Pobrezia lanarekin deuseztatzen da

La povertà si elimina con il lavoro1

Randall Wray-ren hitzaldiaz:

Il professor Randall Wray, docente di Economics presso la University of Missouri – Kansas City e Senior Scholar al Levy Economics Institute of New York, ha fatto notare che i costi della disoccupazione non sono misurabili solo in termini economici, ma hanno anche componenti sociali molto forti: oltre alla mancata produzione, la disoccupazione ha infatti una ricaduta in termini di emarginazione sociale, crimine, povertà ed instabilità sociale e politica. L’alto livello di disoccupazione registrato ai giorni nostri è spiegato da un livello di spesa pubblica troppo basso rispetto a quello della tassazione, e da qui nasce l’esigenza di aumentare il deficit del settore pubblico. Uno Stato con la sua valuta sovrana possiede gli strumenti necessari per raggiungere la piena occupazione ed offrire un salario che possa permettere ai lavoratori una vita dignitosa. In particolare, il professor Wray ha illustrato i contenuti del Job Guarantee, o piano di lavoro garantito, una misura di politica economica che porterebbe all’occupazione di tutti coloro che vogliono e possono lavorare. Attraverso i piani di lavoro garantito, l’offerta di lavoro verrebbe interamente comprata creando una riserva di occupati che porterebbe un diffuso benessere ed uno sviluppo sostenibile per la società. La misura comporta indirettamente l’istituzione di un salario minimo dignitoso, sotto il quale nessun lavoratore presterebbe il proprio lavoro. Il valore della valuta sarebbe agganciato ad un’ancora di alta qualità, ovvero il lavoro, e ciò si tradurrebbe in un’elevata stabilità dei prezzi e del valore della valuta. Tuttavia, avverte il professor Wray, non è scontato che lo Stato decida di avvalersi di strumenti che portino alla piena occupazione, in quanto esistono motivazioni politiche che fanno tendere lo Stato alla conservazione di un esercito di riserva di disoccupati, con l’obiettivo di mantenere alta la ricattabilità dei lavoratori e bassa la quota dei salari.”

Randall Wray Milanen

Hitzadia: Kalecki: the political economy of full employment

Rete MMT@retemmt

“Nessuno che lavora dovrebbe essere povero” Wray #MMT parlando del salario del #JobGuarantee ora Milano @ptcherneva

2016 mai. 18


1.500 sarrera UEUko blogean

image001

1. UEUko bloga

2006ko azaroan hasi zen UEUkoen ekonomia bloga, Heterodoxia, Ekonomiaz haratago izenekoa1. Hauxe zen nire lehen sarrera blog horretan: Marx hasiberrientzat2.

2011n Finantza Kapitalismo, bi liburuxkatan, argitaratu zen3. Finantza sistemak bereganatu egin du ekonomia erreala4. Europan esaten den moduan, Finanzkapital uber alles. Sistema berri hori aztertu zen, bera gainditzeko zenbait neurri proposatuz5.

2013an Diru Teoria Modernoa. Finantza Ingeniaritza izeneko liburua plazaratu zen6. Liburu horretan, aspaldian bezalaxe, dirua zen gaia. Diruaren sormena, maileguak eta kreditua. Bankugintza eta partida biko kontabilitatea. Horretarako, diru teoria modernoa (DTM) erabili zen: besteak beste, Randall Wray-ren, Stephanie Kelton-en eta Bill Mitchell-en lanak erabiliz. Bereziki Warner Mosler izan zen gidari.

Helburua aspalditik izan dudana bera da7. Ezin da bestela izan: Euskal Herriaren independentzia ekonomikoa eta monetarioa dut helburu, ez besterik. Horretarako, akademian erabiltzen eta ezagutzen diren testuetatik oso urrun ibili naiz, ortodoxia ekonomikotik erabat aldenduta.

Beste zenbait lanetan egin dudan bezala, eta Euskal Herriko egoera beti presente edukita, liburuan jorratu ditut gure herriaren independentziarako beharrezko diren zenbait proposamen eta neurri.

2013an UEUko Ekonomia Saileko zuzendariak blogaren izena eta izana aldatu zituen. 2013ko udaberritik aurrera honela izendatu da bloga: Heterodoxia, diru teoria modernoa eta finantza ingeniaritza. Hona hemen haren hitzak eta proposamena:

Heterodoxia bloga. Proposamenak:

Bloga Joseba Felix Tobar Arbuluk elikatzen du %100ean. Beraz, ez du zentzurik bloga Ekonomia Sailaren izenean agertzea. Bloga Josebaren izenean agertu behar da. Berea da. Hori bai, UEUko Ekonomia Sailkide bezala agertuko da, beraz, bloga Ekonomia Sailaren produktua izaten jarraituko du. Blogeko aurkezpena (azalpena) eta titulua aldatzea hobesten da: adibidez, tituluaren kasuan, “Heterodoxia, ekonomiaz haratago”, “Heterodoxia, finantza ingeniaritza eta diru teoria modernoa”.

2. Datuak

Sarrerak, bisitak eta abar. Datu horiek guztiak UEUko Zuriñek eman dizkigu.

Esan bezala, bloga 2006an hasi zen.

Ez dakigu zenbat bisita egon ziren hasieratik (2006tik) 2009ra.

Dakiguna, Zuriñeri esker,

2009tik 2014.10.08 arte: 10.791 + 1.115 + 1604 = 13.510 bisita izan ditu blogak

Jakin behar duguna:

Zenbat bisita egon dira 700. sarreratik 800. sarrerara?

eta

Zenbat bisita egon dira 800. sarreratik 900. sarrerara?

eta

Zenbat bisita egon dira 900. sarreratik 1000. sarrerara?

Baita zenbat bisita egon dira 1000. sarreratik 1100. sarrerara ere?

Halaber, zenbat bisita egon dira 1100. sarreratik 1200. sarrerara?

Baita zenbat bisita egon dira 1200. sarreratik 1300. sarrerara ere?

Halaber,zenbat bisita egon dira 1300. sarreratik 1400. sarrerara ere?

Eta, zenbat bisita egon dira 1400. sarreratik 1500. sarrerara?

Gogoratzekoa:

1400. sarrera hauxe da:

http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2016/04/04/fidei-defensor/

1300. sarrera hauxe da: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2016/02/02/feminismoaz-hitz-bi/

1200 sarrera hauxe da: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/11/11/homage-to-catalonia-3/

1100. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/08/23/paul-krugman-eta-warren-mosler-zorrari-buruz/

1000. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/05/30/me-mmt-dtm-italieraz-13/

900. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/03/24/deutsche-bank-eta-w-mosler/

800. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2015/01/12/europak-plazebo-bat-eztabaidatzen-duen-bitartean/

700. sarrera hauxe zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2014/10/08/dtm-eta-eurogunea-berriz/

(Falta zaizkigun datuak jakingo ditugu Zuriñe lanera itzuliko denean, hurrengo irailen.)

Oharra: Beti cum mica salis hartu behar dira datuok, noski.

Segituko dugu lanean…

Zuen iruzkinen zain, mila esker.

Ez adiorik.

joseba

(josebafelix@outlook.es)


3 Aipatu bezala, 2006tik aurrera http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia webgunean azaldu dira emaitzak. 2006ko azaroan jadanik Finantza Kapitalismoa aipatu zen: http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2006/11/07/marx-hasiberrientzat/.

2006ko hasieratik 2009ko abendu arteko sarrera guztiak, eta lan gehiago erabili nituen Finantza Kapitalismoa izeneko liburua plazaratzeko (2011n): Finantza kapitalismoa. Mundu Globala (http://www.amazon.es/Finantza-Kapitalismoa-1-Mundu-Globala/dp/8493832987) eta Finantza kapitalismoa. Euskal Herrirako irtenbide ekonomikoa eta soziala (http://www.amazon.es/Finantza-Kapitalismoa-Herrirako-Irtenbide-Ekonomiko/dp/8493832995)

4 Hasiera on bat hauxe litzateke: Randall Wray-ren Money in Finance (http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_656.pdf).

6 Ikus http://www.unibertsitatea.net/blogak/heterodoxia/2013/01/27/diru-teoria-modernoa-eta-finantza-ingeniaritza/. Horretarako, beste lan batzuen artean, aipatutako blogeko sarrerak erabili nituen: hasi 2009ko abenduan eta 2013ko urtarrilean bukatu.

Spain is different

Artikulua: La irresponsabilidad fiscal1

(PSOE + PP)

En 2010 el Gobierno del Presidente Zapatero propuso una enmienda a la Constitución Española que modificaba su artículo 135. Fue aprobada con el apoyo del Partido Popular de forma urgente por las Cortes, hurtándose a la ciudadanía el debate sobre las consecuencias o la necesidad de tal reforma. En su nueva redacción, el artículo obliga al estado a mantener un déficit público estructural dentro de los márgenes establecidos por la Unión Europea.

