1) Greziari buruzko azken kezkak
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Greece Could Trigger a $9 Trillion Chain Reaction
Greek Defense Minister, Panos Kammenos holds strong under immense US pressure to turn against Russia
Greece has no more money to give the IMF. EU has money for Ukraine, but none for Greece
Over 60% of German and UK citizens polled believe Athens must pay back its entire debt
With Greece “Nowhere Close” To Deal, Depositors Pull €300 Million From Banks In Single Day
EU Official “Denies” Report Of “Greek Deal Pending” Rumor Which Sparked Stocks, Euro Surge
JPMorgan Warns Greece “Is Not Investable” As Germany Denies Any Deal Progress
Greece Owes $1.2 Billion To Drugmakers As Government Can No Longer Afford Basic Medical Supplies
Greece Feigned Deal Progress, Launched Rumors To Avert Bank Run
“The Greek Endgame Is Here”: Probability Of IMF Default Now 70%, Says Deutsche Bank
Thursday Humor: Greece Wins Contest To Design New Euro Coin
2) Greziako populazioa, inkestak, Grexit eta Syriza
Bill Mitchell-en artikulua: The incommensurate aims of the Greek people1
Hona hemen Mitchell-en artikuluan azaltzen diren puntu nagusiak:
i) Euroguneko eliteek badakite zertan ari diren eta haien politika kausatzen ari direneko kaos artean, pertsonalki, oso ongi ari dira egiten.
ii) Greziako jendea ezagutze nahasmena jasaten ari da, alde batetik esperientziatik eta bestetik mass mediaren erasotik. Azkenak modu oker batez aipatzen du Greziak eurogunea uzten baldin badu eta moneta subiranoa berrezarri, ondorio katastrofikoak egongo liratekeela.
iii) Greziako populazioaren helburuak neurrigabeak dira eta badirudi ez dagoela Grezian eztabaida sakon bat kontraesan hori argitzeko.
iv) Inkestek ez dute laguntzen2, kontraesanez beteta daudelako.
v) Onartuko diren erreformei buruz3, erantzunak ez dira oso garbiak ere.
vi) Grexit dela eta, gutxiengo batek onartzen du, eta hori zenbait baldintzarekin4.
Puntu batzuk oso argi daude:
a) Syriza aukeratua zen austeritatearekin amaitzeko5.
b) Eurogunea uzten ez badu, Troikarekin aritu behar du Syrizak6, EBZk zorra ezabatu dezakeelarik.
c) Syrizak ez du hezi bere jendea Grexit dela eta, beraren onuraz eta kalteaz. Eurogunearen logikaz, arauez eta egituraz ez dira jakitun greziarrak7.
d) Ondorioz, Greziako jendeak eurogunean segitu nahi du, eta ez du nahi austeritatearekin segitzea: kontraesanezko bi posizio.
Grexit delakoarekin katastrofismoa martxan jarri da. Azken eredua, The Guardian-eko artikulu hau: Greece would face dire consequences from a euro exit – as its people know8.
Katastrofe hipotesien aurka, hona hemen Mitchell-ek dioena:
1) Bankuen gordailuak ateratzea erraz saihestu daiteke nazionalizazioa dela medio eta gordailu bermatzearekin. Gobernuak berme horiek finantzatu ahalko lituzke, moneta jaulkitzeko ahalmenaren ondorioz9.
2) Moneta jaulkitzailea den gobernuaren ahalmenaren aurka10, nazioarteko diru merkatuak botere gabekoak dira.
3) Hyper inflazioaren mamua beti azalarazten dute11.
Mass mediaren erasoak direla eta, hona Mitchell-ek gogorapena:
“… the mainstream catastrophe viewpoint that ignores the opportunities that would be provided to the Eurozone states if they restored their own currency and took some heed of what Argentina was able to achieve when it ignored the warnings and threats of the IMF and the international bankers and restored its own sovereignty.”
Euroaz eta euroguneaz, argi diosku:
“There is nothing irrevocable about the euro or the Eurozone.”
“A Greek exit would … would immediately stimulate growth in Greece. From the minute the government reversed its penurious fiscal position, GDP growth in that nation would start to rise.”
