QE, Europar Batasuna, inflazioa eta deflazioa…, Schäuble, progreak eta abar

A little bit of plain English and Basque1

Fact: The ECB’s quantitative easing has flushed the system with liquidity though Europe still has one foot in deflation.

Galdera: Likidezia eta deflazioa? Non ote dago inflazioa?

To all the ‘trendys’ (euskarazko ‘progreak’) of Europe, followers of Wolfgang Schäuble, including the Basque ones:

Warren Mosler-ek, 2011n: MMT to the ECB- you can’t inflate, even if you wanted to2

First things first:

  1. With the tools currently at their immediate disposal, including providing unlimited member bank liquidity, lowering the interbank rate, and buying euro national govt debt, the ECB has no chance of causing any monetary inflation, no matter how hard it might try.

(Eskuragarriak diren tresna guztiekin –mugagabeko banku likidezia, banku-arteko tasa jaistea, eta euroko gobernu nazionaleko zorra erostea-, EBZk ez dauka inongo aukerarik inflazioa sortzeko, gogor saiatu arren.)

2. There just are no known channels, direct or indirect, in theory or practice, that connects those policies to the real economy. (Note that this is not to say that removing bank liquidity and national govt credit support wouldn’t be catastrophic. (…))

(Ez dago inolako kanal ezagunik, zuzen edo zeharka, modu praktikoan zein teorikoan, politika horiek ekonomia errealari lotzeko. (Kontuan hartu honek ez duela esan nahi banku likidezia eta gobernu nazionaleko kreditu laguntza kentzea ez litzatekeela hondamendia izango.))

Second:

3. Lower rates sure doesn’t do the trick. Just look to Japan for going on two decades, the US going on 3 years, and the ECB’s low rate policies of recent years. There’s not a hint of monetary inflation/excess aggregate demand or inflationary currency weakness from low rates.

(Baxuagoko tasek ez dute lortzen. Begiratu Japoniari bi hamarkadetan, AEBri 3 urtetan, eta EBZren tasa baxuetako politikari azken urteotan. Ez dago tasa baxuetatik datorren inflazioko / gehiegizko eskari osoko edo moneta inflazionista ahultasuneko inolako aztarnarik. )

Third:

  1. If anything, seems to me the depressing effect on savers indicates low rates from the CB might even, ironically, promote deflation through the interest income channels, as the non govt sector is necessarily a net receiver of interest income when the govt is a net payer. (See Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sacks 2004 Fed paper on the fiscal effect of changes in interest rates3.)

(Ezer aipatzekotan, iruditzen zait, ironiaz, Banku Zentralaren tasa baxuek deflazioa sustatu lezakete, interes errentako bideen bitartez, zeren ez gobernuko sektorea baita interes errentako hartzaile netoa gobernua ordaintzaile netoa denean. (Ikus Bernanke, Reinhart, eta Sacks-en 2004ko lana, interes tasen aldaketak eragin fiskalaz.).)

Forth:

  1. And if what’s called quantitative easing was [were] inflationary, Japan would be hyperinflating by now, with the US not far behind. Nor is there any sign that the ECB’s buying of euro govt bonds has resulted in any kind of monetary inflation, as nothing but deflationary pressures continue to mount in that ongoing debt implosion. The reason there is no inflation from the ECB bond buying is because all it does is shift investor holdings from national govt debt to ECB balances, which changes nothing in the real economy.

(Eta QE inflazionista izango balitz, Japonia honezkero hyper inflazionatuta egongo litzateke, AEBak urrun ez egonik. Euroko gobernu bonoen EBZren erosketak ez du inongo inflaziorik sortu, ezer ere ez, deflazio presioak etengabe zor inplosioetan finkatzen segitzen duten heinean. EBZren bonoen erosketak aldatzen ditu inbertitzaileen jabetzak gobernu nazionaleko zorretik EBZko balantzeetara, zeinak ez baitu ezer aldatzen ekonomia errealean.)

Fifth:

6. Nor does bank liquidity provision have anything to do with monetary inflation, currency depreciation, or bank lending. As all monetary insiders know, bank lending is never reserve constrained. Constraints on banking come from regulation, including capital requirements and lending standards, and, of course credit worthy entities looking to borrow. With the ECB providing unlimited liquidity for the last several years, wouldn’t you think if there was going to be some kind of monetary problem it would have happened by now?