(…)

Un límite tan bajo, de aplicarse en la práctica, llevaría a la economía española a una depresión perpetua. Sin una instancia federal europea con una capacidad de gasto significativa que pueda relevar a los estados nacionales de la responsabilidad de dirigir los ciclos económicos, le toca al gobierno español rellenar las brechas que periódicamente deja el sector privado en la demanda agregada.

(…)

La existencia de desempleo elevado es un síntoma de que el gasto agregado es demasiado pequeño. Si el sector privado no quiere gastar más entonces el desempleo es un síntoma de que el déficit fiscal es demasiado estrecho. El hecho de que el crecimiento económico experimentado en 2015 coincidiera con un incumplimiento flagrante del objetivo de déficit debería ser suficiente prueba empírica de cómo se ejecuta una política fiscal responsable. La histeria de déficit que se ha apoderado de las instituciones comunitarias y de gran parte de los dirigentes políticos en las últimas semanas se disfraza de política responsable.

Hori guztia ote da (PSOE + Podemos) `taldeak’ aldatuko duena?

Azken albisteak Euskal Paradisutik:

Madrilerako hauteskundeak, datorren ekainean:

EH Bildukoek: Otegik dio Espainiako Gorteetarako hauteskundeetara «irabaztera» doazela

… «estatu espainiarra demokratizatzeko ate txiki bat irekitzen bada» EH Bilduren bozak han izango dir[a]...”

EH Bildu estará ahí donde haya una posibilidad para lograr el cambio

Espainia demokratizatzeko.

Espainian cambio‘ lortzeko.

Galdera zuzenak:

Zer nolako ‘cambio’?

Zer nolako ‘demokrazia’ mota?

‘Kanbiatuko’ ote dute, ‘demokratizatuko’ ote dute Espainiako konstituzioaren 135. artikulua?

Hori ote da neokarlistek aldatu nahi dutena?


Grezia: erabateko desastrea (eta 3)

Sarrera: irakur Grezia: erabateko desastrea (1)1 eta Grezia: erabateko desastrea (2)2

Segida:

(3) Varoufakis (the big bluff) tarte garrantzitsu baterako desastrearen kapitaina

Varoufakis oso aipatua eta estimatua omen bide da Euskal Herrian. Hartu hemeroteka: badirudi ekonomialariak, politikariak, kazetariak eta progre guztiak haren alde egon direla (oraindik ere ote daude?)

Blog honetan askotan salatu dugu ezjakin eta bluff hori.

Guk baino hobeto ezagutzen dutenak, Bill Mitchell-ek, kasu, hitz gogorrak izan ditu bluff-erako:

Varoufakis, ezaguna3: Lo que Yanis dice hoy puede ser muy distinto de lo que dijo ayer”.

Varoufakis dela eta:4La seva croada actual per una nova Europa democràtica no treu cap a res.

Ikus, besteak beste, eta azkenak soilik aipatzearren:

Bill Mitchell Finantza Ministro(a)z ari

Varoufakis’ pipe dream (ezinezko ametsa)

Gauza bertsua Warren Mosler-ek: ikus gehiegi ez aipatzearren, ondoko linkak:

Warren Mosler eta A Modest Response

Varoufakis-en azken (aurreko) xelebrekeria

W. Mosler eta Y. Varoufakis

Warren Mosler eta Yanis Varoufakis

Eta bankugintzaz ikasteko, Greziari dagokionez, ikus ondoko lan eder hau, hirutan banatua:

Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (1)

Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (2)

Warren Mosler eta Skender Fani-ren arteko elkarrizketa Greziako bankuen itxieraz (eta 3)

Nahikoa eta sobera!

Artikulua: Why Varoufakis’ DiEM2025 is fighting the wrong fight5

Hona artikuluan azaltzen diren punturik nagusienak.

(i) Varoufakis dela eta:

(a) Zazpi hilabeteko bi frakzioen talka: Syriza-k boterea hartu zuenetik (2015eko ekainean) berorren kapitulaziora (zazpi hilabete beranduago)6

(b) Haren herrikideak eta lagunak, edo lagun ohiak dioena7

(c) Demokrazia Europan izenekoa, Varoufakis-en ospea eta 2015ean esandakoa errepikatzea8

(ii) Zer nolako erreformak?

(d) Europako parlamentua, alderdi politiko transnazionalak9

(e) Arazoak. Zergatik ez hasi maila nazionalean?10

(e) Estrategia berria: ebidentziarik gabekoa11

(f) Kontrakoa da egiazkoa12

(g) Neoliberalismoa nagusi13

(h) Gehi lege antisozialak, nonahi14

(iii) Ezkerraren TINA (There is no alternative)

(i) Nazio-estatuaren garrantzia15

Nation-states can pursue their own policies”

(j) Dani Rodrik eta Bill Mitchell: gogoratu Nazio-estatua ezina omen da16

(k) Is the nation state ‘finished’?17

(l) Bill Mitchel comes to the rescue18. Berriz, gogoratu Nazio-estatua ezina omen da

(m) Varoufakis eta sofismazko ideologia19

(n) Moneta jaulkitzaileko herrialdeak bere zeregina edukitzen segitzen du20

(iv) Zergatik ez eman lehentasuna maila nazionalari?

Internationalism never meant giving up on the national struggle. The contrary is true

(o) Borroka maila nazionalean21

(p) Varoufakis-ek ez du goian aipatutako guztia ikusten22

Aspaldian idatzi nuen moduan, greziarrek ez zuten merezi Varoufakis bezalako bluffa.

Zertan ari gara gu, EHkook?

Arren, aldatu dezagun errotik aldatu behar dena.

Utz dezagun betiko ideologia neoliberala (progreen eskutik hedatuz doana etengabe) edo/eta Varoufakis-en bezalako sofismak…

Defenda ditzagun nazio-estatuaren garrantzia eta moneta propioaren rola eta etorkizuna.

Bukatzeko, hona hemen sei (6) urrats garrantzitsu: Sei (6) urrats XXI mendean independentista izateko


6 Ingelesez: “This text deals with strategy, but strategy cannot be seen separate from people and their histories and actions. SYRIZA has always been an uneasy conglomerate of groups of many political persuasions, but ever since it came to power in January 2015, until its capitulation seven months later, two main fractions fought a fierce fight. On one side, there was the heterogeneous left, which wanted to make good on the electoral promise (the Thessaloniki program): there was going to be no austerity any longer, Greece would negotiate a debt write off and if the Troika pushed the country to the brink, the group advocated leaving the euro zone. The leadership, on the other side, also wanted to end austerity. But under no condition was it willing to exit the euro zone.”

7 Ingelesez: As Lapavitsas explains, the Syriza leadership convinced itself that if it rejected a new bailout, European lenders would buckle in the face of financial and political unrest. The mastermind of this strategy was Yanis Varoufakis. He negotiated with the lenders for more than six months. But Greece could not negotiate effectively without an alternative plan, including the possibility of exiting the euro zone. Creating its own liquidity was the only way to avoid the Troika’s headlock. That would be far from easy, of course, but at least it would have offered the option of standing up to the catastrophic bailout strategies. The Syriza leadership would have none of it.”

(See One year on, Syriza has sold its soul for power: http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jan/25/one-year-on-syriza-radicalism-power-euro-alexis-tsipras)

“‘SYRIZA failed,’ writes Lapavitsas, ‘not because austerity is invincible, nor because radical change is impossible, but because, disastrously, it was unwilling and unprepared to put up a direct challenge to the euro. Radical change and the abandonment of austerity in Europe require direct confrontation with the monetary union itself. For smaller countries this means preparing to exit, for core countries it means accepting decisive changes to dysfunctional monetary arrangements. This is the task ahead for the European left and the only positive lesson from the Syriza debacle.”(Ikus aurreko One year on, … gehi Lapavitsas Calls for Exit as the Only Strategy for Greek People: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=p5gojqrjhQo).

8 Ingelesez: “Today Varoufakis is back as the initiator of DiEM2025 (Democracy in Europe). The former Greek minister of finance enjoys a lot of credibility with the European left. Much of this credibility is based on the urban myth that the SYRIZA government put up a heroic fight with the undemocratic powers in Europe that showed no economic insight, no consideration to the fate of the Greek people and blatant disrespect for democracy.