Halaber, hazkundea areagotuko da,
“From the wages of those employed in the Job Guarantee, from their spending in local shops, and from the orders placed with construction companies to renew decaying infrastructure.”
Gezurra da bestela esatea12.
Europako eliteek nahi dute Greziak eurogunean segi dezala13.
Baina, Greziak eurogunea utziko badu, gezurrak azaleratuko dira14.
Beste alde batetik The Guardian-eko beste artikulu hau, Grexit: bookmakers put smart money on an unwise move, adierazgarria da, Greziak eurogunean segitzeko argudio ekonomikoei dagokienez.
“National output is down by a quarter in five years. The debt-to-GDP ratio is heading rapidly towards 200%. One in four people are unemployed and there is widespread poverty.”
Aipaturiko baldintza horiekin,
“Demands from Greece’s creditors for more austerity is, in these circumstances, inhumane and economically crass.”
Honela bukatzen du Mitchell-ek:
Horrek guztiak esan nahi du Syrizak segur aski zatituko dela liderrak Troikarekin hitzarmenak lortzeko joera daukala kontuan edukita, eta azkenean Syrizak frogatuko du bera akasdun esperimentua izan dela.
Ondorioz esan daiteke Syrizaren barruan zaila dela zein den euroren aldeko eta aurkako balantzea. Argi dagoena hauxe da, gaurko mugapen politikoekin ezin dela erabaki aukeratutako plataforman. Hortaz, zein da oinarri logikoa?
Egia da Europako eliteek Syriza bezalako jendea gorrotatzen dutela, eta ahaleginduko direla lurperatzeko.
Agian, hori dela eta, bluff hutsa den Yanis Varoufakis islatuagoa azaltzen da eta gidoitik at.
Gogoratu Varoufakis-en azken hau, Varoufakis refuses any bailout plan that would send Greece into ‘death spiral’:
“I wish we had the drachma, I wish we had never entered this monetary union.” (…) “And I think that deep down all member states with the eurozone would agree with that now. Because it was very badly constructed. But once you are in, you don’t get out without a catastrophe”.
Beraz, to be or nor to be? Drakma ala drama? Kapitulazioa ala Grexit?
Grexit-en aukeran, zeinek erabakiko du? Greziak, hauteskundeen bidez, ala Syrizak? Syrizako batzuek ala beste batzuek? Zatituko al da Syriza?
2 Honelako kontraesanak daude, ingelesez: “The respondents were also sure (mostly) that the Greek government would come to some sort of agreement with the Troika:
46% believe that there will be an agreement between the Greek government and lenders, 29% answered “probably yes”, 9% answered “no”, 10% answered “probably not”. Although a significant minority did not think that the process reflected what we might call “negotiations”: On the question whether the government has negotiated hard with Greece’s lenders 43% answered “yes”, whereas 29% said that the negotiation was “non-existent” … Another poll was reported on May 11, 2015 from enikos.gr which told us that – More than 85% of Greeks want to stay in Eurozone. Only “12.2% wish the opposite”. Further, contrary to the other poll: Nearly 75 (74.1%) of respondents think that Greece and its Euro partners will try to find a common ground and reach an agreement with mutual concessions, while just 20.6% thinks the opposite. And: More than 70% (71.9%) of respondents says the Greek government should make mutual concessions in order for Greece to remain in the Euro zone.”
1. 91.7 per cent of the respondents thought that the Greek government “should not accept an increase in VAT (Value-Added Tax) concerning basic commodities, 89.4% is against salary reductions and 85.8% against pension cuts”.
2. “More than 7 out of 10 of the respondents (75.2%) think the government should not accept the reduction of Social Solidarity Benefit for Pensioners (EKAS) or the reduction of the number of people who are receiving it.”
4 Ingelesez: “… despite the strong support for Syriza, only “21.3% of the respondents think the government should accept an agreement with our Euro partners only in case that such agreement includes all the demands of Syriza, even if that bring about a Grexit.” But interestingly “nearly 40% (39.1) would opt for Grexit and implementation of other policies” if the concesssions required involved further cuts in “salaries and pension and increase in taxation”.
