greece sustaining prosperity in a monetary union with the likes of Germany and the neo-liberal fiscal rules that are imposed on all Member States.


It might be that the ‘re-negotiation’ of the debt will create a major dynamic that allows fiscal policy flexibility. I doubt that will happen, which explains my skepticism.


But getting rid of the vandals that had rendered Greece a poorly performing colony of Germany is very welcome. I hope that now they are in power they can introduce some truly radical plans, which would provoke Germany into forcing them out of the union.”

b) Mike Norman: Greece can’t abandon austerity and stay with the euro. Period5.

Alexis Tsipras and his party, Syriza, can talk all they want about ending austerity, but they simply can’t do it without their own currency.

When all the cheering and celebration dies down Greece will be left with a choice: they can move forward on the path to self determination, sovereignty and dignity, but only if they bring back the drachma.

Or, they can stick with the euro and naively believe they will be able to end austerity, rehire fired public workers, raise salaries and do all those other things that they promised to do, but can’t.

This is the classic problem of the modern day left wing. They talk big about all these progressive ideals–help the middle class, workers, safety nets, education, etc, but they simply don’t understand or, don’t buy into the economics necessary to do these things.

Same problem everywhere. Here, too, in the U.S. (Although there’s some hope with Kelton.)

By the way…so far this morning the euro is trading in the classic, buy the rumor sell the news pattern.”

c) Warren Mosler: Credit check, euro slipping on Greece6

“… the euro has fallen a bit further vs the dollar after the Greek election results. I still don’t see this leading to any kind of fiscal expansion, and the proposed debt restructuring is functionally just a tax on bondholders that if anything further removes aggregate demand.

Additionally, the ECB’s latest moves, while actually contractionary/deflationary, are perceived as the reverse and Greece and others will likely give them time ‘kick in’ and spur growth. And while lower oil costs are a plus for most euro consumers, the lower cost of imports adds to the trade surplus, which is a force for a stronger euro.”

Aipaturiko atalean politika azaltzen da, eta bereziki ohiko ezkerraren eskemak. Grezian ikusi duguna Italian ere gertatzen da, blog honetako azken sarreretan ikus daitekeen moduan.

Espainia una, grande y libre-n antzeko fenomenoa azaldu da. Hala Izquierda Unida delakoarekin nola Podemos berriarekin. Biak, Italiako ohiko ezkerra eta Greziako Syriza bezalaxe, galduta daude zorrarekin, bonoekin, politika fiskalarekin eta monetarekin.

Guztiok euroguneko paradisu barruan egoten segitu nahi dute. Guztiok zirkulu karratua topatu nahiz dabiltza (alegia, austeritaterik eza aldarrikatuz eta aldi berean eurogunean segitu guraz):

Greece  (Italy, Spain…and the Basque Country) can’t abandon austerity and stay with the euro. Period

Hortaz, zer gertatzen ari da EHn? Non dago ezkerra? Zertan dago?

Dixi eta salvavi animan meam.



.

 

Greziako hauteskundeak

Albiste onak: Syrizak irabazi du.

Pena: ez du lortu gehiengo absolutua: 149 aulki, 151tik.

Zorionak, beraz.

Baina Syrizaren programa politikoarekin oso kritikoak izaten segitzen dugu…

Hona hemen Bill Mitchell-en gaurko artikulua, berak emaitzak oraindik jakin gabe: Greek elections – a solution doesn’t appear to be forthcoming1.

Aipu batzuk in progress, (eguneratzekoa):

a) Syriza ez da koherentea, sendotasunik gabekoa baizik2.

b) Greziak behar duena3.

c) Zorraren ezabatzea ala zorraren berrizendatzea moneta berri batean?4

d) Euroa, moneta propioa, zergak5.

e) Zorraren afera nagusia6.

f) EBZ, herrialde desberdinetako finantzaketa, arauen aldaketak…7

g) EBZ-ren azken QE-z hitz pare bat8.

h) Draghi, QE berria eta Alemania9. Politika fiskal berria behar da.10

i) Syriza: politika11.

j) Syriza eta ekonomia: Syriza ez da alderdi erradikal bat12.

k) Bonoen merkatu pribatua eta Syriza13.

l) Syriza eta bankuen nazionalizazioa14.

m) Syriza eta politika fiskala15.

n) Greziak behar duena, berriz16.

o) Greziako defizit publikoa:

Greek public deficit has to rise substantially – by multiples of the current Stability and Growth Pact fiscal limits of 3 per cent.”