The same discourse now is being propagated again. In 2015, there was ultimately ‘no choice’ for the Greek government than to accept the Troika’s conditions. Today, DiEM2025 wants to reform the EU institutions. There is, again, ‘no choice. A fight at the national level is impossible, the left has to unite all over Europe and fight the EU institutions head on. DiEM2025’s aim is ‘to democratise the EU in the knowledge that it will otherwise disintegrate at a terrible cost to all’ (see DiEM25:https://diem25.org/) Only two other ‘dreadful options’ remain: a retreat into the assumed antiquated ‘cocoon of the nation-state’ or ‘surrender’ to the European oligarchy. DiEM2025’s goal is ‘to convene a constitutional assembly where Europeans will deliberate on how to bring forward, by 2025, a fully fledged European democracy, featuring a ‘sovereign parliament’ that ‘respects national self-determination and shares power with national parliaments, regional assemblies and municipal councils’ (see DiEM25:https://diem25.org/). This is, as Varoufakis admits in The Independent, indeed ‘utopian.’ But, he continues, it is ‘a lot more realistic than trying to maintain the system as it is’ or ‘trying to leave.’ Whether you’re Greek or British, ‘escape’ is impossible (see Yanis Varoufakis: Europe is sliding back into the 1930s and we need a new movement: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/yanis-varoufakis-europe-is-sliding-back-into-the-1930s-we-need-a-new-movement-a6863311.html and “The UK should Stay in the EU to Fight Tooth and Nail against the EU’s Anti-democratic Institutions”. Yanis Varoufakis: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-uk-should-stay-in-the-eu-to-fight-tooth-and-nail-against-the-eus-anti-democratic-institutions-yanis-varoufakis/5509652?platform=hootsuite) Does this ring a bell?

9 Ingelesez: “DiEM2025’s ‘supra-national democracy’ system should rest on ‘a significantly empowered European parliament, which should be the sole initiator of European legislation’, alongside ‘a completely reformed executive branch, including a directly elected European president.’ This system would guarantee that the Commission would implement policies that are based on the will of the people. Everything must rest on the electoral results of new and truly transnational European parties” (see A Critique of Yanis Varoufakis’ Democracy In Europe Movement (DiEM25): https://www.socialeurope.eu/2016/02/a-critique-of-yanis-varoufakis-democracy-in-europe-movement-diem25/ and The DiEM25 manifesto: Democracy in Europe Movement 2025: https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/anthony-barnett/introduction-to-diem25-manifesto).

10 Ingelesez: “Some problems have to be noted here. To start with, the proposal assumes, bizarrely, that there is a causal link between empowerment of the parliament and political and ideological change. But why would this be the case? Will Europeans elect a more left leaning parliament once the  powers of this institution increase? How will this empowerment of the EP come about? The EP cannot do it itself, so much more is needed. Why concentrate upon the EP to begin with? Such a change can only come about when the power relations within the Commission and the two Councils change. Indeed, what is needed is a near complete overhaul of the European political institutions in globo. And this can only happen as a result of changes at the national level. Why then concentrate upon the supra-national level to start with?

11 Ingelesez: “DiEM2025 has a strategy (if you like) to achieve political change. The new European supra-national democracy needs to go in hand with the creation of a ‘post-national or supranational electorate’. But how would this work? As Thomas Fazi rightly notes, it is evident that for the great majority of ordinary European citizens linguistic barriers and cultural differences impair the opportunity for political participation at a supranational level (see A Critique of Yanis….) This may be obvious, but it is a real concern. Why do we need such parties? What can they achieve that others cannot? There is no shred of evidence that this would advance matters.”

12 Ingelesez: “The contrary is true. Further integration, even if accompanied by a strengthening of the parliament, is not equivalent to more popular control. Varoufakis naively assumes that an enhanced version of the European parliament would suffice for proper democratic control over the Union’s decisions. As Fazi rightly argues, this completely ignores the question of oligarchic capture (see A Critique of Yanis…). Research consistently shows that problems relating to lobbying are exacerbated at the supranational level. Transfers of sovereignty to international loci contribute to the weakening of popular control. These loci are, in general, physically, culturally and linguistically more distant from the general public than nationals one. And this leads to more oligarchic capture (see A Ctitique of Yanis…).”

13 Ingelesez: “… Austerity and reforms are being debated in parliaments until the minority votes against it and the majority approves it, perhaps with a lonely defector here and there. No national government in Europe fell as a consequence of the introduction of austerity measures. This shows that the problem is not exclusively located at the European level. Indeed, without the macabre obsession for ordoliberalism, monetarism, competitiveness, mercantilism and ‘structural reforms’ at the national level, the EU would be powerless to push this agenda.”

14 Ingelesez: “At the same time, as Wolfgang Kowalsky writes, social policy ambitions have been substantially lowered towards ILO standards that are well below current European minimum standards (see Understanding The European Union’s Facade Democracy: https://www.socialeurope.eu/2015/04/understanding-the-european-unions-facade-democracy/). This is, again, very bad. But look at what is happening at the national level. It is not different from what happens in France, the UK or Belgium or many countries where conservative governments (of whatever stripe or colour) implement (or try to implement) a plethora of anti-social laws.

Instead of this ‘façadism,’ as Kowalsky calls it (organising a ‘year of the EU citizen,’ etc.), there are a lot of initiatives that the EU could promote if it would be interested in democracy. It could, for example, make EU democracy real at the workplace and work towards industrial democracy – terms which are never to be found in any European policy document (the EP included). Instead, the institutions (the EP included) are now trying to intrude into national collective bargaining territory by setting limits on wage evolution – a clear strategy to destroy the autonomy of social partners (see Undertanding…). But this, again, is also taking place, in some form or another, in most European countries and so, again, this is a fight that has to be fought at the national level, not by transnational parties, but by social-democratic and democratic leftist parties.

15 Ingelesez: “DiEM’s TINA is much worse than its fallacious analysis of European institutions and their neglect of national power relations. There is nothing accidental about it. It is the logical result of their underlying diagnosis of what is wrong with the world: if nations have become powerless in the face of globalization, then it is indeed nonsensical to initiate a political fight at the level of the nation state. That is DiEM’s thesis. But the nation state has not become powerless in the face of globalization.

The thinking that DiEM2025 and many others promote is that the model of politics based on the nation state is ‘finished’ (Varoufakis). In Europe, nation-states gained ‘responsibility without power,’ while the supra-national level gained ‘power without responsibility.’ The sovereignty of national parliaments has been dissolved. Today, national electoral mandates are by design impossible to fullfil. Hence, reform of the European institutions (or more precisely, the EP), is the only remaining option. Varoufakis is far from the only one who sees it like this. According to Slavo Zizek, the lesson that the left has to learn from the ‘Syriza episode’ is that it is impossible to fight global capitalism in one country. According to Zizek, the ‘new Neo-Keynesian social democratic temptation’ that is momentarily in vogue in some quarters and that aims at putting up a fight at the level of the nation-state is but a smoke screen of the confused pseudo-left falling for nationalism and populism, entertaining the population with the illusion that they can make a difference (see At the same time, as Wolfgang Kowalsky writes, social policy ambitions have been substantially lowered towards ILO standards that are well below current European minimum standards (see Slavoj Žižek on DiEM25: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fFNJYpwv39s&ebc=ANyPxKqRbyyT93b3zEQUbZEqpRrJKQsiWNLRU58_C443ELrcu3NyhlnO0N7Kt145BVhgd2BkbZUBa7b7I_I2OgF94PoX2hx5HA). That is well put, but it is not true.”

16 Ingelesez: “How do they know this and why are they so sure? A couple of years ago, Dani Rodrik introduced what he calls ‘the political trilemma of the world economy’(…)

As Bill Mitchell rightly writes, it has been skillfully sold by all political forces everywhere. (…)

The truth is that we do not live in a completely globalised world, far from it. Ergo, nation-states can pursue their own policies. This conclusion is reached by all those who look into it (see The scope for progressive tax reform in the OECD countries: A macroeconomic perspective with a case study for Germany: http://www.boeckler.de/pdf/p_imk_wp_150_2015.pdf, for a study of Godar, Paetz and Truger on the scope for redistribution and growth policies at national level in the EU and Is Global Capitalism Eroding the State? for a literature overview)”

17 Ingelesez: “There is no evidence for DiEM’s TINA. Their thesis that capital became completely supra-national and that ‘we,’ in order to fight it and stand a chance, need to follow and bring the fight to the same supra-national level is incorrect. The ‘footloose’ character of capital will be fought at the national level which will in turn lead to international cooperation or it will not be fought. If capital did become completely footloose and the nation-state is ‘finished,’ why does Goldman-Sachs and others pay Hillary Clinton millions of dollars for speeches that have to remain secret? Why does the corporate lobby pumps billions into the regulatory institutions of countries, why are think thanks and marketing agencies that have no other goal than to skew the opinion of voters blossoming everywhere, why is the corporate sector so eager to buy up the media so that its ideological boundaries can be closely safeguarded? Is that because the nation state is ‘finished’?