So how does one make sense of that seemingly inconsistent set of majority preferences? It is clear that a significant minority understand that the only option if the ‘red-line’ is crossed is to exit. But still, a majority of Greeks do not want to accept or, perhaps, do not understand, that they – You can’t have your cake and eat it.”
5 Ingelesez: “Syriza was elected to stop austerity and it defined some sort of ‘red line’ beyond which it was unacceptable to cross. So there is a resonance of that in the opinion polls. The Greeks will tolerate cuts but not in certain areas.”
6 Ingelesez: “Unless it leaves the Eurozone, it has to strike a deal with the Troika (however it is named these days). Without the credible threat of exit, all the bargaining power is in the hands of the creditors. They appear more concerned with enforcing the austerity dogma than the possibility that the Greeks will not be able to meet their debt repayments.
After all, the ECB, which holds a significant portion of Greek’s public debt knows (but would not admit it) that it can just write the debt off without impeding its own operations. That is the capacity of the currency issuer.”
7 Ingelesez: “Syriza doesn’t have a credible threat because it has failed to educate the people of the costs and benefits of exit against on-going austerity. The logic of its electoral success was that it could march to Brussels and tell the elites that austerity was over and everyone would shake hands and that would be it. The logic of the Eurozone, however, the antithesis of fiscal activism, unless the activism is of the austerity bent. If they concede to Greece that austerity is damaging and there is an alternative, then the game is up for them. The whole structure and rules of the monetary union would be seen to have failed. So there is no way there will be significant concessions from the Troika.”
8 Hemen dator katastrofea: “An exit from the euro would lead to a run on the banks and the collapse of the Greek banking system. If Greece was shut out of international money markets, the temptation would be to meet the government deficit through printing money, leading to rapid inflation. People’s savings would be wiped out. And an effective devaluation might do little for Greece’s balance of payments anyway, except possibly through tourism. Poverty would become increasingly widespread.”
9 Truke tasak dela eta: “Then the question would be the conversion rate between the new currency deposits and the former Euro-denominated deposits. If the new currency depreciated significantly, then in the short-term there would be losses in the exchange. But we have seen it in Argentina and, more recently, Iceland, once the crisis is over, the exchange rate adjusts back and what were initially losses are reduced or even converted to gains. It is not an unambiguous disaster.”
10 Gobernuak “… can set yields through appropriate central bank intervention should it wish to (unnecessarily) continue issuing debt.
If the “international money markets” don’t like the yields on the bonds offered then the central bank can purchase all the tender each time. And, of course, such a government would not have to issue any debt at all. So it could fund domestic expenditure include a national Job Guarantee and infrastructure revitalisation to the limit of the available real resources. No one would surely suggest that there are no idle labour resources that could be brought back into productive use via appropriately targetted job creation policies.” Ikus Who is in charge?
11 Ingelesez: “… the hyperinflation bogey is always introduced when it becomes obvious that the ‘international financial markets’ scare is non-binding. Whenever governments increase their deficits, mainstream economists and their pawns in the financial media make claims about the likely inflation that they say will result. The large fiscal and monetary stimulus packages introduced by many governments to offset the GFC have not resulted in the predicted inflation. It isn’t the first time that the doomsayers have been proven wrong. When QE was first introduced in Japan in the 1990s, mainstream economists rushed to predict that the massive expansion in central bank reserves would be inflationary.”
12 Are gehiago, “… to the extent that the new currency depreciated somewhat (I don’t think it would much because it would be initially in short supply), exports would be boosted.”
13 Ingelesez: “The elites are desperate for Greece to remain in the Euro because it can never become a demonstration case of how bad the common union actually is. While it stays in the monetary union, it can be blamed for profligacy and the workers can be accused of being lazy or overindulgent, especially when spurious comparisons are put out with Germany.”
14 Ingelesez: “… once Greee leaves the Eurozone, then it will become obvious to all that the austerity lie is a lie. Greece would grow quite quickly from day one and demonstrate, just as Argentina did, the capacity of ones own currency.”