A balanced budget position doesn’t resolve that issue.”

p) Eurogunetik irtetea?17

Ondorioak:

The only reasonable conclusion is that Syriza’s stated policy aims are not mutually consistent. They cannot achieve the (motherhood) aspirations of higher growth and increased incomes and equity while allowing Brussels to dominate the magnitude of their fiscal deficits.

They cannot achieve their aims with a fixed exchange rate (effectively no independent exchange rate) with Germany as a partner in the monetary union.

Their policy pledges resonate with the suffering population. But the reality is that the population is not being educated by progressive forces about the self-inflicted damage that retaining the euro as their currency is causing.

Letters by economists that avoid that issue do not help.

Political parties that make it a root-and-branch commitment to remain in the Eurozone do not help.”

Mitchell-ek dioenez, I don’t see Syriza as the solution as they shift to the centre (which is really the right). I would love to be proved wrong!”

Ezin adosago egon Mitchell-ekin!

PS: Telebistan

a) Bihar goizean, 11:00etan, grabatuko didate Hamaika TB-koek Santurtzin, Ertzak progamarako.

b) Etzi, 16:30etan ETBko Azpimarra programan egongo naiz.

Let’s see what happens in Greece …


2 Ingelesez: ”… Syriza talks bit about freeing Greece from the Troika-yoke but has a set of proposals that are mutually inconsistent. They might help around the edge and redistribute income a bit but what is needed is a massive boost in national income and that can only come from a massive increase in spending.”

3 Ingelesez: “Repeat: a massive fiscal boost is required, which means deficits above 10 per cent of GDP for many years forward. Repeat: that can only be accomplished within the current political reality if Greece leaves the Eurozone. It should have done that in 2008. It should never have joined. It should do it next week.”

4 Mitchell-en hitzez: “… I do not support the cancelling of the debt. I support a redenomination of it in a new currency, which is the sole right of the democratic country who issues that currency under monopoly conditions.”

5 Ingelesez: “…There is thus no question that a nation currently using the euro could abandon it, introduce its own currency, and require all taxes to be paid and all contracts to be denominated in that currency.”

6 Ingelesez: “... the principle also means that if a government changes its currency and re-denominates at some given parity, all contracts must be honoured at the re-denominated rate … (…) the discussion suggests that all public debt should be re-denominated into the local currency at the going parity on day one.”

7 Ingelesez: “…most Eurozone nations will not be able to run the necessary magnitudes for their fiscal deficits (to favour ‘pro-growth’) under the current terms that restrict the ECB – the monopoly-issuer of the euro – from funding such deficits.

Countries such as Greece already ran foul of the private bond markets who are required to fund the deficits under current rules.

So why not call for the rules to be changed to allow the ECB to properly act as a currency-issuer? The reason is obvious. Germany would never allow it and it, basically rules the Eurozone.”

8 Ingelesez. The latest announcement of quantitative easing while unconstrained from the prior conditionality that accompanied the – Security Markets Program – which began in May 2010.

That program saw the ECB demonstrate categorically that by purchasing specific government bonds in the secondary markets (to get around Treaty rules) it could eliminate the private bond markets from the picture and control bond yields to whatever rate it chose.

It was a salutary lesson about the power of the currency-issuer. The problem with the program is that the ECB insisted that the fiscal austerity be imposed and followed as a condition for it buying a beleaguered nation’s debt in the secondary markets.

So they controlled yields and dealt the private bond markets out of the equation but wrecked the economies in question at the same time.”

9 Ingelesez: “The German ‘tolerance’ of Draghi’s QE announcement this week is limited I suspect. They know that as long as the fiscal deficits are prevented from rising and austerity is maintained that QE will not do much to stimulate growth.

10 Ingelesez: But if QE was [were] combined with large-scale expansion of fiscal deficits in several countries targetted at public sector job creation and infrastructure development then the German ‘tolerance’ (currently given through gritted teeth) would quickly vanish and there would be a political crisis.

11 Ingelesez: “I have no doubt this political messaging is a genuine attempt to engender optimism. I agree with that a major shift in Greek politics is required and that Syriza appears to be achieving that a shift. But is it the shift that is required?

I doubt it – and I am sorry to say that as I have friends in the Syriza movement.”

12 Ingelesez: “First, don’t get the idea that Syriza is a radical party. Its public statements and the proposal it has taken the Greek people is not radical at all and would see it operate within the mainstream (neo-liberal) rules that are set and enforced by Brussels.