18 Ingelesez: “As Bill Mitchell wrote on his blog…, ‘(t)he actual reality (is) that politicians still have legislative capacity to restrict economic activity across borders (…)

(see The impossibility theorem that beguiles the Left: http://bilbo.economicoutlook.net/blog/?p=32961)

And why is this not happening? One can accuse the right of many things, but not that they are right wing. They are what they are. But the same is not true for the left. As Bill Mitchell writes:

The problem is that the stupidity of the Left politicians has bought the myth that international economic integration is so advanced and inevitable …”

19 Ingelesez: “This, in a nutshell, is what happened during the last thirty or so years. It is not financialisation that broke social democracy’s back (as Varoufakis recently declared on Dutch television (see here)), but the fallacious ideology that nothing much can be done at all, that structural change is impossible, that the political struggle on the level of the nation state is over and that the only thing left to do is to manage the state in neoliberal vein, with some ‘social corrections’ here and there, corrections that prove completely insufficient, that is, at least, in so far that social democracy, as New Labour in the UK did under Blair, did not completely accept the neoliberal ideology about welfare scroungers etc. and made everything even worse for the unemployed and the poor than it already was.

20 Ingelesez: “The fact remains that it is possible for currency-issuing countries to follow their own economic policies – policies that have, among others, full employment as a goal. This is the real issue. It is not about the democratisation of institutions. It is not about the need for transnational European politics. It is not about anything that floats in the air, such a societal model which, as Varoufakis explains, is ‘at the same time libertarian, Marxist and Keynesian’ (see Yanis Varoufakis: Europe is sliding back into the 1930s and we need a new movement: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/yanis-varoufakis-europe-is-sliding-back-into-the-1930s-we-need-a-new-movement-a6863311.html and “The UK should Stay in the EU to Fight Tooth and Nail against the EU’s Anti-democratic Institutions”. Yanis Varoufakis: http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-uk-should-stay-in-the-eu-to-fight-tooth-and-nail-against-the-eus-anti-democratic-institutions-yanis-varoufakis/5509652?platform=hootsuite). What we need are leftist parties that are capable of winning national elections.”

21 Ingelesez: “If DiEM2025 wants to fight for ‘more democratic EU institutions,’ let them. But the more important fight will take place at the national level. Nothing can harm the European oligarchy more than countries dropping out of the EMU (or threaten to do so), re-adjusting, returning to growth and doing better than the dysfunctional, ultra-neoliberal euro zone. Everywhere in Europe, capital is setting up divides among fictitious ethnic and cultural fault lines to pursue a divide and conquer strategy vis-à-vis labour. The left has to fight this struggle on every possible scale. Internationalism never meant giving up on the national struggle. The contrary is true. This has absolutely nothing to do with nationalism. (…) This does not exclude international solidarity. On the contrary, it is a condition for such solidarity to exist. We need authentic social democratic parties that win elections nationally, send left-wing representatives to the European parliament, left-wing representatives to the Council and the Commission and Keynesians to the ECB. The fight for investment, recovery and against austerity and corporate lobbying has be to taken to the inside of these institutions. How will transnational political parties achieve this? It is on the national (and local) level that people relate to politics. It is there that the major strengths lie.”

22 Ingelesez: This is, of course, not how Varoufakis sees it. As he explained in the Independent, almost eight years after the outbreak of the financial crisis, unemployment in the EU is still at crisis levels, it is twice as high as in the US and the UK – ‘which are now reaching what economists consider ‘full employment.’’ To begin with, no one believes these statistics. There are millions of unemployed people in these countries. ‘If unemployment was still 10-11% in the UK or the US, the administration would have collapsed,’ Varoufakis tells the Independent (see Yanis Varoufakis: Europe is sliding back into the 1930s… see also Left Manifestos for Europe: Diem25 – Democracy in Europe Movement 2025, Yanis Varoufakis and Transforming the EU: https://tendancecoatesy.wordpress.com/2016/01/26/left-manifestos-for-europe-diem25-democracy-in-europe-movement-2025-and-transforming-the-eu/ and A New Manifesto For Europe!: http://klauskastner.blogspot.com.es/2016/01/a-new-manifesto-for-europe_19.html for critique). How does he know? Did Spain’s government, where unemployment is still over 20%, collapse? Did the Irish government collapse? Ireland’s main’s austerity party got re-elected and the old prime minister is back in power. No transnational party will change this. But decent, authentic and principled social democratic parties can, if they stand up.”

Grezia: erabateko desastrea (2)

Sarrera: irakur Grezia: erabateko desastrea (1)1

Segida:

(2) Desastre hutsa, totala

Grezia: tragedia hutsa besterik ez.

Artikulua: Europe’s liberal illusions shatter as Greek tragedy plays on2

Artikuluan aipatzen diren punturik garrantzitsuenak:

(a) Albistea: Greziak ez dauka dirurik3

(b) Aurreko albistea ez da 1915eko udari zegokion berria eta, okerturik, berriz argitaratu dena orain, 2016an4

(c) Afera sinplea da, erabat: Grezia, berriz ere, austeritate neurriak adostu behar ditu Europako Komisioarekin eta NMF-rekin (aka IMF), NMF-k oso argi dakienean zer nolako egoera txarra dagoen Grezian5

(d) Gainera, gehigarriak diren beste neurri kontingente batzuk eskatzen ari dira, just in case Grezia ez dela izango gai helburu fiskalak (mozketak!) betetzeko6

(e) Aipatutakoa ia ezinezkoa da, Grezia 2018rako aurrekontu superabitak (sic) lortu beharko dituelako, baita hurrengo urteetan ere7

Alegia: “Aliziaren ekonomia Lurralde Miragarrian8

(f) Badirudi Atenasko gobernuak ez dela jakitun aipatutakoaz, gainera, oso ahul dagoela, eta modu desesperatu batez ‘diru laguntza`’ behar duela, euroguneko paradisuan segitu ahal izateko9

Beraz, Tsipras egiten ari da joan den urtean egin zuen gauza bera. Denborekin jolasten ari da10.

Nahasteka korapilatzen ari da Europar Batasunean (EB)…

Alde batetik, Alemanian gertatzen ari dena errefuxiatuarekin, gero Angela Merkel eta Wolfgang Schäubl-en arteko gorabeherak, azken honek Mario Draghi-rekin dauzkan tira-birak direla eta11

Beste aldetik, Grezia EBn mantendu behar dute, zeren Britainia Handian Brexit delakoa hortxe bertan baitago, gori-gori12

Brusela eta Frankfurt ez dira aldatu, nahi eta Greziaren afera eta gero, Europako boto emaileak jakitun egon botoa edozeini emanda ere, EB barruan, horrek ez duela egingo inongo diferentziarik13.

EBko egoera beste edozein lekutako egoera baino txarragoa da bi arrazoi direla medio: alde batetik, bertan dagoen defizit politikoa dela eta, eta bestetik, bertan jarritako politika ekonomikoak ez-efektiboak eta onarpenik gabekoak izan direlako14.

Autoreak dioenez, horretaz aritzen gara gure hurrengo liburuan15. Ilusioak joan den uda arte iraun zuen16. Uda eta gero, Tsipras-ek aukera bat egin behar zuen17.

Segida eta bukaera:

(3) Varoufakis (the big bluff) tarte garrantzitsu baterako desastrearen kapitaina

Artikulua: Why Varoufakis’ DiEM2025 is fighting the wrong fight18

3 Ingelesez: “Greece is running out of money. The government in Athens is raiding the budgets of the health service and public utilities to pay salaries and pensions. Without fresh financial support it will struggle to make a debt payment due in July.”

4 Ez, izan ere, “No, this is not a piece from the summer of 2015 reprinted by mistake. Greece, after a spell out of the limelight, is back. Another summer of threats, brinkmanship and all-night summits looms.”

5 Ingelesez: The problem is a relatively simple one. Greece is bridling at the unrealistic demands of the European commission and the International Monetary Fund to agree to fresh austerity measures when, as the IMF itself accepts, hospitals are running out of syringes and buses don’t run because of a lack of spare parts.

Athens has already pushed through a package of austerity measures worth €5.4bn (£4.23bn) as the price of receiving an €86bn bailout agreed at the culmination of last summer’s protracted crisis and expected the deal to be finalised last October.”

6 Ingelesez: “Disbursements of the loan have been held up, however, because neither the commission or the IMF believe that Greece will make the promised savings. So they are demanding that Alexis Tsipras’s government legislate for additional “contingency measures” worth €3.6bn to be triggered in the event that Greece fails to meet its fiscal targets.”

