Italexit?

Dan Steinbock-en Italy at the Brink: From Renzi’s Referendum to Italexit?1

Aipatutako punturik garrantzitsuenak:

(a) Italia eta bankuen diru laguntza2

(b) Euro eszeptizismoa3

(c) Brexit-en eragin politikoa4

Brexit-en eragin ekonomikoa: Deus ez!

Gogoratu Hazkunde ekonomikoa txartuz doa, Brexit-en aldeko botoak ez dauka zerikusirik horrekin

(d) Italiako bankuen egoeraz5

DTM eta Italiako bankuez, gogoratu ondoko linkak:

Italiako banku krisiaz hitz bi (Mitchell-en eskutik)

Italia: euroa ala biziraupen ekonomikoa?

Post-Brexit: austeritatea eta defizit fiskalak gehi Italiako bankugintza

Warren Mosler-ek Italiako bankugintzaz

Italiako, Alemaniako… eta EB-ko bankuaz hitz bi

Segida:

(d) Renzi-ren afera: Italexit-erantz?6

(e) Post-Rentzi Italia?7

Dan Steinbock-ek honela bukatzen du bere artikulua: “After the Brexit threat, Brussels cannot afford Italexit.”

Alta, gogoratu ondoko link hauek:

Brexit: Europar Batasunarekiko euro ‘estandarraren’ bukaera

Italia, EB, euroa, Eurexit eta hori guztia…

Irtenbidea?

Ikus Litekeena ote hirugarren sektorea suspertzea Italian? DTM: analisia eta proposamenak


1 Ikus http://www.economonitor.com/blog/2016/08/italy-at-the-brink-from-renzis-referendum-to-italexit/.

2 Ingelesez: “Europe’s Summer of Discontent

In the aftermath of the Brexit tensions, Italy is defying Brussels to bail out troubled banks and preparing for constitutional referendum in October. If Prime Minister Matteo Renzi fails to achieve adequate support, economic destabilization will shift from the UK to Italy – which could pave way to the rise of anti-establishment left or right.“

3 Ingelesez: “Along with radical right, Euroskepticism has been on the rise in Italy as elsewhere in Europe. Until recently, Italy saw itself as part of an integrated Europe, but that was before the immigration crisis and continued economic stagnation – both of which are attributed to Prime Minister Renzi by Italy’s radical right and left.”

4 Ingelesez: “Whether you like it or not, the British people have chosen,” said Alessandro Di Battista, after the UK’s Brexit referendum. He is one of the leaders of opposition center-left 5-Star Movement (M5S), Italy’s second-most popular party. The Brexit will have a direct impact on more than 300,000 Italians who are official residents in the UK, and another 300,000 or more who work illegally in underpaid jobs. Any Brexit effect will also have repercussions on the Italian business, economy and markets, especially as the Milan bourse has become part of the London Stock Exchange.

The indirect impact of the Brexit will be broader. As far as major opposition leaders, such as Salvini and Di Battista, are concerned, the Brexit vote will pave way to Italy’s own referendum and – as they hope – Renzi’s defeat in October. In that case, Italian business lobby Confindustria has predicted “political chaos” in the euro core economy of 60 million people. In contrast, the M5S remains committed to EU but not to Renzi.

In the short-term, however, challenges will focus on Italian banks.”

5 Ingelesez: “Fragile banks, credit rating on review

In Italy, unease is increasing as Renzi is now willing to defy the EU and pump billions of euros into its troubled banking system. As the result of Italy’s three-year recession and a decade of stagnation, bad loans restrict the bank’s ability to lend, which, weakens government’s efforts at rejuvenation. To recapitalize Italy’s banks, Rome needs a waiver from European commission state-aid rules.

While German Chancellor Angela Merkel has rebuffed Renzi’s request, Berlin supports Rome’s efforts to clean up the banking system. Merkel knows only too well that if Brussels will penalize Italian banks, Rome might reject Renzi and she would have to rely on anti-system M5Sor radical right’s leaders in Italy.