Syriza is not proposing a restoration of currency sovereignty.Rather it is proposing that Brussels goes soft on Greece for a while and writes down a proportion of the outstanding public liabilities as part of a negotiated easing of the repayment conditions.

Thatis not radical. It ensures that Greece remains within the Eurozone, the dynamics of which are dominated by Germany

They talk about “going to the markets” (private bond markets) to fund government spending. That is about as mainstream as it gets. “

13 Ingelesez:What happens when the private bond markets turn against the government again (as they did in 2010)? Then what?

Syriza talks about restoring the creditworthiness of public debt? What? Who are they representing – the private bond dealers and their assessments? The IMF? The people?”

14 Ingelesez: “Syriza used to advocate the nationalisation of banks in Greece as a recognition of the centrality of banking for financial stability.”

(…) The government has pumped billions into the private banks but the same financial elites continue to run them.

And now? The so-called radicals have abandoned the commitment to nationalise the banks. Why? Who are they proposing to serve?”

15 Ingelesez: “...More telling, is that Syriza plans to ‘stimulate’ the Greek economy within an effectively neutral

fiscal position. (…)

Yiannis Dragasakis – has stated several times that a Syriza government would adopt a balanced fiscal position.

(…) … insisted that the leftists would run a balanced budget. “We are not going to return todeficits,” he said.Well, one couldn’t be more categorical than that?”

16 Ingelesez: “As I explained in this blog – Greece – two alternative views – Greece will not achieve growth with balanced fiscal positions.

How does the Party plan to fill the massive output gap that Greece has? Output gaps can only be closed by increasing output. That requires increased spending.Greece has lost 25 per cent of its real GDP since 2008. While potential output has also surely declined (as firms have scrapped productive capital) in the face of a massive decline in the investment ratio, it remains there is a huge unused capacity in the country. The mass unemployment is testament to that.”

17 Ingelesez: “Running a fiscally-neutral policy to help people will only partially stimulate overall spending in the nation.

The reality is that Greece needs a public stimulus that is way beyond anything that is allowed under the current rules.

But the Greeks can fix that in a single decision – leave the Eurozone and restore currency sovereignty.”

QE: Mosler eta Draghi, berriz…

…edo gaur egun EBn dagoen zorabio ulertzeko gida laburra…

Ikus The latest QE policy removes ECB ‘conditionality’:

http://moslereconomics.com/2015/01/23/the-latest-qe-policy-removes-ecb-conditionality/

Mosler-ek dioenez, Mario Draghi-k orain dela urte batzuk esan zuen EBZ-k behar zena egingo zukeela gobernu nazionaleko ordaintze ezak baztertzearren:

Several years ago Mario Draghi announced the ECB would do what it takes (within the rules) to prevent national govt defaults, which immediately reversed the climb of national govt rates, bringing them down to where they are today.

Baina, baldintza batzuekin, politika fiskalari dagokionez:

But it also came with conditionality’ regarding fiscal policy, where a violation of the fiscal rules carried the threat of the removal of ECB support.”

Mosler-en hitzez, oraingo honetan afera desberdina da:

This time it’s different.”

Egungo indar deflaziogileen aurka aritzeko, herrialde ezberdinetako Banku Zentralek beren herrialde propioen zorra eros dezakete. Beraz, praktikoki ordaintze ezeko arriskua baztertuz.

As part of this broad based fight to reverse the current deflationary forces, the national CB’s will now be buying their own nation’s debt, thereby, for all practical purposes, eliminating default risk.

Orain, baldintza fiskalik aipatu gabe…

Mosler-en iritziz, hitz horiek esan nahi dute azken QE izeneko politikak gobernu nazionaleko politika fiskalaren gaineko lehengo EBZ-ren eragina ezabatzen duela, EBZ-k bere tituluen erosketak ez dizkiolako lotzen onarpen fiskalari.

Beraz, hedapen fiskala nahi duten bi herrialdeak, Grezia eta Italia, operazionalki libre daude horrela egitea ordaintze ezaren mehatxurik gabe… EBko isunei aurre egin ahalko lieke, baina azken isun horiek beste afera erabat desberdinak dira, aurreko ordaintze ezaren arriskutik ezberdinak.

Hortaz, atea irekita dago bera zeharkatzeko nahiko ausarta den edozeinentzat. Hala ere, segur aski ez dute hori ezagutzen, eta segur asko ez lukete hori egingo ezagutuko balute…

Eta, aipatu den bezala1, QE per se euro joera deflaziogile/kontrakziogile sendo bat da, oso txarra den egoera bat are egoera txarragoa bilakatzeko prozesuan.