7 Ingelesez: “This is almost inevitable, given that the target is for the country to run a primary budget surplus of 3.5% of gross domestic product by 2018 and in every year thereafter. This means that once Greece’s debt payments are excluded, tax receipts have to exceed public spending by 3.5% of GDP. The exceptionally onerous terms are supposed to whittle away Greece’s debt mountain, currently just shy of 200% of GDP.

8 Ingelesez: “If this all sounds like Alice in Wonderland economics, then that’s because it is. Greece is being set budgetary targets that the IMF knows are unrealistic and is being set up to fail. It will then be punished further for being unable to do what was impossible in the first place.

9 Ingelesez: “Predictably enough, the government in Athens is not especially taken with this idea. It has described the idea as outlandish and unconstitutional, but is in a weak position because it desperately needs the bailout loan and threw away its only real bargaining chip last year by making it clear that it would stay in the single currency whatever the price.

10 Ingelesez: “So Tsipras is doing what he did last year. He is playing for time, hopeful that by hanging tough and threatening another summer of chaos he can force Europe’s leaders to offer him a better deal – less onerous deficit reduction measures coupled with a decent slug of debt relief. For the time being though, the matter is being handled by the eurozone’s finance ministers, who want their full pound of flesh.”

11 Ingelesez: “The mood is especially unyielding in Germany, where Angela Merkel’s popularity has suffered as a result of her open door policy toward refugees. Faced with growing hostility, she has concluded that this is not the time to show any signs of weakness. She has sought to mollify German voters by giving her finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, a free hand to ratchet up his criticism of the stimulus policies Mario Draghi is pursuing at the European Central Bank, and by insisting that there should be no debt relief for Greece until Tsipras has done everything demanded of him.”

12 Ingelesez: “Merkel must pray that the lid can be kept on Greece until after 23 June, because it is hard to see how a repeat of last summer’s argy-bargy would help keep Britain inside the EU – rather more important to Germany in the long term than a few billion euros of debt relief.

The reason is that David Cameron can only win his referendum by securing the votes of non-Conservative supporters, for some of whom the handling of Greece exemplifies everything that is wrong with the EU – its lack of democracy, hyper-conservative economic agenda and insistence that the single currency is a great success when in fact it has proved to be a colossal failure.”

13 Ingelesez: “It has been (…) no change in Brussels and Frankfurt, where the officials responsible for the eurozone’s bone-headed policies carry on regardless. Voters across Europe have got the message from the way Greece’s opposition to austerity was crushed – you can vote for whoever you like, but it won’t make any difference.

14 Ingelesez: “The situation in the eurozone is worse, however, in part because the democratic deficit is so marked, in part because economic performance has been woeful and in part because there has been a dogged insistence on continuing with policies that have been both ineffective and unpopular.

15 Liburua: Europe isn’t working, by Larry Elliott and Dan Atkinson, Yale University Press: http://bookshop.theguardian.com/catalog/product/view/id/414560/.

16 Ingelesez: “As Dan Atkinson and I [Larry Elliot] argue in our forthcoming book about the failure of the single currency, Greece was the point where progressive illusions were shattered. Until last summer it was just about possible to believe in a cuddly European polity dedicated to higher living standards, full employment and more generous welfare states.

17 Ingelesez: “Then a gun was held to Greece’s head. Tsipras was faced with a choice. Ignore what the people want or see your banks go bust. This in a country which had seen the economy shrink by a quarter in five years. Difficult to spot what was awfully progressive about sucking spending power from an economy woefully short of demand. Then or now.”

Grezia: erabateko desastrea (1)

(1) Grezia: diru laguntza banku- eta korporazioetara joaten da

Who would have thought? Nork pentsatu izango zukeen?

Bill Mitchell-en artikulua: Greek bailout money goes to banks and corporations – who would have thought?1

Artikuluan aipaturiko punturik garrantzitsuenak:

(a) Grexit dela eta: Greziako inkestak2

(b) Langile alferrak (greziarrak ote?)3

Greek workers worked 2120 hours in 2008 while the German worker on average worked 1430 hours. The OECD average was 1764 hours.”

(c) Nora joan ziren Greziarako diru laguntzak?4

Only €9.7 billion actually went into the Greek fiscal balance as ‘stimulus’. That is less than 5 per cent of the total funds went to help the Greek economy recover.”

Greece_Bailout_Funds_Breakdown

(d) Nondik etorri ziren diru laguntzak5

(e) Nola erabili ziren lehengo bi diru laguntzak (ikus grafikoa)?6

(f) Autoreen ondorioak: irabaziak pribatizatu, galerak sozializatu7

The point is that Greece urgently needs (and has done so for the last 7 years) a major fiscal stimulus

(g) Mitchell-en ondorioak: puntako eskuinak, Syriza (neoliberalen alde) eta euroguneko munstroa8

Post Scriptum: Konparaketak

Konparatu, please, aurrean irakurritakoa Euskal Herrian gaur azaldu diren bi albisterekin:

(i) Greziarako akordioak desaktibatu du berehalako beste krisi baten arriskua

(ii) El Eurogrupo da luz verde a un nuevo desembolso de 10.300 millones para Grecia

Errealitatea (Mitchell-ek aurkeztu duena) eta gai berberari dagozkion EH-ko goiko bi albisteak bi mundu oso desberdinei dagozkie.

Hau dunk hau!

Segida:

(2) Desastre hutsa, totala

Artikulua: Europe’s liberal illusions shatter as Greek tragedy plays on9

(3) Varoufakis (the big bluff) tarte garrantzitsu baterako desastrearen kapitaina

Artikulua: Why Varoufakis’ DiEM2025 is fighting the wrong fight10

(Segituko du)


2 Ingelesez: “Earlier this week (May 23, 2016), the Greek public opinion polling agency – Public Issue – published its latest Political Barometer (No. 156) which reported on – Attitudes towards the European Union and the Euro. As at May 2015, the majority of Greeks polled did not believe that the EU has a future and a rising proportion now believe things would be better off in 1-2 years if Greece exited the euro and introduced its own currency (32 per cent as opposed to 18 per cent 6 months ago). Things are shifting. I also wonder what the next polls will say when the Greek people learn of the latest research that shows where all the Greek bailout money has gone? It is an appalling story really.”

3 Ingelesez: “Popular opinion, especially among the German population is that the Southern Europeans are to blame for their problems.

In the case of Greece, the view is that they cheated their way into the common currency, refuse to exert discipline on their public spending, refuse to pay taxes, and are lazy – prone to siesta.

Remember back in 2011 when the German Chancellor claimed at a CDU event that pensions and holidays were excessive in Greece (…)

For non-German reading readers – Merkel was attacking the early pension age and leave arrangements in Greece, Spain and Portugal.

This article is interesting – German public opinion is caught between scapegoating Greeks and love-bombing them.

But the ‘lazy southerners who do not work hard enough’ has been an on-going narrative for those who have tried to justify the vicious austerity that has keep the nation in depression for around 8 years already, with no end in sight.

For other evidence, please read these blogs:

1. Greek pension myths.

2. I wonder what they will do with the new building.

In the latter blog, I posted this graph, which comes from the OECD and shows comparative data on working hours.

Greek workers worked 2120 hours in 2008 while the German worker on average worked 1430 hours. The OECD average was 1764 hours.

(…)

So they are not that lazy (at least in relative terms). Portugal’s workers also work harder than Australia and a lot harder than the Germans. And spare the thought … even those lazy latino Spaniards work harder than the Germans!

4 Ingelesez: “The paper – Where did the Greek Bailout Money Go? – was written by the EMST researchers Jörg Rocholl and Axel Stahmer and makes for depressing reading.

The aim of the research was to trace “the flow of money for the different Greek bailout funds” and answer two questions:

1. Where did the money come from?

2. Where did the money go to?

The researchers produce this graph (Figure 1) which traces the first and second bailouts which taken together summed to €215.9 billion.

The breakdown is obvious – Only €9.7 billion actually went into the Greek fiscal balance as ‘stimulus’. That is less than 5 per cent of the total funds went to help the Greek economy recover.

It is no wonder it kept going backwards.” (Caveat: 1 bilioi = Europako mila milioi)

5 Ingelesez: “Of the €215.9 billion disbursed under the first two bailout programs, €183.9 billion came from the EU and the rest (€32 billion) came from the IMF.

The study does not trace the €86 billion that was promised under the third bailout in August 2015. However, they suggest that the “major part of the programme serves again to cover the debt repayment and interest payments to existing creditors, this time mainly the European Central Bank (ECB) and the IMF”.”