(Banku likideziaren hornitzeak ez dauka zerikusirik inflazioarekin, moneta depreziazioarekin, edo banku mailegatzearekin. Guztiok dakigunez, banku mailegatzea ez dute inoiz erreserbek mugatu. Bankugintzari buruzko mugak erregulaziotik datoz… Azken urteetan EBZk mugagabeko likidezia eskaini duenez, diru-arazo motaren bat egongo balitz, ez zenuke uste jadanik bera gertatu ahal izango lukeenik?)

Sixth:

  1. So the grand irony of the day is, that while there’s nothing the ECB can do to cause monetary inflation, even if it wanted to, the ECB, fearing inflation, holds back on the bond buying that would eliminate the national govt solvency risk but not halt the deflationary monetary forces currently in place.

    (Beraz, gaur egungo ironia ikaragarria ondokoa da: ez dagoenean ezer EBZk egin dezakeenik inflazioa sortzeko, nahiz eta horixe gura, EBZk, inflazioaren beldurrez, geldiarazten du bonoen erosketa, zeina gobernu nazionaleko solbentzia arriskua baztertuko lukeen, baina ez ditu beren tokian dauden indar deflazionistak geldiarazi.)

Seventh:

  1. So where does monetary inflation come from? Fiscal policy. The Weimar inflation was caused by deficit spending on the order of something like 50% of GDP to buy the foreign currencies demanded for war reparations. It was no surprise that selling that many German marks for foreign currencies in the market place drove the mark down as it did. In fact, when that policy finally ended, so did the inflation. And there was nothing the central bank could do with interest rates or buying and selling securities or anything else to stop the inflation caused by the massive deficit spending, just like today there is nothing the ECB can do to reverse the deflationary forces in place from the austerity measures.

(Beraz, nondik dator inflazioa? Politika fiskaletik. Weimar inflazioa defizit gastuak sortu zuen, Barne Produktu Gordinaren % 50 inguruan, atzerriko moneta erosteko, gerraren kalteak ordaintzeko eskatzen ziren monetak. Merkatuan atzerriko moneta lortzeko hainbeste alemaniar marko saltzeak markoa behera eraman zuen. Izan ere, politika hori amaitu zenean, inflazioa ere bukatu zen. Eta ez zegoen ezer banku zentralak interes-tasekin egin zezakeenik, edo tituluak salerosketarekin edo beste edozerekin inflazioa geldiarazteko, defizit gastu masiboak sorturiko inflazioa. Gaur ere, ez dago ezer EBZk egin dezakeenik deflazio indarrei austeritate neurrietatik ezeztatzeko.)

Eighth:

  1. So here we are, with the ECB demanding deflationary austerity from the member nations in return for the limited bond buying that has been sustaining some semblance of national govt solvency, not seeming to realize it can’t inflate with its monetary policy tools, even if it wanted to.

(Beraz, hemen gaude, EBZk kide diren herrialdeei austeritate deflaziogilea eskatzen, gobernu nazionaleko solbentzia dirudien bonoen erosketa mugatuaren trukean, konturatu gabe EBZk ezin duela inflazionatu bere politika monetarioko erremintekin, nahiz eta berak hori gura.)

Ninth:

Post script:

The only way the ECB could inflate would be to buy dollars or other fx4 outright, which it doesn’t do even when it might want a weaker euro, as ideologically they want the euro to be the reserve currency, and not themselves build fx reserves that give the appearance of the euro being backed by fx.

(EBZk puzten edo inflazionatu dezakeen modu bakarra dolarrak erostea izango litzateke edo beste fx bat, eta horrek ez du gauzatzen, nahiz eta euro ahulago bat gura, ideologikoki euroak erreserba moneta izatea nahi duten heinean, baina ez beraiek fx erreserbak pilatzea, euroa babestuta egongo delako itxura emango luketen fx erreserbak.)

The end. Bukaera.

Dakienak badaki, ez dakienak baleki!

(Zabaldu, arren)


 

1 Euskarazko bertsioa ez da itzulpena, laburpen txikia baizik.

3 Ikus Monetary Policy Alternatives at the Zero Bound: An Empirical Assessment, http://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6893868.pdf.

Iruzkinak (2)

Utzi erantzuna

Zure e-posta helbidea ez da argitaratuko. Beharrezko eremuak * markatuta daude