1 In ECB, Jobless Claims, Sea Container Counts, Housing Starts, Purchase apps, Architecture Billings, miles driven, Redbook sales, my take on consequences of $50 oil:

http://moslereconomics.com/2015/01/22/ecb-jobless-claims-sea-container-counts-housing-starts-purchase-apps-architecture-billings-miles-driven-redbook-sales-my-take-on-consequences-of-50-oil/

Like the carpenter with the piece of wood “no matter how much I cut off it’s still too short”

Draghi has yet to realize rate cuts/QE/etc. are a deflationary/contractionary bias:

*DRAGHI SAYS WILL BUY UNTIL SEE SUSTAINED INFLATION IMPROVEMENT

Ander-en e-posta

Ander lagunak honelako mezua helarazi dit:

Ikus http://www.berria.eus/paperekoa/1781/014/001/2015-01-21/erakutsi_nahi_dugu_arazoa_politikoa_dela.htm.

Yannis Milios: Eurogunea uzteak, “Grezia bezalako herrialde txiki batentzat dibisaren debaluazioa ekarriko luke. Barne debaluazioak, austeritateak eragindako kalteen antzekoak ekarriko lituzke”.

Hau horrela al da?

Erantzuna:

Aspaldiko Ander,

Horixe da mamua, horixe da beldurra.

Hori dela eta, aipatu dut Syriza-koak kikildu direla Troikaren aurrean.

Zeinek esaten du Milios-ek aipatutakoa?

Troikak, hau da Nazioarteko Moneta Fondoak, Europako Banku Zentralak eta Europako Komisioak… gehi Merkel-ek (Alemaniak!).

Ez horiek bakarrik.

Greziako zorabio berdintsua ikus daiteke Italiako ‘ezkerrean’.

Ikus argitaratutako azken sarrera: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/01/21/italiaz-hitz-bi-2/

Eurolandiatik kanpo ez dago bizitzerik?

Zer moduz Islandia, Groenlandia, Suitza, Norvegia?

Ikus Kataluniari buruz, gure UEUko sarrera hau: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/11/12/katalunia-eta-dtm/

Herrialde txikiak ala ezjakintasun handia?

Herrialde txikiak ala beldur ikaragarria?

Bide batez, nominalismotik at, non ote dago gaur egun ‘ezkerra’ Europa osoan?

Izan untsa!

QE EBrako: irtenbidea?

Zer ote da QE?

QE1.

Mosler-ek: QE zerga bat da besterik ez!

Ingelesez:

QE euro style: http://moslereconomics.com/2011/08/09/qe-euro-style/

QE doesn’t work to help the economy: http://moslereconomics.com/2013/10/04/fed-seems-to-know-qe-doesnt-work-to-help-the-economy/

QE is bad for banks: http://moslereconomics.com/2013/10/07/qe-is-bad-for-banks/

QE is a tax: http://moslereconomics.com/2014/05/02/qe-is-a-tax/

Euskaraz:

QE eta krisia: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/03/06/beste-euro-krisi-bat/

EB, zer ote da hurrengoa?: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/06/01/zer-da-hurrengoa-qe/

Plazebo bat!: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/01/12/europak-plazebo-bat-eztabaidatzen-duen-bitartean/

Bill Mitchell-ek gaur: Fiscal austerity drives continuing pessimism as oil prices fall2

Aipu soil bat, ingelesez:

… A significant proportion of the financial commentators and business interests are now putting their hopes on the ECB to save the world with quantitative easing (QE). That, in itself, is a testament to how lacking in comprehension the majority of people are about monetary economics. QE will not save the Eurozone….”

QE dela eta, politikariak, ekonomialariak eta kazetariak EBn zorabio berri batean murgiltzen ari diren bitartean…

… Gogoratu EB ‘salbatzeko’ bidea, Mosler-en bidez:

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2013/02/14/mosler-en-eurolandiarako-proposamena/

eta

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2013/06/20/teklatuaren-bidez-eurolandian-ere/

Eta badaezpada ere, Draghi-z eta Molser-ez, ondoko link hau irakurtzea komenigarria litzaiguke:

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2012/11/10/m-draghi-ebc-ko-presidentea-eta-w-mosler/


1 Ikus http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantitative_easing: Quantitative easing (QE) is monetary policy where a central bank creates new money electronically to buy financial assets.

Italiaz hitz bi (2)

Italiaz orain dela gutxi aritu gara1. Bill Mitchell bertan egon da2.