6 Ingelesez: “In relation to the first two bailouts, we also learn (see the graph above) that:

1. “€86.9 billion were used to repay maturing government debt”, which included €9.1 billion to the IMF.

2. “€52.3 billion were paid for interest on existing government debt”.

3. “€37.3 billion were paid to the … [Hellenic Financial Stability Fund]… HFSF” – which ,

4. “€29.7 billion were paid for the PSI” (Private Sector Involvement or the ‘haircut’ or the ‘default’). In other words, handouts “to allow and provide appropriate incentives for the Greek government debt restructuring in March 2012.”

THE HFSF was “created in July 2010 as a private legal entity to stabilize the Greek banking sector” and

The researchers also do some interesting calculations on the PSI component.

They show that after all the gymnastics:

the nominal gross debt relief resulting from the €107.1 billion haircut and from the €20.6 billion bond buyback programme was significantly reduced by the need to finance the HFSF and PSI payments of €37.3 billion and €34.6 billion, respectively. The overall debt burden only decreased €51.3 billion from 2011 to 2012

7 Ingelesez: “The authors conclude among other things that financial institutions (banks etc) went wild (incurred a lot of debt) as a result of the “rather low risk spreads on Greek government bonds before 2010” and were “helped in their investments by the fact that the regulation on investing in (Greek) sovereign debt was mild or non-existing.

European banks failed to have adequate capital to justify the lending they engaged in.

The study clearly shows that the bailout money was used to “transfer risks from private creditors to public creditors … [the] … money was used to repay the private creditors by taking on more debts that were taken by private creditors.

The old saying is apt: Privatise the gains, socialise the losses.

Now the Greek government (people) are in debt to the ECB and the IMF and the gluttonous European banks have been secured by the bailout funds.

The German daily newspaper Handelsblatt concluded (Source – Behind Paywall) that:

For six years Europe has tried in vain to put an end to the crisis in Greece through loans, and keeps demanding ever harder measures and reforms. The cause of the failure obviously lies less on the side of the Greek government and more on the planning of the bailout programs.

The point is that Greece urgently needs (and has done so for the last 7 years) a major fiscal stimulus. Piling up more debt obligations on the government and forcing it to cut net spending even further is counterproductive and extremely damaging.”

8 Ingelesez: “It has surprised me how long it has taken for the Greek people to begin to change their opinions about Europe and the Eurozone. The polling data is now revealing a strong trend towards favouring a return to their own currency and a lack of hope in the European Project.

Political developments across Europe are reflecting that this sentiment is not confined to Greece. The Austrian Presidential elections have altered the mainstream politics in that country which has nearly gone with a far right lunatic.

The European elites have created a monster which is steadily coming home to haunt them.

The problem for the Greeks is that the political party that might have steered them out of this mess – Syriza – has turned into a pack of surrender monkeys who now do the bidding for the neo-liberal elites (banks, corporations) and further undermine the prosperity of the Greek people.

The problem then is that parties like Golden Dawn become the vehicle to channel the anti-euro sentiment and merge it into other sentiments that are less than desirable.”

Islandiatik ateratako irakaspenak

In Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (eta 4), hauxe irakur daiteke:

Zer lortuko zuketen islandiarrek baldin eta goian aipaturiko DTM-ko proposamenak praktikan jarri izan balituzte?

Islandia herrialda txikia da.

Baina moneta subiranokoa izatea ez dagokio herrialdearen tamainari, DTM-koek erakutsi diguten moduan: ikus Herrialdearen tamaina, politika fiskala eta bankugintza berria.

Hona hemen, Randall Wray-k herrialde tamainaz dioena: Ekonomia mistoa eta gobernuaren tamaina: etsenplu bat.”

Joan den ostiralean, Busturiako hitzaldian (Hitzaldia Busturian), galderak eta moneta propioa zirela eta, Euskal Herriko tamainaz aritu ginen. Eta Axularrekin esateko, ekharri zuen solhasak, izan zen perpausa, etzuela, deusek ere hanbat kalte egiten arimako, eta ez gorputzeko ere, nola tamainaz eztabaidatzearen egitekoen geroko utzteak, egunetik egunera, biharretik biharrera luzatzeak.”

Jakina, Euskal Herria txikia da, ez Islandia bezain txikia.

Islandian, ikusi dugun bezala,

Islandiaren bilakaera, eurolandiatik at, eurotik kanpo, moneta propioa, krona erabiliz, honelakoa izan da: “… become one of Europe’s top performers in terms of growt.””

Hortaz?

Busturian esan eta goian aipatu bezala, afera ez dagokio tamainari, moneta propioari baizik. Eta horrekin batera Diru Teoria Modernoari, DTM-ri.

Euskal Herrian, eta nonahi!, ezin da inolako subiranotasun monetarioz hitz egin DTM-tik kanpo. DTM-z ulertu behar da, moneta propioa ongi eta zehazki erabili baino lehen: ikus Diru Teoria Modernoa hasiberrientzat.

Izatez, Stephanie Kelton-ek dioskunez, Diruari buruz pentsatzen duzuna okerra da!

Are gehiago, 2004an BERRIAn argitaratuta zegoen moduan (Euskoak, euroak eta abar…, https://es.scribd.com/doc/256157796/Euskoak-euroak-eta-abar),

erabat separatista den honek hamaika hitzaldi, prentsa-artikulu eta liburutan hitz egin du ogerlekoaz eta euskoaz (…) Balediko Euskal Herri independente baten diru nazional gisa, gutxienez 1993tik 2002ra, hau da, euroa benetan martxan jarri arte, diru nazional horren garrantziaz hamaika biderrez aritu izan naiz…

(H)ogerlekoa, euskoa,… berdin dio izenak, zeren hitzak polisemikoak baitira. Kontua kontzeptuari dagokio, ez izenari, eta kontzeptua hauxe da: moneta propioa.

Gehigarri gisa, ikus ondoko linkak:

Separatista? Bai, noski!

EH eta moneta propioa

O tempora, o mores!

Beraz, globalizazio honetan zer esan eta, bereziki, zer egin daiteke:

(i) Lehendabizi globalizazioa eta neoliberalismoa ez nahastea: Globalizazioa ala neoliberalismoa?

(ii) Geroago, nazio-estatua defendatzea:

Nazio-estatua ezina omen da

(iii) Azkenik, moneta propioa bultzatzea:

DTM lau eskematan (euroa eta lira) eta Ongi etorri euskoa!

Gure Etxeparek idatzi zuen bezala: Hitzak ari bira, dugun egina!

Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (eta 4)

Sarrera: ikus Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (3)1

Islandiari dagokion lehen artikuluan Mitchell-ek DTM-ko zenbait ezaugarri sakon gogoratu digu, blog honetan behin eta berriz ikusi eta aipatu ditugunak.

Bigarren artikuluan, ikusi dugun moduan, islandiarrek bankugintzan izan dituzten hutsuneak eta erabaki okerrak oso nabarmenak izan dira.

Okerrenaz, alta, hirugarren artikuluan jabetu gara. DTM-koek oso argi eta garbi adierazten duten bezala, bankugintzan bi transakzio oso ezberdinak bereizi behar dira: bertikalak eta horizontalak. Eta horretan islandiarrek kale egin dute.

Ikusiko dugun laugarren eta azken parte honetan, Islandiari DTM-koen proposamen zehatz eta sakonak proposatzen ditu Mitchell-ek.

Segi dezagun aurrera…

Segida:

Funtsezko erreforma behar da:

(a) Erabat funtsezkoa2

(b) Ideia berriak banku zentralaz, altxor publikoaz, bankuek jarduten dituzten erak eta moduak aldatuz3

(c) Bankuak aspaldian aritzen ziren eran ari behar izaten dira4

(d) FIRE-ko eragiketak eta espekulazioak alboratu behar dira5

(FIRE dela eta, ikus Fire: sua ote?; Fire: sua ote? Inflazioa, langabezia eta FIRE delakoa; Sua: fire ote? Burbuila finantzarioak eta Dena FIRE da.)

(e) Mosler-ek ere antzeko proposamenak egin zituen 2010ean6

Ikus Warren Mosler-ek bankugintzaz

Mitchell-en hitzez, “Once these changes were made (among others), then much of the concerns about financial instability arising from the banking sector would disappear.

Ondorioak:

(i) Islandian martxan egon den DSP delakoa ez da inongo modelorik sistema finantzario hobe baterako7

(ii) Erreforma funtsezkoagoak behar dira

Harrigarria bada ere, Islandia (mon amour) izeneko blog sarreran ikusi dugun legez, “mirakuluen (sic)” bidez edo Islandiaren bilakaera, eurolandiatik at, eurotik kanpo, moneta propioa, krona erabiliz, honelakoa izan da: “… become one of Europe’s top performers in terms of growt.”