Nonetheless, Italy’s banking threat has alarmed Europe’s regulators. Not so long ago, Brussels signed off some $170 billion worth of precautionary measures, which will help Italian banks with short-term liquidity challenges. However, it is the pressure on capital that’s the greater concern, as evidenced by new stress tests at the end of July. These concerns were particularly associated with Italy’s third-largest bank, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (BMPS), which has close ties with Renzi’s center-left Democratic Party (PD). While BMPS announced it had secured underwriters to back a turnaround, the stress tests found the bank to have the greatest challenge out of 51 of Europe’s top banks to cover its toxic loans in adverse economic conditions.

Recently, the rating agency DBRS placed Italy’s last “A” credit rating on review citing uncertainty over the October referendum. Understandably, the DBRS decision has irked both Renzi and the Economy Minister Pier Carlo Padoan. Currently, DBRS is only one of the four major agencies whose rating the European Central Bank (EBS) can still use to keep Italy in the top band for collateral requirements for its lending to banks.

A downgrade would bring Italy’s sovereign rating to BBB, which would raise the cost for Italian banks of using government bonds as collateral for ECB loans.”

6 Ingelesez: “Renzi’s rise and fall – or rise?

Renzi needs wins. In local elections last June, the PD was beaten in key municipalities by the M5S and center-right parties, including the NL. In Rome, Renzi’s candidate for mayor was defeated by M5S’s lawyer Virginia Raggi who ran on an anti-establishment platform, pledging to fight corruption. The message reverberated in Italy’s capital where Gianni Alemanno, mayor until 2013, remains on trial for corruption and the Mafia Capitale scandal confirmed organized crime’s foothold in municipal services. While Renzi acknowledged PD’s defeat, he refused to resign leadership in the party and has staked his political future on the constitutional referendum in October.

Italians are sympathetic to the idea of streamlining politics in the Eurozone’s third-largest economy in which a gridlocked legislature and unstable governments sustain a seemingly endless ping-pond between the two chambers of parliament. If Renzi loses his referendum, he will resign from the role of the prime minister and the PD’s leadership. That, in turn, would end the post-Berlusconi period of relative stability in Italy, while paving way to ‘Italexit’ – an Italian referendum on the EU.

(…) In reality, Renzi’s political capital could collapse in October, which would effectively nullify his reform program. In turn, the eclipse of Renzi’s reforms could herald Italy’s next sovereign downgrade, which could foster a perception about the ECB’s quantitative exhaustion.”

7 Ingelesez: A post-Renzi Italy

The 5-Star Movement, the Northern League, and the center-right opposition party Forza Italia strongly oppose the October referendum, which they call undemocratic and favorable to the incumbent PD.

(…)

Currently, the Eurosceptic M5S enjoys 30.6% support in polls, as against the ruling PD’s 29.8%, whereas the support of the far-right NL has declined to less than 13%. The M5S can no longer be ignored as anti-establishment voice founded by comedian Beppe Grillo. Almost every third Italian is behind it. Concurrently, Luigi Di Maio, the deputy speaker of the parliament, has become the most likely figure to lead the party at the next general election. While he remains critical of Brussels, he believes that the EU is now used as a scapegoat for the weaknesses of Italy’s domestic politics.

Renzi wants structural reforms, EU integration and US cooperation. Despite its Euroscepticism, the M5S supports EU membership, but also national referendum on the euro. Salvini wants political power, exit from the euro and Euro-skeptic cooperation with Russia. Whatever the outcome of the October referendum, it will be preceded by the Italian banking debacle.

In turn, both Brussels and Berlin know only too well that if they support Renzi too much, they risk losing the support of EU integrationists. But if they don’t support Renzi enough, they risk losing Italy.

After the Brexit threat, Brussels cannot afford Italexit.

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