Mitchell-ek Italiako ezker politikari zenbait gomendio luzatu dizkio3.

Garrantzitsuena: Italiako ezkerra lotsatu behar da4, Troikaren aurrean men egiteagatik.

Beste aldetik, La Liga Norte, eskumako alderdiak euroari sakoneko kritika egin dio5 eta Konstituzioan enplegu osoaren printzipio sartu nahi du6.

Zer nahi du Liga horrek? Padaniarako independentzia, egitura federal baten barruan eta erregio autonomia handiarekin. Halaber, Italiako estatu federal berria eurotik irtetea.

Eta azken puntu hau da garrantzitsua Mitchell-entzat. Izan ere, haren hitzez, “… their Euro exit strategy is the only sensible path for Italy to follow if they want to break out of the cycle of recession and increasing poverty.

Argi: dena ez da onartzekoa, zeren Ligakoek proposatutako estatu fiskala oso neo-liberala baita.

Mitchell-el Ligaren alde onak7 eta txarrak8 ongi ezagutzen ditu.

Zein da afera?

Italiako ezkerra (Greziako Syriza bezalaxe) pro-eurozalea da.

Italian Ligaren aurka egiteko, eta haiekin hauteskundeetan ez nahasteko edo, ezkerra eurozalea da9.

Ligak-k ondokoa dioen bitartean: “… recognises the damage the Eurozone has caused for workers with high unemployment and lost incomes and plans to do something about it ...”

Europan lehen aldiz, Ligakoak, “… they are planning to present to the Parliament a major constitutional amendment which will embed, for the first time, the principle of full employment. This principle will take priority over any of the rules imposed by Brussels (the European Commission) on the Eurozone nations.

Beste era batera esanda, “…the Stability and Growth Pact fiscal rules, the Two-Pack, the Six-Pack, the Fiscal Compact would be non-operative under Italian law if the economy was below full employment.”

Badirudi hori dela urrats garrantzitsu bat euro usteko ildoan, eta oparotasunerako oinarriz, behin herrialdeak euro utzi eta gero, bere moneta propioa egonkortuz…

Aipatutakoa aparteko politika egoki bat izan liteke ezker progresiboarentzat.

Baina…

Ezkerrak: “… The left talk relentlessly about ‘structural reform’ which is just the Troika neo-liberal mantra.”

Mitchell-ek dioenez:

  1. Why the hell is it being left to the crazies on the extreme right to articulate basic economic and social (in terms of employment) sense?

  2. That is why the left should hang their heads in shame.

Bi gehigarri:

a) Mitchell-ek oraintsu DTM desmitifikatu du10, eta

b) 2012an Warren Mosler-i italierazko testu luze bezain sakona11 argitaratu zuen

Ea ikasiko dugun!


3 Ikus The Italian left should hang their heads in shame: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=29570.

4 Ingelesez: The only conclusion is that the Italian left should hang their heads in shame for being surrender monkeys to the neo-liberal forces defined by the Troika.”

5 Ikus “Enough Euro, Another Europe is Possible” campaign (“Basta Euro, Un’Altra Europa è possibile!”), Mitchell-ek aipatua.

6 Mitchell-ek ingelesez, “The article (November 24, 2014) – Lavoro: Borghi Aquilini, inserire in costituzione prinicipio per piene occupazione – or “Jobs: Borghi Aquilini: wants to insert the principle of full employment into the constitution

7 “They are also strongly committed to environmental policies such as public green areas, national parks, recycling and opposes the big corporate food industry in favour of healthy alternatives.”

8 “But the League is also a nasty neo-fascist group fostering extremely conservative social policy stances – anti abortion, anti stem cell research, anti gay and same sex marriage, anti-immigration, and authoritarian rule of law positions. Their far right xenophobia amounts to racism.”

9 “…the left are pro-euro because the Lega Nord is anti-euro. Go figure. The left is scared of being confused with the Lega Nord in the electoral process.”

Greziaz, berriz!

Grezia. Hauteskundeak. Syriza. Euroa. Programa ekonomikoak…

Kazetari batek honelako galdera egin zidan orain dela gutxi:

Ba ote dago arriskurik Grezia eurogunetik kanpo geratzea?

Mehatxuak mehatxu, ez dirudi Syriza-ko liderrek egoera hori planteatzen dutenik.

Izan ere, ez liderrik ezagunenek ezta ekonomialaririk nagusienek ere  ez dute litekeen aukera hori ontzat hartu.