Zer lortuko zuketen islandiarrek baldin eta goian aipaturiko DTM-ko proposamenak praktikan jarri izan balituzte?

Islandia herrialda txikia da.

Baina moneta subiranokoa izatea ez dagokio herrialdearen tamainari, DTM-koek erakutsi diguten moduan: ikus Herrialdearen tamaina, politika fiskala eta bankugintza berria.

Hona hemen, Randall Wray-k herrialde tamainaz dioena: Ekonomia mistoa eta gobernuaren tamaina: etsenplu bat.


2 Ingelesez: “Fundamental reform is required

Drawing lessons from the Icelandic bank collapse and the GFC generally, tells me that more fundamental approaches to financial market reform are required and that the problem is not related to the credit-creation capacity of the banks.

In September 2009, I wrote this blog – Operational design arising from modern monetary theory – which provided some ideas on such reforms.

I followed it up in October 2009 with this blog – Asset bubbles and the conduct of banks.”

3 Ingelesez: “The ideas can be distilled down to:

1. Government treasury and central bank operations should be brought under the “one roof” and the sham of central bank independence abandoned. Please read my blog – The sham of central bank independence – for more discussion on this point.

This aligns the major arms of macroeconomic policy making with the democratic responsibility and accountability.

2. All voluntary constraints on net spending and the institutional machinery that has arisen to implement these constraints, which have lead to unsustainable outcomes with the costs of the dysfunction being borne mainly by the less advantaged groups in the society, should be abandoned.

That is, I would recognise the differences and advantages that a government in a fiat monetary system has over one operating in a convertible currency system (Gold Standard) and create behaviours and institutions that allowed the the government to exploit those advantages to advance public purpose and generate full employment and environmental sustainability.

Specifically, I would stop issuing Treasury debt instruments – that is, stop public borrowing.

Such borrowing is unnecessary to support the net spending (deficits) given that the national government is not revenue-constrained and does not advance public purpose.

This would mean that the net spending would manifest as cumulative excess reserve balances at the central bank.

I would maintain that excess liquidity in the system and keep short-term interest rates at zero or just about. All adjustments to aggregate demand are better made using fiscal policy.

I would abandon all tax incentives, which push speculative behaviour in property markets.

3. Central bank lending to its member banks (those who have reserve accounts with the central bank) should never be constrained and should be priced at whatever the current rate for lending to banks is. By rejecting the “money multiplier” view of the world, we learn that commercial bank lending is not reserve-constrained.

Please read my blog – Lending is capital- not reserve-constrained – for more discussion on this point.

Also please read the following blogs – Building bank reserves will not expand credit and Building bank reserves is not inflationary – for further discussion.

The trick is to change the way the banks operate not restrict their capacity to be banks.

4 Ingelesez:

4. The only useful thing a bank should do is to facilitate a payments system and provide loans to credit-worthy customers.

Attention should always be focused on what is a reasonable credit risk. Banks should only be permitted to lend directly to borrowers. All loans would have to be shown and kept on their balance sheets.

This would stop all third-party commission deals which might involve banks acting as ‘brokers’ and on-selling loans or other financial assets for profit.

It is in this area of banking that the current financial crisis has emerged and it is costly and difficult to regulate. Banks should go back to what they were.

5. Banks should not be allowed to accept any financial asset as collateral to support loans. The collateral should be the estimated value of the income stream on the asset for which the loan is being advanced. This will force banks to appraise the credit risk more fully.

5 Ingelesez:

6. Banks should be prevented from having “off-balance sheet” assets, such as finance company arms which can evade regulation.

7. Banks should never be allowed to trade in credit default insurance. This is related to whom should price risk.

8. Banks should be restricted to the facilitation of loans and not engage in any other commercial activity.

9. Eliminate the vast majority of speculative trading in financial products by declaring them illegal. Almost all (around 97 per cent) of speculative activity in financial markets does nothing to advance public well-being. Financial market regulation should always be motivated by allowing activities that improve our collective lives and scrapping the rest.

By eliminating much of what we now call the FIRE industry, the life of the banker becomes much simpler and safer.

10. Make banks public institutions and make their non-profit mission to unambiguously pursue public benefit.

6 Mitchell-ek dioenez, On March 23, 2010, Warren Mosler wrote a similar article on the topic of banking reform Proposals for the Banking System. It is worth reading.”

7 Ingelesez: “There are many other points that could be made but these suffice to show that the SMS is not a model for a better financial system.”

Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (3)

Sarrera: ikus Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (1)1 eta Islandia eta DTM (Bill Mitchell-en eskutik) (2)2

Segida: Iceland’s Sovereign Money Proposal – Part 2

Lehen partean ikusitakoa3

Bigarren parte honetan ikusiko duguna4

Segida:

Diru Subiranoko Proposamena (DSP), akatsdun paradigmaren oinarriak:

(a) Iritzi okerra5

(b) DSP, laburtuz6

(c) Diru Sormenaren Komitea (DSK): markoa 7

(d) DSK bera: bankuak eta banku zentrala8

(e) Bankuak DSK delakoan9

(f) Espekulaziorako bidea10

(Segituko du)


3 Ingelesez: “In Part 1 [aurreko bi sarreretan], I briefly outlined the Sovereign Money System proposal (SMS) advanced by the Icelandic government as a way forward in banking reform. I also demonstrated that the banking collapse in Iceland in 2008 could hardly be seen as being caused by the banks having the capacity to create credit. Much more was in play including the fact that banks had stopped behaving as banks and were serving the doubtful aspirations of their owners rather than any notion of public purpose. While the Icelandic report claims that the commercial bank lending destabilised the growth cycle in Iceland the reality is that it was other factors that led to the explosion of their balance sheets. The money supply did expand faster than “was required to support economic growth” but that is because the financial system was deregulated and the banksters and fraudsters were allowed to serve their own interests and compromise the national interest. As we will see that sort of duplicity can be reigned in with appropriate structural regulation without scrapping the capacity of the private banks to create credit. “

4 Ingelesez: “In this Part 2, I consider some of the mechanics of the SMS and argue that essentially we cannot get away from the fact that a central bank always has to fully fund a monetary system. If it tries to restrict funds yet maintain private bank lending then recession would surely follow and interest rates would rise beyond the control of the central bank. I also provide some ideas on where more fundamental monetary system reform is currently needed.

5 Ingelesez: “The Sovereign Money Proposal – flawed paradigm underpinnings

The SMS report is written in the context of an erroneous belief that the national government is ‘financially constrained’.

We see that when it claims that:

By delegating the creation of money to private commercial banks, the Central Bank of Iceland, and thereby the state, foregoes considerable income that it would otherwise earn from creating new money to accommodate economic growth.

First, banks do not have to be profit-making if they are publicly-owned and motivated to serve the public interest.

Second, there is a curious anomaly in the proposal in that it appears to be okay for the private banks to leverage profits from the ‘money’ created by the state (more of which later) but not from credit. I fail to see why we should make that distinction.

Third, and more importantly (to ensure this discussion doesn’t hinge on the ownership status of the banks), a national government and its central bank does not need income in order to spend the currency of issue.

It is simply a nonsense to worry about ‘income lost’ when considering the operations of a currency-issuing government.

We also see it when the Report claims the government has to “guarantee bank deposits” under the current system. This is alleged to promote ‘moral hazard’ – risky lending. Again this is really a regulative matter of limiting what banks can do with the assets creates.

It makes much more sense to regulate the asset side of the bank rather than the liability side.

This should also mean that the government should ensure the banks observe their ‘public’ responsibilities to advance public interest. I would ensure that through public ownership.

But it can also be done within a private banking system just as easily through appropriate regulation (see later).

But, the ultimate point the Report makes here is that:

Should any one of them fail, the insurance fund will not suffice to bail out all depositors. In such circumstances, the government will have to step in with taxpayers’ money to guarantee deposits.

Please read my blogTaxpayers do not fund anything – for more discussion on this point.

The taxpayers use the government’s currency – they do not supply the spending capacity of the government.

A sovereign government is never revenue constrained because it is the monopoly issuer of the currency. The government is always capable of underwriting the deposits in the banking system.

In the case of a private bank failure, the government can always nationalise the bank, eliminate the shareholder interest (as recognition of the loss) and trade on as usual with all deposits intact.”

6 Ingelesez: “The Sovereign Money Proposal – in brief

The Sovereign Money System (SMS) proposed by the Icelandic report has several features, which are shared with longer-standing positive money type proposals. In the following quotes CBI refers to the Central Bank of Iceland but generalises to any central bank.