Eta pena da, zeren aipatzen dutena (ikus behean) eta Eurolandiak onartzen eta bultzatzen duena erabat kontrajarriak baitira.

Zer planteatzen dute, bada, Syriza-koek?

Bi testu interesgarri:

a) Todo lo que os están contando sobre la recuperación griega es falso: basta de injerencias1.

b) Yanis Varoufakis: «Grecia no quiere abandonar el euro ni amenazar con hacerlo»2.

Proposamen bat: A Modest proposal for resolving the European crisis3.

Bill Mitchell-ek azken proposamen horri kritika egin dio4, oso gogorra.

Syrizaz eta Greziaz zertxobait aipatua dugu blog honetan:

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/01/02/syrizaz-eta-greziaz-hitz-batzuk/

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/01/02/5845/

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/01/04/atzo-gaur-bihar/

Hortaz?

Greziak badauka beste aukera bat.

Izan ere, badago irtenbide duin, sakon eta erreal bat, Mosler-ek orain dela lau urte proposatutakoa.

Mosler bonoak:

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2011/10/09/greziarako-proposamena/

eta

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2011/10/11/diru-teoria-modernoaren-irtenbidea-greziarako/

Edo, nahi izanez gero, eurogunetik irtetea:

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2011/12/21/eurogunetik-irteteko-estrategia/

Baina Syriza-koak ez dira ausartzen hori planteatzeko. Troikaren aurrean kikildu dira…, nahiz eta ‘proposamen’ berezi bat aurkeztu.

Dena den, oso interesgarria da ikustea zer nolako gomendioak luzatu dizkie greziarrei Troika ia ahalguztidunak. Jende xumea ikaratzeko beste, Greziak eurogunean sufritzen segitzeko eta greziarrek daukaten aukera bakarra ohiko austeritatea izango balitz bezala…

Troikaren aurka Syriza-koek proposatukoak ez dauka funts handirik5. Pena handia, zeren maila intelektualean aukera horrek ez dauka inongo pisurik.

Nire ustez, askoz hobea izango litzateke benetan eurogunetik irteteko planteamendu serio, sakon eta apropos bat egingo balute, sasi-irtenbideak planteatzea baino.

Laster ikusiko dugu politikoki zein pisu izango duen Syrizak datozen hauteskundeetan.

Politikoki irabaztekotan, zer gertatuko da ekonomian?

(Euskal Herrian liluramendu politikoa bide dago Syriza-rekin, lehen Eskoziarekin zegoen antzera, ekonomiari, eta batez ere finantza ekonomiari begirada ausart bat eman gabe. Non ote daude marxistak? Paradisuko linboan? Erabat galduta?)


3 Ikus Varoufakis, Y. and Holland, S. (2011) ‘A Modest Proposal for Resolving the Eurozone Crisis’, Policy Note 2011/3, Levy Economics Institute of Bard College, 2011. http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/pn_11_03.pdf eta

Varoufakis, Y., Holland, S. and Galbraith, J.K. (2013) ‘A Modest Proposal for Resolving the Eurozone Crisis, Version 4.0′, July 2013. http://varoufakis.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/a-modest-proposal-for-resolving-the-eurozone-crisis-version-4-0-final1.pdf.

4 Ikus Options for Europe – Part 73: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=27666.

Hona hemen, ingelesez, Mitchell-ek dioena, laburbilduz:

The aim of the proposal is to ‘resolve the Eurozone crisis’ (…) It is also hard to see how a proposal that involves no fiscal transfers or changes to the Treaty can provide a lasting solution to the mess.

(…) The OMT program thus fails to address the core problem that southern Europe is in depression and the only way out is for budget deficits to expand. The ECB stands ready to buy unlimited government bonds – but only if they have succumbed to a fiscal austerity package that ensures their growth prospects deteriorate even further.”

(…)

“There is no solvency risk for a consolidated government sector – the central bank and the treasury – that only issues liabilities in its own currency. If it issues liabilities (for example, take on debt) – that is denominated in a foreign currency, then insolvency becomes a possibility. In the case of the Eurozone, where there is no fiscal authority, the pecking order is that the member state treasuries are deemed to guarantee their own national central banks which ‘own’ the ECB and which provide lender of last resort facilities to their own banking systems. No fiscal authority backs the ECB but despite all the legal complexities involved in how the national central banks might carry out their lender of last resort duties, the reality is that the ECB is the ultimate lender of last resort in the EMU.

5 Berrirakurri, berriz, Bill Mitchell-en bi aukera: Greece – two alternative views (http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=29778).