First, “money creation and the payments system is separate from the risky investing and lending of banks”. The “private banks do not create money” and “all money, whether physical or electronic, is created by the Central Bank.”

The SMS private bank remains a speculative institution, however. They would offer two types of accounts:

  • Transaction accounts – Individuals and firms will have “Transaction Accounts” held at the central bank with funds created by the central bank. Banks cannot invest these funds and there is no interest paid on them. They are not liabilities of the banks and therefore their status is independent of the viability of the bank administering them.

  • Investment accounts – Banks will create “Investment Accounts” for individuals and firms which can accept funds from the Transaction Accounts. If then invested they are like a fixed-term deposit.

The bank makes profits by levying fees on the administration of the Transaction Accounts and by taking speculative positions with funds lodged in the investment accounts. So it is clear, that a bank can become insolvent under this plan if its investment portfolio fails.

The Transaction Accounts are different to the current system in that the funds are not “backed by risk-bearing assets and can only be withdrawn as long as the bank correctly manages its small stock of liquidity”.

In a currency-issuing nation, however, there is no fundamental improvement. Depositors’ funds are safe irrespective if the government is of that will.

However, in the SMS, the depositor is unable to earn interest on their savings unless they expose the funds to risk via lodgements to bank Investment Accounts.

Individuals will have to pay the banks (fees) to lodge their savings in Transaction Accounts. There is no change there as most banks currently levy account keeping fees.

Second, while the “commercial banks will no longer create money, they will continue to administer payments services for customers and will make loans by acting as intermediaries between savers and borrowers”. The Investment Accounts serve this purpose.

The banks will compete for custom and offer interest to those who wish to transfer funds from their Transaction Accounts into risky Investent Accounts, which provide the banks with the funds to engage in speculative bets.

Should the bets fail, the depositor loses. There would be no guarantees on these funds.

The fixed-term nature of these funds means they are no able to be used “to pay or settle transactions through the payments system, meaning that they are unable to use Investment Account balances as a form of money.”

The difference between the SMS in this regard and the current system is that loans do not create new deposits in the SMS:

commercial bank lending in the Sovereign Money System does not increase the quantity of money in circulation; the act of making loans merely transfers pre-existing money from the bank’s Investment Pool to the borrower’s Transaction Account.

At first blush, a lot of people think that this means that bank lending becomes constrained and controlled by the central bank because the latter would determine the total pool of ‘money’ in the system.

But as we will see, the central bank would still be beholden to ‘fund’ the system through loans to the commercial banks should there be insufficient ‘money’ in the system at any point in time relative to the demand for loans from households, organisations, and firms.

7 Ingelesez: The Money Creation Committee (MCC)

A crucial part of the SMS proposal is that:

The power to create money will be held by the CBI while parliament will decide how any new money is allocated. The power to create money is thereby separated from the power to allocate new money.

So you immediately see that the conservative mistrust of elected democratic government persists in this proposal.

The SMS proposal says that:

Concerns exist that if governments are allowed to create money directly, they will get carried away and create excessive amounts of money to pay for vote-winning projects.

Under Sovereign Money, however, the government is not allowed to create money directly. The decision to create money would be made by a money creation committee, independent of government, on the basis of what is appropriate for the economy as a whole.

I do not support frameworks where key economic decisions are handed to an essentially unaccountable body which then constrain the Parliament we elect to be our agents.

This would continue the voluntary system of constraints (albeit change the type) that conservatives place on governments to hinder their capacity to generate full employment.

I find it odd that we design systems that undermine our collective well-being and punish individuals severely (via unemployment and the resulting poverty) because we don’t believe our governments will act honestly or competently.

There needs to be much more work done at the grass roots level to ensure our political processes are improved. The process of candidate selection needs to be improved and local communities should resist any central imposition of preferred candidates to act on their behalf.

I would argue that political funding should be publicly provided and no lobby group funding accepted. Major electoral reforms are needed to to eliminate the influence of lobby groups, to reduce the power of media concentration etc.”

8 Ingelesez: “Then we come to the Monetary Creation Committee.

The proposal says that:

Decisions on money creation will be taken by a committee that is independent of government and transparent in its decision-making, as is the current monetary policy committee.

So the central bank would increase the money supply in line with its inflation forecast and the target economic growth rate. So if they wanted to maintain inflation, say at 2 per cent per annum, and to support a 3 per cent real GDP growth rate, they would allow the money supply to expand at 5 per cent (which in theory would permit nominal GDP to grow at that rate).

I am told that complaining about the anti-democratic nature of this arrangement is moot given the current system has central bank boards determining monetary policy anyway.

However, the SMS extends that unaccountable technical expert syndrome further. The idea of independence is interesting in this regard.

The concept as used means it is not sensitive to the political process. But who would appoint the MCC? Further, like the current arrangements with central bank boards, fiscal advisory bodies (CBO in the US, OBR in the UK etc) the appointees are typically ideological warriors.

In the current system, there is no diversity of opinion or paradigm on these bodies. Straight-down the road neo-liberalism. Which means the decisions of the MCC will reflect the prevailing ideology of the day which is a different thing to promoting society well-being.

The fact that nations tolerate entrenched mass unemployment as a ruse to fight inflation, when superior inflation-fighting job creation strategies (for example, the Job Guarantee) are available indicates where the biases lie and who would bear the costs.

The MCC would likely, under current ruling ideology, promote a growth rate that was too low and adopt ‘cold turkey’ adjustment paths following the Friedmanesque “short sharp shock” approach.

It is also likely that cycles would intensify under this arrangement because if the economy was overheating somewhat (with inflation accelerating), the money supply would be restricted to reflect that.

It takes time to discipline an inflation cycle and real output changes much more quickly than the price dynamics.

What if the MCC made a mistake? The previous point would suggest that the MCC would be subjected to conservative biases in the current situation and restrict the money supply unnecessarily.

This is a different point to the usual criticism that the MCC would make errors as a result of ignorance (not enough information etc). The SMS proposal acknowledges that possibility but asserts that:

it would also hard to believe that a committee tasked with creating the proper amount of money for the economy would consistently create money to similar excess as the commercial banks have done in the past.

Unaccountable organisations such as the IMF have made massive errors costing billions and causing millions to lose their jobs in the past.

Policy mistakes are part of living in an uncertain world but if fiscal policy (including money creation) is in the hands of the government then as part of the democratic process we are able to punish the decision-maker who errs, should we choose to do so.

Arrangements (such as the SMS proposal) which divorce decision-making from political responsibility and accountability do not allow us to exercise that choice.

Perhaps a rule whereby the members of the MCC had to pay a significant fine if the unemployment rate strayed from it true full employment level would concentrate minds and improve accountability!

But then I would apply that rule to government ministers as well and leave the decision-making power in their hands.

The possibility that the MCC will make errors also leads to another aspect of the SMS proposal.

The Report says:

The concern has been raised that removing the banks ability to create money for lending may cause a reduction in availability of loans compared with the present system and the reformed system would be too constrained.

This is highly likely unless there is an additional source of money available.

And, to be sure, in the SMS proposal there is the capacity for the central bank to make loans to the private banks – that is, provide funds to allow the banks to extend credit “to meet demand for loans from creditworthy borrowers and businesses”.

At this point you will appreciate that nothing much changes then.

9 Ingelesez: “Banks can still get funds from the central bank without the need to first try to get funds from the wholesale or retail markets to ensure they can continue to create loans.

The central bank remains responsible for fully funding the system just as now.

The alternative is that the credit market would become tight and banks would be competing among themselves for depositors with the consequence being that the interest rate would rise.

In that sense, the central bank would lose control of its monetary policy target. By setting the quantity (money supply) it would be forced to allow the ‘price’ (interest rate) to go to whatever the market determined.

If the MCC underfunded the economy and a credit squeeze occurred, then rates would skyrocket and presumably stifle economic activity (to whatever extent total spending is sensitive to interest rate changes).

The alternative is as is the case now – the central bank provides the funds to ensure the rate remains at its target levels and the demand for liquidity in the economy is satisfied.

10 Ingelesez: “All the smoke and mirrors about stopping banks creating money falls aside as soon as we understand that the central bank always has to fund the monetary system or else face the fact that recession and financial instability would follow.

We also see that the SMS proposal still allows the private banks to leverage off the net financial assets (‘money’) created by the State and profit accordingly. So all the moralising about preventing the private banks from determining the allocation of credit should be seen for what it is.

Further, while the SMS proposal says that such loans to the banks will not be able to be on-lent to financial or property companies, it is naive to think that an individual or firm who borrows the funds will not engage in speculative behaviour themselves which are not in the public interest. Just as now.”